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ABSTRACT
The thesis argues that feminist approaches to international law provide relevant and necessary 
methods for understanding the limitations o f the international law on the use o f force. The primary 
argument is that justifications for violence made under international law replicate, at a conceptual 
level, the construction o f justifications for interpersonal violence within Western legal systems. 
Consequently, feminist legal theories that expose the sexed and gendered limitations o f interpersonal 
justifications help demonstrate the sexed and gendered contours o f international justifications for the 
use o f force.
In adopting a structural feminism methodology, the thesis examines the legal reasoning developed by 
states to justify the use o f force. In particular, the thesis offers critical insight into five types o f 
situations where force may be deployed: Security Council authorised force, Article 51 self-defence, 
self-determination, humanitarian intervention andjustifications for the use o f force under the ‘War on 
Terror
Recommendations for action are developed through the use o f a law as narrative technique that 
situates legal accounts within (as opposed to above or separate to) other social and cultural 
discourses. This includes the use o f women’s narratives o f violence that link the violence experienced 
by women in the private sphere o f with the public violence o f states and militaries. I  also demonstrate 
how the domestic analogy can be utilised to develop contours for reform through an analysis o f 
feminist accounts o f the limitations o f mandatory interventions into domestic (intimate partner) 
violence.
The thesis contributes to the literature on the international law on the use o f force with a detailed 
feminist response to justifications for the use o f force, as well as through strategies for reform that 
return to the foundational aspects o f the international legal regime, including the collective security 
structure. To this end the thesis argues Arendt’s political model o f natality offers the type o f 
foundation that future feminist and mainstream accounts must engage with to shift beyond the 
persistent dilemmas evidenced through the domestic analogy and the law as narrative techniques.
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His mother took him to her breast with the exhausted will that makes heroes o f most 
mothers. The fathers stood well away, taking a beer in the Ship Hotel. The century was old 
and weak, but the men spoke o f horses and taxes. A baby knows nothing, and Willie knew 
nothing, but he was like a scrap o f a song nonetheless, a point o f light in the sleety darkness, 
a beginning.
And all those boys o f Europe bom in those times, and thereabouts those times, Russian, 
French, Belgian, Serbian, Irish, English, Scottish, Welsh, Italian, Prussian, German, 
Austrian, Turkish -  and Canadian, Australian, American, Zulu, Gurkha, Cossack, and all 
the rest — their fate was written in a ferocious chapter in the book o f life, certainly. Those 
millions o f mothers and their millions o f gallons o f mothers ’ milk, millions o f instances o f 
small-talk and baby-talk, beatings and kisses, ganseys and shoes, piled up in history in great 
ruined heaps, with a loud and broken music, human stories told for nothing, for ashes, for 
death’s amusement, flung on the mighty scrapheap o f souls, all those million boys in all their 
humours to be milled by the mill-stones o f a coming war.
Sebastian Barry, A Long, Long Way, (London: Faber, 2005)
In cases o f politico-military genocide or other large-scale atrocities, it is generally men, 
particularly those o f a ‘battle age ’, who are most likely to be marked offfor selective killing
Throughout history and around the world today, the number o f women killed by key 
gendercidal institutions — female infanticide and foeticide, maternal mortality, and gendered 
deficits o f health care, education, and nutrition -  vastly exceeds the number o f women or 
men killed in politico-military gendercides.
Valchova and Biason(eds), Women in an Insecure World, (Geneva: Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces,2005)
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PREFACE
I am walking home with a friend and our children. We have just collected the children from 
pre-school. The babies recline, momentarily peaceful, in their buggies. My oldest child picks 
up a stick. My friend’s child follows suit but selects a larger stick and waves it around.
I ask my child to put the stick down. My friend turns to me, rolls her eyes and smiles as she 
says ‘boys will be boys’. My son places his stick on the ground while expressing his 
disapproval at my request. His friend throws his stick somewhat carelessly over his head. 
The stick hits one of the babies on the arm; the little one begins to cry. My friend’s son 
experiences the full wrath of parental rage and is humiliated and castigated in front of his 
friend, my son. The baby is, fortunately, unharmed. I am left contemplating the mixed 
messages we give our children, especially boys.
I raise my children under the motto, that no matter how bad, how upsetting, how dangerous, 
how humiliating or how threatening the act of another may seem their own violence is an 
inadequate means to solve a problem. I am proud of my three children who from a young 
age have, mostly, been able to use creative thinking or the presence of an authoritative 
power (parents, teachers) to resolve conflict with other children. I have no idea whether this 
makes them good boys. I hope it will help them become wonderful people.
Important to my reflections on and engagements with my children is my understanding of 
international law on the use of force. Like our household, the international law on the use of 
force rest on a simple prohibition against force.1 Unlike our household, international law 
allows for authorised force when a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression’ is deemed to have occurred.2 Furthermore, international jurisprudence suggests, 
in addition to authorised force, justifications for force -  especially self-defence -  are an
1 UN Charter, Article 2(4).
2 UN Charter, Articles 39-42; indeed to continue the analogy, if authorised force were permitted 
within my family this would entail the use of force by my partner or me to halt violations of the 
prohibition on violence. As a mother I find little merit in challenging children’s violence with greater 
violence and have experienced the frustrating long term consequences of such an approach in families 
around me; for a discussion of parental rights to use force to control their children, see: Durrant, A 
Generation Without Smacking: The Impact o f Sweden’s Ban on Physical Punishment, (Save the 
Children (UK), 2000).
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integral component of the laws on the use of force or jus ad bellum? In this thesis I present 
an analysis of the international law that permits the authorisation of force by the collective 
security structure and state arguments that seek to justify their unilateral use of force.
Some -  many -  would argue that the international law on the use of force has nothing to do 
with the private, everyday, domestic interactions I have with my children. Yet, much that I 
wish to question in this thesis is contained in my friend’s phrase, ‘boys will be boys’, a 
phrase uttered routinely by those around me in my domestic relationships. How will boys be 
boys unless we tell them? Why does ‘boys being boys’ usually entail the justification of 
violent, dangerous or aggressive play? How do these childish interactions shape men’s -  and 
women’s - perceptions of normal behaviour later in life? In this thesis I challenge the law on 
the use of force as both sexed and gendered through the repetition of sexed and gendered 
understandings of justified violence. To challenge the law on the use of force I use feminist 
understandings of the role of law in the production of sex and gender. I also develop two 
specific methods that emerge from these broader musings on the impact of sexed and 
gendered constructions on personhood.
Firstly, I use a domestic analogy: that is, an analogy between accounts of interpersonal 
violence and international justifications for violence to demonstrate the patriarchal 
underpinnings of the international laws on the use of force.4 Secondly, I regard law as a 
narrative, one telling among many with multiple potential meanings rather than as a source 
of objective and neutral “truth”. Consequently, in the process of looking at law’s narrative I 
look at many non-legal narratives to understand the impact of law. This is something Davies 
refers to as ‘Flat Law Theory’.5 To introduce the use of both the domestic analogy and law 
as narrative approaches in die thesis, I wish to draw on a further personal example.
3 See Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, 1958). International law distinguishes 
jus ad bellum (the law on the use of force) from jus in bello (the international humanitarian law of 
armed conflict), for a discussion of the origins of the terms, see Kolb, ‘Origin of the Twin Terms Jus 
ad Bellum and Jus in Bello', 320, International Review o f the Red Cross, (1997) 553.
4 That is, I look at Western criminal codes, particularly common law defences to homicide, as 
providing a model for international justifications for violence. While I acknowledge the distinctions 
between the two systems and the impact of other legal systems on the international, key to my 
argument is the influence Western national criminal defences has on Western scholars’ 
understandings of international justifications for the use of force. One of the clearest examples of the 
use of Western common law justifications as a model for establishing the normative credibility of the 
international can be found in Franck, Recourse to Force, (Cambridge, 2002), chapter 10.
5 Davies, ‘Feminism and Flat Law Theory’, Conference Presentation, ARHC Centre for Law, Gender 
and Sexuality Conference, Up Against the Nation States o f Feminist Legal Theory, June 2006, 
available online at:
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Like many women, when I am not tied to domestic endeavours, I am working away from 
home, in my case in the city of London. I often commute via train. On my return journey, I 
arrive at the local train station in the evening and must make a fifteen minute walk in the 
dark. It is a pleasant walk that passes a large park, playing fields, tennis courts, a secondary 
school, my son’s pre-school and a row of houses (of which my house is at the end). It should 
be an enjoyable walk. I know my partner makes that walk with headphones on, largely 
unaware of who is around him. In contrast, I turn off any music I might be listening to, place 
my mobile phone on automatic dial with my finger near the call button and grasp my keys in 
the other hand. I note who is walking ahead of me and at what speed. I listen for footsteps 
behind me. I double check the shadows in front of me. I am conscious of the gender, dress, 
and actions of any of my fellow walkers. I have never been attacked or approached while 
walking home at night but I am acutely aware that if I was attacked there would be some 
question as to why I was walking alone at night Most of my girlfriends would not make this 
same walk late at night, yet we live in a relatively safe, affluent and friendly London 
suburb.6 My point is that women live with the fear of potential violence and internalise a 
degree of responsibility for external threats (e.g. I shouldn’t walk out after dark). The threat 
is always gendered, that is, of men attacking, raping, harming or harassing, and, quite 
possibly, is largely unrealistic; women face a much greater threat from the men they choose 
to live with or grow up amongst. Every time I take this walk, in the dark, I am forced to 
recognise the relationship between gender and violence. I believe the relationship between 
constructions of justified violence and gender begins with the choices we make as we raise 
our children. As a society we generally accept that women live with the threat and fear of the 
potential violence of men.
As a legal scholar, I am well aware of the disparity between women’s response to the threat 
and existence of violence and what law regards as provocation defences. Provocation 
defences justify or mitigate actions that are in response to low level but persistent fears or 
threats. Put simply, men who are provoked to kill their nagging wives find their behaviour 
will usually be mitigated by law.7 Similarly, men who fear their partner’s sexual agency 
away from them and kill their partner as a result, or her assumed lover, often find their
http://www.kent.ac.uk/clgs/documents/nsfltPlenarv MDavies Flat%20Law 5iuly06.doc 
(last accessed May 2009).
6 For a similar discussion, see Morgan, The Demon Lover: the Roots o f Terrorism, (Piaktus, 2001,2nd 
Edition) at 15.
7 For a discussion of disparities in gender justice for intimate partner killings, see www.ifw.org.uk 
(last accessed May 2009).
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behaviour mitigated by law.8 I wonder why women walk every night in fear of an attack 
from an unknown man with little more than a can of pepper spray (or a key) to protect them 
while some men find it reasonable to attack and kill a woman they have loved. Why does 
law provide excuses and justifications for some behaviour and not promote the use of 
justified violence in others? I wonder about the role law plays in the social dialogues and 
norms that are co-opted into gendered realities. In fact, from a feminist perspective, much is 
written about the role of law in perpetuating and excusing (justifying) gender violence 
against women by men. I draw on this scholarship extensively throughout the thesis. 
However, my primary concern is not the gendering or sexing of justifications for individual 
violence but rather to ask whether this same biased structure flows onto Western 
constructions of justifications for violence at the international level.
I use feminist understandings of the limitations of national laws that prohibit and justify 
violence, to interrogate international justifications for inter-state violence. This is the 
domestic analogy. I also use non-legal sources to challenge the self-appointed role of law at 
the apex of social and cultural discourse. By using non-legal dialogues, I demonstrate the 
particularity of legal accounts, thus highlighting law as a narrative rather than as a series of 
objective truths and in a horizontal rather than vertical relationship with other normative 
structures.9 In the example above, my personal narrative would be meaningless in a formal 
legal analysis, which is not interested in the cultural phenomenon of gender fear and 
violence but in the regulative impact of, for example, anti-stalking legislation. The focus on 
law often overlooks the role of gender in stalking or in other forms of sexual harassment or 
violence. To understand the role of gender and law it is necessary to appreciate law’s role as 
a social and cultural narrative. This is to see law as a narrative.10
In this thesis I interrogate international law on force from a feminist perspective: focussing 
on the power of the Security Council to authorise the use of force and state justifications for 
the use of force on the territory of other states. My starting point is the question: how do
8 ibid
9 For example, I compare personal narratives of those experiencing the impact of force with those 
using force (chapters two, three, five). I use the narratives of women in nationalist movements in 
chapter four and throughout the thesis I draw on feminist scholarship outside of the legal academy to 
explore the narrowness of legal narratives. See chapter six for a discussion of the limitations of this 
approach.
1 See Thornton, ‘Introduction’ in Romancing the Tomes: Popular Culture, Law and Feminism 
(Cavendish, 2002); also see Buss, ‘Keeping Its Promise: Use of Force and the New Man of 
International Law’ in Bartholomew, Empire’s Law, (Pluto, 2006).
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justifications for individual violence and force -  challenged by feminist scholarship as sexed 
and gendered -  re-emerge in international justifications for the use of force? To answer this 
question, I take the law on the use of force and consider the narratives produced under the 
auspices of international law, exposing their sexed and gendered assumptions. My 
motivation is the justification I make to my sons when expressing my desire for an absence 
of force and violence in their lives.
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CHAPTER ONE
FEMINIST APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON THE USE OF FORCE
1. INTRODUCTION
In this thesis I assert that feminist approaches to international law expose significant 
limitations of the international law on the use of force. This claim is evidenced through 
viewing international regulation of the use of force alongside Western domestic legal 
regulation of interpersonal violence. I argue that many of the sexed and gendered contours of 
interpersonal justifications for violence are replicated in constructions of international 
justifications for violence.
By exposing this domestic analogy fundamental limitations of the international model are 
demonstrated, particularly die failure to see the use of force as a limited means of ensuring 
women’s security. Therefore, alongside asserting the relevance of the domestic analogy, the 
thesis argues that international law on the use of force, jus ad bellum, is limited by a central, 
gendered reality. This is that militaries, and military force, function through the production 
of gendered behaviour that is detrimental to women’s security. The relevance of a sex and 
gender analysis of the law on the use of force is apparent through the domestic analogy and 
through exposure of the impact of military behaviour on women’s lives. The thesis asserts 
that by exposing the role of sex and gender in the international law on the use of force 
feminist approaches demand a rethinking of the assumptions that inform international law, 
generally, and international law on the use of force, specifically.
In addition to the domestic analogy, I use a method of feminist engagement that perceives 
law as a narrative to allow for the possibility of alternative narratives and as a means to
15
analyse dominant narratives. Narrative can be defined as ‘a way of organising events to 
make a coherent story that ideally contains a beginning, middle and end’.1 As a way of 
describing law, not only does a narrative method challenge the assumed objectivity and 
neutrality of law, a law as narrative technique also allows legal developments to be 
contextualised within existing and past legal pronouncements. The range of state and 
scholarly articulations of the self-defence justification in the UN era demonstrate the value 
of this approach.2 International self-defence law viewed as a narrative as opposed to a 
neutral or objective standard can thus be exposed as dependent on specific assumptions and 
as developing over time. Viewing international self-defence laws (or any other component of 
the law on the use of force), as specific narratives, embedded in time and place, also allows 
for the inclusion of alternative narratives to explain events and to develop new legal 
narratives.
The thesis makes claims directed at feminist legal theories and at international law on the 
use of force. For feminist legal theories, the thesis argues a re-examination of the 
foundations of feminist approaches to international law is required. While feminist studies of 
international law contribute an important critique of the contemporary contours of 
international law,3 analysis of the norms regulating force and responses to the underlying 
question of when force is justified are limited. The thesis reveals that this absence is 
reflective of a larger silence from feminist legal theories on the relationship between law and 
violence. I argue that Arendt’s model of natality as a political framework, that is a focus on 
creativity through a central focus on birth rather than mortality, is useful to feminist politics 
seeking to disrupt the law and violence relationship.4 This larger claim is buttressed by 
recognition throughout the thesis that the law and violence relationship is further 
supplemented by social constructions of gender. In exposing the relationship between law, 
gender and violence I advocate the necessity of restricting justifications for the use of force 
and for limiting the authorisation of force by the Security Council. The thesis argues that
1 Kim, ‘The Rhetoric of Self-defense’, 14, Berkeley Journal o f Criminal Law, 2008 (forthcoming) 
available online at: http://Dapers.ssm.com/sol3/Dapers.cfm7abstract id=l 288142 (last accessed May 
2009).
2 This is discussed in chapter three.
3 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries o f International Law: a Feminist Analysis, (Manchester, 
2000); also see: Engle, ‘International Human Rights and Feminisms: When Discourses Keep 
Meeting’ in Buss and Manji (eds), International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005) at 
47, which offers a critical review of Charlesworth and Chinkin’s body of work.
4 Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago, 1998,2nd Edition), at 9; also see, Jantzen, Foundations o f 
Violence, (Routledge, 2004), chapter 4 and at 6 where she writes, ‘ . . .  in the West’s obsession with 
death and mortality, our natality has been largely ignored. Yet it is in birth, in natality, that newness 
enters the world; and it is in the fact of new life that every other form of freedom and creativity is 
grounded.’
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justifications for force and the authorisation of force are conceptually tarred by the use of 
military structures. Alternative means of peace enforcement are consequently devalued and 
under-utilised within the collective security regime. Feminist action within the security 
structure must develop a fundamental re-engagement with the very concept of security and 
potential solutions to security concerns so as to provide answers that do not revolve around 
the deployment of further force.
The claims of the diesis directed at international law recognise recent responses to curb the 
sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse of women during armed conflict.5 
However, the thesis argues that, without recognition of the sexed and gendered bias of the 
international legal structure itself, recent collective security developments are unable to 
move beyond the force — counter force paradigm that assumes that the use of force, when 
legal, can also be rational and controlled. Viewing the use of force through the experiences 
and narratives of women illustrates how the use of force perpetuates and exacerbates 
insecurity in women’s lives.
In this chapter, Part Two introduces the project through discussion of feminist approaches to 
international law and the methodology developed: specifically the terms sex and gender, the 
use of the domestic analogy and the use of the law as narrative technique to explain how 
they are deployed throughout the text. Part Three will introduce the international law on the 
use of force, or jus ad bellum, highlighting the features of the law on the use of force that are 
interrogated in the thesis, and outlines the structure and conclusions of the thesis.
2. FEMINIST LEGAL METHODS
The thesis, while situating itself within feminist approaches to international law generally,6 
consciously develops three interrelated feminist methods: the use of sex/ gender as 
categories for the interrogation of law, the domestic analogy and law as narrative techniques. 
Feminist approaches to international law do not, however, represent a uniform
5 See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 25* September 2008, S/2008/622.
6 For an introduction to the contours of feminist legal theories see: Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 
‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, 85, AJIL (1991) 631; Charlesworth and Chinkin, above 
note 3, at 38-52; Buss and Manji (eds), above note 3; Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in 
International Law', 93, American Journal o f International Law, (1999), 379.
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methodological approach. Different strands of feminist legal theories emerge within the 
international project and it is from within these broader feminist dialogues -  found across 
feminist approaches to international law, feminist legal theories and feminist theories 
generally -  that I have developed the unique approach of the thesis. In this sense the thesis is 
mindful of tensions within and across feminist legal theories (and their international 
counterparts) while seeking to make productive use of developments drawn from dialogues 
across the range of feminist approaches.7 Despite this the thesis situates itself as a form of 
Western feminist legal theory and is primarily influenced by mainstream, Western feminist 
debates. Furthermore, the thesis can be described as a form of structural bias feminism due 
to the attention given to the underlying structures of international law and the contention that 
these are sexed and gendered.
The use of the domestic analogy in the thesis, when developed within a law as narrative 
technique, presents itself as attentive to the limitations of Western feminist approaches and 
is mindful of the role of international law on the use of force as a narrative of empowerment 
within my own culture/s.8 The thesis draws considerably on Western feminist legal 
knowledge rather than projecting the conclusions of the thesis on to the realities, or assumed 
realities, of non-Westem women’s lives. Consequently, the conclusions of the thesis are 
directed at Western theories and approaches to international law, including Western feminist 
approaches to international law. The thesis rejects feminist legal theories that propose an 
essential female experience as the ethical platform for feminism9 and seeks to respond to the 
criticisms of Western feminist legal theories as essentialist10 through the development of a 
method directed at Western feminist accounts.
Strands of feminist approaches within international law include structural bias feminisms, 
third world feminisms, post-colonial feminisms and structural bias instrumentalism.11 The 
thesis, while attentive to the work of third world feminisms, post-colonial feminisms and 
postmodern feminisms situates itself within structural bias feminist approaches. This is the
7 For example, see the discussion of Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women’ in 
Knop (ed), Gender and Human Rights, (Oxford, 2004).
8 See, for example, the discussion of methodological choices in: Murphy, ‘Feminism Here and 
Feminism There: Law, Theory and Choice’, in Buss and Manji (eds), above note 3, at 81.
9 For example, cultural feminist accounts see: Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics o f 
Peace, (Beacon, 1995).
10 For example, Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics o f Postcolonialism, (Routledge,
2005), chapter 4.
11 Engle, above note 3.
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label given to the approach developed by Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright in 1991.12 
Structural bias feminism argues that international law has persistent structural flaws that are 
sexed and gendered.
Charlesworth and Chinkin’s book The Boundaries o f International Law presents a 
comprehensive development of structural bias feminism as a method applied to the tenets of 
international law. Charlesworth and Chinkin argue that international law is ‘ intertwined with 
a gendered and sexed subjectivity and reinforces a system of male symbols’.13 In relation to 
the law on the use of force, Charlesworth and Chinkin conclude, ‘peace is not achieved until 
states take seriously their internal obligations to ensure freedom from violence at home, 
within the community or committed by state agents’.14 In this thesis, this contention is 
extended to include the need to recognise the structural biases that permeate the production 
of lawful justifications for violence. Furthermore, the thesis contends that the collective 
security system of authorising force produces, rather than reduces, gendered harms.
Structural bias feminism has not emerged without criticism; internally from feminist legal 
theorists and externally from international legal scholars. Internal feminist critiques centre 
on three broader tensions present in feminist legal theories: the ongoing engagement with the 
critique of essentialism,15 the tension between theory and practice, and the representation of 
women under feminism as victims rather than agents. External, non-feminist criticisms, 
centre on the underlying political project of feminist theoiy arguing that this is 
misrepresentative through its potentially partial perspective16 or due to an incipient 
utopianism that is unrealisable in the international arena.17 In constructing the methods of the 
project I have used the internal criticisms of feminist legal approaches as a means to 
introduce tensions, or dialogues, that require navigation rather than circumvention and thus 
reflect on the impact of essentialism debates, the theoiy/practice nexus and constructions of 
victim and agency. In response to the external criticisms, that feminism presents a partial
12 Above note 6.
13 Above note 3, at 22.
14 Ibid., at 273.
15 See: Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theories,* 42, Stanford Law Review, (1990), 
581 describing gender essentialism as: ‘the notion that a unitary, "essential'' women's experience can 
be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of 
experience’ at 585.
16 Preston and Ahrens, ‘United Nations Convention Documents in Light of Feminist Theoiy’ 8 
Michigan Journal o f Gender and Law, (2001) 1.
17 Koskennienmi, ‘Book Review of Dallmeyer, Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law 
89, AJIL, (1995) 227, at 230.
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perspective that is ultimately limited by its underlying idealism, I argue that as a partial 
perspective feminist legal theories offer no more a partial account than the current status quo 
of law. In fact, through the incorporation of multiple women’s voices and multiple feminist 
perspectives to develop strategies for the reform of law, feminist legal theories are 
significantly less partial/ biased than contemporary conceptions of the international legal 
model largely confined to the parameters of legal liberalism developed in Western 
patriarchal histories. In response to the criticism that constructing feminist utopias is of 
limited practical value I follow the methods elaborated by Lacey, that feminist movement 
between critique, utopia and reform constructs ‘[ujtopias [that] cannot be reached: rather 
they provide horizons towards which we attempt to move’.18
2.1 Sex and Gender
Although feminist projects vary immensely, the unifying political and ethical assumption of 
all feminist legal theories and methods is that sex or gender, or both, are social discourses 
that are important to understanding and explaining legal structures and relationships.19 I 
regard sex as a reference to the bodily, or biological, distinction between female and male 
body types. I consider gender as the social and cultural consequences o f sex difference. In 
line with contemporary feminist approaches to international law,20 the thesis further asserts 
that categories of sex difference are themselves socially dependent, projecting a socially 
situated theory of the body on to conceptions of maleness and femaleness.21
In applying these discursive distinctions to the law on the use of force, I regard sex as a 
category of assumptions projected onto legal subjects and accepted legal categories. I argue
18 Above note 7, at 46.
19 See the discussion of Bartlett, ‘Cracking Foundations as Feminist Method’, 8(1), American 
University Journal o f Gender, Social Policy and the Law, (2000), 31, at 34. However, note Engle’s 
suggestion that structural bias feminisms have not adequately addressed the ‘feminist’ question. I read 
Engle’s work as inferring a failure to commit to an ethical project in structural bias feminist 
approaches, see: Engle, above note 3, at 47.
20 See the discussion in Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 3, at 3-4.
21 Naffine and Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject o f Law, (LBC, 1997); others suggest the distinction 
between sex and gender is unnecessary because: ‘No universal biological essence of “sex” exists, but 
rather a complex system of potentials that are activated by various internal and external influences. I 
see no useful border separating “sex” and “gender” as conventionally used. I therefore use “gender” to 
cover masculine and feminine roles and bodies alike, in all their aspects, including the (biological and 
cultural) structures, dynamics, roles, and scripts associated with each gender group. I reserve the word 
“sex” for sexual behaviours (recognizing that there is no precise dividing line here either)’. Goldstein, 
War and Gender, (Cambridge: 2003) at 2. The analytical separation of sex and gender does not, in 
this project, assume an essential biological category of sex, rather I regard sex as a category assumed 
to be derived through biology but in fact constructed through language and social discourse; for a 
parallel approach, see Kinsella, ‘Gendering Grotius’, 34 (2), Political Theory, (2006).
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that in liberal legal structures dominant cultural and social expectations about the ‘normal’ 
legal subject specifically project masculine characteristics on to an assumed pre-legal 
subject. The consequence is an almost invisible sexing of the legal subject within liberal 
discourse. Feminist sexing projects work to expose the assumed sex of the legal subject, 
identifying what is included with categories of ‘normalness’ and what is excluded. For 
example, the perception of the state as an entity defined through territorial integrity and 
political independence incorporates into international law an international legal subject that 
parallels the bounded male body of Western liberal states.22 Charlesworth has demonstrated 
how the state, as the primary international legal subject, is imbued with sexed assumptions 
that project a masculine version of legal subjectivity onto the international legal subject.23
The development of a method that draws upon theories of the sexed subject reflects earlier 
feminist analysis of the role of liberal binaries or dualisms in Western legal discourse, 
including the mind/body split.24 Feminist legal theories critique the priority given to the 
mind (rational, male actor) over the body (irrational, female object). Consequently, law is 
described as functioning to ignore the corporeality of subjects. However, in a seminal 
account of the sexing project, Naffine exposes how the body of the legal person/ subject, 
although ostensibly absent, is endowed with masculine characteristics. The silence of law on 
bodies thus constructs both the normal (bounded, male) body and the abnormal (fluid, 
female) body. Bringing this knowledge to international law requires analysis of how the 
state, as the primary international legal subject is assumed to parallel the bounded male 
subject of liberal discourse, as well as mapping the areas where the analogy is not 
developed.25 In this sense the domestic analogy is a useful tool for identifying the sex of the 
legal subject, as it does not assume the sex of the legal subject but seeks to expose where 
legal discourse incorporates sexed assumptions about subjects.
The thesis argues that states retain their status as the primary interpreters and enforcers of 
international law on the use of force, despite contemporary erosions into traditional
22 On the bounded male body of liberal discourse, see Naffine, ‘The Body Bag’ in Naffine and Owens 
(eds), ibid, on the application of this to the state as the primary subject of international law, see 
Charlesworth, ‘The Sex of the State in International Law’ in Naffine and Owens (eds), ibid.
23 Ibid., 2X255.
24 See Olsen, ‘Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective’, 18, International 
Journal o f the Sociology o f Law, (1990), 191.
25 Charlesworth, above note 22; also see Gardam, ‘An Alien’s View of the Law of Armed Conflict’ in 
Naffine and Owens (eds), above note 22, from 233.
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conceptions of sovereignty.26 The current international legal formation of the state not only 
remains central to international law, I argue that the subject status of the state as the primary 
legal subject relies on a perception of the state imbued with male characteristics to qualify as 
‘normal’. Recent developments toward the identification o f‘failed states’ in the international 
system also function to reinforce the implicit rationality attributed to the good/ Western/ 
democratic state because of the entrenchment of a sexed dichotomy in the failed state 
discourse. Failed state discourse has been used by states to justify the use of force on the 
territory of another state, for example in Somalia.27
Throughout the thesis I argue that the law on the use of force plays a crucial role in the 
construction and perpetuation of the sexed state of international legal discourse. The law on 
the use of force cements the sexed state into the international structure through the 
assumption that states can use force/violence in a legal manner that is equated with 
rationality (under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the customary international law right of 
states to use force in self-defence). The international construction of the sexed and gendered 
state mimics Western state domestic legal paradigms that posit a legal subject, also sexed 
male, through the assumption of the capacity for the deployment of rational and 
proportionate force in response to an attack. The necessary implication is that violence 
falling outside the legal construction of assumed ‘normalness’ is feminised as the acts of the 
unruly ‘Other’.
In contrast to feminist sexing projects, the use of gender as a category of analysis provides a 
descriptive account of the relationship between law and society. A gender approach exposes 
the role of law in the construction of gender norms, as well as highlighting the role of gender 
in the application and interpretation of law. The gender component of this project argues for 
the recognition of the tripartite relationship between law, violence and gender.28
26 See Koskenniemi, ‘Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-emptive Self-Defence’ Crimes of War 
Project, Expert Analysis, (August 20* 2002), available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/expert/bush-Koskemiiemi-print.html (last accessed May 2009) 
reflecting on the impact of states as ‘auto-interpreters’ of international law.
27 For a critical analysis with the concept of failed states, see; Wilde, ‘The Skewed Responsibility of 
the Failed State Concept’ 9, ILSA Journal o f International and Comparative Law, (2002), 425. On the 
use of force in failed states, see: The National Security Strategy of the United States 6 (September 
2002), available at <www.whitehouse.gov.nsc.nss/2002/index.html (last accessed May 2009), at 10- 
11; Schmitt, ‘Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia’, The New York Times, (May 2nd 2008); Rice, 
“‘Many Dead” in U.S. Airstrikes on Somalia’, The Guardian, (January 9* 2007); also see chapter six.
28 For elaboration, see: Peach, ‘The Gendering of Violence in the Law’ in Rycenga and Waller (eds), 
Frontline Feminisms, (Routledge, 2001).
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As a distinctly feminist project, the thesis does not merely seek to expose the representation 
and reproduction of gendered discourse in law. The thesis argues that law, including the 
international law on the use of force, also reflects and projects a form of hegemonic 
masculinity that has a negative impact on women’s lives, reduces the opportunities for 
women’s widespread participation in the public sphere and perpetuates threats to women’s 
security and sexual integrity. In this sense, the project is attentive to feminist scholarship 
beyond structural bias feminism, including the work of third world feminist theorists that 
emphasises the complicated role of culture and gender as discourses of power and 
inequalities.29 The enormous variation of gender representations across (and within) cultural 
and social forms is accounted for through three aspects of the project.
Firstly, by analysing the relationship between law, violence and gender rather than just law 
and gender, the thesis incorporates the work of Goldstein on war and gender, within a legal 
framework. Goldstein argues convincingly that, although gender perceptions/ categories 
vary globally (as do perceptions of warfare), what is consistent about gender, cross- 
culturally, is its integral role in the construction of war narratives. Goldstein concludes,
War, then, is a tremendously diverse enterprise, operating in many contexts with 
many purposes, rules, and meanings. Gender norms outside war show similar 
diversity. The puzzle . . .  is why this diversity disappears when it comes to the 
connection of war with gender. That connection is more stable, across cultures and 
through time, than are either gender roles outside of war or the forms and frequency of 
war itself.30
The global consistency of the war and gender dynamic raises questions about power and 
inequalities present in gender relationships. For feminist legal theories gender is more than a 
dominant social discourse. Gender also constructs a consistent hierarchical relationship 
between men and women that functions to reinforce men’s power and women’s 
oppression.31 Goldstein’s exposure of the gendered dynamic of war,32 when developed as a 
feminist legal contention, suggests that attention needs to be paid to the relationship 
between, not just law and gender (as international feminist legal theorists do) or to law and 
war (as scholars writing on the international law on the use of force do), but to the
29 On Third World Feminist knowledge, see: Mohanty, Russo and Torres, Third World Women and 
the Politics o f Feminism, (Indiana, 1991); Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and 
Third World Feminism, (Routledge, 1997); Nnaemeka (ed) Sisterhood: Feminisms and Power from 
Africa to the Diaspora, (Africa World Press, 1998). On Postcolonial Feminism, see: Kapur, above 
note 10.
30 Goldstein, above note 21, at 21 [emphasis in original].
31 MacKinnon, Women’s Lives under Men’s Laws, (Harvard, 2005).
32 Also see: Enloe, The Morning After, (California, 1993); Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases, 
(Pandora, 1989); Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? (Pandora, 1988); Enloe, The Curious Feminist, 
(California, 2004).
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production of integrated narratives of law, violence and gender. As a consequence the 
international law on the use of force, as the manifestation of the law/violence relationship on 
the international sphere, is also a gendered discourse that both reflects dominant social 
discourse on gender normality and plays a role in constructing gender norms. As such, the 
war and gender relationship represents a unique starting point for engaging international law 
as it is a starting point that, by definition, has resonance across communities.
Secondly, the variation of gender relations across social and community groups means that 
the impact of the gender within legal discourse will also be varied. Therefore, I interrogate 
the gender of violence in the law in terms of its reflection and contribution to the production 
of dominant Western gender stereotypes.33 That is, the thesis assumes the prevalence of 
Western legal forms in the production and histories of international law. This is not to 
project the Western legal form as universal or even preferred. Instead I argue that, despite 
the important contributions of non-Westem states, non-Western legal structures and non- 
Westem approaches to the construction of contemporary public international law,34 Western 
legal discourse continues to project itself onto the international as universal. To disrupt the 
universalising tendencies of Western legal forms, I specifically direct the project at Western 
legal liberalism as a particularised cultural model. The conclusions drawn about the 
international law on the use of force are thus acknowledged as of particular relevance to 
Western state self-perceptions. These include the very basic understanding of violence that 
the law on the use of force has been constructed to respond to. At the time of its drafting, the 
focus of the UN Charter was on prohibiting interstate conflict and while the international 
understanding of the nature of armed conflict has expanded during the Charter era,35 the 
Charter template of an interaction between two equal states/ legal subjects continues to 
influence the range of legal responses available. Challenging Western and first world 
perceptions with regard to the range of threats to international security, I argue, requires a 
fundamental re-assessment of the role and possibilities of law. To move toward such
33 See Kapur, above note 10, chapter 4; also see Drakopoulou, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female 
Subjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship’, 8, Feminist Legal Studies, (2000), 1999.
34 See Anghie, Chimni, Mickelson and Okafor (eds), The Third World and the International Order, 
(Nijhoff: 2003).
35 Important developments include Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted on 8 
June 1977, Article 1(4); GA Resolution 1514, 14* December 1960 (Declaration on the Granting o f 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples); GA Resolution 2625, 24* October 1970; for a 
discussion see Lowe, Roberts, Walsh and Zaum (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War: 
the Evolution o f Thought and Practice since 1945, (OUP, 2008) at 34 (in the Introduction by die 
editors).
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possibilities analysis of the limitations of Western approaches, such as those revealed by 
feminist methods, is necessary.
Thirdly, the reconstructive and reformative aspects of the thesis uses knowledge garnered 
outside of Western cultural and legal narratives. The justification for this is an understanding 
of the roots of feminist knowledge in the lived realities of women’s lives. Drawing on 
Gunning’s model of ‘world travelling’, the thesis seeks to enlarge understanding of ‘seeing 
oneself in context’, ‘seeing oneself as the other sees’ and ‘seeing the other in her context*.36 
By developing non-Westem feminist accounts as tools for change, the project, on the one 
hand, argues against dominant social, cultural and political forms while, on the other hand, is 
attentive to the feminist demand for women’s participation in the construction (and re­
construction) of international law. This aspect is in opposition to contemporary feminist 
developments in international institutions that draw primarily on Western feminisms, 
particularly governance feminism that is currently prevalent in the US.37
The integration of a culturally sensitive approach within the thesis’ understanding of the use 
of gender is representative of the basic premise that gender is the site of culturally 
constructed knowledge about assumed biological sex differences. In sum, as a project 
arguing for the relevance of sex and gender to the construction of international law on the 
use of force, the thesis entwines two core feminist methods. As a sexing project assumed 
universal categories, particularly those that construct the international legal subject, are 
exposed as regularly drawing on the opposition between feminine and masculine archetypes 
to construct legal subjectivity. This leads to the domestic analogy (discussed below). As a 
gender analysis the thesis also engages law’s production and embroilment in the social 
construction of masculine and feminine forms that tend to limit women’s participation in 
law, construct specific forms of male violence as justifiable, and limit the representation of 
violence against women as relevant to international peace and security. The perception of 
law as a narrative is integral to the gender component of the project (discussed in 2.3).
36 Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perceptions, World-traveling and Multicultural Feminism', 23, Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, (1991), 189.
37 See the discussion in Engle, ‘ “Calling in the Troops” The Uneasy Relationship among Women’s 
Rights, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention,’ 20, Harvard Human Rights Journal, (2007), 
189.
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2.2 The Domestic Analogy
The use of the domestic analogy in the thesis functions as a conceptual rather than a 
descriptive method. That is, I compare the contours of the regulation of international 
violence with those in Western legal structures regulating violence to demonstrate a 
conceptual analogy. I highlight points of comparison in fundamental legal categories that 
attempt to restrain and/ or justify violence. In contrast, a descriptive or prescriptive project 
would attempt to find empirical correlations and sameness. An example of a prescriptive use 
of the domestic analogy is found in Franck’s Recourse to Force. Franck looks at necessity 
defences developed under common law systems to explain his theory of necessity as a 
legitimating factor for the use of force to halt humanitarian crisis.38 I argue that this is a 
prescriptive analogy that assumes the correlation of domestic legal categories with 
international legal categories and, therefore, explains international legal justifications for 
violence through drawing upon domestic legal justifications for violence.39 In contrast, the 
conceptual analysis developed in this project does not assume the sameness of international 
and domestic legal structures and seeks, instead, to expose concepts developed in Western 
domestic legal orders and assumed to exist in the international legal system.
The central example of this conceptual analogy is the use of the self-defence justification in 
international law. Rather than assume the relevance of the domestic-international self- 
defence analogy, I interrogate the usefulness of the analogy through the feminist critique of 
interpersonal self-defence.40 Through exposure of the conceptual analogy between 
interpersonal justifications for violence and international justifications for violence, I argue 
that sexed and gendered fault lines in international law become apparent. The conclusion 
drawn from this is not that the analogy between the two forms of justifications should be 
strengthened or that feminist answers/ solutions/ approaches to domestic legal issues should 
be superimposed on to the international. Instead I argue that the feminist appraisal of the 
international law on the use of force, viewed through the lens of the domestic analogy, 
promotes a re-examination of the appropriateness of contemporary legal rules on the use of 
force.
38 Franck, Recourse to Force, (CUP, 2002), chapter 10.
39 See further chapter five on humanitarian intervention.
40 See further chapter three on Article 51 self-defence.
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While review of the international law on the use of force has been somewhat fashionable in 
the past decade,41 very little of the literature on force considers feminist methods as a means 
to understand or reconstruct the law on the use of force 42 The domestic analogy exposes the 
particularity of international law apparent at the intersection of Western and masculine 
narratives of law and power. The domestic analogy also illustrates how legal concepts 
developed within the ju s ad bellum framework, including self-defence, self-determination, 
humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive force, while assumed to be neutral legal forms, 
are often imbued with sexed assumptions about the nature and possibilities of law. 
Furthermore, the domestic analogy exposes the state, the primary international legal subject, 
as built on Western legal models of subjectivity that are sexed male. I consider whether the 
international legal subject can be de-sexed or whether answers lie in de-personification of 
the state.43
23  Law as Narrative
I have described the conceptual, or analytical, focus of the thesis as the domestic analogy. In 
contrast, I perceive the use of a law as narrative technique as a descriptive technique. The 
division between, and the use of both, an analytical and descriptive method reflects feminist 
engagement with the relationship between theory and process. Lacey and Jackson describe 
feminist jurisprudence as an interpretative theory, appreciating the value of normative and 
empirical jurisprudence and developing the strengths of both to acknowledge the interlinking 
of theory and practice.44 Lacey also describes this as a process of critique/ utopia/ reform,45
41 See, for example, Sands, Lawless World, (Penguin, 2006); Kennedy, O f War and Law, (Princeton,
2006); Smith, The Utility o f Force, (Penguin, 2006); Stahn, “‘Jus in bello, Jus ad bellum -  Jus post 
Bellum"?: Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’, 17, European Journal o f 
International Law, (2006), 921.
42 Notable exceptions include: Buss, ‘Keeping Its Promise: Use of Force and the New Man of 
International Law’ in Bartholomew, Empire's Law, (Pluto, 2006); Buchanan and Johnson, ‘The 
‘Unforgiven’ Sources of International Law: Nation-Building, Violence and Gender in the Western)’ 
in Buss and Manji (eds) above note 3, at 131; Otto, ‘Integrating Questions of Gender into Discussion 
of ‘the Use of Force’ in the International Law Curriculum’, 6(2) Legal Education Review, (1995), 
219; Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 3, chapter eight; Orford, Reading Humanitarian 
Interventions, (Cambridge, 2003); Stark, ‘What We Talk about WTien we Talk about War’, 32, 
Stanford Journal o f International Law, (1996), 91; Charlesworth approaches the law on the use of 
force tangentially in her reflection on the role of international lawyers in international relations and 
politics, in ‘Saddam Hussein: My Part in His Downfall’, 23, Wisconsin International Law Journal,
(2005), 127.
43 See specifically, the discussion in chapter three, section 2.3: ‘Beyond the Domestic Analogy?’
44 Lacey and Jackson, ‘Introducing Feminist Legal Theories’, in Penner, SchifF, et al (eds), 
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, (Butterworths: 2002).
45 Note, however, the veiy different meaning of ‘utopian’ projects in international legal discourse 
(often associated with neo-liberal accounts) that does not translate into the feminist  use of the term; 
compare the discussion of Koskenniemni, From Apology to Utopia, (Cambridge, 2005, re-issued)
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suggesting a movement between the theoretical enterprise, re-construction of law, and 
practical reform in a manner that shapes a continued exchange between empirical and 
conceptual claims in feminist jurisprudence.46
Law as narrative is a reference to the possibility of law as one telling among many rather 
than presenting law as an objective and universal standard. In this sense feminist knowledge 
of the theory/practice loop is facilitated by a view of law as narrative and a perception of law 
as existing in a horizontal relationship with other forms of social knowledge/ normative 
orders. Narrative approaches, in addition to continuing a tradition drawn from the 
consciousness raising aspect of late twentieth century feminism, have three functions. 
Firstly, a law as narrative approach allows the sanctity of the legal text to be challenged and 
potentially deposed from its place at the top of a hierarchy of social knowledge. This 
discloses the partiality of law, despite its pretensions to objectivity and neutrality, and allows 
for a clearer understanding of the role of theoiy in practice and practice in theory.
Secondly, a law as narrative approach enables critical theories to validate and unearth the 
stories and experiences of those outside mainstream dialogues.47 This facilitates the shift 
away from essentialism in discourse and is heightened by my understanding of Western 
accounts of the law on the use of force as producing a narrative rather than producing 
objective truths. The use of law as a narrative disrupts the segregation of mainstream 
accounts from feminist accounts as both emerge as possible descriptions of the law and of 
the world. Orford’s identification of the implicitly gendered narratives of the hero that 
underpin law on the use of force influences my approach, so that it becomes important to 
consider the capacity of Western states to narrate themselves into a hero-spectator role in the 
enforcement of law on the use of force 48 The narrative element is, therefore, in part geared 
towards the exposure of the latent, powerful and gendered narratives that dominate 
contemporary Western legal accounts of force, especially Western state justifications for the 
use of force on the territoiy of other states. I broaden the range of narratives used to explain 
and understand international law. For example, in chapter four, in discussion of self­
chapter one and Lacey’s account of feminist method, Lacey, ‘Feminist Theoiy and the Rights of 
Women’ in Knop, Gender and Human Rights, (Oxford, 2004), at 46.
46 For example of the relationship between conceptual and empirical accounts/ theory and practice 
see: Charlesworth, Sahgal and Lockett, Gender, Human Rights and International Law, Centre LGS 
Conversation, transcript and sound recording available at: http://www.kent.ac.uk/clgs/news-and- 
events/Conversations/Conversations.htm (last accessed May 2009).
47 Williams, ‘On Being the Object of Property’, 14, Signs, (1988), 5.
48 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Interventions, (Cambridge, 2003), at 180; see further chapter three, 
section 3.
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determination as a potential justification for the use of force in decolonisation contexts, the 
use of non-legal accounts of self-determination affords a re-imagining of the role individual 
and social self-determination might play in future accounts of legal or ‘external’ self- 
determination.
Finally, the law as narrative approach is grounded in the understanding that theoretical 
accounts of international law often function as a closed set of narratives. One of the key 
consequences of this, in Western legal theories, is the ongoing reiteration of a tension 
between positive and natural law approaches and between political and legal understandings 
of international law. Feminist approaches to international law propose alternative narratives 
at the descriptive and the analytical levels of legal theories that may have the potential to 
shift beyond what are often regarded as immovable dichotomies or the boundaries of legal 
theoiy.49 Analysis of strategies to challenge these recurrent binaries, for example between 
legal positivism and natural law, is integral to the discussion in chapter five on humanitarian 
intervention as a justification for the use of force. I argue to shift beyond the recurring 
dilemmas presented by humanitarian interventions feminist approaches require strategies 
that work towards a disruption to the binary ordering common to mainstream theories of 
international law.
A narrative approach allows recognition of multiple sources and interdisciplinary insights 
whilst interrupting the self-regulating exclusivity of standard legal accounts. A law as 
narrative approach is not, however, a random gathering of interdisciplinaiy insights on the 
chosen topic.50 Law as narrative functions as a means of widening the potential of 
international law, so as to appreciate the role of international law in cultural accounts and the 
role of culture in the construction of laws.51 Through the use of feminist narratives on peace, 
security, violence and war across the thesis, I develop specific conclusions regarding the 
need for the increased participation of women in local, national, regional and international 
power structures/ governance. This aspect of the project has a theoretical base and outcome, 
acknowledging the structural inequalities produced through women’s low participation in 
security structures. This claim also leads to one of the key practical conclusions of the thesis:
49 On political-legal dichotomies, see Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’ 17 
Michigan Journal o f International Law, (1996) 255; on the natural law-positive law dichotomy see, 
Koskenniemni, “The Lady Doth Protest’ Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics in International Law,’ 65, 
Modern Law Review, (2002), 159.
501 return to this point in the conclusion of the thesis, see further, chapter six.
51 Thornton, Romancing the Tomes, (Routledge, 2002), in introduction.
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that women’s increased participation is necessary for a system of international security that 
is attentive to the security needs of diverse actors, agents and survivors.
The law as narrative approach is also connected to the acceptance of law, gender and 
violence as integrated social forms. I argue that the acceptance of the law and violence 
relationship requires acceptance of law as a connected rather than an isolated normative 
structure.52 In terms of outcomes the law as narrative approach emerges across the chapters 
of the thesis. In chapter two, the study of Security Council power to authorise the use of 
force is built on a study of the narratives of women, and militaries, after the use of force in 
Korea in 1950,53 thus developing multiple sources and interdisciplinary insight to explain 
and understand the limitations of the law on collective security. In chapter three, the 
international law on self-defence is interrogated for its specific meaning in Western 
communities as a narrative of spectatorship and heroics. This allows for recognition of law 
as composed of specific narratives within specific communities. In chapter four, on self- 
determination, legal narratives are contrasted with narratives from feminist actors engaged 
with three specific self-determination conflicts so that the range of narratives used to explain 
and understand international law are broadened. In chapter five, through the domestic 
analogy, an important alternative account of the structural deficits of humanitarian 
intervention is offered. That is, chapter five utilises feminist narratives on intervention into 
interpersonal domestic violence to explore the conceptual limitations of forceful 
interventions into domestic state violence. Chapter six considers the contours of the ‘War on 
Terror’ as narrative devices that have produced a gendered narrative on the international 
plane analogous to provocation defences as they have developed within Western legal 
structures.
The conclusion across these accounts is a call for the increased participation of women in 
legal structures as a means to develop alternative legal possibilities. In line with the domestic 
analogy built in response to the internal feminist critique of essentialism,54 the call for 
increased participation of women at all stages of the production of legal narratives is not, 
however, built on a cultural feminist ideal of an inherently different ‘female’ voice
52 See: Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ 95 (8) Yale Law Journal, (1986), 1901; also see Derrida, The 
Force of Law, 11, Cardozo Law Review, (1990), 1687.
53 SC Res 80,14th March 1950.
34 See Drakopoulou, above note 33.
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existing.55 To seek women’s full participation in legal processes is to begin a reworking of 
legal configurations and expectations. The achievement of women’s full participation moves 
past quotas towards acknowledgment of the failure of current legal arrangements to be 
inclusive of women at their foundation. My claim is not that women’s experiences and 
knowledge are naturally different to men’s. However, women’s experiences and knowledge 
are informed, globally, by social and cultural norms that result in women having different 
priorities and needs from those of men. Reflecting the cultural diversity of women’s 
experiences and knowledge, as well as the socially constructed spheres of reference 
understood as female, demands a re-creation of fundamental legal categories and processes 
built on women’s participation that extends beyond proportionate representation. I reflect on 
the possibilities and limitations of the feminist ‘utopia’ of active inclusion of women in the 
making of the world throughout the thesis.56 This is a foundational claim, not merely 
instrumental. As a foundational claim the call for the increased participation of women is 
directed at the basic processes that are assumed necessary to build Western liberal 
democracies and the consequent legal structures. In contrast, an instrumental claim would 
limit itself to the equal representation of women and men in law-making institutions.
To conclude this section, three tools are deployed across the thesis — the discursive 
engagement with sex and gender as they emerge in legal documents, the conceptual 
deployment of the domestic analogy, and the reliance on an understanding of law as a 
narrative rather than functioning as a series of objective or universal truths. The limitations 
of these methods, including the overriding simplicity of a feminist ethics (limiting the sex- 
gender claims), the risk of reproduction rather than challenge to Western forms through the 
domestic analogy and the myriad potential answers exposed by a law as narrative account, 
are returned to in the final chapter of the thesis. I conclude that these limitations ultimately 
curb the claims the thesis can make while remaining a legal project. To this end, I consider 
Arendt’s model of natality, that is, the capacity within us all, as humans, for new ideas, 
rebirth and creative ownership.57 I argue that Arendt’s natality provokes a radical re­
conceptualisation of feminist ethics and a challenge to the law and violence relationship. To 
arrive at this point I first deploy the methods discussed here in an analysis of the contours of 
the international law on the use of force. I focus on justifications for the use of force in
55 For an account of cultural feminism, the discussion in West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’, 55, 
University o f Chicago Law Review, (1988), at 35 and Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a 
Politics o f Peace, (Beacon, 1995).
56 On the use of the term ‘utopia’ in feminist legal theories, see above note 45.
57 Above note 4; also see chapter six.
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international relations, including the power of Security Council to authorise the use of force. 
The substantive focus of the thesis is introduced in Part Three of this chapter.
3. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE
The history of international law is entwined with the regulation of state violence and force. 
Key instruments of international law generally are often key instruments on the use of 
force.58 The centrality of force to international legal dialogues is a product of historical 
choices that position post-conflict events as crucial legal moments connected to the founding 
of a legal order.59 While the law on the use of force has a history in customary international 
law that precedes and parallels the United Nations Charter, the Charter can be described as 
providing the central contemporary legal narrative on the law of the use of force.60 The use 
of force is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the Charter, may be justified under Article 51 of 
the Charter, and may be authorised through the collective security system articulated in 
Chapter VII of the Charter. It is this model of force as prohibited yet able to be justified 
and/or authorised that the thesis subjects to a feminist analysis. After examining the power 
of the Security Council to authorise force and the right of states to use force in self-defence, 
I turn to justifications outside of the Charter paradigm and track the role of customary 
international law in the adaptation, refinement and application of this ‘cornerstone’ of 
international law.61
My focus is on the mainstream documentation that informs Western state and academic 
approaches to the law on the use of force. By placing Western narratives on the use of force 
at the centre of my analysis, I challenge the assumption of universality that is portrayed in
58 See UN Charter, Preamble; Neff, War and the Law o f Nations, (Cambridge, 2005).
59 On the role of violence in the founding of legal orders, see Cover, above note 52; also see 
Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’, 65 (3), Modern Law Review (2002), 377.
60 For an alternative view, which places international customary law at the centre of international legal 
narratives on the use of force, Ackerman, International Law and the Preemptive Use o f Force Against 
Iraq, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS21314, (April 11* 2003), available online at 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21324.pdf also see: O’Connell, ‘Customary International Law 
on the Use of Force: The UN Charter, Practice and Opinio Juris’, Workshop Presentation at the 
University of Macerata, International Customary Law on the Use o f Force: a Methodological 
Approach, (11-12 June 2004) available online at www.addix.it/intematzionale/relazoni/connell.pdf 
(last accessed 2009).
61 See Greenwood, ‘The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law’, 55, Modem Law Review (1992) 
153 describing the laws on the use of force as ‘the cornerstone of the post-1945 international legal 
order*.
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the bulk of contemporary Western jurisprudence, yet also recognise the complicity of 
feminist approaches to international law in Western cultural histories.62
While I draw on non-Western feminist thinking to enlarge and re-imagine the law on the use 
of force, reflection on the cultural narratives produced in a writer’s own academic, political 
and social environment is a component of feminist approaches to international law. For 
Buchanan and Johnson, the exposure of international law’s foundational narratives and the 
complicity in contemporary expressions of international law is a vital aspect of feminist 
projects.63 Embracing what has been described as the ‘interpretative’ element of feminist 
legal theories, Lacey suggests, ‘feminist legal theories do not merely seek to rationalize legal 
practices; nor, conversely, do they typically engage in entirely external critique and 
prescription’.64 I acknowledge and discursively challenge Western approaches to the 
international law on the use of force from a position recognised as ‘within’ (debates, 
cultures, the mainstream) as well as from ‘outside’ (as feminist, through recognising the 
mainstream of international law as a narrative rather than a universal).65
The thesis primarily presents an analysis of the international law on the use of force, ju s  ad 
bellum. The international humanitarian law of armed conflict, ju s  in bello, is an important 
overlapping and parallel component of international law also concerned with the 
international legal regulation of violence. While ju s ad bellum is the focus of the thesis, 
feminist scholarship challenges the distinction that international law constructs between the 
regulation of decisions to use or restrain from the use of force, ju s ad bellum, and the 
methods and means of armed conflict, ju s in bello.66 The conceptual distinction between the 
two regimes suggests the decisions of powerful state actors to use force (mind) are 
dislocated from the individual acts that occur within an armed conflict (through the bodies of 
the military). Further study of the relationship between ju s ad bellum and ju s in bello, from a 
feminist perspective, would form an important adjunct to the analysis provided in the thesis 
but is not the focus of the current research. In this section I introduce the Charter
62 See Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge, 2003), at 67.
63 For example, see Buchanan and Johnson, above note 42.
64 Lacey, above note 7.
65 Otto, ‘A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325,’ 13, Michigan Journal o f Gender and Law, (2006), 113.
66 On the overlap of the two regimes, see Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’, 
87, AJIL, (1993) 391.
33
components -  prohibition, authorisation and justification - and identify the key literature and 
sources of their elaboration.67
3.1 The Prohibition on the Use of Force
The central Charter provision regulating force is Article 2(4), the prohibition on the threat or 
use of force.68 Analysis of Article 2(4) illustrates the foundational nexus between law, 
violence and gender. Article 2(4) states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The prohibition functions as a restraint on the use of arbitrary force by the primary 
international legal subjects, states. Prior to the UN era, no effective legal restraint on 
unilateral force existed and states were free to make independent assessments as to whether 
the use of force could function as a satisfactory measure of self-help.69 The pre-Charter 
model is described as having its pedigree in Western political and philosophical histories 
that invoke the notion of ‘just’ war to indicate the competence of states to use force as a 
rational and objective response in interstate relations.70
Pre-Charter customary international law is also perceived as underpinning contemporary 
understanding of the parameters and limits of international law on the use of force.71 It is 
through the entwining of Charter and customary law narratives that the prohibition on force 
contained in Article 2(4) can be identified as a sign with an absolute, non-derogable nature 
and as a boundary that must accommodate state justifications for the use of force. My 
contention is that this absolute yet porous quality of the prohibition configures an
67 Gray, International Law and the Use o f Force, (Oxford, 2008, 3rd edition) represents an excellent 
introduction and coverage of the key issues, however, note references to the 2004 (2nd ) edition of 
Gray’s work are indicated; also see O’Connell, International Law and the Use o f Force, (Federation, 
2005).
68 On Article 2(4), see: Franck, Recourse to Force, (CUP, 2002), chapter 1; Gray, ibid, (2004, 2nd 
Edition), chapter 1; Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’ 64 (4), AJIL, (1970), 809.
69 However, during the era of the League of Nations, Article 12 of the Covenant did attempt to impose 
a ‘cooling off period to orchestrate a collective response to the use of force. This was ultimately 
regarded as an ineffective legal mechanism, see: O’Connell, above note 67, at 126-128 and at 131- 
134, (discussing the Kellogg-Briand Pact).
70 Nef£ above note 58.
71 O’Connell, above note 67, at 11-13 ; also see Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), Merits, (1986ICJ), Reports 14.
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international legal subject that replicates Western legal subjects understood through legal 
liberalism as male and masculinised.72
On the one hand the meaning of Article 2(4) is clear: states are prohibited from using force 
against other states. The reference to territorial integrity and political independence aids 
identification of the values enshrined in the recognition of a state while the reference to the 
purposes of the United Nations endows the prohibition with central importance and prestige. 
Yet, just as the prohibition is confirmed by Western scholarship as static and resolvable 
through the text of the Charter, it is also presented as a malleable boundary through the 
development of international customary law. This malleability is revealed at multiple sites. 
Arguments for certain types of force, such as belligerent reprisals, frontier incidents or the 
rescue of nationals abroad,73 depend upon a reinforcement of the prohibition’s static and 
absolute nature alongside a crafted argument for these types of coercive measures to sit 
below the threshold invoked by the phrase ‘the threat or use of force’. For example, 
O’Connell argues that the use of force by Israel against Lebanon in 2006 would not have 
violated the Article 2(4) prohibition if the actions of the Israeli government had been limited 
to the rescue of the Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah, as this would have been 
perceived as a proportionate countermeasure (rather than as illegal aggression) by the wider 
international community.74
Other writers use the final phrase in the prohibition, ‘any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations’, to justify force that would otherwise be in violation of the 
Charter. For example, in his justification for the use of force as ‘humanitarian intervention’, 
Teson writes,
The United Nation’s purpose of promoting and protecting human rights found in 
Article 1(3), and by reference in Article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the prohibition 
of war, has a necessary primacy over the respect for state sovereignty. Force used in 
defense of fundamental human rights is therefore not a use of force inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations.75
The conundrum Article 2(4) presents as supreme yet able to be circumvented is a concern of 
the thesis. Regardless of a writer’s -  or a state’s -  perspective on the more controversial
72 See Naffine, above note 22.
73 However, note these aspects of the use of force are generally outside the scope of the thesis.
74 O’Connell, Proportionality and Sustainable Peace in the Middle East, Policy Brief No. 12, (Joan B. 
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, August 2006) available online at: 
http://kroc.nd.edu/polbriefdocuments/polbriefl2.pdf (last accessed May 2009).
75 Tesdn, Humanitarian Intervention: an Inquiry into Law and Morality, (Transnational, 1997), at 
173-174.
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justifications for the use of force, including preemptive force, humanitarian interventions, 
and implied authorisations, the prohibition will play a fundamental role in illustrating the 
argument and will be deployed as a static, dependable element of the international legal 
order.76 For example, Greenwood argues for the possibility of implied authorisation from the 
Security Council as constituting an appropriate explanation for the use of force in Serbia by 
NATO in 1999 and in anticipation of the use of force by the US and UK in Iraq in 2003, but 
does so after he re-iterates the permanence and relevance of Article 2(4).77
That international law on the use of force figure prominently in general histories of 
international law leads to a skewed understanding of international law.78 International trade 
laws, law and development, laws on the environment, international human rights laws, 
international criminal law, laws on jurisdiction and immunities or alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms are just some of the aspects of international law sidelined by a 
narrative, produced in Western histories, that places the limitation, control and exercise of 
force as the central formative influence on the development of international law. 
Additionally, key Anglo-European documents identified as pivotal international law sources 
have often been the product of conflict or the quest for the control of the excesses of armed 
conflict. For example, the Peace of Westphalia, usually assigned status as the ‘moment* 
when international law was conceived, was the product of the frustrations of European 
statesmen at the end of the Thirty Year War in continental Europe.79 Likewise, key twentieth 
century instruments, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Treaty of Versailles and the UN 
Charter are deemed important because of their relationship with the legal tempering of 
violence. Other long standing international documents -  for example, jus in bello standards, 
such as the Hague Conventions -  also approach war and violence as an established, 
inevitable aspect of international relationships. The Nuremberg trials, responding to crimes 
against the peace and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazi regime during World 
War II, illustrate further the tremendous impact Western perceptions of legal regulation play 
in defining the contours of the legal regulation of violence in the Charter era.
76 For a view which challenges the continued relevance of Article 2(4), see: Glennon, ‘How 
International Rules Die,’ 93, Georgetown Law Journal, (2005), 939.
77 Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force’, 4, San Diego Journal o f 
International Law, (2003), 7, at 10-11.
78 Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past’, 32, New York University Journal o f International Law and 
Politics, (1999-2000), 243.
79 O’Connell, above note 67, at 155
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From the perspective of legal liberalism, the relationship between the control of force and 
the legitimacy of a legal system is inevitable.80 Akin to legal liberalism, positivist theories of 
law assume that a monopoly on the use of force will be exercised by the state. As a 
consequence early positivists, like Austin, had trouble accepting international law as ‘law 
properly called’.81 Kelsen’s positivism, while differing from the Austinian model in that it 
admits international law as law, still places the capacity for legitimate coercion by 
authorities as indicative of the system’s legitimacy as a legal normative structure.82 The crux 
of the positivist challenge to international law stems from the historical capacity of states to 
wage war without incurring sanction under international law. This is because the control of 
force holds a signatory role in positivism, functioning as an indicator of the legitimacy of the 
system and as evidence that the group of rules form a legal system. For contemporary 
international law, that indicator is Article 2(4), which becomes a sign of the shift from 
international law as a collection of norms (pre-Charter) to international law as a valid and 
legitimate system of legal norms (in the Charter era). Consequently, the prohibition on force 
shifts the international legal system into the modern era, where positivisdc legal models 
have provided the base for dominant Western understandings of law. Article 2(4)’s role is 
then more than that of prohibition: it functions as a sign of the legal-ness of die international 
system and the capacity of that system to monopolise the use of force.
Through the gradual shift from 1648 — when a collective security system was envisaged but 
not activated by the Peace of Westphalia -  to the advent of the UN Charter and the 
prohibition on the use of force, the slow accommodation of international legal relationships 
into a form satisfactory to positivist values can be evidenced. As such, under Article 2(4), 
the international legal system gains legitimacy through an assumed monopoly on force. 
Unsurprisingly, the UN system has, consequently, been perceived as under greatest threat 
when states appear to ignore Article 2(4), the prohibition on force. For example, Franck’s 
lament, during the Vietnam conflict in 1970, of ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’ argues that, ‘[t]he 
failure of the UN Charter’s normative system is tantamount to the inability of any rule, such 
as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to have much control over the behaviour of states’.83 
The failure to see key international legal developments manifest in other aspects of 
international relationships: trade, human rights, environmental, health or economic and
801 refer here to what Simpson labels ‘classical Charter liberalism’ see: Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’, 
12, EJIL (2001), 537 at 540.
81 Austin, The Province o f Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses o f the Study o f Jurisprudence, 
1955 ed. (originally published 1832/1863).
82 Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems o f Legal Theory, (Oxford, 1934).
83 Franck, above note 38.
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social developments or minority rights and anti-discrimination laws maintains an emphasis 
on force while downplaying the increasingly complex relationships that exist across, 
between and throughout states.
Law and violence scholar, Robert Cover argues that, ‘violence . . . provides the occasion 
and method for founding legal orders, it gives laws (as the regulator of force and coercion) a 
reason for being and it provides a means through which law acts’.84 Cover’s work, and 
subsequent law and violence scholarship,85 although directed at national legal structures, 
illustrate an important element of the international legal system. That is, Cover’s work 
illustrates the extent that the regulation of violence is conceived as the implicit rationale for 
the legal edifice, in line with the positivist project generally (that often translates politically 
into versions of liberalism).
Cover’s tripartite description of law and violence can be applied to international law to 
understand the inherent role of violence within the structure of the international legal 
system. Thus, violence is understood as providing the founding motivation for the 
contemporary international legal system, as the events of World War II lead to the pursuit of 
an international structure that would halt future aggression by states.86 Violence also gives 
the international legal system its rationale for continued existence, that is, the unjustified 
violence of states using force unilaterally is seen as requiring a collective enforcement 
mechanism. Non-coercive dispute resolution techniques, such as, mediation or conciliation, 
are defined as non-legal processes or, in the case of institutional adjudicative processes 
under international law, are ‘soft’ law with persuasive rather than binding impact. Likewise, 
the means through which law ‘acts’ is grounded in violence; that is, Chapter VII authorises 
legal coercion in the form of Article 41 acts (measures short of force) and Article 42 (the use 
of force).87 Cover’s approach is helpful as a means of bringing the crucial role of violence in 
law, in this case in international law, to the surface. The dichotomy between illegal force
84 Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ in Minow et al (eds), Narrative, Violence and the Law, (1992), 
213.
85 Ibid; also see, Sarat, Law, Violence and the Possibility o f Justice, (Princeton 2001); Sarat and 
Kearns (eds), Law's Violence, (Michigan: 1995).
86 However, also see Derrida’s understanding of the semantic violence inherent in the founding of a 
legal system, Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, 11, Cardozo Law Review, (1990), 1687; other scholars have 
inferred the founding violence of the international legal system is colonialism, see, Berman, ‘In the 
Wake of Empire’, 14, American University International Law Review, (1998- 1999), 1515.
87 Cover describes all legal acts as coercive and thus violence, I argue that this approach has equal 
purchase to international legal coercion/acts as to national structures; for a discussion of Article 41 
and 42 see chapter two.
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(the rationale for a legal system) and authorised force (the means through which law acts) 
can be seen to underpin the international system or to provide what Franck calls the ‘solar 
plexus’ of the international system.88
Feminist theory adds to law and violence scholarship the further feature of gender. That is, if 
we understand law as intimately co-opted in violence -  dividing that which is authorised 
from that which is regulated and outlawed - inserting understandings of gender in violence 
highlights a fourth category of violence in Cover’s model: violence that is invisible or 
deemed unimportant by the legal system. Violence against women often falls into this 
category under international and national legal structures. As a form of violence often 
associated with the private sphere, violence against women is not within Cover’s category of 
acts to be regulated or acts authorised by law. Instead violence against women is often 
characterised as cultural, traditional or not violence at all and thus outside of law’s proper 
domain.
Violence against women can be defined as physical harm directed at women and often 
tolerated within a community because the survivor is female. For example, honor crimes are 
a widespread form of violence against women. Other forms of violence against women 
include social or cultural restrictions on women’s bodily integrity, particularly sexual 
integrity, such as that caused by harmful cultural practices. Violence against women also 
includes the physical confinement of women through social norms that dictate women as 
inferior and therefore belonging in the private sphere, especially when such confinement 
limits women’s capacity to be educated, to be literate, to have access to adequate health care 
or to become self-sufficient through earning. Violence against women also includes the 
spectrum of sexual violence, exploitation and abuse directed at and inflicted on women: 
sexual harassment, sexual servitude/ slavery, sexual assault, incest, etc. Violence against 
women may be legal or illegal, criminalised or tolerated; what is significant is that the 
harmful practice is defined by the biological sexual identity of the victim, that is she is 
female, rather than by the type of violence inflicted.89 Domestic violence is a form of
88 Franck, ‘The Laws of Force and the Turn to Evidence’ American Society o f International Law 
Annual Meeting,, Conference Paper, (Thursday 28th March 2006).
89 For a legal definition, see: Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GA Res 
48/103, 20 December 1993; also see Secretary-General In-depth Study o f All Forms o f Violence 
against Women, 9* October, 2006, A/61/122/Add. 1.
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violence primarily inflicted toward women within the private sphere by family members, 
particularly husbands or intimate partners.90
The deficiencies of the international legal structure are exposed by inserting an 
understanding of the gender of violence in each element of Cover’s law and violence 
model.91 At the original point of law’s violence -  what Cover calls the founding of a legal 
system -  gendered violence functions to exclude women’s voices in the constitutive acts of 
the legal system. This happens (at least) twice under international law. Not only were 
women for the most part absent (or kept on the other side of the door, out of the public 
space) during the foundation of national legal structures (states), which then come to 
constitute international legal subjects, but women’s exclusion also occurs at the founding of 
each pivotal instrument in the evolution of international law -  from the Peace of Westphalia 
to the UN Charter and Nuremberg.92 This physical exclusion from the public agreement on 
founding documents functions as a violence enacted against women by the patriarchal 
histories of the communities we live within. This is then underscored by a discursive 
violence that further excludes women from subjectivity in legal documents either 
(originally) as citizens in nation states or through the limited representation offered to them 
in the international sphere by the international legal subject of the state.93 Derrida describes 
this as the force of law, positing legal categories as spaces of violent exclusions through the 
binaries and boundaries that rein in some law and subjects whilst (violently) excluding 
others. Beyond this, we can describe an additional violence faced by women as the historical 
and discursive combine to perpetuate the marginalisation of women in the legal system. The 
understanding provided by searching out the gendering of violence in law underpins the 
thesis as a whole and informs conclusions drawn on discursive and participatory 
disadvantages to women embedded in the law of use of force.
The second site of violence identified by Cover, which incorporates the acts that provoke 
law’s gaze and are deemed criminal or deviant, further demonstrate the dependency of legal 
representations of violence on social constructions of gender. Under national legal 
structures the refusal and reluctance of the law to categorise violence against women -  in all
90 Above note 28.
91 Hunter, ‘Law’s (Masculine) Violence’, 17 (1), Law and Critique 27, (2006), 27.
92 See Knop, Diversity and Self-determination in International Law, (Cambridge 2002); Otto, 
‘International Peace Activism: The Contributions Made by Women’, 82, Reform: A Journal o f 
National and International Law Reform, (2003), 30; both of these authors demonstrate the influence 
of women’s peace movements on international law in the first half of the twentieth century.
93 Charlesworth, ‘The Sex of State in International Law’ in Naffine and Owens, above note 21.
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its social manifestations -  as illegal is historically evidenced and continues to inform 
categories of criminality and regulation.94 Domestic violence, sexual harassment, crimes of 
honour, sexual violence and sex discrimination may have begun to appear in the legal 
landscape after three decades (and more) of feminist scholarship and activism, yet each 
remain ad hoc legal categories or underdeveloped categories of criminal behaviour. The 
thesis aims to expose how this gendering of law and violence embedded in Western national 
systems is present in international laws, which designate the criminal or deviant acts 
(aggression) of states. Particular attention is paid to the failure of the international system to 
register violence against women during armed conflict or peacetime as a threat to 
international peace and security.
Finally, Cover’s third site of violence -  the enforcement of law -  remains unresponsive to 
crimes and violence against women under national legal forms, with low arrest rates, 
gendered defences such as provocation and self-defence, low reportage and conviction rates 
often nullifying the recognition of gender-based violence by Western legal structures. The 
enforcement of international law is the focus of the thesis. The positioning of the use of 
force as the ultimate enforcement mechanism in the international system is a clear 
acknowledgement of the relationship between law and violence. The thesis demonstrates the 
additional relationship between each of these categories and sex/gender. I accordingly 
develop, as a conceptual claim, that the invocation of a domestic analogy with national 
criminal justifications for violence incorporates a sexed narrative into international law. 
When women use violence, Western legal structures have appeared reluctant to 
accommodate this within legal perceptions of justifiable acts. The thesis argues that 
international justifications are construed in analogous terms. Feminist scholarship would not 
necessarily advocate the use of force to halt violence against women, instead the conceptual 
challenge mounted by an approach to law that seeks to expose the gender of violence in the 
law is important. The conceptual claim is underscored by the wealth of empirical and 
descriptive evidence of the impact of the use of force on the lives of women.
In addition to a conceptual gendering, the international law on the use of force has neglected 
the role of women at the level of participation. A consequence of this is that the conceptual 
exclusion of women appears ‘normal’ or ‘natural’. When mainstream international legal
94 Dobash and Dobash, ‘Violent Men and Violent Contexts’ in Dobash and Dobash (eds), Rethinking 
Violence Against Women, (Sage, 1998), at 141 -168; McColgan, ‘General Defences* in Bibbings and 
Nicolson, Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law, (Cavendish, 2000).
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narratives produce a gradual march from the Peace of Westphalia, through the Concert of 
Europe towards the Hague Peace Conferences, beyond the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 
Covenant of the League of Nations to the proclamation of the UN’s prohibition on the use of 
force, women are not absent. Women are, quite literally, on the other side of the door, 
invisible yet present in the proceedings, in the language of law and in acts that are to be 
regulated, authorised and outlawed. The gendering of violence in the law therefore begins in 
international law through women’s physical exclusion from decision making processes. Otto 
recognises this in two ways in her work. First, in a similar way to Knop, Otto works to 
reinstall recognition of the presence of women, as advocates of peace, as stateswomen and 
diplomats, at the meetings that produce the great instruments of international law.95 Second, 
Otto exposes the role of woman, as ‘other’ to the legal subject that constitutes the texts and 
acts of the legal system. Thus Otto writes,
While women were seldom produced explicitly by early legal texts, they were implicit 
in every representation of masculinity . . . Many of the boundaries, concepts and 
metaphors that inform international legal thinking have also played a role in the legal 
reproduction of the dualisms of sex, such as the division between public and private 
spheres and the idea of the sovereign nation state, which privilege masculine forms of 
power over those associated with the feminine. . .%
Otto then applies this approach to specific legal documents, in this case the Hague
Conventions on the laws of war or jus in bello,
The first international instruments that set out to regulate war illustrate the 
reproduction of sexed subjects in hierarchal relations. They were concerned almost 
exclusively with (male) combatants, despite the already long history of war-time 
sexual abuse of women.97
Otto’s exposure of the complicity of the social construction of gender in international legal 
histories focuses on the international law of armed conflict/ humanitarian laws and 
international human rights laws. The myth of military protection, which in reality 
circumvents women’s ‘dignity and autonomy’,98 as indicated by Otto, is also a narrative that
underscores the laws that govern the naming and framing of jus ad bellum. An
understanding of the gendered continuum of violence becomes crucial to understanding the 
possibilities of exposing the ‘gendering of violence in the law’.99 The gendered continuum 
plays out both in regular legal histories of international law, which continually refer to
95 Knop, above note 92; Otto, ‘Lost in Translation’ in Orford (ed), International Law and Its Others, 
(Cambridge, 2007).
96 Ibid. at 322.
97 Ibid
98 Ibid at 323.
99 Peach, ‘The Gendering of Violence in the Law’ in Waller and Rycenga, Frontline Feminisms, 
(Routledge, 2001).
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national or domestic legal structures to explain and underpin the international legal edifice, 
and in doctrinal incursions into international law. Cockbum refers to the domestic analogy 
as ‘a connection between the violence women experience in everyday life and the violence 
of war. Women talk about a ‘continuum of violence*. The linking factor is ‘gender” .100 By 
exploring the ‘gendered continuum of violence* cultural understandings of femininity and 
masculinity are exposed as relevant to international law on the use of force. Yet rather than 
seeking gender’s removal or gender reversal my approach is to seek out, following Otto, 
gender’s fluidity.101 For Otto, this would require understanding women’s participation (in 
peace and security processes) as making a ‘transformative difference’ that can be used to 
‘challenge the ideas that war and masculinity are intertwined and that women are the 
peacemakers’.102 For Otto the key is to perceive a gender analysis as leading toward a 
‘“multi-gendered” transformation rather than one that is gender-free’.103
To conclude, Article 2(4) perceived as the normative lynchpin of the international order and 
the boundary between prohibited and justified force has a gendered history and functions as 
a sexed concept. When Article 2(4) and its history are analysed through the relationship 
between law, gender and violence the structural inequalities of international law are exposed. 
As a consequence I argue that feminist legal approaches must, on the one hand, challenge 
the limitations of Article 2(4) from a place ‘within’ the contemporary international law on 
the use of force. The re-structuring and development of the prohibition within Article 2(4) 
represents this type of necessary feminist project. On the other hand, as an approach to 
international law built on challenging the international legal structure from its foundations, 
feminist legal theoiy requires concurrent strategies that work to produce a re­
conceptualisation and re-imagining of international law and its boundaries, including Article 
2(4) and justifications for the use of force, outside of mainstream legal approaches.
I return to the prohibition in the concluding chapter of the thesis and suggest that it is the 
prohibition that demands increased attention and legal expansion rather than continued 
attention to potential justifications for the use of force. This conclusion is drawn from the 
underlying contention that the use of force, as a form of military behaviour, has adverse
100 Cockbum, ‘Feminist Antimilitarism’, in Women’s Teach-In: Antimilitarism, Fundamentalisms/ 
Secularism and Civil Liberties and Anti-Terrorism Legislation after September 11th 2001, Occasional 
Paper 14, (Women Living Under Muslim Laws, November 2003).
101 Otto, ‘A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325,’ 13, Michigan Journal o f Gender and Law, (2006), 113, at 170.
102 Ibid
103 Ibid.
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consequences for women regardless of the justification or authorisation underlying or 
legitimating force. The articulation of justifications ignores the gendered impact of military 
behaviour. Instead, I argue, a renewed focus on the prohibition encourages peace building 
and preventative strategies.
3.2 Authorising Force
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the power to authorise collective enforcement 
measures for the maintenance of international peace and security is granted to die Security 
Council. In the preceding chapter of the Charter, Chapter VI, the Council is directed to 
recommend the pacific settlement of disputes through ‘negotiation, enquiiy, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement. . .  or other peaceful means’.104 In contrast to the 
mandatory cooling off period in the Covenant of die League of Nations, Chapter VI has been 
utilised through largely non-binding language by the Security Council with respect to the 
pacific settlement of disputes and engages a low threshold, applying Chapter VI powers to 
events ‘likely to endanger international peace and security’ in Article 33 or ‘any dispute, or 
any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute’ under 
Article 34. Chapter VII, in contrast, gives the Council binding powers under a higher 
threshold for the purposes of authorising the use of force. Under Article 39 the Council 
should respond to ‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’ to 
‘maintain or to restore international peace and security’.105
The tension between soft and hard law developments in international law are of feminist 
interest.106 Chapter VI, with its emphasis on alternative methods of dispute resolution and 
preventative action, is a form of soft law,107 while Chapter VII in conjunction with Article 
25 of the Charter,108 empowers the Security Council to authorise coercive measures, 
including force, and grants the Council the capacity to create binding, hard law directing the
104 Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, Article 33. This article is directed at die parties to a 
dispute who ‘shall, first of all, seek a solution’ (through the means listed in the text), Article 36 (1) 
permits the Security Council to take action/ recommend procedures.
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Article 39; however, note die Advisory Opinion of the 
ICJ in the Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued presence o f South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 276 (1970) where the Court emphasised that 
the powers of the Security Council are derived from Article 25 of the Charter regardless of whether 
they are Chapter VI or Chapter VII resolutions.
106 Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 3, at 279.
107 Ibid, at 65-67.
108 Article 25 states: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’.
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use of force.109 Feminist scholarship interrogates legal categories that invoke a distinction 
between peace and coercion and argues that the dichotomy replicates a gendered hierarchy 
between socially constructed forms of feminised and masculine knowledge.110 I consider the 
social and cultural narratives that link authorised force and masculinity, implicitly distancing 
women and non-forceful means of conflict resolution across the thesis.
The primacy of gender in military behaviour, however, extends beyond the association of 
masculinity with the laws authorising the use of force. Chapter VII, under Article 41, 
empowers the Security Council to authorise measures short of the use of force. Article 42 
empowers the Security Council to authorise measures as may be necessary, including force. 
Article 41 has been developed by the Security Council primarily through economic 
sanctions, through contemporary targeted sanctions regimes and through the post-conflict 
justice regimes of the ad-hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Security 
Council has also extended its remit through the authorisation of peacekeeping forces.111 The 
power of the Security Council to define threats, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression 
(Article 39), to authorise sanctions (Article 41), and to authorise the use of force (Article 
42), as well as the institutional development of peacekeeping and post-conflict tribunals 
form the substantive focus of chapter two. My contention is that a system for the 
authorisation of collective force embeds assumptions about the capacity of states and 
militaries to use force in a proportionate manner and towards positive ends. The current 
system that ignores the complicity of states and militaries in gendered violence not only 
overlooks the ways that women’s security is threatened in peacetime and during war, but 
ignores the negative and lasting impact of conflict on women.112
The authorisation of force by the Security Council, even when it was rarely used during the 
Cold War, has been perceived as a settled and necessary aspect of the United Nations legal 
structure. State practice that has sought to extend the justifications for unilateral state force 
often underpins unilateral action with references to the corollary powers of the Security 
Council.113 For example, the United States led its allies into Iraq in 2003 and, although often 
regarded as a rejection or ‘bypass’ of the Security Council enforcement system, the
109 See Gray, above note 68, at 261-262, discussing the Security Council’s capacity to mandate 
peacekeeping operations.
Otto, above note 92.
111 Higgins, ‘A General Assessment of UN Peace-Keeping’ in Cassese, (ed), United Nations Peace- 
Keeping, (1978), 1-14.
112 Cockbum, and Zarkov, (eds), The Postwar Moment (Lawrence and Wishart, 2002).
113 See, for example: Greenwood, ‘International Law and die NATO Intervention in Kosovo’, 49, (4) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2000) 926, at 927,930.
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justification narratives deployed by the US were tied expressly to prior Security Council 
resolutions, such as Resolution 1441, to establish the legality of the use of force in Iraq.114 
Subsequent explanations of the invasion rely on this sense of ‘implied’ authorisation in past 
Security Council resolutions.115 In this sense, the capacity of the Security Council to 
authorise the use of force plays an important role in state justifications for the use of force. 
Despite the perception of Article 2(4) as a constraint on the use of force, a system that 
configures authorised force as possible and, consequently, as an effective method to resolve 
disputes, gives justifications for the use of force, voiced unilaterally by states, increased 
viability and range.
Chapter two analyses the power of the Security Council to define threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression (Article 39) and the power under Article 42 to 
authorise the use of force. Some material is also presented on the role of Article 41 
measures: specifically sanctions and the international criminal tribunals. I also consider UN 
peacekeeping initiatives as alternative narratives to the use of force. However, the 
conclusions drawn in relation to each of these areas of international law are limited and are 
not the primary focus of the thesis. For example, the partial analysis of the emergent area of 
international criminal law is only considered with respect to its impact for the international 
law on the use of force. The ambivalence expressed toward contemporary developments 
with respect to the criminalisation of sexual violence in armed conflict is indicative of 
deeper concerns about feminist developments at an institutional level that are, at times, 
disconnected from the plurality of feminist discourse in the academy.116 The primary 
argument in chapter two is that the lasting and negative impact of force as a gendered 
solution limits the usefulness of force as an enforcement mechanism, evidenced through 
analysis of Article 42. This challenges the paradigm of international law built on a positivist 
conception of law in a permanent relationship with violence. The extreme nature of this 
claim is revisited in the final chapter of the thesis.
114 US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Address to UN Security Council, (February 5th 2003) 
available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/200302Q5-l.html (last
accessed May 2009); also see Security Council Res 1441, (8th November 2002).
115 Greenwood, above note 77.
116 Heathcote, ‘From Security Council Resolution 1325 to 1820* Dept of Politics, Bristol University, 
Department of Politics, Channelling Our Knowledge ESRC Seminar on 'Understanding Gendered 
Agency in Violent Conflict', 14/ 15th November 2008.
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3.3 Justifications for the Use of Force
The predominant focus of the thesis is the construction of justifications for the use of force 
by states. The Charter permits states to use force unilaterally, outside Security Council 
authorisation, as a form of self-defence in response to an armed attack. Article 51 states,
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.
The existence of a right of states to act in self-defence is perceived as a customary 
international law right preserved in Article 51 of the Charter.117 Past treaties, such as the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and state practice, notably the Caroline Incident of 1837,118 are often 
invoked to explain the preservation of the right and the necessity of the continuance of a 
right of states to act in self-defence, as well as the contours of the right, in the UN era. The 
pedigree of Article 51 self-defence is often underscored by references to writers as far back 
as Augustine, St Thomas of Aquinas, Grotius, Vattel and Vitoria, to name a few.119 Each of 
these authors then come to play a role in the Western narrative on the use of force, 
establishing the timelessness of aggression between states and the capacity of international 
law to recognise some acts of force as justified. For example, Vattel is recorded as writing, 
‘[a] nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force..
. against the aggressor. It may even anticipate the other’s design, being careful, however, not 
to act upon vague or doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the 
aggressor’,120
One of the tasks of die thesis is to consider how justifications for force, such as that used in 
self-defence, gain credibility through international legal narratives that invoke certain 
criteria to underpin the normativity of self-defence. Historical narratives play a role in
117 Nicaragua Case, above note 71, at para. 176,191-5.
118 See Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases,’ 32, AJIL, (1938).
119 O’Connell, above note 67, at 106-126.
120 De Vattel, The Law o f Nations, Vol IV, at 3, (1758).
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grounding the continued resonance of the self-defence justification.121 My interest is in how 
analogies with interpersonal self-defence play a role in historical and contemporary accounts 
to explain the existence of the right of states to use defensive force. This can be traced back 
at least to Grotius who finds that the right of states to act in self-defence is self-evident 
through analogy with the right of individuals to act in self-defence as, ‘we shall hold to this 
principle, that by nature every one is the defender of his own rights; that is why hands were 
given us’.122 Grotius’s analogy and texts continue to be utilised in contemporary accounts 
that also seek to demonstrate the self-defence analogy with interpersonal self-defence. As a 
consequence, the perceived self-evidence of individuals to repel attacks on their bodily 
integrity is often granted by analogy to states to repel attacks on their territorial integrity.
In contrast to approaches that take for granted the self-evidence of an individual's right to 
act in self-defence (assuming the act meets tests of proportionately and necessity), feminist 
legal scholars have exposed the central role of legal self-defence in the perpetuation and 
construction of a masculine ‘normal’ subject in Western legal systems.123 It is this feminist 
engagement with the particularity and exclusionary nature of the interpersonal justification 
of self-defence that I test against the international justification of self-defence. I argue that 
the sexed and gendered features of self-defence replicated in Article 51 are not limited to the 
Charter: the paradigm of a sexed state exercising rational force in a controlled and 
proportionate manner is enhanced by customary law justifications. This is in part through the 
features of self-defence (proportionality and necessity) that mirror interpersonal limits on 
self-defence and are extended under international law to other forms of justified force and is 
in part due to contemporaiy understandings of how force is able to protect a population or a 
state.124
Beyond the domestic analogy, I analyse Article 51 through reference to the defence of 
Kuwait in 1991. This has been described by Western commentators as a ‘textbook case’ of 
self-defence.125 The Iraqi aggression was, mainstream narratives tell us, controlled and
121 O’Connell, above note 67, chapter one; Defter, I., The Law o f War, (Cambridge, 2000); Dinstein, 
War, Aggression and Self-defence, (Cambridge, 2001, 3rd Edition), at 163-165; also see, Kinsella, 
‘Gendering Grotius,’ 34 (2), Political Theory, (2006), 161.
122 Grotius, On Law o f War and Peace, Book I, Chapter m , (1814) at:
http://www.constitution.org/gro/dibp.htm para. 1,102.
123 See for example, Jacobs and Ogle, Self-Defense and Battered Women Who Kill: A New 
Framework, (Praeger, 2002); R v. Lavalee [1990] 1, S.C.R.
124 Chinkin, ‘The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Yugoslavia (FRY) under International 
Law’, 49 (4), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2000), 910.
125 O’Connell, above note 67, at 2.
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defended through the application of proportionate force.126 That Article 51 defined self- 
defence is found in a single event in the history of the United Nations Charter, despite state 
attempts to accommodate a range of other events within Article 51, calls that system into 
question. This is acknowledged by the increasing references to preemptive force and 
humanitarian interventions, yet enlarged models of justificatory force given voice in the 
West embed Article 51 in the narrative as central, useful and illustrative of a state’s capacity 
to use force in a controlled way. This thesis argues that, far from suggesting a shift away 
from the self-defence paradigm, twenty-first century narratives reinforce the relevance and 
persistence of Article 51 self-defence. By looking at conflicts often outside of the Western 
gaze, particularly conflicts in Africa, a very different understanding of conflict is 
illuminated.127 Although the thesis only peripherally engages non-Westem understandings 
and strategies for challenging armed conflict, non-Westem approaches provide evidence of 
the failure of the West to shift from a narrative of ‘the hero’s quest’128 to the slow path to 
peace. The hero’s walk is an excellent description of the predominant Western 
understanding of force as it identifies a Western hero that is male and that uses violence 
under international law without cultural or gender sensitivity.129 This thesis is concerned 
with exposing the sex and gender of the narratives of force. The cultural insensitivity of this 
narrative is thus a secondary, although no less important, theme.130
In chapter three I consider how the self-defence justification, contained in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, functions alongside of the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of 
force to replicate a model of behaviour drawn from interpersonal relations and projected 
onto states as international legal subjects. The following three chapters of the thesis test this 
contention against contemporary developments with respect to the use of force to support 
self-determination struggles,131 humanitarian intervention,132 and the use of preemptive force
126 Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, in Evans, International Law, (2006), at 792-3.
127 See, for example, Mgbeoji, Collective Insecurity, (British Columbia Press, 2004).
128 Orford, above note 62, at 67.
129 Buchanan and Johnson, above note 42, at 157-158.
130 Note, however, Murphy’s discussion of the accommodation of difference in feminist legal theories, 
Murphy, ‘Feminism Here and Feminism There: Law, Theory and Choice’, in Buss and Manji, above 
note 3.
131 See General Assembly Resolution 1514; for discussion, see: Crawford, The Creation o f States in 
International Law, (OUP, 2nd Edition, 2006), at 135, Crawford lists four different situations where the 
relationship between self-determination and the use of force must be considered.
132 For a survey of issues and opinions, see: Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention; 
Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, (CUP, 2003); International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, (International Development Research Centre, 
December 2001)
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in the era of a ‘War on Terror’.133 Each of these chapters also provide arguments for the re- 
conceptualisation of international law on the use of force; either through a further extension 
of the domestic analogy (as in chapter five on humanitarian intervention) or through the 
elevation of alternative narratives (as in chapter four on self-determination). The analysis of 
the ‘War on Terror’ is presented in chapter six, however, this is developed alongside the 
recognition in chapter three (on self-defence) that contemporaneous narratives on 
preemptive force and/or the ‘War on Terror’ function to disguise deep-set sexed and 
gendered narratives in the international law on the use of force. In this sense, the arguments 
in response to the US led ‘War on Terror’ are important to demonstrate the reach of sex and 
gender in ongoing accounts of war and law but are not the primary contention of the thesis.
The final chapter, on the ‘War on Terror’, also reflects on the overall conclusions of the 
thesis and what they mean for future feminist approaches to international law and for the 
international law on the use of force. I argue that feminist approaches can play a central role 
in the re-conceptualisation of the international law on the use of force. Such re­
conceptualisation pivots on strengthening the prohibition on violence and on force. Integral 
to this development is the insertion of feminist dialogues on natality, on women’s 
participation and on the inclusion of alternative narratives. The thesis does not project these 
as simple or even complete answers, rather as starting points for future feminist and 
mainstream dialogues that seek to disrupt the law-gender-violence paradigms that lead to 
women’s oppression, insecurity and discrimination. Underlying this conclusion is the 
knowledge that feminist legal projects must work ‘within’ accepted legal paradigms/ 
narratives as well as from a position outside mainstream projections of law.
Of particular concern in the final chapter, is the unanswered question of whether the use of 
force could, or should, ever be justified under a feminist approach. Although some feminist 
approaches have answered this in the affirmative, for example, in response to the widespread 
sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, this remains an under analysed 
aspect of feminist legal theories.134 Returning to the domestic analogy, feminist advocacy 
within domestic legal structures have persistently argued for recognition of the use of fatal 
violence by survivors of intimate partner abuse as a legal justification. I do not argue in the
133 Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September’, 14, EJIL, (2003), 
227; Taft and Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and International Law’, 97, AJIL (2003), 557; Reisman 
and Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense’, 100, (3) AJIL,
(2006), 525.
134 Above note, 37.
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thesis that a parallel enlargement of justifications for state force would be a positive feminist 
development. This is because underlying the domestic feminist claim for recognition of 
battered women who kill is an acceptance that state strategies to halt domestic violence are 
inadequate. On the international plane, I argue, before justifications for the use of force can 
be analysed from a feminist perspective recognition needs to be given to the relationship 
between law, gender and violence. This is in contrast to contemporary developments in the 
collective security structure that have recently indicated the possibility of the use of force to 
challenge violations of women’s rights, particularly Security Council resolution 1820 on 
women, peace and security and Security Council resolution 1807 on the possibility of the 
use of targeted sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.135
The justifications for the use of force analysed in the thesis are not the only justifications 
that states make when using military force on the territory of another state. Nor are state 
justifications always clearly articulated. Furthermore, state justifications are often argued in 
the alternative rather than presented as straightforward or as isolated reasons for the 
deployment of force. The pleadings of NATO states before the ICJ in the Legality o f the Use 
o f Force preliminary proceedings illustrate well the range of perceptions different states take 
with regard to their justifications for using force even when acting in concert.136 Some of the 
justifications that remain outside the focus of the thesis include the use of force with the 
consent (or invitation) of the state whose territory the force is deployed within,137 armed 
reprisals,138 countermeasures,139 protecting nationals abroad140 and intervention into civil 
wars.141
135 SC Res 1820, 18th June 2008, on women, peace and security in operative paragraph one 
“expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where 
necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence’; SC Res 
1807,31st March 2008; see further chapter two for discussion of these resolutions.
136 Legality o f the Use o f Force, (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports 1999 compare the written 
submission of the Kingdom of Belgium (setting out a doctrine of humanitarian intervention) with that 
of the United States (listing a variety of justifications) for further discussion see Gray, above note 67 
(3rd Edition), at 45-46.
137 For an indication of the range of state claims in this area, see: Gray, above note 67 (3rd edition), 
chapter 3.
138 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defense, (Oxford: 2001 3rd edition) at 194-5 describing armed 
reprisals as ‘measures of counter-force, short of war, undertaken by one state against another in 
response to an earlier violation’.
139 See Franck, above note 38, chapter 8.
140 Ibid. Chapter 6.
141 Above note 67, (3rd Edition) chapter 3; ibid Chapters 4 and 5.
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With respect to the international law on the use o f force, I make some specific 
recommendations, for example advocating a focus on strategies that reinforce the value and 
purpose o f the prohibition on force rather than a focus on justifications for violence. I make 
such recommendations with caution and with awareness that legal reform will always be 
circumscribed by the sexed and gendered discourse that unconsciously informs the self­
perceptions of humans across communities/ states/ cultures. I also consider the two way 
impact o f force; on states using force as well as on states that are the sites of conflict 
Drawing on the eloquent reading of the Iliad offered by Weil, I argue that until Western 
states fully engage with the destructive (sexed and gendered) consequences of military 
behaviour within our own communities we will remain blind to the failure o f force as an 
enforcement mechanism.142 In this sense, the larger purpose of the thesis is to advance 
Western self-reflection on the assumptions integral to our narratives of law, violence and 
gender and how we, as Western citizens, often come to international law projecting those 
assumptions as universals. By identifying the sexed and gendered contours o f the 
international law on the use of force, a key particular masked as universal is exposed, 
challenged and re-imagined.
142 Weil, ‘The Iliad, or the Poem of Force’, in Weil et al, War and the Iliad, (New York Review 
Books, 2005, first published 1945).
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CHAPTER TWO
AUTHORISING FORCE: CHAPTER V n
The cook knows salt, the composer strings, and the gardener soil; 
the war scholar should know gender.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Justifications for the use of force in international relations are sexed and gendered through 
their reliance on conceptual analogies with Western justifications for interpersonal violence. 
In this chapter, the capacity of the Security Council to authorise the use of force is analysed 
to demonstrate the relationship between armed conflict and threats to women’s security. The 
chapter contends that the enlargement of threats and the increased willingness of the 
Security Council to authorise force under the collective security structure provides a baseline 
for unilateral state solutions that are forceful. Consequently, the willingness of the collective 
security structure to pursue forceful and military solutions fails to respond to the nexus 
between armed conflict and gendered violence while reinforcing the use of force as a viable 
solution to complex international dilemmas and, increasingly, internal ones.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Part Two analyses the role of Article 39 of the UN 
Charter, which empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of threats to 
international peace and security, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. I argue that 
the contemporary broadening of the category of threats under Article 39 has consequences 
that flow through to justifications for the use of force, including the reluctance to see women 
as at risk from different threats to men and a conceptual blindness to women as individuals 
rather than as typically sexualised feminine stereotypes. Part Three considers the tools the 
Security Council has at its disposal when responding to a threat, breach or act of aggression. 
Article 41 measures, including sanctions and transitional justice mechanisms, Article 42 
authorisations of force and peacekeeping initiatives are analysed alongside contemporary
1 Goldstein, War and Gender, Cambridge, (2001), at 403.
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reports2 that have attempted to renew and review the international security structure in 
response to contemporary threats.31 assess how Article 41 has been interpreted and applied, 
acknowledging that Article 41 may provide an important check on the authorisation of 
military force and a genuine alternative narrative for international law. I conclude, however, 
that recent developments with respect to targeted sanctions signal more than ever the role 
that Article 41 measures play in endorsing future (unilateral) state justifications for the use 
of force. I follow this with consideration of Article 42 measures, drawing on the narratives 
of women working as sex workers adjacent to military bases to illustrate the role of sex in 
militaiy institutions and to further demonstrate the detrimental role of militaries and, 
consequently, armed conflict as threats to women’s security. I consider the two reports, A 
More Secure Worlct and In Larger Freedom5 that attempt to incorporate the increasing 
range of justifications for force used by states, (self-determination, humanitarian 
interventions and terrorism) within the collective security structure of the Charter. Both 
Reports deploy and develop the term ‘human security’ as an element of strengthening the 
collective security structure.6 I argue that these Reports, and the legal model assumed by 
them, constitute a continuation of the security model relied on during the Cold War and in 
the two decades since. As a continuation of past choices with regard to collective security, 
and specifically the authorisation of force, these reports make no inroads into challenging 
the gendered and sexed history of Charter regulation and authorisation of force.
The chapter provides an analysis of the legal structures utilised by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and challenges Security Council practice through the
2 Report of the Secretaiy-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2nd December 2004, UN Doc A/59/565 (henceforth A More 
Secure World); Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security 
and human rights for all, 2Dd March 2005, A/59/2005 (henceforth In Larger Freedom); also see GA 
Resolution A/Res/60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome.
31 am unable to cover the range of issues that need to be broached under this topic within the confines 
of the diesis, for a description of the law and pertinent legal issues, see; Frowein and Krisch, ‘Chapter 
VIF in Simma, The Charter o f the United Nations, (OUP, 2002, 2nd Edition); I consider the key 
articles that shape the collective response to threats to international peace and security, Article 39, 
Article 41 and Article 42 in this chapter. Other relevant articles in Chapter VII include Article 40 
(which permits the Security Council to make provisional measures as ‘it deems necessary or 
desirable’ before acting under Article 39) and Article 53 (which deals with the role regional 
arrangements and agencies might take in conjunction with Chapter VII)- These remain outside the 
immediate scope of the thesis.
4 Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2nd December 2004, UN Doc A/59/565 (henceforth A More 
Secure World).
5 Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human 
rights for all, 2nd March 2005, A/59/2005 (henceforth In Larger Freedom).
6 For a definition of human security see: Ogata and Sen, Human Security Now, Report of the 
Independent Commission on Human Security, (2003).
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use of the alternative account of conflict and security apparent when women’s narratives are 
incorporated into the analysis. The domestic analogy, in this chapter of the thesis, is used to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of a collective security model that has at its core patriarchal 
perceptions of policing and security. The capacity of the Security Council to determine the 
nature of threats to international peace and security, under Article 39 of the UN Charter, 
reinforces a model of security that prioritises threats to (elite) male members within a 
community as the primary threat to the state.
Part Three further argues that the disparity between threats and solutions rests in the 
broadening of threats to recognise non-state, non-traditional threats without a corresponding 
broadening of solutions to incorporate non-traditional, non-state and, it is argued, 
comprehensive non-violent solutions. A feminist analysis, therefore, concludes that a return 
to the conceptual base of the collective security structure is necessary to expose the 
inadequacy of force (whether justified or authorised) as a solution to the threats to women’s 
and men’s security. 7 The chapter contends that authorised military force, rather than 
increased in an international legal structure addressing ‘human security,’ requires reduction 
through attention to the negative consequences of military force for women and attention to 
alternative methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
2. ARTICLE 39
Article 39 grants the Security Council the power to determine the existence of threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression for the purpose of initiating Chapter VII 
acts. Article 39 states,
Outside of legal scholarship both empirical and conceptual accounts from international relations, 
gender theorists and feminist whose work analyses war and military behaviour challenge the 
universality of current international security regimes and suggests that understanding die complex 
functioning of gender is indeed crucial to understanding the functioning of states and international 
security. An integrated dialogue from feminist legal scholarship that speaks to international jurists 
needs to be added to these discourses. The law on the use of force, particularly Chapter VII powers of 
the Security Council, can then be exposed as part of the process of gendering international 
law/security rather than outside of it. See further Otto, ‘Integrating Questions of Gender into 
Discussion of "the Use of Force" in the International Law Curriculum', 6, Legal Education Review, 
(1996), 219; Chinkin in ‘A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force’, 12, Australian 
Yearbook o f International Law, (1992), 279; Buss, ‘Use of Force and the New Man of International 
Law,’ in Bartholemew (ed), Empire’s Law, (Pluto, 2006).
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The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with article 41 and 42 to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
The security narrative produced through the application of Article 39 can be described as 
particularised in two ways for the purposes of a feminist study. Firstly, application of Article 
39 is particularised through a dependency on the jurisprudence that forms Western liberal 
philosophical accounts of law. Secondly, like Western liberalism, the narrative is 
particularised through the reliance on a historically male form of legal subjectivity.
Liberal constructions of citizenship, derived from the Western notion of the family headed 
by a patriarch, profoundly inform constructions of international sovereignty giving the 
international a platform of assumptions that sex the security structure.8 Despite the changing 
understanding of sovereignty produced in response to internal state violations9 and non- 
Westem theoretical accounts of state power,10 traditional conceptions of sovereignty 
continue to inform the construction of the law on the use of force. Traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty produce a model of security where states, as sovereign citizens in the 
international order, are produced as actors analogous to the Western, liberal (masculine) 
subject requiring analogous forms of policing. Gardam suggests ‘the appropriate analogy 
from national law is . . .  the rules regulating the use of collective force by representatives of 
the State, such as the police. With some notable exceptions, most jurisdictions place legal 
restraints on the amount of force that may be used by such individuals in their public 
capacity’.11 However, in addition to the restraints on police powers, omissions in police 
action continue to define the risk of violence in the lives of many women. This chapter 
argues that, within the international system, similar omissions of action apply and define 
threats to women’s security as outside of international legal and political concern.
8 Note, I am writing here of the mainstream Western narrative on force, rather than an inherent quality 
of die laws on die use of force. This reflects my concern with the situated subject and the need for 
Western feminists to reflect and analyse the status quo of their own culture; see the discussion of 
culture and gender in chapter one.
9 Evans, Sahnoun, et al, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, (International Development Research Centre, Canada, December 
2001)
10 Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International 
Law’, 40, Harvard International Law Journal, (1999), 1.
11 Gardam, ‘Legal Restraints on Military Enforcement Action’, 17, Michigan Journal o f International 
Law (1996) 285, at 306; Frowein and Krisch, above note 3, at 721 stating ‘chapter VII confers upon 
the Security Council solely a police function’.
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2.1 Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression
Brownlie defines a threat as consisting in ‘an express or implied promise by a government of 
a resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of that government’.12 
Unlike Article 2(4) that prohibits the threat of force, Article 39 invokes Security Council 
action in response to any threat to the peace. This is significant, as it suggests while only 
threats that are associated with armed force are prohibited, collective enforcement action 
may attempt to curb a much wider category of behaviour. This capacity to broaden the 
nature of threats has been a feature of Security Council action apparent in the history of 
Article 39’s application.
The earliest broadening of Article 39 occurred in response to the attempt to control Southern 
Rhodesia by the Ian Smith government in 1966. Despite the internal nature of the political 
upheaval in Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council described the situation as a threat to 
international peace and security. In Resolution 221, of 9* April 1966, the Security Council 
authorised the use of force to secure the embargo on oil tankers in the region, finding 
breaches of the embargo would constitute a threat to the peace.13 In Resolution 232, of 16th 
December 1966, the Council defined the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a continued 
threat to international peace and security.14 This broad use of Article 39 was replicated in the 
1990s when the Cold War deadlock on the Council ended and the collective security system 
was able to operate more extensively.15 Importantly, the significant conflicts that invoked the 
collective security system after 1990 were primarily of an internal character, often 
humanitarian rather than military crises and assumed to be within Article 39 powers rather 
than clearly articulated as coming under Article 39 in resolutions.16 For example, in 1991, in 
Resolution 688, the Security Council expressed grave concerns over ‘the massive flows of 
refugees towards and across international frontiers’ and instigated Chapter VII measures to 
protect the Kurdish population in Iraq.17 In 1993, Security Council resolutions identified the 
failure of the Libyan government to renounce terrorism as a threat to international peace and
12 Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force, (1963) at 364; see also: Starchier, The Threat o f 
Force in International Law, (Cambridge, 2003); Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’, 82, AJIL, (1988) 239.
13 SC Resolution 221,9th April 1966.
14 SC Res 232, 16 December 1966 ‘Determines that the present situation in southern Rhodesia 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security'.
15 Repertoire o f the Practice o f the Security Council, 1989 -1992 Chapter XI.
16 See Security Council Res 929 (Rwanda 22nd June 1994), 841(Haiti 16th June 1994), 1125 (Central 
African Republic, 6th August 1997) in each case the threat was of a non-international nature and 
consisted of a humanitarian rather than military crisis. Security Council responses to Somalia and 
Liberia in Resolution 794 (3rd December 1992) and Res 813(26 March 1993) respectively, refer to a 
threat to peace and security in the region rather than an international threat
17 SC Res 688, 5* April 1991.
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security.18 In 1994, the humanitarian crisis and internal violence in Haiti led to the Security 
Council’s identification of a threat to regional peace and security and ‘acting under Chapter 
VIP the Council established a ‘multinational force* with the power to ‘use all means 
necessary’.19 Security Council actions in Albania and in the Central African Republic in 
1997 were also instigated under Chapter VII powers. In these two situations the unrest was 
internal, and in the case of Albania in response to financial crisis, yet described as 
constituting, in both cases, ‘a threat to peace and security in the region*.20
Article 39 also uses the term ‘breaches of the peace’ as a threshold for Security Council 
action under Chapter VII. The term ‘breach of the peace* has been invoked four times by the 
Security Council in its resolutions: in response to North Korean force against South Korea in 
1950, during the 1980’s Iran-Iraq conflict, in response to the 1982 Argentinean invasion of 
the UK occupied Falklands Islands and after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990.21 The four 
instances stand in contrast to the actual uses of militaiy force that could be said to have 
‘breached the peace’ since the inception of the UN Charter.22 For example, interstate 
conflicts in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 199323, in the Cameroon and Nigeria in 1994,24 and 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000,25 did not lead to Security Council identification of 
aggression or a breach of the peace, continuing the Cold War trend that saw the interests of 
powerful states dictate the range of violence that drew international attention. This was 
despite the cross border nature of these conflicts.
18 SC Res 883 of 11th November 1993.
19 SC Res 933,30th June 1994 and SC Res 940,31st July 1994.
20 See SC Res 1114 (Albania) 19th June 1997; SC Res 1125 (Central African Republic) 6* August 
1997.
21 SC Res 82, 7th July 1950 (Korea); SC Res 502, 3rd April 1982 (Falkland Islands); SC Res 598,20th 
July 1987(Iraq- Iran).
22 For a detailed list see Franck, Recourse to Force, (Cambridge, 2003); for discussion see Gray, The 
Use o f Force and International Law, (Oxford, 2004,2nd Edition), at 204.
23 SC Res 822, 30th April 1993: ‘Notes with alarm . . .  the latest invasion of die Kelbadjar district of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces’ while ‘reaffirming also the inviolability of 
international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory’.
24 See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, ICJ 
Reports (10* October 2002); in response to the Court’s findings Nigeria withdraw its troops from the 
disputed region, the Bakassi Peninsula in 2006.
25 In SC Res 1297,12* September 2000 and SC Res 1298,17* September 2000 the Security Council 
identifies a threat to international peace and security in response to the hostilities between the two 
states, in subsequent resolutions the Council refrains from identifying any Article 39 breach other 
than reference back to these two earlier resolutions, see, for example, SC Res 1312, 31st July 2000 
(establishing the UN Mission in the Ethiopia and Eritrea).
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A breach of the peace may be regarded as less than an act of aggression yet more than a 
threat. Considering the countless frontier incidents, belligerent reprisals, illegal occupations, 
armed conflicts, acts of political violence and political repression across the second half of 
the twentieth centuiy the development of this aspect of Article 39 by the Security Council 
appears limited. The absence of many conflicts from the list has, in part, to do with the 
consequences of finding an initiatoiy breach to trigger Chapter VII powers, as well as the 
political nature of conflict and of the Council. The reluctance of the Security Council to 
identify breaches of the peace is connected to the implications of doing so, as Article 41 or 
Article 42 action may be the next step. However, as form of violence constituted as less than 
aggression, Article 39 breaches of the peace represent an area of undeveloped potential for 
the Security Council where perhaps identification of a range of violent scenarios may be 
addressed without apportioning blame on a specific state.
The third element of Article 39 identifies acts of aggression as triggering Chapter VII 
powers of the Security Council. The Security Council has, in the past, identified acts of 
aggression under Article 39 from three states, Israel, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.26 
The scarcity of incidents is in part because an act of aggression would perhaps initiate a 
state’s right to individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. As 
many conflicts result in both parties to a conflict claiming self-defence, the Security Council 
has shown a reluctance to expressly grant the right of self -defence or to imply a right 
through the identification of an act of aggression.27
The reluctance of the Security Council to identify acts of aggression, combined with the 
potential for political deadlocks amongst the permanent members of the Council, led the
26 Security Council Resolutions: 573, 611, 387, 567, 568, 571, 574, 577, 455. Additionally, although 
commentators perceive the attacks in New York on September 11th 2001 as constituting an armed 
attack for die purposes of Article 51 self-defence, the Security Council, in Resolution 1368 defines 
the attacks as constituting a threat to international peace and security. The Resolution does, however, 
make reference to the right of states to use force in self-defence.
27 Also, note, when the Security Council has been bound through political stalemate the General 
Assembly has demonstrated a willingness to identify acts of aggression. For example, the General 
Assembly condemned the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 as an act of aggression 
in Resolution 36/27. The use of the term ‘act of aggression* did draw criticism from some states that 
saw this as an impingement on Security Council powers and abstained from voting for the resolution. 
(1982 UNYB 425. GA Res 36/27 (109-2-34) ‘condemns Israel for its premeditated and unprecedented 
act of aggression’). It should be noted that the resolution did recommend further Security Council 
action rather than attempting to replace Security Council action: in para. 5 the General Assembly 
‘Reiterates its request to the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action to prevent 
Israel from further endangering international peace and security*.
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General Assembly to clarify the meaning of ‘aggression’ in 1975.28 The General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression sets forth the type of acts that constitute unjustifiable aggression. 
Article 3 of the Definition includes invasion and attack by armed forces, military occupation, 
annexation of territory, blockade of ports or coastlines, bombardment or the use of any 
weapons against another state or its armed forces and the acts of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars and mercenaries which carry out acts of such gravity as to amount to the 
equivalent of any of the other components of the definition 29 In Article 4 the Assembly 
acknowledges this is not an exhaustive list. Despite being open-ended, the focus of 
Resolution 3314 is on military force and military behaviour. The Definition of Aggression 
will be supplemented, possibly superseded, by the development of the crime of the 
aggression under the Rome Statute that creates the International Criminal Court. As yet, it is 
not clear whether the Security Council will retain exclusive power to identify acts of 
aggression and, under what is referred to as the ‘red-light’ provision, to halt investigations 
into acts of aggression through the use of Chapter VII powers, if amendments to the Rome 
Statute as recommended by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression are 
accepted by state parties.30 The most recent report from the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression defines the act of aggression as, ‘the use of armed force by a state 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state’ 
reiterating the military and state-centric view of aggression for the purposes of international 
law.31
Although there has been limited identification of acts of aggression by the Security Council, 
attempts to define aggression illustrate the state-centric, military understanding of aggression 
under Chapter VO. In contrast, through its generous application of the notion of threats 
under Article 39 the Security Council has shifted away from its role as an arbiter of the 
external relationships between states and increasingly shown a willingness to interrogate the 
‘domestic’ or internal acts of states. Humanitarian crises and civil conflicts have been 
brought to the attention of international institutions and have been defined as threats to 
international order under Article 39. In some cases this has lead to the authorisation of 
Article 41 and Article 42 acts by the Security Council, that is the use of measures short of 
force under Article 41 or the authorisation of force under Article 42. The internationalisation
28 GA Res 3314,14* December 1974.
29 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Merits, 1986 ICJ Reports 14, 
Pienceforth Nicaragua case, para 195.
0 Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Report o f the Sixth Session, 20th February, 
2009, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2; for discussion see; Weisbord, ‘Prosecuting Aggression’, 49, Harvard 
International Law Journal, (2008) 162.
31 Ibid., see Annex 1 of the Report
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of crises internal to a state, however, has been selective and has developed in a way that does 
not impact significantly on the domestic structure of powerful states. Consequently, the 
limited definition of aggression, confined to interstate military force maintains state 
impunity for aggressive acts, particularly internal structural violence that targets civilian 
security through file negation of women’s security. This has distinct consequences for the 
potential for violence against women to emerge on the international security agenda. 
Furthermore, the selective nature of interventions into internal disturbances/ crises/ conflict/ 
unrest mimics the selective nature of interventions into domestic family violence within 
national legal structures, demonstrating how omissions to act as well as choices to intervene 
function to regulate both public and private spheres.32
In response to Article 39 and of concern to feminist approaches to international law, are 
questions of how the three categories of violence exclude aggressive state policies that 
dictate women’s poverty, segregation, ill-health and death. Consequently, the destructive 
and fatal cost of Taliban policies for women in Afghanistan in the 1990s was not identified 
by either the Security Council or the General Assembly as aggression, as a threat to or a 
breach of the peace.33 The removal of women from public space, the denial of education and 
the denial of health services, the ‘apartheid’ system, that was overt and aggressive in 
Afghanistan, was not defined as an act of aggression or considered to be related to the 
subsequent threat to international peace and security posed by the Taliban harbouring of the 
terrorist organization, Al-Qaida.34 Thus, legal scholarship emphasises the Taliban regime’s 
complicity in terrorism, while the gross human rights abuses directed at the population, 
particularly women, under the regime are downplayed or presented as historical.35 In 
contrast to the failure of the Security Council to connect the Taliban sexist apartheid with its 
complicity in terrorist attacks, in resolutions issued by the Security Council from 1976 
through to 1985, the acts of aggression that South Africa directed at neighbouring states
32 See further the discussion in chapter five.
33 See, for example, SC Res 1363 (30 July 2001) and Perrin ‘Women Banned from Kabul Hospitals’, 
in Sassdli and Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Vol U Cases and Documents, (2nd Edition, 
ICRC, 2006), at 2297.
34 See SC Res 1363,30* July 2001; SC Res 1378,14* November 2001.
35 For example, Gray’s account makes no mention of the Taliban’s oppressive gender apartheid, 
despite the obvious legacy this will have on attempts to re-structure Afghan political and social 
infrastructure, see Gray, above note 22; Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of 
Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq’, 4, San Diego International Law Journal, (2003), 7; Franck, 
above note 22; compare to the approach of Charlesworth and Chinkin, ‘Sex, Gender and September 
11 ’, 96 (3), AJIL, (2002), 600.
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were consistently linked with the racist apartheid regime within that state.36 In early 
resolutions the link is implied. For example, in Resolution 387 (1976) the Council condemns 
South African attacks on Angola as acts of aggression and condemns the apartheid structure 
separately in a following resolution, stating, ‘the policy of apartheid is a crime against 
conscience and dignity of mankind (sic) and seriously disturbs international peace and 
security’.37 By 1985 the link is explicitly stated by the Council. The preamble to Resolution 
577 states ‘these wanton acts of aggression by the minority racist regime in South Africa 
form a consistent and sustained pattern’.38 Unlike the linkage of the South African history of 
apartheid and external aggression, the Taliban internal policy of aggression against women 
and the harbouring of terrorists have not been explicitly linked in legal instruments. 
However, the Afghan reality joins studies of pre-conflict indicators,39 and four decades of 
feminist scholarship that acknowledges the role violence against women, as an aggressive 
state policy, plays in undermining international peace and security.40
2.2 The Domestic Analogy
Feminist theory identifies the ‘domestic’ or private acts of a state as aligned with the private 
sphere of liberalism that is traditionally left unregulated by the legal structure. However, 
feminist legal theory also exposes the fallacy of this aspect of liberalism by highlighting the 
range of interferences the liberal state has always conducted in the ‘private’ sphere.41 The 
overt claim of international law, as governing the external relations between states, is 
challenged by the range of interferences by the international legal structure, through the 
actions of the Security Council, into the internal (domestic) activities of the state, and (more 
recently) through Article 41 measures that target individuals 42 However, any gains achieved 
from bringing the ‘private’ or ‘domestic’ into the realm of international legal regulation are 
countered by the confines of the system that continues to marginalise actors that fail the test 
of statehood. Therefore, while the Security Council has given the appearance of broadening 
the scope of Article 39, at least with respect to threats, this application generally rests on the
36 This is not to suggest the impact of racist state policy can be simply aligned with state orchestrated 
or tolerated gendered oppression, nor to ignore the complex inter-relationship and overlap of 
racialised and gendred violence.
37 Security Council Resolution 392 (1976).
38 Security Council Resolution 577 (1985).
39 Schmeidl, Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action, International Alert, June 
2002.
40 Morgan, The Demon Lover, (Piaktus, 2001,2nd Edition), chapter two; also see: also see Amis, The 
Second Plane, (Cape: 2008) connecting the masculine violence of the 9/11 terrorists with negation of 
female citizenship common to religious fundamentalism, at 19,49.
41 Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, (Hart, 1997), 73 -78.
42 See section 3.1.1 below.
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assumption that the threat must be to a state and to the continued capacity of the state under 
attack to exist.43 The ‘broadening’ of Article 39, under this analysis, plays a role in 
perpetuating in international law the flaws of liberalism identified by Western feminist 
accounts, that is, the Security Council’s approach to threats under Article 39 may remove 
some boundaries but maintains a boundary between public and private regulation that is 
sexed.
In a similar manner, the In Larger Freedom Report uses the concept of human security to 
enlarge the list of threats to international peace and security that fall within the purview of 
international law. The Report was constructed by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to 
address the success and implementation of the Millennium Development goals five years 
after their construction and to preface the Millennium Outcomes document that state parties 
were to vote on later in 2005.44 The Report states:
The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just 
international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and 
environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences . .
45
The In Larger Freedom Report develops the recommendations of the earlier report, A More 
Secure World, commissioned by the SecretaryGeneral and constructed by a high-level panel 
of experts. A More Secure World describes a threat as ‘any event or process that leads to 
large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the 
international system’.46 This appears to mimic and consolidate the proclivity of the Security 
Council to see threats to the peace as more than cross border aggression. Yet this attempt to 
utilise the concept of human security within the collective security system ties potential 
threats to die existence to the state. Widespread violence against women, while able to fulfil 
the first aspect of this test, fails the second test because violence against women is not 
perceived as undermining the primacy of the state in the international system. Violence 
against women, both during and outside of officially recognised armed conflicts, tends to 
occur in private and is, consequently, cast as an offence against the individual rather than the
43 The establishment of no-fly zones to protect the Kurdish people in northern Iraq stands as isolated 
example, although the Security Council did not explicitly authorise the use of force, see McDonald, 
‘Self-determination and Kurdish Women’, in Mojab, Women o f a Non-state Nation, (Mazda, 2001).
44 See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last accessed May 2009); GA Resolution A/Res/60/1 
2005 World Summit Outcome.
45 In Larger Freedom above note 2, para. 78.
46 A More Secure World Report, above note 2, at 12 [italics added] and page 15, which states ‘we all 
know all too well that the biggest security threat we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far 
beyond states waging aggressive war’.
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group.47 In fact, feminist texts challenging global violence against women specifically seek 
to re-imagine the state in international relations, suggesting the state may be a barrier to the 
eradication of violence against women.48 In addition, social, cultural and political norms 
combine to construct a large proportion of violence against women as occurring within the 
private domain and this is then represented in legal norms as ‘normal’. These intertwined 
sets of norms may particularise in individual communities yet they have global consistency. 
This intersection of social norms and cultural norms with political and legal norms, 
consequently, creates a specifically gendered form of ‘domestic’, ‘private* and ‘cultural’ 
harms that are invisible to political and legal regulation.49
For example, A More Secure World, when considering human security, identifies six major 
threats to international peace and security: economic and social threats (including poverty, 
infectious diseases and environmental degradation), inter-state conflict, internal conflict, 
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism and transnational 
organised crime. If we focus on just one aspect of these threats, poverty, it becomes clear 
that the understanding of threats, in assuming the state as the basic unit of international 
relations, ignores how these threats affect women in a different way from how they affect 
men. International data suggests, of the 100 million people who live in extreme poverty, the 
overwhelming percentage are women.50 In A More Secure World, there is a failure to 
identify the nexus between sex and poverty, or what other UN Reports label the 
Feminisation of Poverty.51 The Report, within the discussion of poverty, twice makes 
specific reference to women, firstly, as at risk of maternal mortality when living in poverty,52 
and secondly, through a reference to gender equality in the list of ‘ambitious but feasible’ 
goals of the UN Millennium Declaration (later the Millennium Development Goals).53 By 
missing the opportunity to see poverty as a gendered problem, A More Secure World 
exposes the sexed assumptions the international security dialogues function within, which
47 See Valchovd and Biason(eds), Women in an Insecure World, (DCAF, 2005).
48 Knop, ‘Re/statements: Feminism and Sovereignty in International Law’, 3 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems, (1993), 293, at 308,316.
49 However, note the readiness of international community to respond to transnational organized 
crime, UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, GA Doc. 55/25, 15th November 2000, 
(entered into force 2tfh September 2003). For a UN wide strategy on challenging violence against 
women, see Secretary-General In-depth Study o f All Forms o f Violence against Women, 9* October, 
2006, A/61/122/Add.l. The Report does not contain specific recommendations for die Security 
Council to act on.
50 Above note 2, at page 26 (quoting 100 million people living in extreme poverty); also see, UN 
Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Platform for Action, September 1995, para. 47.
51 Ibid para 48.
52 A More Secure World, above note 2.
53 Above note 2, at 28 (para 57); the Report goes on to acknowledge in para. 59 ‘Little has been done 
to address the gender aspects of the Millennium Development Goals’.
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represent threats to international peace and security as gender neutral. By failing to 
incorporate recognition of women as the main victims of poverty, A More Secure World is 
unlikely to lead to tangible strategies for hearing the needs of those who face the extreme 
consequences of poverty: women. The consequential threats that women face during conflict 
can often be linked to their vulnerability as economic actors. The oblique references to 
maternal health and gender equality further expose the limited normative perceptions of the 
collective security system, which fail to see women as more than mothers or statistics. This 
approach is replicated in the later report from the Secretary-General In Larger Freedom 
document.54
Under this analysis what is implicit in the past action of the Security Council is made 
explicit in the recent Reports from the Secretary-General. That is, while die international 
system is able to accommodate a broad range of threats to international peace and security, 
and invoke Chapter VII powers as a consequence, there continues to be a weighted 
assumption that the threat must be to a state. The incorporation of a division between legal 
subjects with standing to invoke the collective enforcement mechanisms and legal subjects 
without access to the Security Council chambers reflects a sexing of the international legal 
subject of the state. Women, by definition, exist outside and within the structure of the state. 
As a consequence women are ‘theoretically’ given access to the international security 
structures through the vehicle of the state, yet the poverty of actual representation of women 
in state institutions ultimately mitigates against this facilitating reforms that 
comprehensively challenge violence against women. As such, threats to women are not 
usually perceived as threats to the continued existence of the state.
Feminist approaches to international law have developed limited narratives on potential 
ways forward in response to the legal framing of collective security. On the one hand, social 
and empirical accounts of violence against women have argued for the recognition of the 
gendered continuum of violence. This has influenced institutional activism and led to the 
two important Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, resolutions 1325 
and 1820.55 The most recent of these, resolution 1820, indicates the possibility of widespread 
sexual violence in conflict as constituting a threat to international peace and security and 
thus as a possible trigger for future authorised force under Article 42. Critical scholarship 
from feminist scholars has, however, indicated apprehension at the turn to international
54 Above note 2.
55 SC Res 1325,31st October 2000; SC Res 1820,18th June 2008.
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enforcement to regulate widespread sexual violence during conflict without thorough 
analysis of the sexed and gendered parameters international security mechanisms function 
within.56 In terms of the domestic analogy, the turn to the Security Council to police 
violence against women, or under Security Council resolution 1820 sexual violence 
perpetrated by militaries, replicates the turn to national legal structures to police domestic 
violence and sexual violence that, as feminist scholarship documents, has been marred by 
institutional and structural limitations that parallel cultural gender inequalities.57
Three arguments are evidenced from this analysis. Firstly, the broadening of threats in the 
contemporary collective security environment replicates a Western domestic model built on 
a distinction between public and private spheres to co-ordinate the regulation of legal 
subjects. Despite incursions into the private (or domestic) space of states women are denied 
a voice or adequate participation within the private arena of states, particularly states that are 
recognised as threats to international peace and security. Secondly, even when women’s 
security is paramount, for example, in situations of extreme poverty, the gender component 
of this threat is either erased through gender neutral language or frustrated through sexed 
and sexualised stereotypes that represent women as mothers or women as sexually 
vulnerable rather than as actors with capacity, rights or agency. Thirdly, despite attempts, 
through recent collective security documents to contain responses to broader categories of 
threat within the collective security structure, state justifications for force have mirrored 
Security Council enlargement of the category of threat. The paradigm case is arguments for 
unilateral humanitarian interventions that emerge after the Security Council included 
humanitarian crises within the range of threats under Article 39 during the 1990s.
23 A Feminist Approach to Article 39
Study of the use of Article 39 by the Security Council, highlights the flexibility with which 
the Council, and other arms of the UN, are prepared to define the international security 
mandate and how, as is seen in recent documents, reports and resolutions, international 
institutions give the appearance of responding to critical analysis of security issues, 
including critical and third world challenges to the veil of sovereignty.58 At the same time, 
the identification of a broader threat, inclusive of women’s rights, would be
56 Otto, *A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325,’ 13, Michigan Journal o f Gender and Law, (2006), 113.
57 Graycar and Morgan, The Hidden Gender o f the Law, (Federation, 2002,2nd Edition).
58 For example, Security Council Res 1296, 19 April, 2000 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict.
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counterproductive, or result in gender solipsism, if die security consequence was a broader 
mandate for authorised force. Indeed, by responding to critical challenges regarding the 
nature of threats, the current international apparatus gives the appearance of moving forward 
yet fails to also include critical scholarship on the limitations of force as a solution to global 
security threats.59 Current proposals to widen the remit to authorise force in preemptive and 
humanitarian situations, in this context, emerge as narrow responses to broad and complex 
problems. Despite the inadequacies of Article 39 so far identified, it would be misleading to 
describe this as the full range of Security Council approaches. The Security Council has 
constructed important alternative narratives (and action) through peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding initiatives, through the sanctions regime and through post-conflict justice 
tools, such as the ad-hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. I discuss these 
narratives, as well as the capacity of the Security Council to authorise the use of force under 
Article 42 in the following part of the chapter. As noted earlier, the Security Council also 
has the power to recommend peaceful methods of dispute resolution under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter.
The approach of contemporary reports and resolutions on threats, breaches, and acts of 
aggression, stand in contrast to feminist dialogues on re-imagining the terrain of the 
international legal security structure. For example, Chinkin uses Gunning’s model of world- 
travelling, alongside An-Naim’s process of "cross cultural dialogue’, to understand the 
dilemmas posed by different accounts of security and to re-imagine security structures. 60 
The Great Lakes Security Pact, signed by eleven Central Africa states in 2006, demonstrates 
the possibilities of international law embracing this kind of pluralism. The Pact, which 
includes Protocols on sexual violence against women, on democracy and good governance 
and on non-aggression and mutual defence, was constructed through consultation with 
women and women’s NGOs, as well as civil society generally.61
59 See, for example, Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, (Sage, 1996); Chandler, ‘The Road to 
Militaiy Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda’, 23 
(3), Human Rights Quarterly, (2001) 678.
60 Chinkin in Gowlland-Debbas (ed) United Nations Sanctions and International Law, (Kluwer,
2001), at 390; Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perception, World-travelling and Multicultural Feminism’ in Wing 
(ed), Critical Race Feminism, (NYU Press, 1997); An-Naim, ‘Problems of Univerasal Cultural 
Legitimacy for Human Rights’ in An-Naim and Deng (eds), Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural 
Dialogues, (Brookings, 1990).
61 For discussion see: International Law in Situations o f Post-conflict: The Great Lakes Peace 
Process, LSE International Humanitarian Law Project, available online at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/proiects/greatlakes/ihl-greatlakes-summarv.htm (last accessed 
May 2009); see further the discussion in chapter six.
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At an analytical level, Orford argues mainstream international law commentators should 
regard feminist dialogues on difference as a starting point for re-defining security to be 
inclusive of difference, including women’s difference.62 To redefine security and, therefore, 
to redefine the meaning of Article 39,
[m]ainstream international lawyers should recognise that there is something to be 
learnt from feminist scholars . . . the emphasis which feminist theorists place on 
difference, far from being anarchical or nihilistic, lays new ground for negotiating 
interconnections and alliances among differently situated individuals.63
Feminist theory provides in depth understanding of its own partiality, and cultural 
limitations, which could be developed to create a model for the re-definition and re- 
imagining of security norms.64 However, at present, despite the broad understanding of what 
constitutes a threat to the peace, despite the potential of a wide understanding of the phrase 
‘breaches of the peace’ under Article 39 to include non-military threats, and despite the 
linkage of the internally repressive apartheid regime in South Africa with that state’s 
external acts of aggression, women’s security concerns remain hidden in a system that 
universalises elite (white) men’s definitions of threats and harms to humans.65
While reform of the Security Council and the collective security regime generally is a 
project outside of the scope of the thesis, the underlying claim, that force as a solution 
complicates and extends threats to women’s security, is utilised to further demonstrate the 
weakness of the use of justified unilateral force in forthcoming chapters. The final chapter of 
the thesis returns to this conclusion and calls for a (re)vision of the international law on the 
use of force that has the futility of force and the capacity of humanity for creation (rather 
than destruction) as the foundation for future legal norms.
62 Orford, ‘The Politics of Collective Security’, 17 Michigan Journal o f International Law, (1995) 
373, at 408 to 409.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid; Confortini, ‘Galtung, Violence and Gender’, 31 (3), Peace and Change, (2006) 333
65 For an alternative approach see Askin, ‘Prosectuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender Related 
Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’, 21 (2), Berkeley 
Journal o f International Law, (2003), 288 at 349 where she claims, ‘sexual violence, at very least rape 
and sexual assault, have risen to the level of a jus cogens norm’.
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3. AUTHORISING FORCE AND MEASURES SHORT OF FORCE
In this section, I consider the measures available to the Security Council to maintain 
international peace and security. The discussion incorporates measures short of force 
(Article 41) and the authorisation of force under (Article 42). I begin with a review of the 
power of the Security Council to authorise sanctions. Feminist analysis of the post­
millennium shift to targeted and smart sanctions has been limited; consequently, I argue that 
future feminist dialogues need to engage the fundamental issue of how to structure a legal 
system without force or coercion to adequately challenge contemporary uses of Article 41. 
This raises questions on the relationship between law and violence and the underlying 
anthropomorphism of international legal subjects. The law and violence relationship, in 
influencing the construction of the international legal subject, constructs a masculine legal 
persona for states that implicitly justifies specific forms of violence. Furthermore, 
contemporaiy US justifications for strikes against terrorist actors on foreign territory are 
legitimated by the current targeted sanctions regime that bypasses civil and political 
protections of the accused. The discussion of Article 41 also broaches the issue of 
transitional justice mechanisms, specifically the ad-hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
(the ICTY) and Rwanda (the ICTR) and the hybrid court in Sierra Leone. I argue that any 
positive developments in these forums, for example the prosecution of sexual violence in 
specific conflicts/ contexts, are undermined by the limited legal paradigm the tribunals have 
been shaped to function within.
In the central discussion of this part of the chapter, I examine Article 42 of the UN Charter, 
sidestepping the usual array of issues so as to give prominence to the relationship between 
sex/gender and the use of militaiy force. By highlighting the gendered dimension of military 
engagements, I argue the perception of authorised force as a ‘successful’ enforcement tool is 
significantly challenged by feminist approaches. The closing discussion considers 
contemporary initiatives around peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement as 
containing alternative narratives to Article 42.
3.1 Article 41, Measures Short of Force
Article 41 empowers the Security Council to authorise measures short of force. The text of 
Article 41 states:
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The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Feminist analysis of Article 41 and its role in the collective security regime has not been 
extensive.66 Feminist scholarship tends to focus on specific measures authorised under 
Article 41 and the consequences of such measures for women.67 The two types of provisions 
the Security Council has developed under Article 41 are sanctions and transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as the ad-hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Feminist analysis of sanctions emerged after the decade 
long sanctions directed against the state of Iraq.68 Feminist analyses of the ICTY and the 
ICTR have critiqued,69 challenged,70 praised71 and influenced the role of these institutions in 
prosecuting sexual violence during conflict.72 Feminist scholarship has less often assessed 
the role of the ad-hoc tribunals in the development of contemporary norms on the use of 
force.73
I argue that both sanctions and transitional justice mechanisms play a role in consolidating 
Article 42 authorised force as part of an apparently gender neutral and therefore responsive 
collective security regime. As a consequence, I argue that Article 41 functions to bolster the 
appearance of Article 42 force as a viable solution to the increased range of threats the 
Security Council has acknowledged as within the concern of the collective security structure. 
Furthermore, the reliance of states on the existence of Article 41 sanctions to strengthen 
unilateral justifications for force represents an unexplored aspect of the international security 
structure. The potential use of sanctions to combat sexual violence in conflict, therefore, 
represents a site where feminist perspectives require articulation and reflection. At the other
66 For a starting point, see the discussion of Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries o f 
International Law, (Manchester, 2000), from 301.
67 See, for example, Buck, Gallant and Nossal, ‘Sanctions as a Gendered Instrument of Statecraft’, 24, 
Review o f International Studies, (1998), 69; Stark, ‘UN Sanctions Against the Taliban’, 95, ASIL 
Proceedings, (2001), 24-25; Bahdi, ‘Iraq, Sanctions and Security: A Critique,’ 9, Duke Journal o f 
Gender Law and Policy, (2002), 237.
68 Orford, above note 62, at 379-380.
69 Chinkin, ‘Feminist Reflections on International Criminal Law’ in Zimmerman (ed), International 
Criminal Law and the Current Development o f Public International Law, (Duncker and Humblot:
2002), 125.
70 Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal 
Law”, 25, Windsor Journal o f Access to Justice, (2007), 3.
71 Bergoffen, ‘Toward a Politic of the Vulnerable Body’, 18 (1), Hypatia, (2003), 116.
72 Hailey, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in 
Positive International Criminal Law’, 30 Michigan Journal o f International Law, (2008), 1.
73 See Chinkin, ‘Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law’, 5, EJI,L (1994), 326.
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end of conflict, transitional justice mechanisms have received extensive feminist debate 
although primarily as an element of contemporary international criminal law. I argue that the 
relationship between transitional justice measures and the use of force requires increased 
feminist analysis.
3.1.2 Sanctions
The Security Council first used Article 41 in 1966 when Security Council resolution 221 
authorised the use of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. However, it was the prolonged 
use of sanctions in Iraq, during the 1990s that illustrated the ineffectiveness of broad based 
economic sanctions and instigated international concern regarding the impact of sanctions on 
civilians.74 By 1995 the Secretary-General had concluded sanctions ‘raise the ethical 
question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a 
legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be 
affected . . . \75 The Secretary-General also noted the obstruction of humanitarian efforts 
caused by sanctions against the Iraqi government, the spill-over effect on neighbouring 
economies, the potential to enhance a leader’s credibility (as the UN appears as the cause of 
the greater suffering) and the long term implications for the target economy as features of 
Article 41 sanctions.76 The decade of sanctions against Iraq also highlighted the negative 
consequences of Article 41 measures in terms of nutrition, health and civil infrastructure for 
target populations.77 Feminist scholarship has demonstrated how economic sanctions have 
specific consequences for civilian women.78
Consequently, the development of ‘smart’ and ‘targeted’ sanctions in the past decade has 
been, in part, a response to the criticisms of the severe consequences of the sanctions against
74 See, for example, Bhatia, Kawar and Shahin, Unheard Voices: Iraqi Women on War and Sanctions, 
(CHANGE, 2001); Bossuyt, Adverse Consequences o f Economic Sanctions and the Enjoyment o f 
Human Rights, UN ECOSOC, E/CN.42/200/33 (2000).
75 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, (1995), para. 70.
76 Ibid.
77 ‘Report of the Second Panel Established Pursant to the Note by the Security Council of 30 January 
1990 (S/1999/100), Concerning the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq’, s/1999/346, annex (30 
March 1999); also see FAO/WFP/WHO, ‘Assessment of Food and Nutrition in Iraq (May/June 2000). 
However, also see the work of Cortright and Lopez which suggests the failure to find weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq suggests the decade of sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime was 
successful, see ‘Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked’, 83 (4), Foreign Affairs, (July/Aug 2004), 90 - 
103 available at www.fourthfreedom.org .
78 Buck, Gallant and Nossal, ‘Sanctions as a Gendered Instrument of Statecraft*, 24, Review o f 
International Studies, (1998), 69.
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Iraq in the 1990s.79 Even before the instigation of the ‘War on Terror* by the United States 
and its allies, the Security Council acknowledged the need for a sanctions regime that 
impacted less on civilian wellbeing.80 Smart sanctions have developed as strategies that are 
directed at significant economic enterprises that fuel conflict, for example the diamond trade 
in Sierra Leone.81 Targeted sanctions compel states to take action against named individuals 
or groups. For example, Security Council Resolution 1267, of 15* October 1999, established 
the ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’ that directs governments to freeze assets, 
apply travel embargoes and arms embargoes on (suspected) members of Al-Qaeda or the 
Taliban.82 This has resulted in a shift toward the Security Council preference for sanctions 
targeted at individuals, and their assets, rather than broad based sanctions against states. This 
can be contrasted with the discussion of threats to individuals in the previous discussion. 
Under the analysis of Article 39,1 argued that threats to individuals within a state must reach 
a threshold that also represents a threat to the stability of the state as a whole. Threats to 
women’s security do not reach this threshold suggesting a reconfiguration of the state may 
be necessary to effectively halt violence against women. In contrast, under the sanctions 
regime, the Security Council has shown itself willing to direct sanctions law at individuals 
and effectively bypass the state.
A key concern in relation to the current approach of the Security Council is the permissive 
role given to the security services of powerful states in locating and identifying potential 
terrorists without the necessity of providing evidence or compliance with democratic norms 
on the rights of an accused. Targeted sanctions may also play a role in justifications for 
targeted strikes against terrorist actors, illustrating the continued nexus between Article 41 
and the use of force. That is, this emergent justification for the use of force, couched in the 
language of the ‘War on Terror’,83 replicates developments under the authority of the 
Security Council in the construction of targeted sanctions under Article 41. However, when 
individuals are wrongly listed under Article 41 measures it may still be possible for those 
individuals to challenge the mis-labelling despite the lack of guarantees of fundamental 
rights in the structure of targeted sanctions, as has occurred in the case of Kadi.u  When the
79 Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions’, 13 (1), EJIL (2002), 43.
80 Gardam, ‘Legal Restraints on Military Enforcement Action*, 17, MJIL (1996) 285; O’Connell, 
‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’, 13, EJIL, (2002), 63.
81 See SC Res 1306, 5* July 2000; however I do not provide an analysis of smart sanctions.
82 SC Res 1267 (15th October 1999); see also SC Res 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 
(2004), 1617 (2005) and 1735 (2006) which develop the broader approach of Res 1267 to apply to 
named individuals.
83 See further chapter six.
84 Kadi v Council o f the European Union and the Commission o f the European Communities, Case T- 
315/01
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model is used to justify the use of force, as has been the policy of the US since at least 2006, 
there is little scope for those killed to challenge any potential miscarriages of justice. Media 
reports from Somalia,85 Syria86 and Pakistan,87 where this type of ‘targeted’ force has been 
used by the US also suggest that targeted strikes cany high risks to civilians. It is not only 
the language of ‘targeted’ sanctions and ‘targeted’ strikes that is parallel, the reliance on 
security services evidence of who constitutes a terrorist for the purposes of either sanctions 
under Security Council resolution 1373 or unilateral military attacks circumvents the basic 
civil and political rights that are the cornerstone of democratic political structures. The 
existence of the targeted sanctions regime gives implicit approval of the use of any measures 
to halt terrorist actors. While the retraction of human rights assists the further narrative of 
the terrorist actor as outside the boundaries of humanity and thus not protected by the agreed 
norms of the international community.
A feminist analysis of the sanctions regime must engage the consequences of the targeted 
sanctions model and also consider whether a gender analysis is appropriate, as other issues 
that may be raised under die spectre of religious rights and racial discrimination may require 
concurrent or preliminary critical engagement. Furthermore, to provide a full analysis of the 
sanctions regime the relationship between Article 41 and the use of force would need to be 
discussed at length. This infers discussion of what types of enforcement under Chapter VII 
would be of an acceptable nature to feminist approaches to international law when viewed 
from the relationship across law, gender and violence. The use of sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia in 1966 highlighted the role Article 42 measures play as a tool to ensure the 
success of Article 41 sanctions.88 The sanctions against Iraq, and the failure of the Iraqi 
government to capitulate to the demands underlying the sanctions regime, also demonstrate 
the relationship between Article 41 and the use of force. Targeted sanctions, which are 
directed at individuals rather than states, appear to have also functioned to implicitly 
condone the use of military force to challenge the activities of individuals that are perceived 
as a threat to international peace and security, at least in contemporary justifications 
elaborated by the US. Consequently, Article 41 measures raise a host of conceptual 
questions. In terms of the law on the use of force, implied authority arguments and targeted 
strikes against terrorist actors illustrate the role states have used Article 41 sanctions, far
85 Clayton, ‘US Strikes at al-Qaeda in Somalia’, The Times, 9* January, 2009.
86 Scott, Tyson and Knickmeyer, ‘US Calls Raid a Warning to Syria’ The Washington Post, 28th 
October, 2008.
87 Sturke, ‘27 Dead in US Strikes says Pakistan*, The Guardian, 31s* October, 2008.
88 That is, the Security Council authorized the use of force to ensure the embargo was complied with, 
see SC Res 221,9* April 1966.
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from being a ‘humane alternative to war*,89 as a means to add legitimacy to unilateral 
justifications for the use of force.
Feminist legal theories must open debates on the nature of law and violence and ask when 
force would, if ever, be justified from a feminist perspective, especially in light of recent 
institutional developments regarding sexual violence during armed conflict. Thus, in 2008, 
the Security Council in Resolution 180790 envisaged targeted sanctions as a potential means 
to challenge impunity with respect to sexual violence in the DRC. If the Security Council 
continues to move toward the use of sanctions to challenge sexual violence in armed conflict 
and during humanitarian crises,91 and in light of the analysis above, the possibility of 
widespread sexual violence emerging as a justification for force must be addressed by 
feminists advocating such a move.92 I argue, below, that the use of force is itself a limited 
solution that perpetuates and increases sexual violence and sexual exploitation and abuse in 
a manner that is specifically harmful to women. As a consequence, the use of force to halt 
violence against women, sexual violence or sexual exploitation and abuse is not a feminist 
use of force. It is from this perspective a feminist account of Article 41 sanctions must 
initiate debate and action.
3.1.2 Transitional Justice Mechanisms
In contrast to sanctions, which were perhaps foreseen at the drafting of the UN Charter, the 
ad hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) instituted a new role for the 
Security Council.93 Although the Tribunals were set up ostensibly under Article 41, there 
was no precedents for them other than the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials,94 and this has led 
some scholars to suggest the Council has developed a quasi-legislative role in the UN
89 Badhi, ‘Iraq, Sanctions and Security: A Critique’, 9, Duke Journal o f Gender Law and Policy, 
(2002), 237, at 237.
90 31st March 2008.
91 Also see Security Council 1820,18th June 2008, operative paragraph 1.
92 For an early statement of the need for sanctions to address feminist issues, see ‘UN Sanctions 
Taliban Abuse of Women’ Ms. Magazine, September 21s* 1999.
93 See SC Res 808 and 827 (1993) which established the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (henceforth ICTY) and SC Res 955 (1994) which established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. A thorough analysis of the role of sex and gender in the work of the 
ICTY and ICTR is outside of this thesis; numerous excellent and varied accounts exist from other 
feminist commentators, see Askin, above note 65; Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Discontents: 
Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 99 (4), AJIL, (2005), 774; Haffajee, 
‘Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR’, 29, Harvard Journal o f Law and 
Gender, (2003), at 201.
94 Also see, Satkauskas, ‘Soviet Genocide Trials in the Baltic States: the Relevance of International 
Law’, 7, Yearbook o f International Humanitarian Law, (2004), 388.
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system (although this has been emphatically challenged by others).95 In 2002, the Security 
Council also facilitated the construction of the Special Court in Sierra Leone.96 The Special 
Court represents a hybrid -  international and national — criminal model that has further 
influenced the recently established Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.97 
These developments suggest not only is the domestic analogy useful for understanding how 
legal concepts are adapted from the national to create the narratives and contours of 
international law but that analysis engaging the reverse (the transfer of legal concepts from 
the international to the national) is also necessary.
For feminist jurisprudence, the identification of the rape and sexual violence that occurred 
during the genocide and violence in the Former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda was one of the 
most dramatic discourses on force that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century.98 
For example, in Resolution 820, the Security Council condemned,
. .  all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the practice of “ethnic 
cleansing” and the massive, organised and systematic detention and rape of Women, 
and reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or order or have ordered the 
commission of such acts will be held individually responsible. . . "
The work of feminist advocates and academics, as well as the courage of the women who 
were survivors of this violence, to raise awareness of the use of rape as a systematic and 
integral aspect of conflict amended institutional responses to armed conflict at the close of 
the twentieth century.100 While the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are 
timetabled to cease activity in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the broad, global 
awareness of their existence remains an important narrative that includes a challenge to 
sexual violence that has been made vocally in mainstream Western communities (legal and
95 Stalon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, 99(1), American Journal o f International 
Law, (2005), 175; for an opposing view see Pomerance, ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the 
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial’ in, ‘Agora: the Wall in Occupied Palestine’, 
99, AJIL, (2005) 26; see further, Gross, ‘The International Court of Justice and the United Nations’, 
120, Recueil Des Cours, (1967), 314.
96 See SC Res 1315,14th August 2000.
97 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was created by the Cambodian government 
and the UN but it will be independent of them. It is a Cambodian court with international participation 
that will apply international standards.
98 Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, (January 
1993).
99 Security Council Res 820 (1993).
100 Chinkin, above note 73; SC Res 807 and 827 (1993); sexual offences were not explicitly included 
in the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the Former Yugoslavian Republic and it was dependent on 
interpretations of customary international to bring sexual offences before the tribunal. Mainstream 
commentators do acknowledge rape as a war crime; see, Walzer, Just or Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations (92nd edition, 1992), chapter 8; Meron, ‘Rape as a Crime under 
International Humanitarian Law,' 87, AJIL, (1993), 424.
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otherwise).101 Additionally, one of the legal consequences of the recognition of sexual 
violence in conflict by the ICTY and ICTR has been the inclusion of rape and sexual 
violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the Rome Statute creating 
the International Criminal Court.102
In these ways the tribunals, and the subsequent development of the ICC, illustrate the re­
imagined potential of international law, as a tool of words as well as force.103 The ICTY and 
ICTR, and the ICC, should be applauded in terms of the commitment from the feminist 
advocates who demanded the inclusion of rape and sexual assault in the Tribunal’s and the 
Court’s jurisdiction.104 What is left out of this development is the eveiydayness of soldiers 
having sex with local women during conflict, under conditions of duress and prostitution, 
and the everydayness of soldiers raping and sexually assaulting women in their own 
communities during, before and after conflict. From ‘bush wives’ to ‘comfort women’, to 
sex workers and military wives, militarism requires someone to wash and manage domestic 
spaces and chores, including sex. The gendered dominance of heterosexual men over 
heterosexual women in domestic space continues to be the model militaries and military 
personnel depend upon.105 At the same time, heterosexual normativity also defines the range 
of violence against women tolerated by communities. When gendered violence occurs in a 
conflict zone the same private, domestic barriers limit women’s access to justice only, unlike 
‘peace’ time, the reporting of domestic and sexual violences are further frustrated by the 
perception of war and conflict as sphere of male activity, actors and injuries, as well as the 
suspension of community support and policing structures. Consequently, the ad hoc 
Tribunals in the UN collective security regime present positive and negative narratives for 
feminist jurisprudence. Positive because the tribunals demonstrate the strength of women’s 
voices when raised together and the role ‘multi-cultural dialogues’ amongst women can play 
in shaping legal narratives.106 It is, however, also a negative development because the 
tribunals have not only proven to be inadequate tools for individual women and their 
communities in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the tribunals have also left
101 Kadic v. Karadzic 70 F.3d 232; Bergoffen, above note 71.
102 Copelon, ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into International 
Criminal Law’, 46, McGill Law Journal, (2000) 217-240; Report of the Secretary-General’s Special 
Advisor on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, UN doc: A/59/710, (5th
reflection on the role of words as a tool for social change, see Minow, ‘Words and 
the Door to the Land of Change’ 43 Vanderbilt Law Review (1990) 1665.
104 Bergoffen, above note 69.
105 Above note 1, at page at 6.
106 See Stiglmayer (ed), Mass Rape: the War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegvoina, (Bison, 1994); 
Mertus, ‘The Kitchen Cabinet’ in Waller and Rycenga, Frontline Feminisms, (Routledge, 2001).
April 2005).
For a feminist
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unchallenged in international law the military institutions and structures that continue to be 
based on gendered narratives of violence.107 The gendered narratives of military behaviour 
utilise men’s violence against other men to construct a rationale for the use of force while 
functioning to disguise the additional narrative of violence against women that exists as 
normal masculine behaviour.108
Moreover, Chinkin reminds us that the tribunal for the former Yugoslavian, and we can add 
the Rwandan Tribunal and the ICC, are reactive legal tools. They do not challenge social and 
economic injustices or violations of human rights in peacetime that are equally a threat to 
women’s security.109 Furthermore, the turn to international criminal law reinforces the myth 
of collective force as a positive form of protection for communities suffering due to civil 
wars, humanitarian crises or political violence. Chinkin stresses the importance of Security 
Council acts and international legal policy geared towards the prevention of armed conflict 
and the prevention of an ‘environment conducive to the occurrence of such offences’.110 This 
re-iterates Morgan’s research that shows how in repressive states (of either an internal or 
external nature) practices often begin with a broadening of gender discrimination and the 
instigation of overt policies geared towards the refraction of women’s rights.111
To conclude, Article 41 measures, in the form of tribunals although in some ways a positive 
international legal narrative for some women, perpetuate the central role of force in the 
collective security structure by giving the victor’s force the appearance of a positive 
achievement and through the unquestioning acceptance of gendered military behaviour, for 
the most part not deemed exceptional or in violation of international humanitarian laws. I 
reflect further on the unquestioning acceptance of gendered military behaviour in the 
following section in relation to the capacity of the Security Council to authorise force under 
Article 42 of the UN Charter.
107 Nowrojee, ‘ “Your Justice is Too Slow”: Will the ICTR Fail Rwanda’s Rape Victims,* in 
Pankhurst (ed) Gendered Peace, (Routledge, 2007); also see Schomberg and Peterson, ‘Genuine 
Consent to Sexual Violence Under International Criminal Law, 101, AJIL, (2007) ,121; Chinkin, 
above note 73.
108 Moser and Clark, Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? (Zed, 2001).
109 Chinkin, above note 73, at 340.
110 Ibid
111 Morgan, above note 40, introduction to the 2nd Edition.
77
3.2 Article 42, the Authorised Use of Force
The implicit condoning of the use of force, apparent in Article 41 measures, is explicit in 
Article 42 of the Charter. Article 42 states,
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations
In Resolution 82, the Council identified North Korean armed attacks on South Korean 
territory as a breach of the peace.112 In Resolution 83, the Council recommended that 
Member states ‘furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to 
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area’.113 This 
Article 42 authorisation of force was then expanded in Resolution 84, which placed the US 
command in Korea under the United Nations flag.114 As the only authorised use of force 
during the Cold War, the force in Korea was an anomaly rather than indication of a norm of 
Cold War security.115 However, the use of military threats to control the actions of states was 
very much a part of Cold War security.116
The second set of Security Council resolutions authorising the use of force occurred in the 
early 1990s, after the Cold War stalemate had ended. The increased capacity of the 
permanent members of the Security Council to work in concert led, in 1990, to the 
authorisation of force against the Iraq state.117 In response to Iraqi aggression against 
Kuwait, Security Council Resolution 678 permitted member states to use ‘all means 
necessary* to secure the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory.118 The use of force in 
Kuwait to expel the Iraqi military provides the pivot between the Cold War era when Article
112 SC Res 82,25th July 1950, also see SC Res 83,27th June 1950.
113 Ibid.
114 SC Res 84,7th July 1950.
115 Note, SC Res 232 which authorized the UK to use force to secure compliance with sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia in 1966.
116 See (on the use of gendered language during the Cold War) Cohen, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational 
World of Defense Intellectuals’ in Wyer (ed), Women, Science and Technology: A Reader, 
(Routledge, 2001).
117 Although China abstained from voting ‘because it sought a peaceful solution and had difficulty 
accepting the resolution because the phrase “all means necessary” permitted the use of military 
action’; Gray ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq’, 13, 
EJ1L, (2002), 9.
118 Greenwood, ‘New World Order or Old? The Invasion of the Kuwait and the Rule of Law,’ 55 (2), 
Modem Law Review, (1992), 153; Heathcote, ‘Article 51 Self-defence as a Narrative: Spectators and 
Heroes in International Law’, 12(1), Texas Wesleyan Law Review, (Fall 2005).
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42 force was exceptional and the post-Cold War environment when the use of force has been 
authorised by the Security Council in multiple contexts and situations. One consequence of 
this increased activity, and the increased number and type of situation the Security Council 
has seen fit to intervene in, has been a distancing from the formal structure of the Charter as 
resolutions authorising force have not always been made expressly under Article 42 powers 
or even with clear reference to a violation of Article 39.
The use of force has been authorised by the Security Council in Somalia (1992), Yugoslavia 
(1992 and in 1996), Rwanda (1994), the Great Lakes (1996),119 Albania (1997), the Central 
African Republic (1997) and Sierra Leone (1997) and East Timor (1999).120 The use of force 
by NATO in Serbia in 1999 was later endorsed under Security Council Resolution 1244, 
although the legality of the initial decision to use force remains controversial.121 Since 2000, 
the Security Council has recognized the right of the United States to act in self-defence after 
the September 11th 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York122 and acknowledged the 
foreign military presence in Iraq in the months subsequent to the 2003 invasion.123 The 
Security Council has also authorised the use of force in Liberia,124 the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo,125and the Cote d’Ivoire,126 although in these three instances the actions were 
perceived as limited operations, the military nature of the operations indicates their status as 
Chapter VII authorised force.127 The propensity of the Security Council to authorise force 
during the 1990s, and beyond, prefigures A More Secure World and In Larger Freedom, 
highlighting how the collective security structure has consistently broadened the meaning of 
threats, while relying on force as the central form of legal coercion that may be taken in 
response to the threat articulated.
119 SC Res 1080 although this force was not, in fact, deployed
120 Somalia: SC Res 794 (3rd Dec 1992); Former Yugoslavian Republic: SC Res 752 (15* May 1992), 
761 (29* June 1992), 781 (9* October 1992), 998 (16* June 1995), 1037(15* January 1996); 
Rwanda: 929 (22 June 1994); Albania: 1101 (28* March 1997); Central African Republic: 1125 (6* 
Aug 1997); Sierra Leone 1132 (8* Oct 1997); East Timor: 1264 (15* Sept 1997).
121 SC Res 1244,10* June 1999; see further chapter six.
122 SC Res 1368, 12* September 2001 and SC Res 1373, 28* September 2001; on die status of this 
force (i.e. as coming under Article 51 rather than Article 42) see: Greenwood, ‘International Law and 
the Preemptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq’, 4, San Diego International Law 
Journal, (2003), 7, at 21.
123 SC Res 1511 16* October 2003, para. 13; SC Res 1546, 8* June 2004.
124 SC Res 1497 August 2003.
125 SC Res 1484 2003.
126 SC Res 1464 2003.
127 Gray, above note 22, at 257 -  260; in 2007 the Security Council authorised a military force, acting 
under Chapter VII, in the Darfur region of Sudan, SC Res 1769 (31st July, 2007).
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My study of Article 42 is constructed around the argument that military force functions to 
perpetuate and aggravate violence against women rather than offer a solution to women’s 
security. My approach to Article 42 is somewhat unusual. I take the 1950 use of authorised 
force under the US command in Korea, and with UN authorisation, as the central dialogue. I 
am not, however, interested in debating the usual legal controversies. I will not discuss the 
legality of Security Council Resolutions 82 through to 84, which authorise the use of force 
or discuss the adjacent political issues pertinent to any Cold War conflict. Rather, I wish to 
examine the consequence a foreign military presence has held for Korean women. While the 
UN mandate ceased in 1951,128 US military bases remain as a legacy in the Republic of 
Korea. This has important, contemporary parallels with the use of force in Kosovo (in 1999), 
which also saw (contentious) authorised force lead to the establishment of a large foreign 
(US) military base. At writing, US military personnel remain stationed in Republic of Korea 
although this is no longer a UN force (they remain at the request of the government of the 
Republic of Korea).129 The long term consequences of that force must be included in future 
dialogues on force, so as to adequately address women’s security. Furthermore, the ill- 
defined boundary between peacekeeping and the use of force, as evidenced in the 
forthcoming section, as well as the emerging awareness of the embroilment of some 
peacekeeping personnel in crimes of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse,130 identifies the 
necessity for historical and contemporary analysis of the complicity of legal narratives in the 
sexual violence of militaries. I will highlight, first, the sex industries that were shaped by the 
Korean War. Through this account social dialogues can be seen to challenge the role of 
militaries as protectors of communities, particularly women in post-conflict communities. 
Consequently, the merits of placing Security Council authorised force as the ultimate 
international sanction are questioned.
In Resolution 84, the Security Council authorised a ‘coalition of the willing’ to use ‘all 
means necessaiy’ to obstruct North Korean forces from passing the 38th parallel.131 Today 
around 27000 US troops, as well as roughly 4000 foreign contractors and 11500 family 
members of foreign personnel continue to be stationed in the Republic of Korea.132 What is 
less well documented is the recruitment of over a million South Korean women to work in 
the state-sanctioned sex industries that have existed on the peripheries of the US bases since
128 See SC Res 90,31st January 1951.
129 A similar situation continues in Iraq today, as US military forces remain at the ‘request’ of die 
Iraqi government
130 Report of the Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report prepared pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 59/296 on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN Doc. A/60/862, (24* May 2006).
131 Above note 112.
132For an update, see: www.globalsecuritv.org (last accessed May 2009).
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the authorised force in 1950.133 Moon’s study of sex workers, or kijich’on, in the Republic of 
Korea, Sex Among Allies, illustrates how US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) security 
policies regulated the sexuality and sex of soldiers while facilitating sex, sex industries and 
constructions of sexual identity with little regard for social consequences in civilian 
communities.134
The authorised use of force in Korea in the 1950s was controversial because the Security 
Council member representing the USSR was absent when the vote to authorise the action 
occurred. That force was authorised and that the force was of a militaiy nature was not 
controversial. Indeed this is assumed to be the correct role for the Security Council. 
Consequently, the sexual demands of militaries on civilian communities are deemed part of 
the status quo of force and no more destructive than the sexual demands individual men 
make of individual women. For over one million women in the Republic of Korea, who have 
worked and who continue to work in the kijich’on sex industries, this is not an incidental of 
military behaviour.135 Furthermore, the paradox between protector and aggressor enacted in 
individual relations between kijich’on women and US militaiy customers highlights the 
illusionaiy and inadequate ‘security’ supplied by military forces. The near sixty year 
hostility between North and South Korea must be judged alongside the complicated 
relationship between US military behaviour and South Korean life. ‘All of the women I 
interviewed’, writes Moon,
. . . stated that their greatest need for ROK government protection (after the Korean 
war) was not from Northern Korea threats but the exploitation and abuse of 
club/owners/pimps, local Korean police and VD clinic officials, and the power of the 
US army bases. In other words, they needed protection from a Korean law 
enforcement system that inadequately provided for their legal, economic, political and 
human rights and a Korean government too cowardly and self-interested to protect 
them against violence and abuse by US soldiers.136
Moon’s study of the experiences of kijich’on women can be connected to the experiences of 
women who globally, in peace and war, experience greater threats from interpersonal 
relationships than any other source.137 Many of the women Moon spoke with experienced 
violence at the hands of US servicemen or their ‘pimps’, many lived in abhorrent conditions 
and all lived with social exclusion, as did their children. Moon’s findings are replicated in
133 Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US - Korea Relations, (Columbia, 1997).
134 Ibid. chapter three.
135 Ibid. in prologue.
136 Ibid. at 26.
137 Kelly, ‘Wars Against Women’, in Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank (eds), States o f Conflict, (Zed, 
2001)
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studies of other US military bases in Asia,138 in studies of US homeland bases where 
domestic violence levels are three times higher than civilian rates,139 and in communities 
globally where, ‘the risk of violence and violation within the household is one thing women, 
irrespective of their social position, creed, colour or culture, share in common’.140
Three points can be drawn from Moon’s study of the kijich’on women’s experiences. Firstly, 
studying the ‘campfollowers’ or kijich’on women illustrates the distortion of public and 
private space in women’s lives. For women in the camptowns adjacent to US bases, the 
division between ‘work’ and ‘family’ is/was not always clear. Moon describes the social 
hierarchies that construct both the kijich’on woman’s home and work environments, with 
women married to US servicemen at the top of the social hierarchy followed by women who 
had a ‘cohabitation contract’ (kyeyak tonggd).141 A cohabitation contract involves the setting 
up of house by a sex worker and a serviceman for an agreed period (dependent on the tour of 
duty and training schedule of the man). The woman performs the role of the ‘wife’ while he 
pays her club debt and provides for her financially.142 Moon records, ‘all the women I met in 
camptowns either actively dreamed or had dreamed of leaving prostitution and leading so 
called normal lives, marrying a GI’.143
The paradox of sex industries serving US foreign military bases lies in the offer of potential 
security that occurs at both the personal and public level. Yet the threat to women’s personal 
security is also constructed through both spheres. Ostensibly the presence of the US in the 
Republic of Korea serves to protect the community from Northern Korean aggression. 
Likewise, women who dream of marrying US military personnel perceive some escape from 
the dangers of camptown prostitution through the sexual contract of marriage. At the same 
time, the continued US presence in South Korea may be the persistent obstacle to unification 
or cessation of hostilities between the two Koreas and, at a personal level, the presence of 
US military bases provides the greatest individual threats to individual women working in 
the adjacent sex industries.144 This information must be framed in terms of sex workers’
138 Sturdevant and Stolzfus (eds), Let the Good Times Role: Prostitution and the US Military in Asia, 
(New Press, 1992).
139 Special Edition on Intimate Partner Violence and the Military, 9, Violence Against Women, (2003), 
1039 [various authors].
140 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues, (Harvard, 2006), at 31.
141 Above note 133, at 26
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid
144 Ibid at 22.
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rights, and, through acknowledgement of every woman’s right to health and the freedom to 
live and work free from the threat or infliction of violence. Yet international legal narratives 
on these issues remain conceptually dislocated from the law on the use of force. When the 
Security Council does ‘see’ the sex in military behaviour this has been through narratives of 
deviance (suggesting soldiers having sex with local women is unusual) or through stories of 
female sexual vulnerability (and therefore in need of protection both from and via military 
institutions).
The second issue to note is, that, this discussion focuses on one group of women in Korea 
and cannot illustrate how the presence of US forces in Korea has affected all Korean women 
and, likewise, questions concerning men’s safety and the construction of masculinity, sit 
outside the immediate discussion. However, the discussion does have broader relevance as 
discourse around ‘good* and ‘bad’ women develops directly from identification of kijich’on 
women as acting outside social norms of female behaviour. This serves to reinforce 
conservative gender roles in the lives of non-kijich’on women in the Republic of Korea. 
Enloe has demonstrated how similar social discourse emerges in US (homeland) military 
communities and on other foreign military bases, including those in Bosnia in the 1990s and 
presently in Kosovo.145 Social discourse in the Republic of Korea from the latter half of the 
twentieth century indicates a division between ‘bad’ women, who worked as prostitutes 
around military bases, and ‘good’ women, who conformed to traditional Korean stereotypes 
of femininity.146 These discourses influence the company women keep, women’s access to 
public spaces and the types of clothes women are expected to wear, as well as their access to 
sex.147 While these may seem like benign social discourses, of interest but perhaps not of 
great importance to international law, for feminist jurisprudence the production of gendered 
cultural norms within a community and, globally, play a direct role in the perpetuation of 
violence against women. Historical and contemporary studies demonstrate the role gender 
norms play in limiting women’s full access to political, health and labour rights.
Finally, the impact of US militaiy bases on adjacent communities is not merely a historical 
issue. In addition to the development of sex industries around bases, current research 
highlights the role of foreign military bases in fuelling human trafficking industries. In 
Kosovo, the growth of a local sex industry, and the emergence of Pristina as a transit and
145 Enloe, Maneuvers: the International Politics o f Militarising Women’s Lives (Berkeley, 2000).
146 Above note 133, at 39.
147 Enloe, ‘It Takes Two’ in Sturdevant and Stolzfus (eds), above note 136.
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receiving point for the trafficking of women, parallels the arrival of the US$36.6 million US 
military base and the UN forces, KFOR.148 While the exact relationship between the two 
industries (trafficking and the military) is at times obfuscated, the arrival of the UN 
peacekeepers and the US militaiy is definitely a contributory factor. While reports suggest 
international clientele represent only twenty percent of sex industry business in Pristina, it 
should be acknowledged this is assessed in terms of client numbers rather than client 
expenditure.149 Additionally, evidence of individual peacekeepers direct involvement in 
trafficking has emerged as a grim reminder of the relationship between militaries and sex.150 
Institutional recognition of this knowledge has been exponential since die advent of the new 
millennium. However, institutional responses have hinged around highly gendered images of 
women and men that do not necessarily generate positive cultural dialogues.131 This is 
because attempts to challenge sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers has not been 
extended to Article 42 actors, has not been in the context of the ‘normalness’ of military 
actors having sex and has failed to challenge stereotypes of female sexual vulnerability.
In the legal histories of Western liberal democracies the distinction between the protected 
and protector is aligned with images of femininity and masculinity. Law’s role is assumed to 
be protective, a role that is often sexed male in Western cultures, while those offered the 
law’s protection are feminised (rather than merely gendered these are perceived as natural 
and universal categories). The consequence is a sexing of legal categories and legal actors, 
which has continuing consequences for the acts and rights of individuals, although these 
sexed normative claims are not, in themselves, addressed to any particular man or woman.
To conclude, that local women are co-opted into supplying sexual services for foreign 
militaries during conflicts, including Security Council authorised force, is a fact that requires 
inclusion in the international legal narrative on the use of force, specifically in discussions of 
the possibilities of Article 42 measures. This is because military prostitution often involves
148 Amnesty International USA, So What Does it Mean That We Have Rights? Protecting the Human 
Rights o f Women and Girls Trafficked for Forced Prostitution in Kosovo, available at Amnesty USA 
Website: www.amnestvusa.org/news (last accessed May 2009); UNMIK, Combating Human 
Trafficking in Kosovo, Strategy and Commitment, (May 2004) available online at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/UNMIK Whit paper on trafficking.pdf (last accessed May 2009); 
on state responsibility for the actions of peacekeepers and UN actors in Kosovo, see Krieger, ‘A 
Credibility Gap: The Behrami and Saramati Decision of the ECHR’, 13, Journal o f International 
Peacekeeping, (2009), 159.
149 Amnesty International Report, Ibid
150 Ibid
151 Otto, ‘Dissonance Between Survival and Consent’, Second Annual Shimizu Lecture in 
International Law, London School of Economics, (7* March 2007).
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conditions akin to trafficking, as the women are often in situations of debt-bonds, suffer 
violence at the hands of their ‘clients’ and are often restricted or controlled in their access to 
the provision of basic services, including medical treatment, food and shelter.152 Workers are 
underpaid, or not paid at all; suffer social exclusion and risk pregnancy as well as illegal 
abortions and sexually transmitted diseases. As Sturdveyant and Stolzfus demonstrate the 
experiences of Korean women are replicated in the communities adjacent to US military 
bases in the Philippines and in Japan.153
In October 2003 the Security Council acting within its Chapter VII powers authorised ‘a 
multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to 
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’.154 While questions may be raised about the 
legality of foreign military forces in Iraq prior to this time, after Resolution 1511 there is 
clear Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII for the foreign military presence. At 
this stage, who the foreign militaries in Iraq are having sex with, and under what conditions, 
can be only speculated upon; although narratives that have emerged in the Western media 
surrounding Western sexual violence in Iraq after the 2003 invasion have been disturbing.155 
Unfortunately, it is clear from the In Larger Freedom report that this aspect of military 
behaviour will have a small, if any, impact on future Security Council decisions to authorise 
the use of force.
In contrast to the argument presented here, that identifies an ongoing and structural 
association between sexual violence, exploitation and abuse and military actors, institutional 
developments continue to perceive sexual exploitation and abuse as the acts of non-state and 
non-UN actors, so while recognising the danger of the ‘post conflict moment’ for women a 
recent Secretary-General Report finds,
. . . owing to the increased civilian-combatant interface of current conflicts, the 
targeted use of sexual violence is increasingly becoming a potent weapon of war and a 
destabilising factor in conflict and post-conflict societies.156
152 See, for example, the narratives of kijich’n women in Sturdevant and Stolzfus (eds), above note 
138.
153 Ibid.
154 Security Council Res 1511,16 October 2003.
155 See Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the Peacewomen Project 1325 
Security Council Monitor Resolution Watch, (29 June 2007) online at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325-Monitor/RW/theme PK Ops.htm (last accessed May 2009).
156 Report of Secretary-General on women, peace and security, 25 September, 2008, S/2008/622, 
para. 5.
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The Report ignores the role of UN forces in sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse 
and locates the trivialisation of responses as the consequences of local police, military and 
judicial tardiness. This contributes to a general impression of sexual violence and abuse 
during conflict as happening outside the mainstream of international collective initiatives. At 
the same time Security Council resolutions have shifted to include routine prohibition on 
sexual relations when constructing peacekeeping mandates that do little to challenge the 
sexual and domestic cultures of militaries, due to non-mandatory language and the 
responsibility for action to be left to the individual troop-contributing states.157
33  Alternative Narratives
In this section I argue that the post-millennium narratives emergent in response to changing 
threats and changing political relationships between states create an extension of past 
security norms and fail to challenge the ingrained sex and gender of international laws on the 
authorisation of force and measures short of force. I begin by focusing on the work of 
peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement and more recently peacebuilding missions. I 
argue that the peacekeeping continuum, represented by this range of activities, relies on 
military actors in a manner that undermines any potential for change through peacekeeping 
operations. I then return to the two documents issued by the Secretaiy-General, A More 
Secure World and In Larger Freedom, and assess their recommendations for the future of 
collective security. To challenge the contemporary UN collective security model I argue it is 
necessary that the war scholar and the international jurist learn to understand gender like "the 
cook knows salt’.158 Feminist legal scholarship must also work to provide ongoing analysis 
of the collective security framework from a feminist legal perspective.
3.3.1 Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Peace enforcement
This section considers the peacekeeping continuum as an alternative narrative to the use of 
Article 42 force. The UN peacekeeping continuum can be described as the range of activities 
encompassed by the terms peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. 
Peacekeeping refers to the monitoring of ceasefires or early intervention before armed
137 For example, see SC Res 1870,30* April 2009, which in para. 28: *Requests the Secretary-General 
to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance by UNMIS with the United 
Nations zerotolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed, 
and urges troop contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including redeployment 
awareness training, and other action to ensure fall accountability in cases of such conduct involving 
their personnel’.
158 Goldstein, above note 1.
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conflict breaks out. For example, the deployment of peacekeepers to Lebanon after the 2006 
attacks by Israel was framed around the maintenance of a ceasefire agreement.159 
Peacebuilding refers to a longer process of renewal and re-development of institutions and 
civil infrastructure; for example, as occurred Timor Leste (after the use of force by UN 
forces in 1999) under the guises of the UN Transitional authority.160 Peace enforcement 
describes peacekeeping missions that have developed into Chapter VII forces, such as 
occurred in Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s.161
The United Nations records a total of US$54 billion dollars spent and the loss of 2231 lives 
since the first peacekeeping operation was deployed to the Congo in 1966.162 During the 
Cold War the Security Council authorised a total of 15 peacekeeping operations, five that 
remained in operation beyond 2005.163 During the 1990s the amount of peacekeeping 
operations instigated increased dramatically. By 2008, over 90 000 uniformed soldiers, from 
119 different countries and in conjunction with over 5000 civilian international staff 
members and approximately 12 000 local civilian staff members, as well as over 1500 
volunteers, were deployed under the UN flag.164 These figures demonstrate how the UN 
peacekeeping enterprise is predominantly staffed by trained military personnel.
It is my contention that for the Security Council to continue to authorise peacekeeping 
without recognition of the incipient militarisation, and the relationship of militarisation with 
negative gender discourse for men and women, is to perpetuate a model of peace premised 
on (sexed and gendered) force. In response to the More Secitre World Report, the Secretary- 
General initiated a Peacebuilding Commission to oversee the activities of peacekeeping 
operations and to 'effectively address the challenge of helping countries with the transition 
from war to lasting peace’.165 The role of the Peacebuilding Commission includes the 
provision of a central intergovernmental body to better facilitate the ‘immediate post-conflict 
phase to longer term reconstruction and development’.166 To achieve this goal, it is vital the 
Peacebuiling Commission examines the persistent gender weaknesses of past peacekeeping 
operations. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding fail women as a solution to security threats as
159 SC Res 1701,11th August 2006.
160 SC Res 1272,25* October 1999.
161 Gray above note 22, at 225; Resolution 770, August 1992; SC Res 836, June 1995.
162 For up to date figures see: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm (last accessed May 2009).
163 Gray, above note 22, at 204.
164 Above note 164.
165 In Larger Freedom above note 2, at para. 114.
166 More Secure World Report, above note 2: introductory note by Kofi Annan at para 15; also see 
Report of UN Panel on Peace Operations, available at: 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/ (last accessed May 2009).
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not only are they seen to downplay women’s role in communities, contributing to women’s 
future low status in the ‘new’ state, but peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as military based 
operations, bring increased threats (rather than protection) to women. Such threats include 
sexual violence, from peacekeepers or from the sex industries that spring up alongside 
military bases, as well as the threat of sexual and domestic violence from local men.
Each aspect of the peacekeeping continuum raises these issues. For example, peacekeeping, 
as an activity deployed in the ‘post-conflict moment’ must address the increasing feminist 
scholarship that questions the militarisation of post-conflict communities,167 the failure of 
international institutions to be inclusive of women in decision-making process168 and the 
increased levels of violence against women in post-conflict communities.169 Peacebuilding 
initiatives in East Timor, in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate how women’s 
rights have either been implemented through simple formal equality models173 or, in the case 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, been ‘traded’ for constitution building initiatives that tolerate 
religious laws and customs that are built on gender constructions that are often harmful to
174women.
The peacekeeping continuum, therefore, offers an illusionary ‘alternative’ to force from a 
feminist perspective. The incipient militarisation of peacekeeping endeavours is of key 
concern, especially in terms of the associated sexual exploitation and abuse that is 
increasingly apparent as an element of peacekeeping communities. The shift by the UN to 
record and challenge sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is undermined by 
strategies, for example, the production of a Code of Conduct,175 that depend upon gendered 
images of women’s sexual vulnerability that also negates women’s agency. This replicates
167 Cockbum and Zarkov, The Postwar Moment, (Lawrence and Wishart, 2002).
168 Chinkin, Peace Agreements as a Means o f Promoting Equality and Ensuring Participation o f 
Women, UN Doc. EGM/PEACE/2003/ BP; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart, Gender, Conflict 
and Peacekeeping, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
169 Above note 162; Durham and Gurd, Listening to the Silences: Women and War, (Kluwer, 2005), 
chapters 6, 8, 16; Orford, above note 62, at 389, citing Hibaaq Osman, Somalia: Will Reconstruction 
Threaten Women’s Progress? Ms. Mar-April, 1993 at 12; Coulter, ‘Female Fighters in the Sierra 
Leone War’, 88, Feminist Review, (2008) 54.
170 Charlesworth and Wood,’ Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor’, 71 (2), 
Nordic Journal o f International Law, (2002), 352.
171 Lyth (ed), Getting it Right? A Gender Approach to UNMIK Administration in Kosovo, (Kvinna 
Till Kvinna, 2001).
172 Kandiyoti, ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil’, 28, Third World Quarterly, (2007), 503.
173 See further the discussion of Timor-Leste in chapter four.
174 Above note 172.
175 Secretary-General Report, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Further Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse in Peace Keeping Operations, UN Doc A/59/710, available online at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/ioumal/asp/ws.asp?m=a/59/710 ; Otto, above note 151.
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the lack of agency, and low levels of participation, offered to women in post-conflict 
communities. In the context of a discussion of authorised force, these narratives suggest the 
gendered faultlines of Article 42 force - especially with regard to the role of militarisation as 
dependent on gender for successful functioning and the consequential limited theory of 
sexual agency -  extend into peacekeeping narratives.
3.3.2 In Larger Freedom
The Secretary-General ’s post-millennium approach to addressing human security does on its 
face appear to embrace some of the concerns presented here. Through the creation of the 
Peacebuilding Commission it could be hoped that stronger mechanisms for incorporating 
women’s needs into peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations may come into existence. 
Consequently, peacekeeping operations after the Secretary General’s Report have seen 
gender awareness and dedicated gender offices as integral elements of their sphere of 
reference.176 Likewise, the broad understanding of threats contained in the Secretary- 
General’s submissions does include social and economic threats, particularly poverty but 
also health. These can be read as encompassing threats to women’s security within the 
mainstream of international laws for authorising force.177 The focus on prevention rather 
than reaction is also a positive step forward. In addition, measures short of force, particularly 
sanctions and mediation, are highlighted as necessaiy before the authorisation of force
178occurs.
Yet this chapter has argued that each of these steps forward in the post-millennium security 
discourse fails to account for the impact of past security norms on women. The 
Peacebuilding Commission, and the creation of gender units179 in the most recent operations, 
is applauded but the emergent work of feminist activists on the failure of gender 
mainstreaming now needs to be incorporated into the objectives of these bodies.180 The 
recognition of poverty and disease as threats to international peace and security is stymied 
by the nexus with the state required for these to emerge on the international agenda. 
Additionally, the failure of the Secietary-General’s Reports to identify specific health threats
176 See Charlesworth and Chinkin’s discussion of the differences between the Cambodian and Liberia 
peacekeeping operations, above note 64, at 294 -  299.
77 Above note 2.
178 Ibid.
179 See the discussion of the Gender Affairs Unit in East Timor in Charlesworth and Wood, above 
note 170.
180 See Kouvo, ‘The United Nations and Gender Mainstreaming’ in Buss and Manji (eds), 
International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005).
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to women or to address the relationship between poverty and women’s lives negates the 
possibility of human security that is reactive to specific threats to women’s security. The 
focus on prevention in the Secretary-General ’s Reports is, therefore, undermined by this 
persistent failure to address women’s needs as a different and complex aspect of 
international security. When women do emerge in either a More Secure World or In Larger 
Freedom it is as mothers, for example, at risk of maternal mortality, or as victims, for 
example, as susceptible to human trafficking networks. Women as potential agents integral 
to the building of processes that challenge international threats are overlooked. Feminist 
evidence suggests it is through listening to women and through developing policies aimed at 
eradicating violence against women, that real change within communities is achieved.181 
These conceptual flaws are then played out in peacekeeping operations that fail to 
accommodate women’s health needs, fail to utilise women’s potential to act as community 
leaders and fail to see women’s role as actors during and after armed conflict I have also 
considered how sanctions, as an alternative to Article 42 force, require analysis from 
feminist scholars in terms of the limits of the law and violence relationship. This is further 
evidenced in the In Larger Freedom’s section entitled ‘Protecting Civilians’ that identifies 
women and gender violence within the wider discussion but fails to acknowledge the 
disproportionate presence of women in civilian communities in times of armed conflict.182
Underlying each of these claims is an understanding that militaiy force and armed conflict 
are influenced by dominant social constructions of gender. Military structures also play a 
role in the reproduction of gender roles that are based on a hierarchy of relations between 
men and women. To persist as military narratives the soldier is constructed as the warrior or 
male actor poised to save feminised communities without this gendered assumption, 
militaries cease to look like military institutions.183 When projected on to the law on the use 
of force, the underlying assumption present in the collective security structure — that force 
can be authorised and thus be a tool to achieve legal enforcement -  is recognised a gendered 
assumption that prioritises and legitimates male forms of violence as legal.
181 However, note Recommendation 19 (d) which states ‘Greater consultation with and involvement in 
peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often 
neglected during negotiations’ This recommendation Mis short of demanding women’s inclusion in 
decision-making forums, above note 2, page 80.
182 Ibid pages 62-63.
183 Gardam, ‘An Alien’s Encounter with the Law of Armed Conflict’, in Naffine and Owens, Sexing 
the Subject o f Law, LBC, 1997.
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The chapter concludes with reflection on the disparity between mediation and force in the 
More Secure World Report. While the Report reflects at length on the use of force, it fails to 
provide a full scale analysis of the role of mediation in the international community. Thus, 
the Report reiterates the division between Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter that 
Charlesworth and Chinkin highlight as inimical to positive change for women.184 While the 
Secretary-General introduces the Report with approval of the recommendation that ‘two of 
the tools which we must improve are sanctions and mediation’, the Report has a dedicated 
section on sanctions and on the use of force but no section on mediation.185 The capacity of 
the Security Council to act under Chapter VII and authorise force is given extensive 
attention in the Report. This suggests that while threats to international peace and security 
continued to be broadened, the capacity to respond to those threats has not been braodened. 
The Report provides recommendations on the capacity of states to act in self-defence under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter and the power of the Security to authorise force under Article 
42. These recommendations were then re-assessed by states in September 2005 and 
formalised in international law at the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent General 
Assembly Resolution.186 As such the use of force to ‘protect’, the use of preventative force 
and the general enlarged scope of Security Council action (including humanitarian actions, 
peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding) gained re-iteration rather than renewal. 
For feminist scholarship these developments are important as they entrench authorised force 
as the preferred means of international arbitration in times of crisis. However, any benefits 
gained by die use of force are challenged by the chorus of women’s voices highlighted in 
this chapter, which not only identify a different range of threats to human security, but 
demonstrate force, whether illegal or authorised, as complicit in domestic and sexual 
violence against women.
My final concern is that in a system where the use of authorised force gains increased 
probability, justifications for unilateral force are also widened. In the final four chapters I 
consider self-defence rights, self-determination as a justification for the use of force, 
humanitarian interventions as a justification for force and the ‘War on Terror’ as a 
justification for the use of force. Implicit in each discussion is an understanding that state 
justifications function by referencing authorised force. That international law has a
184 Above note 66, at p. 6.
185 See above note 2, at 50-51 (sanctions) and 53 -62 (the use of force); the Report does encourage the 
use of treaties and intergovernmental bodies in response to specific threats, but does not specifically 
develop understanding of international mediation as a means to prevent or halt threats.
186 Importantly, the Report’s five stage test for the legitimacy of Security Council acts authorising 
force was left out of the outcomes document; see above note 2, recommendation 56, at page 85.
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collective system for authorising force suggests force may be used proportionately and that 
the use of force may occur with justice as the goal. This fuels state justifications to use force 
unilaterally. Had the Secretary-General applied the broad approach used to define human 
security in the attempt to develop measures to curb threats, the status quo of force may have 
shifted. Without such a re-focus, the collective security system contained in Chapter VII, 
and reinforced by recent Secretary-General and General Assembly initiatives,187 at this stage 
fails to address the association of gender with armed conflict or the role of militaiy activity 
in the perpetuation of violence against women, particularly sexual violence. The 
consequence is the denial of the impact of armed conflict on women’s lives and the 
incapacity of the current system to challenge threats to women’s security.
187 Above note 2.
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CHAPTER THREE
JUSTIFYING FORCE: ARTICLE 51 SELF-DEFENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
The domestic analogy between the regulation of international justifications and interpersonal 
justifications both constructs and limits the international law on the use of force in a sexed 
and gendered way. This chapter focuses on the international legal right of states to use force 
in self-defence. I argue that the international right to self-defence, preserved in the UN 
Charter and customary international law, mimics the faultlines of Western domestic self- 
defence laws. This occurs through the construction of a paradigm case of self-defence that is 
assumed by legal narratives across domestic and international accounts. As a consequence, 
feminist analysis and philosophical accounts on the limits of the interpersonal right offer 
useful tools to understand the limitations of the international right of states to use force in 
self-defence.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Part Two considers Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and the application of this right in the UN era. I argue that the domestic analogy illustrates a 
conceptual weakness of the international model. Feminist accounts of the limitations of 
domestic laws on self-defence are instrumental in demonstrating the flaws of the 
international model. Akin to its domestic counterpart, the international right to use force in 
self-defence is circumscribed by the requirements of necessity and proportionality. This is 
the point where the analogy is most evident and where feminist approaches to international 
law must work to build an international legal response that is not presupposed on a 
masculine legal subject. Feminist reconstruction of international law on self-defence, 
therefore, requires exposure rather than reinforcement of the analogy. I argue that strategies 
are required that construct the scope of international self-defence outside of the sexed 
interpersonal parameters of self-defence. The chapter also acknowledges the conceptual 
disparity between international and interpersonal self-defence present through the inclusion 
of a right to collective self-defence under Article 51.
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Part Three considers how the sexed and gendered contours of international self-defence are 
masked by contemporary debates on the scope of self-defence under the conditions of the 
‘War on Terror’. Part Three, therefore, argues that the preemptive self-defence claim 
articulated under the ‘War on Terror’ narrative is an extension of the self-defence analogy, 
as the ‘War on Terror’/ preemptive self-defence justification attempts to revive a 
provocation type excuse on the international plane. As a consequence I make two claims in 
response to contemporary narratives on preemptive self-defence and in light of the domestic 
analogy established in Part Two of this chapter. Firstly, as preemptive force is closer to a 
provocation type excuse, rather than a self-defence justification, preemptive force is riddled 
with analogous conceptual flaws to those identified by domestic feminist legal theories in 
response to Western domestic provocation laws. This argument leads to a rejection, from a 
feminist perspective, of the usefulness of preemptive force as a justification for the use of 
force under international law. Secondly, through the significant shifting of debate on 
international self-defence since 2001, preemptive self-defence narratives entrench Article 51 
as normatively unproblematic (even when argued to be temporally surpassed by the 
conditions of the ‘War on Terror’). This has the further consequence of embedding the sexed 
and gendered contours of Article 51, established in Part Two, as an international legal 
narrative that is normal/ natural. 1 argue that feminist approaches to international law on self- 
defence must engage the normative contours of the right to use force in self-defence to build 
an understanding of possible re-conceptualisation of this area of law that does not prioritise 
an inherently male understanding of justified violence. Through understanding Article 51 as 
a narrative with distinct descriptive purchase in Western communities, the Western heroic, 
male state and the assumption of Western spectator privilege in defining the parameters of 
die international right to use force are exposed.
The chapter concludes by arguing that feminist appraisal of international self-defence laws 
must look behind narratives on terrorism and preemptive self-defence to expose the sexed 
constructs entrenched in apparently less controversial readings of Article 51.1 argue analysis 
of the limitations (necessity and proportionality) of international self-defence is an important 
site for future feminist scholarship. The chapter closes with a discussion of the merits of the 
domestic analogy as a discursive tool, considering whether this approach, as utilised by other 
commentators, should be amended or rejected.
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2. THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY
State arguments for justified force attempt to gain legal acceptance for acts that would 
otherwise be prohibited under Article 2(4). In the absence of Security Council authorisation 
under Article 42 of the UN Charter, Article 51 allows states to claim self-defence as a 
justification for the use of force. Article 51 declares:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessaiy to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.1
Prior to looking at contemporary debates on the range and scope of Article 51, it is important 
to understand the accepted parameters of the right of states to act in self-defence. Despite 
recognised tensions between customary international law and Charter based self-defence, 
there remains a settled ‘core’ of international self-defence.2
The core includes: Article 51’s role in protecting (and forming understandings of) the 
sovereignty of states through the armed attack requirement,3 the function of self-defence as a 
private right of states, 4 the capacity of Article 51 to be exercised either individually by 
states or collectively by a group of states, and the settled role of the general international 
legal principles of proportionality and necessity as parameters on defensive actions.5 Each of 
these features has been reiterated by the International Court of Justice and generally each is
1 UN Charter, Article 51.
2 Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq,’ 
4, San Diego International Law Journal, (2003), 7; Gray, International Law and the Use o f Force, 
(OUP, 2008,3rd Edition), at 70,121.
3 See Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Preemptive Force’ 14 EJIL, (2003) 227, at 228-233. Note, 
while it is accepted that ‘an armed attack’ triggers the right to self-defence, the definition of what 
constitutes an armed attack has been the subject of controversy, see: see Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Merits, 1986 ICJ Reports 14, [henceforth Nicaragua case] para. 
195.
4 However, note some commentators suggest the Security Council does play a role in Article 51 
actions, see Gray, above note 2, at 101; also see Nicaragua case, ibid, at para. 200.
5 For further descriptions of the ‘core’ of Article 51 self-defence, see Cassese, International Law, 
OUP, 2001 at 310; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence, (CUP, 2001, 3rd Edition), chapter 7; 
Gray, above note 2, chapter 4; Mgbeoji, Collective Insecurity, (UBC, 2003), at 83.
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regarded as an uncontroversial element of Article 51.6 For example, in the Nicaragua Case 
the Court stated ‘the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned being the victim 
of an armed attack’7 so that ‘[w]here collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected 
that the State for whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be a victim of an 
armed attack’.8 The Court also found ‘general agreement on the nature of acts which can be 
treated as constituting an armed attack’ alongside affirming collective self-defence as an 
important component of the international right.9 Later statements from the Court, including 
in the Oil Platforms case where the Court re-iterated the necessity that a state be the victim 
of an actual armed attack,10 the Israeli Wall Opinion where the Court found the building of 
the wall could not be a form of self-defence due to the absence of an armed attack,11 and the 
Congo v. Uganda decision where the Court found states must be the victim of an armed 
attack imputable to another state for Article 51 to initiate a private right of states to act 
defensively,12 reference the primacy of state sovereignty and territory as that which must be 
under attack. Outside of this core of self-defence, each of these judgements has been the 
subject of dissension amongst international lawyers and states have made a range of 
controversial claims, particularly the right to protect nationals abroad,13 the right to use force 
on a foreign territory when an invitation from the government exists,14 and the right to use 
anticipatory self-defence.15
This is not to suggest that Article 51 has been uncontroversial. The use of the phrase ‘the 
inherent right’ in Article 51 has produced tension over the continuation of customary 
international law on self-defence during the UN era. The ICJ, in the Nicaragua case, 
indicated that the Charter and customary international law on self-defence function as 
compatible rather than oppositional.16 However, this never really resolved the different 
approaches that, on the one hand, argued for a reading of Article 51 subject to customary
6 See Gray, above note 2 at 70 and at 121, stating ‘[t]he core content of self-defence is universally 
accepted’; Gardam, 'Proportionality and Force in International Law’, 87, AJIL (1993), 391 at 403.
7 Nicaragua Case above note 3, para. 191
8 Ibid. para. 195
9 Ibid.; see Mgbeoji’s discussion suggesting General Assembly Res 3314, the Definition of 
Aggression settles this, above note 5, at 90.
10 Oil Platforms Case (Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic o f Iran v USA) (2003) ICJ 
Reports, 161, para 51.
11 Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ July 9th 2004, para. 139 [henceforth Israel Wall Opinion]
12 Armed Activities on the Territory o f the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) ICJ 
19th Dec, 2005, para 143 [henceforth Congo v. Uganda]
13 See Gray, above note 2, at 75.
14 Ibid, at 74.
15 Dinstein, above note 5; O’Connell, The Myth o f Preemptive Self-defence, paper prepared for the 
American International Law Task Force on Terrorism, (2002)
16Abovenote3.
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international law doctrine, and therefore incorporating a notion of anticipatoiy self- 
defence,17 and, on the other hand, scholars that emphasised the requirement of a literal 
reading of Article 51 and thus perceiving an actual armed attack as a prerequisite to state 
invocation of Article 51.18 This debate has developed again in the early twenty-first century 
with preemptive self-defence adding a potential third category to be accommodated within 
the self-defence justification. I review this development in Part Three.
Rather than engaging with this tension between the articulation of a customary international 
law versus a Charter formulation of self-defence, I place the settled ‘core’ of self-defence 
under scrutiny. This is because an important aspect of the core of Article 51 is the 
incorporation of an analogy between interpersonal and international self-defence into the 
contours of the international right.19 For example, Rodin explains the role of state 
sovereignty in international self-defence as follows:
The structure of international law suggests a strong analogy between individual self- 
defence and national-defense: persons are constituted by their existence as organic 
entities and they have the claim-right against other persons not to destroy their life or 
interfere in their bodily integrity. States are constituted by their existence as sovereign 
entities and they have the claim-right against other states not to destroy their political 
independence or interfere in their territorial integrity.20
The reiteration of the state as the primary victim of the armed attack requirement replicates, 
in international law, a legal subject that is drawn from national legal structures, particularly 
Western legal structures. However, feminist legal theories have analysed how common law 
accounts of self-defence configure a masculine legal subject21 Furthermore, the unqualified 
acceptance of an armed attack,22 as the primary trigger to initiate a state’s right to act under 
Article 51, replicates the public, one-off and aggressive nature of attacks envisaged in
17 For example, see: O’Brien, The Conduct o f Just and Limited War, (1981), 133.
18 Henkin, How Nations Behave, (1979) 141- 144; Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force 
by States, (OUP, 1963), 257-276.
19 Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense’, 50, Villanova Law Review, (2005) 699, at 
744.
20 Rodin, War and Self-Defense, (OUP, 2002), at 110.
21 Coomaraswarmy, Report o f the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (February 7* 1996); Jacobs and Ogle, Self-Defense and 
Battered Women Who Kill: A New Framework, (Praeger, 2002); Lyons and McCord, ‘Moral 
Reasoning and the Criminal Law: the Example of Self-defence’, 30, American Criminal Review, 
(1992), 97.
22 While contemporary debates argue for the shift to inclusion of ‘preemptive self-defence’ to include 
responses to challenge future rather than actual attacks, this leaves the armed attack requirement in 
tact as die central understanding of Article 51, see further Part 3, below.
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interpersonal relations.23 This projects a similar vision of masculine-defined violence onto 
international law. I argue that international law construes the masculine state in analogy with 
the masculine subject of interpersonal self-defence laws, despite the inclusion of collective 
self-defence in the international model that from the outset indicates the different 
circumstances and degrees of violence apparent in a simple comparison between 
international and interpersonal self-defence. This then leads to examination of the 
articulation of limitations on the scope of international self-defence (necessity and 
proportionality) and the consequences of this analysis for the persistence of the domestic 
analogy. I conclude that through the explicit linkage with the legal features of interpersonal 
self-defence, Article 51 is given a sexed meaning that draws on Western canons of 
masculinity to define danger, violence and aggression 24
2.1 Which ‘Self* Defended? Construing the Male State
Article 51 is constructed so that the decision to use force is shifted from the collective 
(represented by the UN Security Council acting under Article 42) to the individual state. In 
this designation of state capacity to recognise an armed attack and to respond with defensive 
force, Article 51 embeds a model of sovereignty drawn from interpersonal self-defence 
rights. For many writers this point is self-evident.25 The analogy between the sovereign 
status of the state and citizen is evidenced and underpinned by the right of legal subjects to 
act in self-defence, in a somewhat circular relationship. When explaining why self-defence 
exists, many commentators describe interpersonal self-defence as functioning as a form of 
‘basic norm* that the international right accrues from.26 For example, Grotius, who develops 
international self-defence through the analogy, declares the ‘right of defending our persons 
and property . . . may nevertheless be applied to public hostilities’.27 Similarly, in the early 
twentieth century, the US Secretary of State suggested to the French Ambassador, during the 
drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that ‘no treaty provision can add to the natural right of
23 R v. Lavalee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852; also see Kim, ‘The Rhetoric of Self-defense’, 14, Berkeley 
Journal o f Criminal Law, 2008 (forthcoming) available online at: 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm7abstract id=1288142 (last accessed May 2009).
24 I use the term ‘sexed’ in preference to ‘gender’ because self-defence constructs the ‘normal’ or 
natural’ legal subject that, I argue, is the sexed male; see further discussion in chapter one.
25 Glennon, ‘The Fog of Law: Self-defence, Incoherence and Article 51’, 25, Harvard Journal o f Law 
and Public Policy, 539, (2001-2002), at 557; Dinstein, above note 5, at 160; also see: Dickinson, ‘The 
Analogy between Natural Persons and International Persons in the Law of Nations’, 26, Yale Law 
Journal, (1916-17), 564.
26 On the function of a basic norm in a legal system see, Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems o f 
Legal Theory, (Oxford, 1934,2002 Reprint).
27 Grotius, De Jure Ac Pads (The Law o f War and Peace), (translated by Campbell, 1814), chapter 1, 
XVI available online at http://www.constitution.org/gro/dibp.htm
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self-defence’.28 The interpersonal right is thus perceived as explaining the existence of 
defensive rights accruing to states. Because interpersonal self-defence is regarded as an 
inherent aspect of personhood, the assumption is that the right of self-defence is replicated in 
the international system as a right of all legal subjects.29 This is further supported by the 
language of Article 51, which refers to self-defence as an ‘inherent right’.30 Some 
commentators underscore this with reference to the French text of the Charter that describes 
self-defence as ‘droit naturel’.31 Dinstein describes the international right of self-defence as 
having ‘its roots in inter-personal relations’ adding it ‘has been sanctified in domestic legal 
systems since time immemorial’.32 Walzer grounds the analogy in the understanding of the 
functioning of the international legal system as a whole,
Our primary perceptions and judgements of aggression are the products of analogical 
reasoning. When the analogy is made explicit, as it is among lawyers, the world of 
states takes the shape of a political society the characterisation of which is entirely 
accessible through such notions as crime and punishment, self-defense, law 
enforcement, and so on.33
Lauterpacht uses the domestic analogy to explain the manner in which self-defence vests in 
states but is limited by law.34 Similarly, Kelsen, suggests,
[ijmposing obligations on, and granting rights to states by way of international law 
has the same character as imposing obligations on, and granting rights to, a legal 
person by way of the state legal system, the state is the legal person.. .35
This approach to self-defence continues to resonate through contemporary documents where 
some discemable core is perceived as existing prior to contemporary international legal 
developments. A claim to state rights, including self-defence, is evidence of the sovereignty 
of a state and vice versa. This is intimately connected to understandings of the ongoing 
existence of the legal system, so Walzer goes on to claim, ‘the rights of member states must
28 Telegram from Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State, to the Ambassador in France (23rd April 1928) 
in Foreign Relations o f the US, (1928) 34,36-37.
29 However, international law no longer regards states as the only legal subject: Reparations for 
Injuries Suffered in the service o f the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 11* April 1949, p. 174; 
the extension under international law of a right of self-defence to legal subjects other than states has 
not been mooted.
30 However, this choice of wording has not been without controversy or alternative interpretations see 
Gray, above note 2, at 98-99. Due to space restrictions I have not developed a comparative analysis of 
national self-defence provisions. Such a project may be a valuable tool to exposing the partiality of 
the contours of international self-defence.
31 Schachter, ‘Self-defence and the Rule of Law’, 83, AJ1L, (1989), at 259; see also Nicaragua Case, 
above note 3, at para. 176
32 Dinstein, above note 5, at 160, however see also p. 164 where Dinstein acknowledges ‘even if the 
right of self-defence will never be abolished in the relations between flesh-and-blood human beings, 
there is no guarantee of a similar immobility in international law’.
33 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (Basic Books, 2006,4th edition), at 58.
34 Lauterpacht, The Function o f Law in the International Community, (1933), 179-80.
35 Kelsen, above note 26, at 110.
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be vindicated, for it is only by virtue of those rights that there is a society at all. If they 
cannot be upheld (at least sometimes), international society collapses into a state of war or is 
transformed into a universal tyranny’.36 Similar sentiments, predicting the demise of the 
United Nations system regulating the use of force, after flagrant violations of Article 2(4) 
and Article 51, have been expressed by commentators37 including, most recently, after the 
US led invasion of Iraq in 2003.38
Yet in discussing the right of states to act in self-defence most writers fail to consider why a 
right to act in self-defence exists at either the interpersonal or international level. 
Furthermore, rare philosophical accounts of (interpersonal) self-defence prove to be 
complicated, unconvincing and largely abstract.39 Uniacke, one of the few scholars to offer 
an extended and convincing philosophical account of self-defence, explains the failure of 
other philosophical engagements:
An account of justified homicide in self-defence must elaborate, rather than simply 
assume, a theory of forfeiture, because important human rights such as the right to life 
are typically said to be unconditional. The claimed unconditionality of human rights 
creates an immediate, insurmountable difficulty for a theory of forfeiture in respect of 
the right to life: an unconditional right cannot, by definition, be forfeited.. .  If I forfeit 
my right to life when I unjustly threaten someone else’s life, then the right to life is 
not an unconditional human right40
Uniacke provides a comprehensive survey of the attempts of other scholars to pin down the 
normative reasoning that lies behind self-defence. Uniacke’s conclusion is to regard self- 
defence as a limited right. This avoids the difficulty of the existence of a justification that 
abrogates the right to life.41 Under international self-defence laws the same conundrum must 
be faced with respect to Article 2(4), which has been perceived as a jus cogens norm 42 
Schachter explains,
Recognising these rights as exceptions to the general prohibition on force necessarily 
presupposes that the exercise of the right is limited by law. If this were not the case
36 Walzer, above note 33, at 59.
37 Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’ 64, AJIL, (1970), 809.
38 Franck, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq*, 97, (3), AJIL, (2003), 607; Glennon, 
above note 25.
39 For a helpful discussion of the legal and moral ambiguity in interpersonal self-defence, see Kim, 
above note 23, at 33-44.
40 Uniacke, Permissible Killing, (Cambridge, 1994), at 195.
41 Also see: Ashworth, ‘Self-Defence and the Right to Life’, 34, Criminal Law Review, (1975), 282, at 
296.
42 Chinkin, ‘A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force’, 12, Australian Yearbook o f 
International Law, (1992) 279, at 280.
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and each state remained free to decide for itself when and to what extent it may use 
force, the legal restraint on force would virtually disappear.43
The circularity that Uniacke identifies as existing in philosophical understandings of 
interpersonal self-defence,44 remain in international understandings of die right because the 
right exists through the acceptance of Article 2(4)’ s absolute prohibition on force mid the 
acceptance of justified acts in abrogation of Article 2(4). Uniacke argues, to justify self- 
defence and move beyond the circularity of other accounts, it is therefore necessary to 
‘specify the scope of such rights in terms of what is just and unjust treatment of, and 
interference with, the particular individuals who posses these rights’.45 Underlying this 
analysis is the contention that there is no absolute right to self-defence as this would lead to 
incompatibility with Article 2(4) or, under national laws, lead to a violation of the right to 
life. Instead philosophical engagement with the normative structure underpinning self- 
defence laws, as either an international or an interpersonal right vesting in legal subjects, 
suggests self-defence must always be a limited, or curtailed, right. Consequently, 
philosophical engagement indicates the right of a state to act in self-defence is always a 
qualified right. In this sense the requirements that force be judged under standards of 
necessity and proportionality maintains the very possibility of self-defence as a justification 
for use of force in the international sphere. It is therefore the limits o f the right to self- 
defence and not its analogy with interpersonal self-defence that are required to explain the 
existence o f the right under any legal system.
However, the pliability of international self-defence -  through tests of necessity and 
proportionality -  continue to be explained through references to interpersonal self-defence. 
Thus one commentator explains,
. . . international law contains no rigid rules about what amounts to reasonable 
measures of self-defence. Just as English law has gradually discarded inflexible rules 
about the degree of force which may be used in self-defence in favour of a principle 
that the force must be reasonable in the light of the circumstances of each case. Thus, 
as the scope and extent of a conflict increases, the range of measures which a state 
may legitimately take in self-defence broadens.. f 6
43 Schachter, above note 31.
44 ‘if the possession and content of human rights is determined by a prior view about what is and what 
is not morally permissible, it is then circular to explain the permissibility of particular acts, such as 
homicide in self-defence, in terms of the non-violation of these rights’ above note 40, at 211, 
referencing ‘Self-Defense and Rights’ in Thomson, Rights, Restitution and Risk, (Harvard, 1986), 33.
45 Ibid at 211.
46 Greenwood, ‘The Relationship between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello\ 9, Review o f International 
Studies, (1983), 221, at 223.
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This interpretation of English self-defence laws precedes feminist interrogation of the 
application of the right to act in self-defence. In the late twentieth century, however, 
alongside the rise of feminist theories and activism in Western states, there emerged feminist 
understandings of the inadequacies of interpersonal self-defence laws in framing female 
violence as justifiable. Feminist critiques of the sexed nature of interpersonal defences 
remain pertinent, for example, a US study in 2002 found:
Self-defense law has not been especially successful in the defense of battered women 
who must claim it as a justification for killing their abusers to survive. This legal 
defense generally fails because the critical elements of the defense are not met—most 
often, a factual base for finding that the threat requiring lethal force was imminent and 
a factual base for finding the decision to use deadly force was reasonable (italics in 
original).47
Similar accounts have been offered in other Western states by feminists, in law reform 
processes and by the judiciary in some states.48 In 1990, the Canadian Supreme Court found,
The law of self-defence is designed to ensure that the use of defensive force is really 
necessaiy. It justifies the act because the defender reasonably believed that he or she 
had no alternative but to take the attacker’s life. If there is a significant time interval 
between the original unlawful assault and the accused's response, one tends to suspect 
that the accused was motivated by revenge rather than self-defence. In the 
paradigmatic case of a one-time bar room brawl between two men of equal size and 
strength, this inference makes sense 49
The Canadian Supreme Court highlights three assumptions of the bar-room brawl model of 
self-defence laws. First, the defensive acts are in response to a single act of irrational force. 
Kim describes the impact of this as setting, ‘the parties in dramatic opposition -  the violator 
of peace versus the law abiding citizen, or, more simply, antagonist versus protagonist, 
villain versus hero’.50 Second, the act of irrational force occurs in a public space, so that:
.. .countering unjust violence with violence which is just evokes romanticized images 
of the cowboy or adventurer, defending himself (and perhaps also his honor) against 
the perils of the lawless frontier.51
Thirdly, the parties come to the conflict with relatively equal strength. In Western, and 
particularly common law legal traditions, the consequence of these features has been the 
development of the scope of self-defence without consideration of the impact of power
47 Jacobs and Ogle, Self-Defense and Battered Women Who Kill: A New Framework, (Praeger, 2002), 
at 4.
48 See, for example, in the context of the UK, Quick and Wells, ‘Getting Tough with Defences’, 
Criminal Law Review, (June 2006), 514.
49 R v. Lavalee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 p 868
50 Above note 23, at 8.
51 r t - j
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inequalities associated with social constructions of gender.52 What is perceived in 
philosophical, national and international accounts of self-defence as fundamental to the 
normative integrity and existence of the right -  the requirements that self-defence be 
necessary and proportionate -  has been identified by feminist legal theories as relying on 
interpretations that poise a male subject or actor to benefit from them.
From this perspective what is important for international versions of self-defence is the 
acknowledgement that the very features that should be seen to justify the existence of a legal 
right to self-defence for states, necessity and proportionality, reflect domestic legal standards 
that have been demonstrated as being subjective in a manner that projects male 
characteristics on to perceptions of the legal subject. This is not argued so as to develop a 
‘female’ version o f proportionality or necessity: rather to acknowledge the spectrum o f 
experiences we encounter, and are at risk o f encountering, as gendered subjects. The 
limitations on interpersonal self-defence construct a legal subject that is presumed to be male 
and presumed to act in stereotypically male ways. This is achieved through a legal narrative 
that evokes a paradigm case of self-defence that is assumed to be morally just. That a 
parallel paradigm is transplanted into international relations, where the state is assumed to be 
at greatest risk from an armed attack from another state, replicates a masculine model of 
interactions between legal subjects.53 This allows the rightness (or moral valour) of the right 
of states to act in self-defence to dictate a violent response that, as the previous chapter has 
argued, when conducted as military force not only reflects a sexed legal model but also 
produces complex gendered consequences and harms. Consequently, self-defence developed 
as an inherent right of states and without adequate attention to the limitations of such a right, 
places the understanding of an international legal structure premised on the prohibition on 
the use of force at risk.
Each of the features identified in the Lavelee case,54 therefore, retain meaning under the 
international right of self-defence. This includes the public nature of violence that attracts
52 Byrd, ‘Till Death Do us Part: A Comparative Approach to Justifying Lethal Self-defence by 
Battered Women’, Duke Journal o f Comparative and International Law, (1991), 169.
53 However, in political discourse the state is often referenced through a female pronoun, especially 
when the integrity of the state appears to require defending, see, for example, the discussion of the 
defence arrangements between the US and Canada, at 313, ‘State Building and Nation Building' ‘in 
Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge, 2003); in the context of a weaker 
state drawing on the military power of another state the feminised reference for the state protected is 
not surprising and corresponds with sexed narratives between protectors and protected persons in 
liberal discourse; for discussion see Kinsella, ‘Gendering Grotius’, 34 (2), Political Theory, (2006).
54 R v. Lavalee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, at 868.
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the attention of the international system (through the armed attack requirement of Article 
51), the assumption that deployment of force occurs in a simple attack-counter force binary 
and that the parties using aggressive and defensive force are of equal size and strength. 
Domestic feminist legal theories demonstrate how these features are more likely to protect 
some male violence and determine female violence as unjustifiable. Reflection on the 
relationships between states suggests these same features represent a limited account of the 
manner that communities encounter threats or of the way that conflicts emerge between 
states. Of particular importance is the understanding that responses to the primary threats to 
women’s safety and security are not construed as crossing the threshold that deems 
international or individual defensive measures justifiable.
As a result the sexed legal subject of international self-defence laws has specific 
repercussions for women.55 Firstly, constructions of the state as a masculine actor 
contributes to the devaluation of characteristics associated with the feminine. The corollary 
of this is when women act outside dominant projections of gender norms they are often 
ridiculed, demonized or ignored. This plays a role in women devaluing their own voice, 
authority and agency regardless of their specifically feminine or masculine traits because the 
voice of ‘reason’, ‘rationality’ and ‘authority’ is associated with culturally described 
masculinity and reinforced by legal structures. Secondly, the construction of self-defence 
through a masculinised state gives military behaviour - the use of force -  the appearance of 
being exercised, when defensive, as rational and controlled behaviour. Of particular concern, 
as was discussed in the previous chapter, are the specific threats military behaviour holds for 
women and that such threats exist whether a woman is local to a conflict, internally 
displaced or a refugee, a participant in the military action, or the member of the family of a 
military actor.56 Moreover, under international self-defence the disanalogous inclusion of 
collective self-defence enhances the narrative of rational force as within the capacity of the 
international legal subject of the state through a projection of heroics onto the powerful state 
able to ‘save’ and ‘rescue’ a state violated by the aggression of the rogue state. I discuss this 
below, in part 2.3. Finally, the international reasonableness requirements further entrench a 
sexed form of subjectivity into international law while failing (like their national 
counterparts) to gauge harms to women and violence against women in tests of 
proportionality or necessity.
55 This shift from a conceptual / analytical account to a descriptive/ empirical evaluation is indicative 
of the feminist assumption of the role of practice in theory and vice versa.
36 Houppert, ‘Another KBR Rape Case’, The Nation, (April 3ri 2008); Amnesty International, Lives 
Blown Apart: Crimes against Women in Times o f Conflict. Stop Violence Against Women. Amnesty 
International Report, (London, November 2004).
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2.2 How to Defend? Necessity and Proportionality
While functioning as general international legal principles, as well as having discrete 
meaning in the international humanitarian law of armed conflict,57 necessity and 
proportionality are perceived as the parameters that the use of defensive force must occur 
within to be considered lawful. As has been discussed, above, attempts to explain the 
existence of self-defence lead to circular arguments unless attention is paid to the limits of 
the right. Rodin tells us ‘the legal and philosophical literature on self-defense has identified 
three intrinsic limitations to the right. These limitations are necessity, imminence, and 
proportionality’.58 Brownlie describes proportionality as ‘innate in any genuine concept o f 
and the ‘essence’ of self-defence.59 Gardam describes the joint requirements of necessity and 
proportionality ‘as integral components’ of self-defence.60 These descriptions are re-iterated 
by other writers, who describe the proportionality and necessity requirements through 
reference to the Caroline incident61 as the ‘fons et origo’62 of self-defence and indicative of 
when ‘the modem law of self-defence was bom’.63 For Bowett, the Caroline incident is the 
‘locus classicus’ of international self-defence rights.64 Like, philosophical accounts of the 
interpersonal right, international accounts of self-defence see these limitations on the right as 
self-evident and integral to the existence of the right. Rodin describes the limitations as ‘a 
deeply intuitive restriction to rights of defense’, although he acknowledges the necessity 
requirement, under the international right, as broader than interpersonal accounts.65
57 Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use o f Force, (Cambridge 2004), chapters 3 and 4.
58 Rodin, above note 20. Also note, while necessity and proportionality are accepted international 
legal principles in contexts outside of self-defence, the notion of imminence is often subsumed into 
the category of necessity. I use the broader expression of reasonableness to embrace all three 
concepts.
59 Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States, (OUP, 1963), at 434 and 279.
60 Gardam, above note 57, at 186.
61 See Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’, 32, AJIL, (1938), 82; this is a discussion of the 
1837 British attack on a civilian vessel to halt the initiation of action by American rebels in support 
of the Canadian challenge to British rule. The subsequent correspondence between the US Secretary 
of State, Daniel Webster and his British counterpart, Lord Ashburton, is accepted as defining the 
parameters of necessity for the purpose of international self-defence laws.
Greenwood, ‘War, Terrorism and International Law’, 56, Current Legal Problems, (2003), 505 at 
517.
63 Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law at 11 September’, 51, ICLQ (2002), 401 
at 406.
64 Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (Manchester, 1958), at 58.
65 Above note 20, at 43; and at 111-112 ‘In domestic law the test of necessity is applied through the 
period of domestic action. . .  In international law however, the test of necessity is applied only to the 
commencement of a conflict not throughout the war’.
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Through the domestic analogy enlarged in this project, I argue that the contrast between state 
and scholarly acceptance of the limits on self-defence and the failure of states to develop 
clear practice in this area is explained by the sexed core of the analogy. To explore this 
further I will consider each limitation on international self-defence -  necessity and 
proportionality -  in turn. Under the discussion of necessity I will demonstrate how the state 
is sexed male through the application of the necessity standard that assumes, in analogy with 
the domestic right, the equal strength of the parties and the public nature of the armed attack. 
Under the discussion of proportionality I will consider the attack-counter attack model that 
ignores other forms of forcible intervention and also overlooks the consequences of military 
behaviour to non-militaiy actors, thus paralleling the masculine subject of interpersonal self- 
defence.
2.2.1 Necessity (and Imminence)
Necessity refers to the choice to use force to repel an armed attack and addresses the aim of 
defensive force, that is, the state must believe there is no other option other than to use 
defensive force. Schachter explains, ‘force should not be considered necessaiy until peaceful 
measures have been found wanting or when they clearly would be futile’.66 Ago suggests the 
state under attack ‘must not, in the particular circumstances, have had any means of halting 
the attack other than recourse to armed force. In other words, had it been able to achieve the 
same result by measures not involving the use of armed force, it would have no justification 
for adopting conduct which contravened the general prohibition against the use of force’.67 
States appear to accept this formulation, underpinning it with references to the Caroline test 
that necessity under self-defence must be ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment of deliberation’68 and thus incorporating a test of imminence (or 
immediacy) into self-defence.69 Immediacy incorporates a temporal element into necessity 
through focus on the possibility of the necessity of force to prevent further attacks. As 
necessity (and imminence) adheres to the private aspect of self-defence, which shifts the 
initial decision to use force from the collective body (the Security Council) on to the state 
claiming defensive rights, external regulation of the necessity of action taken in self-defence
66 Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, 82, Michigan Law Review, (1984), 1626 at 
1635.
67 Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, by Roberto Ago, Agenda Item 2, 
A/CN.4/Ser.A/198/Add.l (Part 1) II (1) Yearbook o f the International Law Commission, (1980), 69.
68 Above note 61.
69 On imminence in self-defence, see Nicaragua Case, 14 ICJ Reports 1986, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Schwebel, at 362-7.
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by a state will be difficult.70 It has been suggested the ‘jury’ of states in accepting or 
rejecting the actions of other states functions as an adequate arbiter.71
The reliance on the public jury of states assumes that the original attack takes a certain form 
that is public in nature. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ found the absence of an armed attack 
negated the US’s claim to be acting in self-defence. While in this case the consequence was 
a re-affirmation of the territorial integrity of a smaller state, the armed attack requirement 
also protects more powerful states from having other types of interventions assessed in the 
international sphere. For example, France’s multiple interventions into its prior African 
colonies have not always taken the form of an armed attack as they have been justified as 
policing type acts or at the consent of the state.72 This limits the capacity of the former 
colonies to respond with a self-defence justification as the use of military force does not 
always conform to the public nature of an armed attack and is frustrated by the less powerful 
position of the former colony.
Ultimately, this approach lends itself to the influence of powerful states in controlling when 
and where self-defence is deemed necessary in an analogous manner to interpersonal self- 
defence assuming a masculine legal actor. While the use of defensive force in Kuwait 
against Iraq in 1991, and by the US and its allies against Afghanistan since 2001, have been 
perceived as consolidated by Security Council resolutions recognising the existence of the 
right in these circumstances, Security Council recognition of the right to act in self-defence 
is not deemed an integral component of Article 51.73 This is despite the ICJ indicating in the 
Nicaragua Case that the reporting of defensive force by a state to the Security Council may 
enhance the credibility of a state’s claim. Rather the identification by powerful states that a 
violation of its or its allies’ territorial integrity has occurred constructs die possibility of 
rational self-defence under international law. Consequently, the international right 
incorporates an analogous model of subjectivity to the interpersonal right. Legal subjects, 
under both legal structures, are deemed equal so that inequalities between the parties are not 
perceived to impact on the capacity of a state to act in self-defence. Underlying this is an
70 The necessity requirement, therefore, undermines contemporary debates on preventative, 
preemptive or anticipatory force that attempt to re-define the parameters of an ‘armed attack’ under 
Article 51 (and thus the necessity of defence).
71 Franck, Recourse to Force, (Cambridge, 2002), at 107 and 187.
72 See the discussion in Gray, above note 2, at 85.
73 Greenwood, ‘New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and die Rule of Law’, 55, Modern 
Law Review^1992); SC Res 1368, 12th September 2001; Dinstein, ‘International law as a Primitive 
Legal System’, 19, New York University Journal o f International Law, (1986-87), 1 at 12.
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assumption about the legal subject having the capacity to choose to use force in a rational 
manner. Less powerful states using force will either have to risk applying what appears to be 
unnecessary force or embark on a course of action that appears irrational because of their 
lesser military might.
This recalls the critique of interpersonal self-defence, from feminist theorists, that suggests 
the necessity requirement assumes the equal strength of legal subjects who find their life to 
be under threat. Consequently, the judge in the Lavalee case acknowledged interpersonal 
self-defence offers little justification for defensive action that appears unnecessary because 
of the disparity in physical strength between partners. In this case, the defendant, Ms 
Lavalee shot her common law husband after prolonged physical and sexual abuse. Although 
not under threat at the time when she shot her partner he had previously threatened to kill her 
and, immediately before his death, raped her. The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged 
that in a situation of self defence, as envisaged by the Canadian legal system at the time of 
the trial, Ms Lavalee’s acts would be regarded as unnecessary. The mapping of human 
relationships in interpersonal accounts of selfdefence directly affects the construction of the 
proportionality and necessity requirements under international law, favouring those that are 
perceived by law as physically strong.
The public nature of the ‘bar-room brawl model’ associated with interpersonal selfdefence 
can be to seen to pervade the way international lawyers construct the scope of international 
selfdefence, which provides only loose parameters on what is ‘necessary’ in the 
international system, assuming the equal position of states before the law and assuming the 
public nature of interstate aggression. Implicit in this construction of the necessity principle 
is the requirement that an attack be directed against a state. The consequence is an 
inadequacy within international self-defence that is analogous to the inadequacies of 
interpersonal selfdefence. That is, rather than illustrating the need to adjust the necessity 
requirement in parallel to feminist reconstruction of the scope of interpersonal selfdefence, 
a feminist analysis of the international principle of necessity suggests the underlying analogy 
between the state and individual as legal subjects with the capacity to selfdefend may 
require severance. Severance would involve a reconsideration of when it is necessary for a 
state to use force outside of the collective security system, and a reconsideration of what 
constitutes an armed attack to recognise how inequalities between states allows for different 
standards to be applied.
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2.2.2 Proportionality
Gardam describes the factors to be assessed in reviewing the proportionality of international 
defensive force and includes consideration of the geographical and destructive scope of a 
forceful response, the temporal scope of the response, the choice of means and the method of 
warfare and the effect of force on third parties.74 Under international law necessity is judged 
at the beginning of a defensive action while proportionality is perceived as applying to the 
duration of the conflict. Proportionality under jus ad bellum is distinct from the test of 
proportionality under jus in bello, as the latter refers to the individual acts within a military 
engagement while the jus ad bellum test looks at the proportionality of the defensive action 
as a whole. Greenwood emphasises the need to understand the contingencies of each conflict 
as shaping and changing the potential proportionality requirements, in addition to the need to 
acknowledge that proportionality is not a test of sameness.75 The resultant model of state- 
assessed proportionality recognises that ‘[vjery different conclusions may be reached as to 
what is proportionate action depending on how the equation is defined and applied’.76 In her 
analysis of the use of force against Serbia in 1999, Chinkin considers indicators of 
proportionality to be applied when states seek to justify humanitarian interventions and that 
could reasonably be extended to tests of proportionality under Article 51. Chinkin extends 
the ambit of possible factors to include environmental damage, the impact on civilian 
infrastructure and the cultural and social meaning of force on a community.77 This broad 
understanding of proportionality has not been accepted in state practice.
The proportionality equation with respect to international self-defence relies, on the one 
hand, on an assessment of the trigger and, on the other hand, an application of appropriate 
(proportionate) consequences. Both of these assessments, however, reinforce the sexed 
subject of international law as underlying this is a perception of a force-counter force binary 
that mimics the ‘bar-room brawl’ on the interpersonal plane.
With regard to assessment of the trigger two standards seem to operate. Less powerful states, 
when subject to the interventions of neighbouring states through cross border incursions or 
the ‘policing’ interventions of former colonial powers, cannot rely on Article 51 to establish 
a right to self-defence due to the absence of a clear armed attack. Yet more powerful states
74 Gardam, above note 57, at 162 to 179.
75 Greenwood, ‘Self-defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict’, in Dinstein (ed), 
International Law at a Time c f Perplexity, (Nijhoff, 1989), 273.
76 Gardam, above note 57, at 155.
77 Chinkin, ‘Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War?’, 93, AJIL, (1999) 841 at 844.
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(such as Western and former colonial powers) consistently manipulate this standard to argue 
defensive force in response to less than an armed attack can be proportionate, for example to 
defend against the actions of terrorist actors. Underlying this is an assumption that a state’s 
legal subjectivity, and thus capacity to exercise self-defence, is defined through the state’s 
military capabilities, or strength. Consequently, more powerful states retain the right to 
exercise the right in a wider range of circumstances.
In relation to the counter force side of the proportionality equation, the gendered impact of 
military force further undermines contemporary assessments of what constitutes 
proportionate defensive force. For example, the assessment of overall civilian harm and /or 
deaths through the defensive action or the displacement of the civilian population do not 
form part of the proportionality jus ad bellum equation. This is because, to a degree, these 
are the expected consequences of the use of force. However, women constitute a 
disproportionate number in civilian and refugee populations during armed conflict making 
this a gendered harm.
Furthermore, Gardam’s work on the segregation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello suggests 
that these different standards function to exclude particular types of harms from the 
discourses of international law. Gardam writes,
Long term civilian causalities resulting from starvation and disease do not appear to 
be part of the equation. Neither is the extent to which any forceful action will lead to 
the displacement of the civilian population and the creation of large numbers of 
refugees.78
Self-defence, like all uses of force, often leads to the displacement of civilian populations. 
However, this has not been accommodated within discussion of proportionality 
requirements. As the majority of refugees and displaced persons are often women and 
children the failure to adequately weigh population displacement in proportionality 
equations represents an unacknowledged gendered consequence of force.79 Currently, states, 
when assessing the proportionality of the use of force, need not consider potential civilian 
causalities (although this is an aspect of proportionality under international humanitarian 
law). As a consequence jus ad bellum proportionality imposes few real limits to die acts of a 
state in a defensive situation, especially in terms of the assessment of civilian deaths or
78 Gardam ‘Proportionality as a Restraint on the Use of Force,’ 20, Australian Yearbook o f 
International Law, (1992) 161.
79 Amnesty International Report, Lives Blown Apart: Crimes Against Women in Times o f Conflict. 
Stop Violence Against Women Amnesty International London, (November 2004), available online at 
http://web.amnestv.org/librarv/ (last accessed May 2009).
110
injuries, in terms of the long term psychological impact of force on a community or the 
gender disparate harm that occurs as a result of conflict.
The focus on single acts invoking the international right,80 despite the multitude of 
interactions between states that lead to the use of force, also matches the isolated bar-room 
brawl model of interpersonal self-defence. Both the perception, that attacks must occur in 
public to cross the threshold of violence to invoke Article 51, and the assumption, that the 
formal equality of states can provide a level playing field forjudging the reasonableness of 
state action, mimics problematic, gendered aspects of interpersonal self-defence laws as they 
stand in common law countries.
2.3 Beyond the Domestic Analogy?
Beyond recognising the role of a sexed and gendered domestic analogy in self-defence laws 
it is useful to reflect on what to do with this knowledge. One strategy would be the 
development of increased feminist legal analysis of international self-defence that works to 
sever the analogy and to disrupt the personification of the state as the international legal 
subject. This would entail a radical re-imagining of the structures and processes of 
international law and, thus, have to confront the realities of the contemporary international 
legal regime that, for the most part, function to maintain the power of global and national 
stakeholders.81 This strategy may be limited in terms of political expediency but is appealing 
as a way of focusing on a horizon where international law is re-imagined at a structural level 
through gender disruptive strategies.82 The study of self-defence laws presented here, 
suggests at the core of such a strategy is the de-personification of the state in our re­
imaginings of international law. This would involve acceptance and full examination of the 
fundamental difference between a state as a legal subject and an individual as a legal 
subject.83 Without the de-personification of the state it is difficult to imagine the state 
without the current projection of sexed and gendered characteristics.
80 However, note the discussion, below, on contemporary shifts to accept preemptive force in 
response to numerous small scale attacks or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as 
crossing the threshold of an armed attack, below, section 3.1.
81 Knop also considers the impact of severing the analogy between states and individuals, see: Knop, 
‘Re/statements: Feminism and Sovereignty in International Law’, 3, Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems, (1993), 239.
82 On role of horizons in international feminist legal theories, see Lacey, ‘Feminist Theory and the 
Rights of Women’ in Knop, Gender and Human Rights, (Oxford, 2004), at 46.
83 However, see Lauterpacht who suggests the analogy between state and individuals lies in the ‘fact 
that states are composed of individual human beings’ in Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in 
International Law’, 23, BYIL, (1946), 26, at 27.
I l l
As has been noted, other features of the international right of states to act in self-defence, for 
example, the possibility of collective self-defence, also limit the persistence of the analogy. 
Under common law structures, collective self-defence has not received support, at least in 
circumstances where women have enlisted the support of other family members when 
defending against long term abuse from a male partner.84 This is not necessarily the case 
outside of common law legal systems. A difference in the structuring of interpersonal 
justifications, particularly self-defence, across municipal legal systems also militates against 
the continued reliance on the domestic analogy to explain international self-defence. An 
alternative strategy would be to work towards maintaining the analogy but developing 
reasonableness requirements to better reflect women’s experiences of conflict. This type of 
approach presents a risk of essentialising woman’s experiences of conflict but has the 
advantage of being conceptually and politically convenient.
In mainstream analysis, only a handful of commentators consider the differences between 
state and individual citizen as legal subjects and the impact this has on the scope of 
international self-defence.89 The difference is most often articulated in relation to 
understandings of the requirement of necessity. Rodin describes this as:
A significant disanalogy between the application of necessity in international and 
domestic law. In domestic law the test of necessity is applied throughout the period of 
defensive action.. .  In international law, however, the test of necessity is applied only 
to the commencement of a conflict, not throughout the war.86
However, nearly all commentators, whilst re-iterating the importance of necessity and 
proportionality to international self-defence, also suggest these features have been 
inadequately developed, applied or realised under international law.87 A feminist appraisal of 
the use of the domestic analogy to underpin international self-defence laws, alongside 
recognition of the sexed structure of interpersonal self-defence laws, particularly through the 
articulation of proportionality and necessity, advocates re-imagining the limits on the scope 
of self-defence in a way that does not depend upon the sexed legal subject of the state.
84 For example, see R y. Keavenev [2004] EWCA Crim 1091, (Unreported Case) in the UK and 
Osland y. The Queen [1998] HCA 75, in Australia.
85 See Grieg, ‘Reciprocity, Proportionality and the Law of Treaties’, 36, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, (1987), 283.
86 Rodin, above note 20, at 111.
87 See Dinstein, above note 5, at 184.
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This approach concludes that the error of the domestic analogy does not rest in the re­
configuration of self-defence as a justification for the use of force under international law 
but instead in the reconfiguration of gendered forms of both aggressive and defensive force 
under international law. Gardam concludes,
The potential of necessity and proportionality to restrain unnecessaiy and excessive 
force should not be underestimated, particularly during times when the legal regime 
regulating the situations in which States can resort to force is under strain. The more 
dubious the arguments validating the use of force in the first place, arguably the more 
stringent the requirements of necessity and proportionality . . . However, to a 
considerable degree, proportionality remains a rhetorical tool in the hands of States 
that they rely on either to justify their forceful actions or to condemn those of other 
States.88
Gardam’s approach shifts away from the largely subjective nature of necessity and 
proportionality to suggest that the principles can be useful legal tools if refined and 
developed to produce the outcomes ostensibly claimed by their presence. Gardam’s 
approach avoids the reiteration of the sexed legal subject as the lynchpin of Article 51 self- 
defence and avoids the sexed model of self-defence that is currently accepted under 
international law, through a focus on the role of human rights and humanitarianism as the 
basis for understanding restraints on force.89 Gardam’s suggestion that proportionality and 
necessity be developed as real restraints on unilateral and collective force suggest a re- 
imagining of this area of international law that, if inclusive of understandings of the 
gendered continuum of violence, may challenge and change the way states use force in the 
future or, at least challenge, the readiness of states to use Article 51 as a catch-all 
justification for the use of military force.
Gardam, in line with other feminist approaches, sees that the broadening of understandings 
of proportionality and necessity does not lie in attempts to justify force/ violence but in 
understanding and expanding the concepts to fully consider the proportionality of military 
behaviour in terms of its impact on all citizens within a community. This would include an 
understanding of the impact of force on the citizens in the community exercising force as 
well as the impact of force on the community subject to defensive attacks. Increased 
militarism within states exercising the use of force also has gendered repercussions that lead
88 Gardam, above note 57, at 187.
89 Gardam, ‘Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action’, 17, Michigan 
Journal o f International Law, (1995-6), 285.
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to specific, although often different, risks for women and men.90 Ultimately such an 
approach would lead to narrowing concepts of proportionality and necessity as it involves a 
re-imagining of what is valued when we speak of the ‘state’ or state sovereignty so that this 
encompasses more than military capabilities.
3. NARRATIVES OF SELF-DEFENCE
In addition to understanding the sexed base of international self-defence laws, it is essential 
to engage with contemporary debates on the changing nature of international self-defence 
laws. Key debates have emerged in response to the perception of changing global threats, 
particularly global terrorism and changing forms of weaponry.91 While the previous chapter 
discussed how the collective security structures have responded to these concerns, in this 
chapter, I consider how the perceived broadening of the threshold for Chapter VII measures 
has increasingly led to state practice that uses the concerns of the collective security regime 
to broaden justifications for unilateral action.
In contrast to my approach above, which suggests that the refinement of defensive rights is 
required to limit the capacity of states to choose to use force outside of the collective 
security structure, contemporary narratives put forth by some Western states and Western 
commentators have developed an expansion of defensive rights. Consequently, the doctrine 
of preemptive self-defence functions to secure Article 51, as described in Part Two of this 
chapter, as an adequate and universally accepted component of the international security 
regime. While it may be difficult to imagine a global legal system without the right of states 
to act in self-defence, my analysis has shown that this does not mean we can be complacent 
in our acceptance of Article 51. However, preemptive self-defence shifts the focus of 
debates considerably and, rather than engaging the aspects of customary international law I 
have discussed in this chapter, preemptive self-defence justifications challenge the armed 
attack requirement in Article 51, while using the Carotins incident92 as indicative of a 
factual precedent rather than as a statement of legal principle. That is, prior to the ‘War on
90 Sharoni, ‘Homeffont as Battlefield’ in Mayer (ed) Women and the Israeli Occupation, (Routledge, 
1994) at 10; Turner, et al, ‘Acute Military Psychiatric Causalities from the War in Iraq*, 186, British 
Journal o f Psychiatry, (2005) 476-479.
91 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, UN Doc A/59/565, (2nd December 2004); Gray, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy for 
the UN Collective Security System?’, 56, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2007), 157.
92 See above note 61.
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Terror’ the Caroline incident emerges in legal discourse for its statement of a legal principle, 
that there ‘must be a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation’.93 In the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 
terrorist attacks on the US, the facts of the Caroline incident are used to demonstrate the 
pedigree of preemptive/anticipatory force. For example, Greenwood considers, first, the 
range of actor incorporated under the armed attack requirement (‘the threat in the Caroline 
case came from a non-state group of the kind most would probably call terrorist today . . 
.’).94 Greenwood then considers the nature of the armed attack in the Caroline incident, 
which occurred prior to any actual attack taking place, as affirming the right of anticipatoiy 
self-defence as a central feature of contemporary self-defence. This approach overlooks this 
point as the very feature of the US-UK disagreement in the Caroline incident, and that the 
phrase ‘there must be a necessity of self-defence’ represented an agreement of the state of 
the law between the American Webster and his UK counterpart although they remained in 
disagreement of the application of this principle to the facts.95 Under contemporary 
approaches to justifying preemptive force, such as that elaborated by Greenwood, the facts 
of the Caroline incident are instrumentalised to indicate a type of self-defence rather than to 
indicate a legal standard (that self-defence must be necessary and proportionate). 
Furthermore, the contemporary narrative on preemptive force deploys both Article 51 and 
the Caroline incident as signs to establish its legitimacy. The consequence is a shift away 
from discussing Article 51 self-defence as a limited right -  and articulation of the correct 
parameters of those limitations -  towards the use of Article 51 to justify otherwise unlawful 
acts.
3.1. Article 51 as a Sign in the ‘War on Terror’
Prior to the advent of the US led ‘War on Terror’, scholarly debate and inconsistency in state 
practice with respect to the self-defence justification suggested an impasse existed between 
actors who regarded Article 51, through inclusion of the term ‘an inherent right’, as 
maintaining the right of states to use force in response to an imminent attack and those who 
focussed on the plain meaning of the drafting of Article 51, that is, that self-defence must be
93 Letter from Daniel Webster (April 24, 1842), 29 British and Foreign State Papers, 1129, 1138 
(1857) quoted in Greenwood, above note 2, at 13; also see, above notes 61, 65 and accompanying 
text.
94 Greenwood, above note 2, at 17.
95 See, Occelli, ‘ “Sinking” the Caroline’, 4, San Diego International Law Journal, (2003), 467.
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in response to an armed attack.96 For example, Israel’s claim that it was justified in attacking 
die nuclear reactors in Iraq in 1981, as a form of anticipatoiy self-defence, was rejected by 
most states and the vast majority of scholars.97 Despite this rejection of anticipatoiy self- 
defence by the majority of states and scholars during the Cold War and the 1990s, the 
possibility always remained that the anticipatory defence exception might crystallise into a 
formal rule of the international system. This position received some support when the ICJ 
found in the Nuclear Weapons Advisoiy Opinion in 1996 that it could not describe the use 
of nuclear weapons as unconditionally prohibited. The Court advised that the use of a first 
strike with nuclear weapons in an extreme case of self-defence, where the very survival of a 
state was at risk, may not be illegal.98 Nevertheless, any right to anticipatory force was 
framed in extremely narrow terms, supporting the earlier position that: ‘in a very limited 
number of situations force might be a reaction proportionate to the danger where there is 
unequivocal evidence of an intention to launch a devastating attack almost immediately’.99
In the era of the ‘War on Terror’ the debate on anticipatory self-defence has shifted 
considerably. That is, an acceptance of anticipatory self-defence has increasingly become 
apparent in the writing of international legal scholars. Furthermore, anticipatory self-defence 
can be distinguished from preemptive self-defence and the broader notion of premptive self- 
defence is now the locus of contemporary debates. For example, O’Connell’s, otherwise 
useful, account of the failure of the preemptive force argument, finds anticipatoiy force as an 
acceptable aspect of international law.100 What was in the past the exception or the anomaly 
(anticipatoiy self-defence) has become the rule. As a consequence, debates and disputes 
move further away from the linguistic parameters of Article 51 (that is the extent that the use 
of the word ‘inherent’ incorporates pre-existing customary international law) to argue the 
merits or demerits of preemptive defence. Unlike anticipatory self-defence, which utilises 
the necessity requirement of self-defence to suggest a state need not wait for an actual attack 
if knowledge of an imminent attack exists, preemptive self-defence responds to the
96 Brownlie, ‘The Use of Force in Self-defence,’ 37, BYIL, (1961), 183, at 227, finding ‘when there is 
only circumstantial evidence of an impending attack would be to act in a maimer which disregarded 
the requirement of proportionality’.
97 Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, 82, Michigan Law Review, (1984), 1620; 
Cassese, International Law, (Oxford, 2001), at 309-310; however, O’Connell describes this as an 
example of preemptive rather than anticipatory self-defence, above note 15, at 12; see also Franck, 
above note 71, at 106-107.
98 Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports, (8th July, 1996) 
226.
" ib id , a t227.
100 O’Connell, above note 15, suggests ‘To maintain a legal order that restrains other states and to 
uphold the rule of law, the United States should continue its conservative commitment to limits on the 
unilateral use of force, and reject a reckless doctrine of preemptive self-defence’ at 21.
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possibility of a future attack or attacks without specific evidence to measure necessity or 
proportionality.
The shift from debating anticipatory to preemptive self-defence accedes to Barthes’ 
description of the structure and role of new narratives. New narratives (in this case 
preemptive force) do not emerge fully formed and in contradistinction to past narratives. 
Instead, new narratives, to gain legitimacy, utilise signs from previously accepted narratives 
to enhance their credibility.101 The debates for, against, and around preemptive defence 
deploy Article 51 and the Caroline incident as a sign of their continuity with past (accepted) 
narratives and play an important role in attaching the possibility of preemptive defence to 
the Charter and to customary international law. When the old narrative is re-asserted as 
acceptable and uncontroversial, the previously contentious issue (anticipatory force) also 
appears uncontroversial and scholars and states are pushed to articulate a position on 
preemptive force. The very act of incorporating preemptive force into the narrative has the 
function of giving it the appearance of an appropriate topic for legal debate. However, Gray 
demonstrates the weakness of arguments for preemptive force through the North Korean 
response to the US identification of that state as a part of the ‘Axis of Evil*:
After the USA denounced North Korea as part of die Axis of evil, North Korea on the 
basis of reciprocity invoked the right of self-defence. This escalation of rhetoric 
illustrates vividly the danger of preemptive action and the abandonment of the 
language of diplomacy. The destabilizing impact of the ‘Bush’ doctrine and the 
perverse incentive it offers States to hasten to acquire weapons of mass destruction 
may be seen. North Korea in withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
regime in January 2003 said that it was entitled to take a preemptive strike against the 
US because of US threats.102
The practice of North Korea illustrates the poverty of assessing die proportionality of the 
level of a threat that is yet to materialise or be acted upon. Furthermore, the rapid shift in 
state, scholarly and institutional narratives is alarming and supports my earlier contention 
that the parameters of Article 51 are far from settled and should not be overlooked or under 
theorised by feminist legal scholars.
The second aspect of the preemptive force narrative revolves around the invocation of the 
Caroline incident. Again what was previously controversial103 is articulated as a settled,
101 Barthes, Image-Music-Text, (Hill and Wang, 1977, Trans. Heath).
102 Gray, above note 91, at 162 (footnote 24).
103 Kearly, ‘Raising the Caroline’, 17, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 325, 1999.
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clear and satisfactory legal doctrine. The Caroline incident has come to be encapsulated in 
the phrase, ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of 
deliberation.’104 Yet, read in the actual correspondence between Daniel Webster and Lord 
Ashburton,105 as well as in light of the circumstances of the actual incident, the Caroline 
doctrine appears to be suggesting a higher standard than contemporary international law 
requires.106 By demanding imminence within the test of necessity it necessarily becomes an 
inadequate guide to the scope of contemporary defensive actions. For example, following 
the attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania in 2001, the United States chose to 
wait before exercising the right to act in self-defence, while the use of force to defend 
Kuwait after Iraq aggression commenced five months after the initial attacks by Iraq on 
Kuwait territoiy. This indicates how the ‘immediacy’ aspect of the Caroline doctrine has 
been adapted to the realities of contemporaiy warfare, where the transportation of troops, 
logistics and weaponry in collective defence is a long term rather than an immediate project.
When preemptive force is included in the narrative, the Caroline incident can not provide 
any guidance with respect to the articulation of standards of reasonableness, so scholars tend 
to use the facts of the Caroline to support arguments in favour of preemptive self-defence. 
Occelli’s analysis leads her to find that the Caroline facts establishes a customary 
international law right of states to use force on the territory of a neutral state where a threat 
of future attacks compels the state to act (that is, as a form of factual precedent). She 
incorporates terrorist acts into the range of plausible justifications for preemptive self- 
defence because they are ‘characterised by continuing, but intermittent, acts. When one 
attack is completed, the threat does not end’.107 For O’Connell the response of the United 
States to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network is justified because it can be accommodated in the 
narrative of anticipatory self-defence, while the (at the time proposed) use of force against 
Iraq (that occurred in 2003) could not be justified as it would constitute preemptive force. 
O’Connell argues,
The Security Council action after September 11 can be cited to support anticipatory 
self-defense in cases where an armed attack has occurred and convincing evidence 
exists that more are planned, though not yet underway. By contrast, international law 
continues to prohibit preemptive self-defense or even anticipatory self-defense, if that 
is understood to be different from responding to incipient attacks or ongoing 
campaigns. In other words, a state may not take military action against another state
104 Above note 61.
105 See Stevens, Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod Affairs in A nglo-A merican-Canadian 
Relations, 1837-1842, (Alabama Press, 1989).
106 Occelli, ‘ “Sinking” the Caroline*, 4, San Diego International Law Journal, (2003), 467.
107 Ibid, at 484.
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when an attack is only a hypothetical possibility, and not yet in progress -  even in the 
case of weapons of mass destruction.108
O’Connell’s analysis is replicated in the writing of Greenwood at the time of the US and UK 
instigation of force in Iraq in 2003.109 However, Greenwood tells us he will ‘avoid treating 
such words as though they were terms of art’ and thus he favours the term anticipatory 
action that he describes as ‘within the concept of self-defence’ in the example of the use of 
force in Afghanistan in 2001 because ‘the threat from Al-Qaeda was imminent’.110 Attempts 
to describe and justify the use of force in Afghanistan since 2001, whether under the 
umbrella of anticipatory or preemptive force, appear to embrace the earlier writing of 
Bowett, who advocated this approach prior to the ‘War on Terror’ narrative but was, at the 
time, criticised by other scholars.111 Central to the new narrative is the use of the Caroline 
incident as indicative of a factual situation similar to the ‘War on Terror’ rather than as the 
elaboration of the legal doctrine that international self-defence is circumscribed by some 
form of reasonableness- proportionality and necessity - test.112
In addition to shilling the legal narratives with regard to the legacy of the Caroline incident, 
the ‘War on Terror’ also produces a new narrative with regard to state responsibility for 
terrorist attacks by non-state actors. Previous ICJ pronouncements constructed a relatively 
high threshold for invoking the responsibility of states for the acts of non-state actors. In the 
Nicaragua case, the Court found responsibility for the acts of non-state actors can be 
attributed to the state if the state actually participated in or directed the acts;113 while in the 
more recent Congo v. Uganda case the court emphasised that their must be actual 
involvement of the state in the attacks.114 While a lower threshold was established in die 
ICTY Tadic judgement, that focused on effective control,115commentators distinguish this 
for the purposes of establishing individual criminal, rather, than state responsibility.116 The 
‘War on Terror* narrative, in contrast, invokes the non-legal standard of states harbouring
108 Above note 15, at 11.
109 Above note 2.
110 Ibid, at 25, although note Greenwood describes the use of force by the US as ‘pre-emptive action’ 
that ‘fell within the concept of self-defense because the threat from Al-Qaeda was imminent’ (at 25); 
further Greenwood argued that the use of force in Iraq would be justified through implied 
authorisation from the Security Council.
111 Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, (1958), 112; this position was rejected by Brownlie, 
International law and the Use of Force by States, (1963) 112; also see Dinstein, above note 5, at 172 
(describing incipient armed attacks); for a rejection of Dinstein’s claim at this time, see: Cassese, 
International Law, (Oxford, 2001), at 308-309; see also Franck, above note 71, at 107-08.
112 See, for example, Greenwood, above note 2.
113 Above note 3, at para. 75-125,215- 20.
114 Above note 12, at para. 146.
115 Tadid Case, 105ILR 453.
116 Aust, Handbook o f International Law, (Cambridge, 2005) at 413.
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terrorists. At one level, this exposes the complicity of repressive regimes in creating safe 
havens for terrorist actors, yet at another level, the standard is meaningless as all states -  
willing or unwilling -  harbour some terrorists. For Western states, however, Security 
Council resolution 1373 applies, directing states to freeze terrorist assets and impose travel 
bans. This constructs a split between the manner that international law is applied across the 
divide of powerful (Western) and weak (third world/ non-Western) states.117 Underlying the 
narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ violating the territorial integrity and political independence 
of states harbouring terrorists is an extension of the Article 51 narrative. Prior to the 
September 11 attacks on the US, the question of instrumentalising Article 51 against non­
state actors was accommodated by the Nicaragua standard of widespread and actual control 
so that the assumption persisted that the armed attack requirement, therefore, must have a 
clear nexus to the state.118 The contemporary narrative allows for a side stepping of state 
responsibility norms through the reliance on a lower than accepted standard for attributing 
the acts to the state perceived as harbouring terrorists, while engaging Article 51 to justify 
the use of force (and thus shield the state using force against terrorists from responsibility for 
forceful incursions on the territory of another state).
To conclude, since the advent of the ‘War on Terror’ there has been a shift from debating 
anticipatory to preemptive self-defence. There also appears to be an increased reliance on the 
Caroline incident as a factual precedent rather than as a description of legal doctrine on the 
correct customary international law principles relevant to self-defence. What was previously 
contentious (e.g. anticipatory self-defence and self-defence in response to attacks by non­
state actors) have become increasingly accepted and perceived as within the ‘normal’ range 
of Article 51 self-defence and its incorporation of customary international norms on self- 
defence, while preemptive force moves into the realm of contention/ debate. A similar shift 
occurs from the language of Nicaragua test of effective control to the articulation of states 
harbouring terrorists again through the use of Article 51 to supplement the new narratives.
These shifts in Western state practice and scholarship demonstrate how Article 51 is used as 
a sign available to assist the deployment of new narratives. Franck is quite explicit about this 
and suggests this was the intention of the drafters of the UN Charter and uses the domestic
117 Baxi, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Anghie, Chimni, Mickelson and Okafor, The Third World 
and International Order, (Kluwer, 2003).
118 See Greenwood, above note 2.
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analogy to underpin this idea.119 For Koskenniemi this is a product of the international 
system, where ‘the legal subjects that are bound by the law interpret it, and that’s an aspect 
you can’t avoid’.120 However, Koskenniemi acknowledges the key consequence of the 
preemptive force argument is not that states can ‘auto-interpret’ the law,121 rather that a right 
to deploy preemptive force shifts the limitations of the right away from a measure against an 
armed attack to the objective underlying the force. ‘The reasonable objective is to protect the 
state. Anything you do to protect the state, you can then use armed force for because 
anything that threatens the state tends to be equal to a threat or use of force’.122 In other 
words, the tests of proportionality and necessity become measured against the objective (the 
protection of the state) rather than an actual armed attack.
Returning to the domestic analogy, the preemptive force justification appears to be closer to 
the partial defence of provocation rather than self-defence. Provocation defences, under 
common law, mitigate a violent response to behaviour that is persistent and that the legal 
subject feels unable to control.123 Brownlie records the appearance of provocation as a 
justification for the use of force during the 1920s in a number of alliance treaties.124 
Brownlie demonstrates the inadequacy of interstate force justified on provocation grounds, 
through the test of proportionality:
The concept was extremely vague and any act or omission by the authorities of a State 
could be regarded as provocation if it displeased a powerful opponent. . .even if the 
term were restricted, which it was not, to some military or frontier crossing, it justified 
full scale assault, a formal war, and had no regard for proportionality.125
Arguments in favour of preemptive self-defence,126 or a definition of anticipatory self- 
defence that includes the use of force against terrorist threats,127 use a similar argument 
justifying the use of force through analysis of a state’s subjective assessment of the 
magnitude of a threat rather than through reasonableness requirements gauged by the nature
119 Above note 71, at 4-5, chapters 7 and 10.
120 Koskenniemi, ‘Iraq and the “Bush Doctrine” of Preemptive Self-Defence* Crimes of War Project, 
Expert Analysis, (August 20* 2002), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/expert/bush- 
Koskenniemi-print.html (last accessed May 2009).
121 Ibid
122 Ibid.
123 Quick and Wells, above note 48.
124 Brownlie, above note 96, at 199; for example, the Locarno Treaty, 16* October, 1925.
125 Ibid
126 Greenwood, above note 2; Glennon, above note 25; National Security Strategy of the United States 
6 (September 2002), available at: www.whitehouse.gov.nsc.nss/2002/index.html (last accessed May 
2009); National Security Strategy of the United States 23 (March 2006), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss/2006/nss2066.pdf (last accessed May 2009).
127 O’Connell, above note 15.
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of an actual attack. Furthermore, the legal structure of interpersonal defences distinguishes 
between justifications (usually self-defence) and excuses (provocation). The international 
legal system recognises justifications for the use of force but has no sense of excuses as a 
defence for the use of force.128 The implicit provocation analogy in preemptive self-defence 
arguments is returned to in chapter six, as a means to demonstrate the wider implications of 
the thesis in the era of the ‘War on Terror’.
In the following section I reflect on how these developments extend the sexed and gendered 
base of international self-defence laws through the production of social and cultural 
narratives that resonate with images of the Western state as the male hero of the narrative, 
the Western state as the male spectator implicitly in control of the narrative, and through 
images of the terrorist as the rogue, male actor. Each of these images of masculinity 
distinguishes women’s lives and actions from the solar plexus of international law, that is, 
the law on the use of force.
3.2 Article 51 as a Heroic Spectator Narrative
Feminist legal theories encourage the perception of law as a narrative. As Thornton states,
We can no longer be bound by a blind obeisance to legal authority that typified a 
bygone age. Popular evocations of the disillusionment with law bear this out. Law is a 
dynamic social and cultural phenomenon, which can not be explained by reference to 
itself alone. To escape the vacuous circularity and to persist with the task of 
revisioning law as an intellectual discipline, it has to be located within a wider frame, 
which includes the world of popular imagination, with its hope, as well as its
•  •  129cynicism.
Thornton’s approach is developed as an international method in the work of Orford, who 
analyses justifications for humanitarian interventions under a scheme that perceives law as 
narrative.130 Orford considers the type of popular (Western) narrative that cloaks ideas about 
the role and purpose of Article 51 and suggests,
The fact that the reader is invited to identify with a white, violent, masculine hero 
limits the capacity of international law to address the ways in which the hero’s
128 Note, too, that the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
annexed to GA Res56/83, 12 December 2001, find circumstances precluding the responsibility of 
states cannot be used as an excuse for a serious breach of international law, see Article 26.
129 Thornton, Romancing the Tomes: Popular Culture, Law and Feminism, (Routledge, 2002), 
introduction.
130 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge, 2003).
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journey of action and self-validation affects the lives of the human beings caught up in 
that quest. . . .  As a consequence, violence becomes a logical form of self-defence. 
The self that is being defended . . . .  is the competitive, irresponsible and brutal self of 
white, imperial masculinity, reproduced unendingly in the heroic narratives of 
militarist internationalism.13
Orford* s approach is to avoid the quest for a truth ‘that can correct existing 
misrepresentations’ in exchange for a method that is ‘interested in coming to terms with the 
‘truth’ that is produced by texts’.132 In considering law as a narrative with respect to Article 
51, it is important to think through the role Article 51 plays in legitimising a specific range 
of force and a specific range of narratives for Western communities. I am interested in how 
these narratives manifest in legal arguments for and against different aspects of self-defence 
but attention might also be paid to the role the media and popular culture in Western states 
play in diminishing and strengthening certain narratives around interstate self-defence.
My focus on the production of a social narrative in Western communities also attends to 
Gunning’s method of world travelling. Gunning argues that, as part of the anti-essentialist 
project, feminist approaches need to pay attention to the production of knowledge within 
their own communities.133 That is, for Western scholars, there must be an examination of the 
cultural norms that construct the dominant narratives and discourses prevalent in Western 
communities.134 Orford’s analysis of the range of narratives produced in Western 
communities (in response to what is alleged to be humanitarian interventions) argues that 
Western accounts of international law play a role in producing a heroic narrative with 
Western states cast as the ‘White Knight’ of international law. With respect to international 
self-defence laws, the key feature of the heroic narrative is the collective self-defence 
entitlement.
131 Ibid, at 180.
132 Orford, ‘Muscular Humanitarianism’, 10 (4), EJIL, (1999), 679, at 682.
133 Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perceptions, World-travelling and Multicultural Feminism’, 23, Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, (1991), 189.
134 This was vividly brought home to me in a discussion with a scholar who had conducted a study of 
sexual violence in Kurdish communities in Northern Iraq. One of the recorded limitations of the 
project was the inability of the researcher to ask direct questions regarding sexual violence to women 
in die communities. It seemed the researcher’s own cultural norms and taboos made her acutely aware 
of the pain and invasion of these questions and she refrained from asking them specific questions as a 
consequence. She recorded how a male colleague did not experience the same inhibitions as was able 
to maintain a more clinical approach to the research. Far from a representation of Kurdish gender 
stereotyping this research indicated the strong Western social norms regarding transgressions and 
social facilitation which men and women often experience differently.
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As noted earlier, Article 51 specifically refers to the right of self-defence as an individual 
and collective right of states. While the inclusion of the word collective during the drafting 
of the Charter was at the behest of Latin American states,135 and possibly conceived as 
linking Article 51 with Article 53 (on collective and regional security arrangements), in 
practice states have taken this to refer to the use of defensive force to assist an allied state, 
without necessarily any prior collective security agreement existing. In the Nicaragua case, 
the IC J stipulated a state must have issued a request for assistance for the collective aspect of 
Article 51 to be invoked by a state.136 The use of force in the defence of Kuwait, by Western 
states during the 1991 Gulf War, complied with these requirements and was, therefore, 
widely accepted as a correct exercise of Article 51 powers.
Rather than facilitating the development of regional security norms, collective self-defence, 
for Western states, has facilitated an image of the militarily powerful ‘saving* the smaller 
state through the use of its defensive muscle. While at the time of its deployment Western 
force in the defence of Kuwait was potentially controversial,137 it has since become 
embedded in Western narratives as an appropriate and fair use of force. Questions about 
Kuwaiti government structures, inclusions and exclusions, particularly with respect to the 
provision of civil and political rights of women,138 the Bedoon people139 and migrant 
workers in Kuwait,140 are not inserted into the international narrative of Western heroics and, 
consequently, these actors are denied the protection of international legal narratives. The 
male and elitist Kuwaiti government was re-installed as the legitimate government as a 
consequence of this use of collective force. At the same time Iraq, through its choice to use 
aggressive force, has since had its internal political structure destroyed. For women in Iraq, 
there has been a significant retraction of women’s rights since the early 1990s that Western 
military activities in the region, including the post-2003 Occupation, and Western-led 
Article 41 sanctions during the 1990s, have played a role in producing.141 The heroic 
discourse of collective self-defence simplifies the consequences of military action and 
distracts attention from important issues, such as, women’s rights within a state, that are a 
necessary component of state, regional and international security.
135 Mgbeoji, above note 5.
136 Nicaragua Case, above note 3.
137 Greenwood, above note 75.
138 Al-Mughui, Women in Kuwait: the Politics o f Gender, (Saqi, 2000).
139 The 2000 Human Right Watch Report on Kuwait focuses on the discrimination and lack of legal 
rights afforded the Bedoon and can be found online at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/kuwait/kuwait-04.htm (last accessed May 2009).
140 Charlesworth, and Chinkin, The Boundaries o f International Law: A Feminist Analysis, 
(Manchester, 2000) at 262.
141 Al-Ali, and Pratt, What Kind o f Liberation? Women and the Occupation in Iraq, (Berkeley, 2009).
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It is at this point that the analogy with criminal/ interpersonal self-defence looks uneasy. 
Collective self-defence has not generally been accepted as an element of the interpersonal 
right to use force in self-defence. Where women have requested help from a physically 
stronger party to defend against an aggressive partner, courts have perceived this as negating 
the imminence of the threat of an attack or the necessity of defence.142 The existence of 
collective self-defence under international law, therefore, either alludes to the ineffective 
base of the analogy or forces us to acknowledge that states cannot be personified. Possibly 
there is some merit in both claims. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest if a state is able 
to request collective assistance then this should be achieved through the collective security 
system, either under Chapter VII or VIII of the Charter or for requests for Security Council 
involvement under Chapter VI. This reading would be in line with the larger themes of the 
UN Charter.
Focusing on the role of collective self-defence as a narrative that functions to embed 
Western heroics as a normal element of the international legal structure also compels 
questions about the capacity of collective force to be achieved within the confines of 
proportionality. By allowing more players to act as defenders (a privilege not given to the 
aggressor), collective self-defence anticipates the greater strength of a state’s allies. For 
Western states, superior military might has been achieved through airpower.143 Mclnnes 
describes how the superior airpower of the West, particularly the United States, plays an 
important role in Western domestic narratives of the fairness of Western led force, such as 
that provided as collective self-defence against Iraq during the Gulf War. The fairness, or 
perceived proportionality, is narrated through the protection offered to Western military 
actors and by extension Western civilian communities who can remain outside the theatre of 
war. As a consequence, the narrative of heroic Western states assisting their allies with 
‘safe’ airpower and precision bombing also constructs a spectator relationship between the 
bulk of Western citizenry and the use of force. That is, Western actors -  politicians, legal 
advisers, NGOs, diplomats, military leaders and media outlets -  play a convincing role in 
framing the contours of the narrative of a conflict without risk to their own lives. As Western 
citizens we gain the privilege of watching the production of this narrative without facing the 
direct threat of force, aggression or conflict in our communities.144 This is underscored by
142 Above note 84.
143 Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War: the West and Contemporary Conflict, (London, 2002), chapter 
five.
144 Mclnnes discusses how the events of September 11th 2001 reinforce the spectator narrative, rather 
than unsettle it, ibid. at 3; also see Heathcote, ‘Article 51 Self-Defense as a Narrative: Spectators and 
Heroes in International Law’, 12 (1), Texas Wesleyan Law Review (2005), 131.
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policies geared toward minimum causalities for Western military personnel. In this sense, 
collective self-defence, exercised proportionally, reads as a narrative of empire and 
imperialism; integral to the construction of empire and imperialism are images of 
masculinity and femininity that conform to dominant Western gender hierarchies.145
When the US and the UK, alongside the ‘Coalition of the Willing,* embarked on the use of 
force in Iraq in 2003, this narrative began to look unstable. The perceived proportionality of 
airpower was exchanged for the brutality of occupation and narratives on the futility, rather 
than the heroics of force, have emerged in Western dialogues. The disproportionate tally of 
Iraqi civilian deaths against Western military deaths, the excesses of and abuses by Western 
soldiers and the shift toward increased political chaos in Iraq, suggests that the Western 
masculine hero captured in the heroic narrative of ‘freeing’ Iraq is no longer so easy to 
script.
What is evident is not the loss of the heroic narrative, or the failure of the spectator’s 
justification for armchair articulation of the normative contours of force, rather the failure of 
the gendered narrative to produce long term security for any of the actors involved. As 
Western citizens, our complicity in the narrative of the collective defence of Kuwait has 
focused on military narratives of necessity and proportionality that appease our sense of 
danger to our own militaries, yet this has been at the cost of recognition of the 
disproportionate civilian deaths in states where defensive force is exercised and our wilful 
ignorance of the role enhancing the agency of all actors might play. In Iraq after 2003, where 
the measure of proportionality must be judged against a perceived threat rather than an 
actual armed attack, the heroic narrative appears to have unravelled.
Perceiving international laws on self-defence as narratives with cultural and social meanings 
in our communities exposes our complicity in force, abuse, deaths and silencing. To 
articulate norms that envisage self-defence as a right of states without a Western, masculine 
origin is to listen for the voices of those damaged and dislocated by war and armed conflict. 
For feminist approaches to international law, this involves taking descriptive data of the 
lives of non-Westem women and the political demands of non-Westem women and
145 Nesiah, ‘Resistance in the Age of Empire’, 27, Third World Quarterly, (2006), 903 at 907.
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recording these as meaningful and instrumental in the development of future narratives of 
law on the use of force.
3 3  Conclusions
This chapter examines the way an analogy with domestic self-defence laws has been used to 
explain the existence of a right of states to act in self-defence under international law. While 
the prospect of an analogy, in itself, may not be a fundamental flaw of the international 
system, the chapter demonstrates how the analogy is currently an inadequate means to 
develop international self-defence rights because of the masculine subject invoked by the 
analogy. This detracts from claims of Article 51 as ‘inherent’, ‘natural’ or universal.
By looking at philosophical accounts of the rationale behind the right of (individuals) to self- 
defence, the limitations on the right -  articulated in interpersonal and international self- 
defence as reasonableness requirements -  are demonstrated as intrinsic to Article 51. From 
the perspective of feminist legal theories, the development of reasonableness requirements 
has reinforced a masculine subject as the primary beneficiary of the self-defence 
justification. This generally excludes female violence from reliance on the defence in 
common law systems. Under international law, through the use of replica legal language to 
limit Article 51 self-defence, the customary international law standards of necessity 
(imminence) and proportionality embed the sexed legal subject of legal liberalism in 
international accounts.
To move beyond the reiteration of a sexed legal subject under international law two 
alternatives have been considered. Firstly, it is suggested that the analogy -  and hence the 
right to self-defence -  could survive the criticisms evidenced through my analysis of the 
domestic analogy and the use of feminist theories. This approach acknowledges the 
entrenched reality of self-defence having political meaning to states (and individuals) and 
the difficulty (although not impossibility) of conceiving of an international legal subject that 
is not predicated on the human subject of domestic legal systems. For the feminist legal 
account to retain meaning, however, future articulations of the limitations on the use of 
Article 51 self-defence would require review and development. This would involve a 
refinement of international self-defence, possibly developed through empirical accounts of 
the impact of military behaviour on civilian communities, to address the discrepancy
127
between civilian understandings of necessity and state projections of necessity. The impact 
of attacks on the electrical grid and essential services of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War provide 
an excellent example of necessity blinkered to long term civilian suffering.146 Feminist 
methods that invoke ‘peripheral subjects’ and promote ‘world travelling’ to listen to and 
understand the needs of those most harmed by conflict would be necessary to challenge 
current (masculine) paradigms of defensive necessity.147
Feminist engagements with proportionality would involve re-examination of the types of 
harms military action inflicts upon a community and necessitate a reconsideration of the 
international focus on armed attacks as the key trigger for Article 51. This would require 
attention to the limited success of military endeavours in ‘protecting’ or ‘defending’ 
communities when viewed through the perspective of civilians, who, in conflict, are 
predominantly women and children. Chinkin’s analysis of the proportionality of the use of 
force in Serbia to halt atrocities against Kosovo exposes the impact of modem airpower 
technology on the communities experiencing defensive (or this case humanitarian) force.148 
Mclnnes suggestion that modem weaponry gives the illusion of proportionality through the 
lessening of risks to Western communities even though they are usually far removed from 
the use of force, highlights the role the law on the use of force plays not just in the 
acceptability of some forms of violence but also in the Western expectation that the narrative 
for Western citizens is experienced as a spectator narrative.149 Using feminist theory on the 
role of engaging the ‘Other’ in international norm making suggests a need to expose and 
move beyond our complicity in spectator narratives to fully assess the proportionality of 
airpower, the use of defensive force and ‘smart’ weapons as securing the proportionality of 
defensive force.
The alternative to re-scripting the customary law limitations attached to Article 51 would be 
for feminist legal approaches to work towards the rejection of the analogy between state and 
citizen and to, consequently, challenge the viability of a continued right of states to act in 
self-defence. Contemporary reports, such as, the More Secure World Report, also suggest 
this possibility as the role of the collective security system is seen as preferential to the use 
of unilateral force by states. This strategy would accommodate the consideration that the
146 See the contrasting accounts of Gardam, above note 6, and Greenwood, above note 73, at 174.
147 Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric: Resurrecting the Native Subject’, 15, Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, (2002); Gunning, above note 136.
148 Above note 78; also see Gardam, above note 57, at 114-115.
149 Above note 147.
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armed attack requirement, on the one hand, is too narrow in that it is not inclusive of threats 
to women’s security while, on the other hand, acknowledging the broader claim of the thesis 
that any move toward increased forms of justified force ultimately undermine women’s 
security. The rare instances when a "classical’ right of self-defence has been perceived to 
exist, suggests the absence of the right under international law would only be detrimental in 
the sense that the increasingly creative arguments for justified self-defence put forward by 
states would be the main casualty.
This chapter also argues, however, that the space for a feminist analysis of the key and 
accepted components of Article 51 has been made increasingly difficult by the contemporary 
narrative surrounding preemptive self-defence and the right to use force to combat terrorism. 
This has distracted attention from the framework of self-defence, focusing on the scope of 
self-defence rather than paradigm Article 51 cases. While few states or commentators have 
argued for broad recognition of these extensions to justifications for force, one of the 
consequences of the articulation of the preemptive force justification has been a shifting of 
debates. As such, the site of controversy has moved so that self-defence in response to an 
imminent attack is increasingly perceived as acceptable, and within the remit of Article 51 
and customary international law on self-defence, while the broader notion of preemptive 
force has become its controversial edge.150
I have suggested Article 51 functions as a sign in this narrative where its deployment allows 
the development of new narratives. Furthermore, the sign functions as a sexed sign 
embedding Article 51 as a natural and self-evident aspect of the international legal regime. 
The controversies exposed by the domestic analogy, above, become increasingly difficult to 
expose and challenge as a consequence.
Finally, the chapter considers how self-defence further protects Western states by scripting a 
masculine narrative of heroics on to contemporary accounts of international law. To re-script 
Western narratives it is important that the producers of Western jurisprudence consider their 
role in the production of narratives and the contemporary incapacity of Western actors to 
hear alternative conceptions of law, of human relations and of the impact of armed conflict. I 
have argued that feminist legal theories must place critical analysis of the personification of
150 Reisman and Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense’, 100, (3) 
AJIL, (2006), 525.
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the state through domestic analogies, such as found in self-defence laws, as the starting point 
for re-imagining international law. In the following chapters, I consider how this approach 
impacts on further justifications for the use of force, specifically self-determination, 
humanitarian intervention and the ‘War on Terror’, using the method to develop strategies 
for a reconstructive feminist project.
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CHAPTER FOUR
JUSTIFYING FORCE: SELF-DETERMINATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters of the thesis have analysed the capacity of the Security Council to 
authorise the use of force and the right of states to use force justified as self-defence. This 
chapter looks at constructions of justified force in the context of self-determination conflicts. 
I argue that the domestic analogy between states and individuals, when used to explain the 
regulation of the right to self-determination, illustrates an underlying tension in liberal legal 
discourse between agents and victims. In the context of self-determination Berman describes 
this tension as follows:
A group seeking self-determination is, by definition, one which feels it has been 
excluded, albeit unjustly, from the community of legal individuals recognized by 
international law. Hence the paradox involved in the legal notion of a legal right to 
self-determination: how can international law recognise a right accruing to an entity 
which, by its own admittance, lacks international existence?1
By analogy, feminist legal theories offer substantial dialogue on the paradoxical claim to 
agency and victim-hood which those outside of legal subjectivity must negotiate to gain a 
voice and rights under liberalism.2 Consequently, this chapter uses feminist knowledge on 
legal subjectivity to engage international legal accounts of self-determination.3 This chapter 
consciously shifts from the use of domestic analogy as a tool of analysis to argue for the 
potential of the domestic analogy to build strategies for change. I argue that international
1 Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-determination and International Law,’ 7, Wisconsin Law 
Journal, (1988), 52, at 52.
2 Brown, States o f Injury, (Princeton, 1995).
3 Naffine, ‘Can Women be Legal Persons?’ in James and Palmer, Visible Women, (Hart, 2002). My 
approach to self-determination is foregrounded by prior feminist engagements with self- 
determination, see: Chinkin, ‘A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force’, 12, 
Australian Yearbook o f International Law, (1992) 279; Chinkin and Wright, ‘The Hunger Trap: 
Women, Food and Self-determination’, 14, Michigan Journal o f International Law, (1993), 262; 
Gardam, ‘A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law’, 12, Australian 
Yearbook o f International Law, (1992); Knop, Diversity and Self-determination in International Law, 
(CUP, 2002); Knop, ‘Re/statements: Feminism and Sovereignty in International Law’, 3, 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 239 (1993); McDonald, ‘Self-determination and 
Kurdish Women’, in Mojab, Women o f a Non-state Nation, (Mazda, 2001); Pahuja, ‘The 
Postcoloniality of International Law’, 46 (2), Harvard International Law Journal, 459; Wright, 
International Human Rights, Decolonisation and Globalisation: Becoming Human, (Routledge, 
2001).
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legal scholarship can utilise feminist critiques of liberalism and liberal legal personhood to 
challenge the victim-agent paradox at the centre of the international legal narrative of self- 
determination.4
To understand international self-determination laws, and the use of force often associated 
with self-determination struggles,5 I suggest three layers of self-determination need to be 
jointly interrogated.
The first layer is external self-determination. This is a reference to the right of peoples to 
freely assert their status as a state and, if desired, reject foreign forms of domination or state 
control.6 In the history of the United Nations, the process of achieving external self- 
determination has been regarded as a possible justification for the use of force and emerges 
as a potential right of ‘peoples’ in the context of decolonisation.7 The First Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions is inclusive of situations ‘in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination’ thus establishing self-determination conflicts as within 
the definition of international conflict for the purposes of the application of the international 
humanitarian law of armed conflict.8 The legal position with respect to jus ad bellum is less 
clear. According to Crawford, the relationship between external self-determination and the 
use of force can be examined from the perspective of three different potential aggressors: 
colonial, administering or occupying powers, liberation groups, and third parties. Within 
these categorisations the use of force by colonial, administering or occupying powers to 
frustrate the right to self-determination of ‘peoples’ has not been accepted as a justified form
4 See, for example, Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, (Routledge, 1991); Frazer and Lacey, The 
Politics o f Community, (Harvester, 1993); MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory o f the State, 
(Harvard, 1989); Matsuda, ‘Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature’, 16, 
New Mexico Law Review (1986); Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, (OUP, 2000).
3 Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, (OUP, 2nd Edition, 2006), at 135 lists four 
different situations where the relationship between seff-determination and the use of force must be 
considered (see footnote 9 and accompanying text).
6 In the Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ, 9* July 2004, the ICJ found external self-determination to be a right rather 
than a mere principle of international law; see Cassese, Self-determination o f Peoples, (Cambridge, 
1998), chapter 4.
7 GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 (The Declaration on Friendly Relations), for an 
extended history see Crawford, above note 5, at 107-147 and Higgins, Problems and Processes, 
(Oxford, 1994), chapter 7.
8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted on 8 June 1977.
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of force.9 For example, the aggressive techniques used by the pro-Indonesia militia in 
Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) in 1999 were challenged by the international 
community.10 In contrast, liberation struggles seeking to challenge oppressive regimes, 
especially those that have emerged as a consequence of colonisation, may have a right to use 
force.11 Crawford argues that this is not an exception to UN Charter Article 2(4) as liberation 
struggles are ostensibly internal conflicts and thus Article 2(4) applies to states rather than 
entities seeking the right to be states through self-determination. For Crawford, as a 
consequence, the situation for non-state entities is ‘legally neutral’ and ‘not strictly regulated 
by international law.*12 Finally, third parties who wish to facilitate a claim to self- 
determination in a foreign state may be able to argue a justified exception to Article 2(4) 
exists. Such an argument would rest on identification of state acceptance of various General 
Assembly resolutions13 and on the assumption that the use of force in question is not an 
attempt to control the territory in the long term.14 The latter categoiy, then, is where self- 
determination narratives intersect with justifications for the use of force.15 The construction 
of self-determination as a justification for the use of force is largely associated with the 
acquisition of external self-determination. This may include forms of autonomy less than the 
acquisition of statehood or the exercise of a choice to remain under the governing structures 
of the foreign state, as well as the formal acquisition of statehood through the control of 
territory.
The second layer, internal self-determination, does not have widespread acceptance as a 
justification for the use of force.16 In references to internal self-determination throughout this 
chapter I include the cultural, economic, social and political development of a community 
and the capacity of a community to articulate an identity from within its population. 
Charlesworth and Chinkin refer to internal self-determination as ‘the right of a people to
9 Crawford, above note 5; however, this statement is misleading as although not officially condoning 
the use of force by colonial and occupying powers this type of force has not been consistently 
challenged by international law, see Berman, ‘In the Wake of Empire’, 14, American University 
International Law Review (1998 —1999), 1515.
10 Security Council Resolution 1264, (1999) 15* September, 1999.
11 GA Resolution 1514, 14* December 1960 (Declaration on the Granting o f Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples); GA Resolution 2625 further suggests the use of force would be 
justified in situations of apartheid or when control of a territory has been acquired through military 
occupation.
12 Crawford, above note 5, at 135, 136.
13 Specifically, GA Resolutions 1514 and 2625; also GA Resolution 2105 (XX), 20* December 1965.
14 Crawford, above note 5, at 139.
15 The distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict is 
important with respect to the application of the international humanitarian laws of armed conflict, see 
Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use o f Force by States, (Cambridge, 2004), at 122-123, 
126.
16 Higgins, above note 7, at 124.
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develop forms of governance within a state structure’.17 This form of self-determination is 
broader than the first layer and is identifiable in the UN Charter as a principle of 
international law and forms a purpose of the United Nations.18 Drew suggests that this is 
self-determination as substance, while external self-determination can be described as self- 
determination as process.19 For Crawford internal self-determination may be described as an 
international principle but internal self-determination is not an inherent element of the 
internationally recognised right to self-determination.20 Other scholars, for example, Cassese 
and Higgins argue that the realisation of internal self-determination rests in minority rights 
and rights to equality, which function as individual rights and do not accrue to peoples in the 
manner external self-determination does.21 To perceive internal self-determination as 
resolvable through attention to minority rights, and essentially contained within die domestic 
jurisdiction of states, is to invoke (or avoid) Berman’s identification of the conundrum 
between victim and agency that haunts self-determination. Non-state entities, by not 
qualifying as a state, may be presumed to be outside the scope of this aspect of the principle 
of self-determination, except insofar as the state with administrative control of the territory 
must guarantee the rights of minorities. The failure of the international legal structure to 
attend to the internal self-determination of non-state entities as more than an issue of 
minority rights, I would argue, is a product of the association of force with external self- 
determination and perpetuates the vulnerability of peoples seeking self-determination in the 
international order.
Within the category of internal self-determination, space exists for developing self- 
determination rights as a means to uphold the entitlement of peoples to democracy. This 
definition of the right is controversial as it not only finds internal self-determination to be an 
international right, rather than a principle, but dictates the form of governance to be 
determined and suggests force could be justified to protect the right.22 I do not engage 
directly with this position as it has received little support from states and may be said to be 
replaced by arguments for humanitarian interventions that re-imagine and refine arguments
17 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries o f International Law, (Manchester, 2000), at 153.
18 UN Charter Article 1(2) and Article 55.
19 Drew, ‘The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial’, 12, EJIL, (2001), 651.
20 Crawford, above note 5, at 85-102.
21 Note, however, Drew, who suggests self-determination linked to decolonisation ‘has a discernible 
core content’ and confers self-determination as process (external) and self-determination as substance 
(internal) on beneficiary peoples, see: Drew, above note 19.
22 See Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86, AJIL (1996), 46; however, 
compare Franck’s approach to that of Falk in ‘The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order 
Precedent’, 36, Harvard International Law Journal (1995), 341.
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justifying force to restore or uphold democracy.23 It should be noted that the argument to 
‘restore democracy’ by force assumes democracy to be a neutral rather than a loaded term.24 
Pre-determined forms of democracy and the use of force to impose democracy run counter 
to the key sentiments of the thesis.25
The third layer of self-determination, which is largely overlooked in international 
discourses,26 is individual self-determination. The right to personal, or individual, self- 
determination is not an express norm of international law.27 Individual self-determination is 
either relegated to the concerns of national legal structures or regarded as the rationale for 
international human rights laws but is not an element of positive or customary international 
law.28
This chapter argues that realising self-determination under international law involves 
attention to all three layers: external, internal and individual. I perceive the layers as 
overlapping and dependent rather than distinct. The relationship between external, internal 
and individual self-determination is demonstrated through women’s narratives that connect 
international law’s failure to guarantee individual and internal forms of self-determination to 
the preoccupation with external self-determination. Consequently, the usefulness of force to 
achieve external self-determination often occurs at the expense of the attainment of 
individual and internal self-determination. I use the narratives of women from within self- 
determination struggles to articulate the limitations of current approaches to self- 
determination and to demonstrate the necessity of engagement with all three layers under 
international law.
23 See chapter six, also see Franck, Resort to Force, (CUP, 2003) and Tesdn, ‘Collective 
Humanitarian Intervention’, 17, Michigan Journal o f International Law, (1996), 323; however, see 
also Higgins’ argument that the capacity to freely choose government is integral to self-determination 
in a sense which would pre-suppose a democratic system, above note 7, at 120.
24 For discussion on the meaning of democracy as reflective of Western liberalism rather than 
universal rights; Otto, ‘Challenging the "New World Order": International Law, Global Democracy 
and the Possibilities for Women’, 3, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 371, (1993).
25 Charlesworth, ‘Think Pieces: Law after War’, 8 (2), Melbourne Journal o f International Law, 233, 
(2007).
26 However, see Chinkin (1992); Chinkin and Wright (1993); Gardam (1992) above note 3.
27 Higgins describes self-determination as accruing to peoples rather than individuals thus marking its 
difference to other human rights, above note 7.
28 Chinkin and Wright, above note 3, at 300-304
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To illustrate the contention of this chapter, I focus on the three major self-determination 
conflicts that have straddled the transition to the new millennium. In choosing the case 
studies to analyse in this chapter I have chosen conflicts that have had specific international 
engagement in terms of the right to self-determination: all have had ICJ Advisory Opinions, 
Security Council and General Assembly engagement that acknowledges the existence of a 
right to self-determination. However, the use of force and the circumstances for the 
justification in each case have varied; indicating rules on the relationship between the use of 
force and self-determination is not clear in practice.29 The first case study is the Saharawi in 
the Western Sahara, where the use of force has not been authorised by the international 
community, despite institutional recognition of the right to (external) self-determination for 
the Saharawi.30 The second case study focuses on the Palestinian people living in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Aggressive and military acts by the Israeli state have been 
routinely condemned by the international community, as have the retaliatoiy tactics 
employed by the Palestinian community, but no overt international military assistance has 
been extended to the Palestinian people. The recent ICJ Advisoiy Opinion, on the legality of 
Israel’s West Bank Barrier, described the right of self-determination as an accepted norm of 
international law that exists erga omnes and that is applicable to the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.31 The third case study considers the granting of external self-determination to the 
people of Timor-Leste, via the UN-supervised popular consultation in 1999, followed by the 
provision of a UN-authorised military force and a transitional administration. In each case 
study I draw on women’s narratives to demonstrate the failures of current international 
approaches through a descriptive analysis. This forms Part Two of this chapter.
In addition to arguing for the practical interdependence of the layers of self-determination, I 
use feminist legal theories to highlight conceptual weaknesses that emerge in self- 
determination justifications for the use of force. I suggest that the conceptual limitations of 
the international legal system are analogous to national models of subjectivity that have 
proven to be ineffective guarantees of women’s rights. I highlight a domestic analogy that 
can be made between women’s pursuit of full self-determination as individuals within 
national legal structures and the challenge of non-states subject status before international 
law. This forms Part Three of the chapter.
29 Crawford, above note 5, at 147-148.
30 Chinkin contrasts this to the history of Timor-Leste where the Security Council authorised the use 
of force without explicitly acknowledging self-determination as the justification for the use of force, 
see Chinkin, ‘Western Sahara and the UN Second Decade of Decolonisation’, in Arts and Leite (eds), 
International law and the Question o f Western Sahara, (IPJET, 2007), at 335.
31 Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ, (9th July 2004), para. 88, 155/ 156.
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This chapter shows how lying the external right to self-determination to the potentiality of 
force undermines the capacity of communities to achieve internal self-determination and for 
individuals to be guaranteed personal self-determination within those communities. Feminist 
scholarship, through analysis of the layers of self-determination and through understanding 
of the limitations of constructions of the legal subject under liberalism, engages this 
knowledge to provide dialogues for shitting forward, away from force, and towards ‘respect 
for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ as demanded by the UN 
Charter.32
2. NARRATIVES OF SELF-DETERMINATION
In this section, I consider three case studies where self-determination struggles have gained 
attention under international law. In particular, each case has drawn statements from the 
International Court of Justice finding a right to self-determination exists.33 In discussing 
each case study, I provide a narrative on the three layers of self-determination, as exposed by 
women’s and feminist perspectives.
Feminist legal engagements with the limitations of sovereignty under Western liberal 
legalism are central to my approach. Thus, while it is more usual to ‘read’ unrealised self- 
determination as a failure of process (as contemporaneously in Western Sahara and 
Palestine, and during Indonesian occupation in Timor-Leste) I find the failure of the self- 
determination process is indicative of fundamental normative weaknesses assumed in 
mainstream accounts of international law. The positioning of force as potentially justified by 
third parties in response to repressive regimes that are seen to stall the self-determination of 
peoples is challenged as, firstly, frustrating internal and individual self-determination and, 
secondly, providing an ineffectual enforcement mandate in the process of self-determination.
32 UN Charter Article 1(2) and 55.
33 Above note 31; also see: Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South Africa 
in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, (21st June 1971), 16; Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports, (16* October 1975), 12 at 72-73 and Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia), (ICJ Reports, 1995) para. 29.
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Consequently, international feminist jurisprudence that re-imagines international sovereignty 
offers pathways to re-imagining the right of peoples to self-determination.34 In Part Three, I 
connect this approach to feminist legal theories, which find Western liberal accounts of 
personhood within national legal structures to be equally confined. The nexus between 
liberalism’s failure to grant women full personhood under national laws and international 
law’s limitation on the entities qualifying for full international legal personality is then 
exposed. To move beyond the limitations of international legal personhood underpinned by 
the version of sovereignty international self-determination depends upon, engagement with 
feminist legal theories must occur at both a practical and normative level. At a practical 
level, international law must engage women as citizens whose involvement and individual 
self-determination is crucial to achieving successful internal and external self-determination 
of a community. By elevating women’s voices within Western Sahara, Palestine and Timor- 
Leste in this part of the chapter I begin this process. In the concluding part of this chapter, I 
explore how, at the normative level, mainstream international law must recognise the sexed 
model of legal subjectivity propounded as universal and, through engagement with non- 
Westem communities and with feminist strategies for individual self-determination, begin 
the process of re-imagining sovereignty.351 argue that the use of force to secure the right to 
self-determination is a counter-productive model owing to the emphasis on territory and 
external self-determination at the expense of the internal and individual self-determination of 
peoples.
2.1 Western Sahara
At the conclusion of Spanish colonial control of Western Sahara, the emergence of a self- 
governing Saharawi territory was superseded by an agreement between the Spanish and the 
Western Saharan neighbouring states of Morocco and Mauritania.36 In 1975, as the Spanish 
government withdrew, the Moroccan and Mauritania governments asserted their right to 
control the territory. Consequently, a large proportion of the Western Saharan community 
fled as refugees into Algeria.37 While Mauritania withdrew its claim to Western Sahara in
34 See, for example, Knop, above note 3; also see TWAIL approaches, for example, Okafor, 
Redefining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa, (Nijhoff, 
2000).
35 For example, Nesiah writes of ‘space’ and ‘places’ in international law transcending the physical to 
play an important role in linguistic categories and, thus, exclusions, see: Nesiah, ‘Placing 
International Law: White Spaces on a Map’, 16, Leiden Journal o f International Law, (2003), 1.
36 Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara, (Zed Books, 2004) introduction; for a description of the 
history of the Western Sahara, see in Arts and Leite (eds), International law and the Question o f 
Western Sahara, (IPJET, 2007), chapters one and two.
37 Franck, ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’, 70, AJIL, (1976), 694.
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1979, Morocco continues to challenge the right of the Saharawi to self-determination or 
control of Western Saharan territory. Initially the Saharawi (through the Polisario Front)38 
challenged Moroccan control of the territory through force. However, a UN brokered 
ceasefire was agreed to in 1991. At the time this was perceived as a precursor to a 
referendum in which the Saharawi could indicate their desires for the future of the territory.39 
This would be in line with the accepted international legal position with regard to the self- 
determination of peoples, established through General Assembly Resolution 1514.40 
Currently, Morocco controls the majority of the Western Saharan territory and the division 
between Moroccan controlled territory and non-Moroccan territory is established by the 
Berm — a wall or barrier constructed by the Moroccan military in 1981.41 East of the Berm 
is inhospitable desert, scarred by landmines. While the Polisario claim control of this region, 
it is also subject to a UN observer mission and creates a ‘buffer’ zone between the refugee 
camps in Southern Algeria and the Moroccan controlled areas west of the Berm. In 2007 the 
Security Council withdrew its support for the referendum process and adopted the 
recommendation of the Secretary-General supporting negotiations between the Saharawi 
people and Morocco.42
After the Spanish withdrawal from the territory in 1975, the International Court of Justice 
found, in an Advisory Opinion addressing the legal status of the Western Sahara at the time 
of colonisation, that there were legal ties between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the 
communities living in Western Sahara. However, the ICJ went on to find that,
. . .  the materials and information presented to it [the Court] do not establish any ties 
of territorial sovereignty. . .  as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in 
the decolonisation of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self- 
determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the 
territory 43
In the thirty years since this ICJ Opinion, the UN General Assembly and Security Council 
have consistently described self-determination as ‘an optimum political solution’ while 
affirming the ‘inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence’ in the
38 Omar, ‘The Position of die Frente Polisario’, in Arts and Leite (eds), above note 30.
39 SC Res 690,29* April 1991.
40 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14* December 
1960, Article 4; General Assembly Resolution 3314 (The Definition of Aggression), 14* December 
1974, Article 7.
41 Shelley, above note 36, at 192.
42 SC Res 1754,30* April 2007.
43 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, above note 33, para. 162.
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countless resolutions written in reference to Western Sahara.44 Throughout this period, the 
state of Morocco has occupied the territory of Western Sahara.
Contemporary documents issued by the various UN institutions,45 particularly the reports of 
the Secretary-General to the Security Council, focus on the development of negotiations 
between Moroccan and Polisario officials. In 2007, the Secretary-General reported, ‘[t]he 
parties did, indeed, express their views and even interacted with one another, but they did so 
by rejecting the views of the other party, and there was hardly any exchange that could be in 
earnest characterised as negotiations’.46 The role of the UN in facilitating political processes 
toward a possible referendum did little to resolve the stalemate between Morocco and 
Saharawi.47 The shift by the Security Council, since 2007, to a focus on negotiations 
between the two parties, and a distinct rejection of any coerced solution has left what 
Chinkin describes as a ‘light institutional footprint’.48
In contrast to international legal instruments that combine a reiteration of rights with little 
action, the Western Saharan people in exile, the Saharawi, have developed their own 
coherent political and social processes. These could be described as processes that facilitate 
internal self-determination as they have resulted in a constitution built on democratic ideals, 
a democratically elected government and robust social institutions, which provide health and 
education services, amongst other social institutions, to the Saharawi living in the Tindouf 
camps in Algeria 49 The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has been recognised 
by 45 states and is a member of the African Union (which Morocco is not). The SADR has 
created a constitution and model of government derived from the Western liberal model.50 
However, because Western liberal governments have proved reluctant to recognise the 
SADR government, or state, the features of liberalism have been developed and applied by 
the Saharawi themselves, rather than imposed.51 This point is underscored by the narratives
44 See GA Res 690 (1991) and GA Res. 61/125 (2007); SC Res 1495 (2003), SC Res 1675 (2006) and 
SC Res 1783 (2007).
45 See SC Res 1754 (2007).
46 UN Doc. S/2007/619, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation 
concerning the Western Sahara, 19th October 2007.
47 See SC Res 1813,30th April 2008.
48 Above note 30, at 334.
49 Shelley records the artistic and creative endeavours of the Saharawi, as well as the capacity for 
dissent within the community, Shelley, above note 36; also see Chinkin, (1992), above note 3; 
Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 17, at 264.
50 Shelley, above note 36.
51 This can be contrasted with the experiences in Timor-Leste where institutional structures were 
imposed by Indonesia and, after the use of force by the international community in 1999, the UN: see
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representing the participation and achievements of Saharawi women within their 
community, as well the commitment of the Saharawi to peaceful transition and the respect 
for human rights within their community.52
Article 30 of the SADR constitution states: ‘the State will aim to defend the political, 
economic, and social rights of Saharawi women and will guarantee their participation in the 
improvement of society and in the development of the country’.53 As such, through the legal 
recognition that the SADR constitution grants Saharawi women, the process of building a 
government in exile appears to have facilitated Saharawi women’s empowerment and 
appears to have been built on women’s participation.54 The form of the words in the SADR 
constitution are, perhaps, provocative in their ‘guarantee’ of participation and their ‘aim to 
defend’ women’s rights, as they offer rights of individual self-determination and internal 
self-determination in a form that women in the West are yet to realise. Evidence from the 
camps suggests these constitutional provisions have been matched with substantive equality 
between women and men in the Saharawi community.55
In 1979, the National Union of Saharawi Women (UNMS — Union Nacional de Mujeres 
Saharaui) was formed, and continues to function, with its 57 members elected for five-year 
terms and with representatives attending world conferences, such as the parallel NGO 
conference to the UN Women’s Conference in Beijing 1995. Among its achievements, the 
UNMS is close to eradicating illiteracy among the Saharawi population: in 1975, at the end 
of Spanish rule, only ten per cent of Saharawi women were literate yet in the camps all men 
and women are taught to read and write.56 The UNMS has set up and run schools, childcare, 
hospital and medical centres as well as museums, nursing schools and language centres (for 
learning Spanish as a second language).57
Scheiner, ‘Self-determination Requires More than Political Independence’ in Arts and Leite (eds), 
above note 30.
52 Above note 30, at 349.
53 http://www.arso.org/03-const.99.htm (last accessed May 2009).
54 This empowerment is within their community, the exile has had a negative effect on the 
international voice of women with the exception of representation in feminist texts, such as 
Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 17; Saharawi women’s voices and activism remains 
suppressed by men’s voices which dominant the texts available. Moroccan voices are given 
expression in international legal narratives, as states remain the primary legal subjects under 
international law.
55 Above note 36, at 172-173,176.
56 Ibid.
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Thus, contemporaiy data from SADR highlights the role women have played in shaping a 
robust internal social structure for the Saharawi or a sense of internal self-determination. 
Yet, this has little, if any, weight in influencing international legal narratives. This 
demonstrates one of the key flaws of external self-determination. That is, the right to self- 
determination locates the holder of the right as peoples. Yet there is some irony in ‘peoples’ 
being unable to gain an international voice until the international community shifts to 
acknowledge the ‘people’ as a state.58 While such a process is reliant on external events 
(foreign state recognition, UN approved/monitored elections) the ‘people’ remain muted in 
international legal dialogues.59 In the process of claiming statehood, communities, like the 
Saharawi, are expected to mimic foreign forms of governance. Admirably, the Saharawi 
have demonstrated substantial success in this process, yet without territory, the articulation 
of their identity is silenced by Moroccan military occupation and territorial control. This 
contrast between external and internal stages of self-determination for the Saharawi 
highlights the territorial base of international understandings of sovereignty, as Moroccan 
control of Western Saharan territory maintains the status quo. This is connected to the 
limitations of building a legal system with force at the apex of coercion and that defines 
political stability through the control of territory. That is, force cannot be used to protect or 
develop the creative, psychological aspect of ‘community’ or ‘people’ yet without creative 
development within a community the emergence of stable government is unlikely to be 
successful.60
When international law does move towards defining self-determination, the legal process 
focuses only on ‘external’ determination — i.e. the holding of a referendum and the 
recognition of the referendum result by the international community and the processes of 
negotiation and co-operation between states.61 When an occupying state frustrates that 
process through ‘domestic violence’62 and is allowed to do so unhindered, the international 
legal narrative becomes a replica of the gendered liberal construction of individual 
personhood: where formal equality rights are acknowledged and substantive inequality is
58 Berman, above note 1.
59 However, in 2005 the ICJ did allow submissions from Palestinian representatives before issuing 
their Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, ICJ, 9th July 2004. The UN General Assembly permits a range of non-member 
states observer status, including Palestine. In contrast, the Security Council has yet to expand its 
mandate to allow non-state groups to address it directly. However, regional organisations have some 
rights, and consequent obligations, under international law.
60 See McDonald’s discussion of the failure of the Kurdish community to build a stable social fabric 
in Northern Iraq during the 1990s, above note 3.
61 Drew, above note 19, at 663.
62 See chapter five on humanitarian intervention.
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ignored. This is a model of citizenship feminists have persistently challenged as sexed. This 
is the model, as we will see below, achieved through the use of force that ultimately led to 
the formation of the independent state of Timor-Leste. Regrettably this coercive action has 
failed to eradicate group violence in Timor-Leste, as it denies the layers of oppression that 
may exist within a society, as well as the propensity for oppressed communities to 
perpetuate violence through the subjugation of minorities within the group.63
The characterisation of aggression under international law is an important aspect of this 
international legal narrative. Under the narrative of international law, the Berm strengthens 
Morocco’s control of the territoiy. The physical impact of the structure is to deny the 
Saharawi people fundamental rights: the right to self-determination, as well as the right to 
shelter and basic resources. To survive, the Saharawi people in the Tindouf refugee camps 
are consequently dependent on humanitarian aid from external sources. The Saharawi are 
also dependent on the continued Algerian acceptance of the camps on Algerian territoiy. 
This can be aligned with Chinkin and Charlesworth’s understanding of the right of 
individuals to self-determination, which they describe as unsatisfactoiy for women when,
A woman may be technically free to work in the paid, public workforce, but if a man 
is given the right to prevent his wife from participating in public, political or cultural 
activities outside the home this freedom is meaningless.64
Under the international legal narrative the Saharawi are technically free to exercise the right 
to self-determination. Morocco is able to exploit the structural weaknesses of the 
international legal system through the violent existence of a physical division and 
occupation of the territory, thereby gaining a foothold in determining the future of the 
region. By refusing localised knowledge and narratives — for example, the strong internal 
self-determination of the Saharawi — within its sources of understanding, international law 
remains focused on the public sphere. One consequence of this structural limitation is a 
resistance to alternative understandings of international relationships.65 Crucial to this 
narrative is the location of force as a means to resolve disputes in place of sophisticated 
reflection on the capacity of the international system to secure positive ends without the use
63 See, for example, oppression of Roma people in Kosovo after the 1999 NATO intervention as well 
as the negative effects of the intervention for women: Rodgers, ‘Bosnia and Kosovo: Interpreting the 
Gender Dimensions of International Intervention’ in Mclnnes and Wheeler (eds), Dimensions o f 
Western Military Intervention, (Cass, 2002); European Roma Rights Centre, ‘Justice for Kosovo’, 4, 
Roma Rights, (2005).
64 Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 17, at 162.
65 For example, the alternative structure of the African Charter on Human rights is often 
acknowledged as ‘different’ rather than ‘alternative’; Banda, Women, Law and Human Rights: An 
African Perspective, (Hart, 2005) at 44.
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of force. When force is politically unfeasible, as in the Western Sahara, the international 
system is devoid of answers to fundamental questions, such as how to secure a right to self- 
determination that is meaningful for the communities claiming the right. This is not to 
promote, or justify, the use of force in retaliation to Morocco’s political stalling and control 
of the Western Sahara territory. Instead, the Western Sahara example demonstrates the 
limitations of force as a model of enforcement.
2.2 Palestine
. . .  in a context where every man is a soldier, every woman becomes an occupied
territory..  ,66
In this section, I highlight the narratives Israeli and Palestinian women bring to international 
law. My conclusion is that, despite the diversity and challenges represented in these 
narratives, a resonant and recurring theme is voiced by Israeli and Palestinian women: all the 
women whose voices are represented draw attention to the nexus between die public and 
private violence in their lives.67 From this I suggest that the recognised right to external self- 
determination, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion in 
the Legal Consequences o f the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
T e rr ito r ie s is meaningless not only because it lacks resources geared towards the 
facilitation of internal self-determination but also because a large proportion of the 
community lacks the capacity to choose the model of individual self-determination that 
constructs their lives and participation in that community. Although the Court was given the 
opportunity in its Opinion to discuss the inadequacy of security achieved through military 
and forceful means, there is a notable absence of references to the violence — of either the 
construction of the ‘Wall’ or of the occupation of Palestinian territoiy — and an absence of 
recognition of the complicity of third states in perpetuating the status quo in the region.69 
Additionally, the role of Israeli and Palestinian women in shaping alternative narratives for 
the region and in bringing oppositional factions together was undermined by an Opinion that 
reiterated legal rights but declined to offer guidance on the means to achieving those rights.
66 Sharoni, ‘Homeffont as Battlefield’ in Mayer (ed),Women and the Israeli Occupation, (Routledge, 
1994) at 10.
67 Sharoni, ‘Middle East Politics Through Feminist Lens’, 18 Alternatives (1993) 5; Mayer, ibid; 
Abdo and Lentin (eds), Women and the Politics o f Military Confrontation, (Berghahn, 2002); El- 
Sarraj, ‘Screaming in Silence’ in Waller and Rycenga, Frontline Feminisms, (Routledge, 2001); 
Mayer, ‘From Zero to Hero’ in Mayer, Gender Ironies o f Nationalism, (Routledge, 2000).
68 Above note 6.
69 Ibid.
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For example, the Court considers the appropriateness of the term ‘wall’ to describe the 
barrier built by Israel and concludes,
The “wall” in question is a complex construction, so that that term cannot be 
understood in a limited physical sense. However, other terms used, either by Israel 
(“fence”) or by the Secretary-General (“barrier”) are no more accurate if understood 
in a physical sense. In this Opinion, the Court has therefore chosen to use the 
terminology employed by the General Assembly.70
Recalling the prior discussion of the Moroccan built Berm in Western Sahara and drawing 
on Nesiah’s analysis of space and place under international law,71 the terminology employed 
— and a discussion of its merits — represents linguistic violence where the meaning and 
relevance of the ‘wall’ to those partitioned by its presence are effectively silenced by the 
nature of legal debates. The technical detail offered by the ICJ in paragraphs 81 through 84 
of the Opinion, on the exact location and materials forming the ‘wall’, are segmented from 
the discussion of the impact and meaning of the act of physical segregation that the ‘wall’ 
produces. This enables the legal narrative to segregate social and economic knowledge from 
the legal/ technical discussion and give the appearance that the two are unrelated. 
Furthermore, the submission of written and oral statements to the Court by state and 
organisations of states can be contrasted with the process of listening developed by the 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, which used testimony from survivors to 
develop the format of legal narrative.72 Unlike the testimonies of female survivors of sexual 
violence during conflict, the testimonies of women living under occupation have not found a 
repository in international law.73 By elevating the voices of Israeli and Palestinian women 
alongside legal narratives on self-determination, the inadequacy of current legal narratives 
can be exposed.
In contrast to the externally-driven legal narratives, internal narratives are better evidenced 
through the texts and dialogues of inhabitants of the Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. The complex combination of historical, political and global factors in the region 
suggests that many alternative narratives could be used to represent the realities of life in 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. My goal is to present one stream of 
narratives and so I analyse the narratives that emerge from Israeli and Palestinian women
70 Ibid. para. 67.
71 Above note 35.
72 Chinkin, ‘Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery’, 95, AJIL, (2001), 
326.
73 For an optimistic account of international institutional responses to sexual violence in conflict, see 
Bergoffen, ‘Toward a Politic of the Vulnerable Body’, 18 (1), Hypatia, (2003), 116.
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working for peace in the region.74 I argue that these narratives are important and 
transformative dialogues with the potential to re-direct the future for Israelis and 
Palestinians. The transformative potential lies in the implicit recognition of, firstly, the 
interdependence of the layers of self-determination and, secondly, the rejection of public and 
private violence as a means of securing self-determination.
The visibility of women’s narratives in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
remains limited and outside of international legal narratives. This is because die narratives 
emerging from women and feminist peace activists tend to attach to our understandings of 
internal self-determination, which lack international legal enforcement. The narratives 
emerge outside the dominant, and public, narratives of militarisation in both the Israeli and 
Palestinian communities so they are doubly gendered female. As women’s narratives they 
are obscured by the failure of equal representation in political and military institutions, 
structures which are built around predominantly male and masculine narratives and histories 
of articulation.75 Furthermore, as narratives that focus on the re-organisation of private space 
as a means to develop the political, the women’s narratives I introduce here are generally 
conceived as feminised and outside of public notice because of their content.76 The 
narratives may also have trouble becoming visible because they seek to circumvent the role 
of the state as the centre of the international legal process by connecting private violence to 
public violence.
The discussion in this section builds on the prior representation of the Western Sahara 
narratives. Here the continuum of external-internal self-determination is extended to 
understand individual self-determination as having relevance to international legal 
narratives. The history of the Occupied Palestinian Territories weaves through the history of 
the United Nations, as an ever-present ‘crisis’ region that has thus far been unable to harness 
the enforcement mechanisms of the Charter to secure peace or stability for either Israeli or 
Palestinian citizens. Sharoni has written extensively on the role of militarised violence in
74 The purpose of using these narratives is to identify flaws in international narratives rather than offer 
‘one true representation’ of women in Israel or Palestine. Furthermore, it is not my intention to 
suggest women’s narratives are predisposed to see peace rather than force as a means to solving 
community dilemmas; rather I have consciously sought non-violent, peace-seeking narratives to 
demonstrate an alternative to mainstream accounts.
75 While women are required to serve in the Israeli armed forces, die list of exemptions from national 
service is broader for women, the length of commitment is shorter and women are not expected to 
take combat positions. Reportage on women’s experiences in the Israeli army is difficult to obtain.
76 On public and private ordering in international law, see: Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public and 
Private Dimension’, 10 (2), EJIL, (1999), 387.
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shaping the private and public experiences of Israeli men and women, scripting the phrase, 
recorded above, describing Israeli women as ‘occupied territories’. Sharoni’s work 
illustrates the consequences of occupation for the occupier and challenges the Israeli 
identification of security with occupation.77 Sharoni also highlights how the distancing of 
women from international and national decision-making forums undermines the confidence 
women have ‘in the legitimacy of their own judgement’.78 I judge her work as 
complementary to the analysis of Palestinian women who likewise challenge the role of 
militarised masculinity as a major source for Palestinian cultural and group identity.79 For 
example, Mayer describes the increasingly complex layers of narrative emergent from Israeli 
and Palestinian women:
On the one hand, the Occupation has provided an area of resistance within which 
many Israeli Jewish women have found their political voice; while the imperative of 
resisting the Occupation has renewed forces of cultural, national and religious 
fundamentalism which have pressured Palestinian women to return to traditional 
roles. Yet, on the other hand, examinations of Jewish and Palestinian women’s lives ..
. also show that the prolonged occupation and its reinforcement of Israeli militarism 
have in many ways enhanced Jewish women’s marginalization and changed Israeli 
society for the worse — while they have, at the same time, empowered the Palestinian 
women who have adjusted to new roles.80
Mayer’s identification of the multiple narratives that are able to exist to define the same 
events, as well as her understanding of the further intersections of group difference, for 
example class, may appear paradoxical. The paradox of the vectors of difference shaping 
simultaneous narratives receives considerable feminist attention elsewhere and informs my 
approach to self-determination rights.81 By elaborating multiple and potentially paradoxical 
or oppositional narratives I hope to avoid what Talukdar refers to as ‘the complicity of 
makers and viewers in promoting a discourse that maintains the status quo’ acknowledging 
‘even when disadvantaged groups are conferred a resistant voice, in practice, this may work 
as reversal’.82 So, while the internal dialogues of self-determination expressed by Israeli and 
Palestinian women demonstrate a multitude of positions and concerns, not always expressed 
through gender perspectives or feminist perspectives, what is constant is the distance women 
have from expressing views in a manner that will impact on the mainstream security 
discourses that inform their lives.83 The security discourses, emergent from either the
77 Sharoni, above note 66.
n Ibid. at 6.
79 Mayer, above note 66; Abdo and Lentin, above note 67.
80 Mayer, Ibid. at 2.
81 Mohanty, Russo and Torres (eds), Third World Women and the Politics o f Feminism, (Indiana, 
1991); Braidotti, ‘The Migrant, the Exile and the Nomad’, 15, Women's Studies International Forum 
(1992) 7.
82 Talukdar, ‘You Have a Voice Now, Resistance Is Futile!’ in Waller and Rycenga, above note 67.
83 Hannan Ashrawi is a notable and welcome exception; see Ashrawi, This Side o f Peace: A Personal 
Account, (Touchstone: 1996).
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militarised Israeli state or the Palestinian leadership continue to equate security with public 
acts of violence. In contrast, both Israeli and Palestinian feminist scholarship equates public
•  •  •  •  84violence/ aggression with the escalating private violence in their communities.
The absence, then, is not in the women’s narratives or perspectives; rather it is in the 
mainstream or dominant legal and political accounts that suppress women’s understandings 
of violence and self-determination. This is not to suggest all Israeli and Palestinian women 
are anti-violence or anti-military or that all men instinctively perceive public violence as 
justifiable while women have a deeper intuitive understanding of the consequences of 
violence.85 In Israel and Palestine, where there is an historical and contemporary absence of 
the use of force under the Security Council Chapter VII powers, both communities continue 
to argue that the force they apply is justifiable.86 This is a modelling of the international 
legal narrative rather than a rejection of it. This chapter argues that alternative narratives 
exist to those that place the use of force at the apex of international relations and these 
narratives have relevance to international law.
For feminist activists and theorists, a key alternative narrative centres on exposing the role 
public violence plays in perpetuating and justifying private violence within a community. 
Sharoni presents a disturbing view of militarised violence in Israel, which extends to the 
manner in which women and men relate to each other.87 In an evocative example, Sharoni 
retells the story of an Israeli soldier charged with the point blank shooting of a Palestinian 
woman, Amal Muhammad Hasin.88 Although charged under Israeli militaiy law the soldier 
was released on appeal. Two years later this soldier shot and killed his nineteen-year-old 
Israeli girlfriend, Einav Rogel, who Sharoni describes as having unconditionally supported 
the soldier during his militaiy trial. Sharoni concludes,
Einav Rogel lived and died in a society that draws clear distinctions between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and usually doesn’t even record the names of Palestinians who are shot. At the 
same time, she did not realize that, like many other Israeli women and most 
Palestinians (both women and men) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, she
84 I am waiy of the suggestion that there is an essential association between women and peace, for a 
discussion on this point, see: Lentin, ‘Existential States of Exile’, in Abdo and Lentin, above note 67, 
at 297.
85 See further, Sjoberg and Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics, 
(Zed, 2007).
86 See Written Statement of the Government of the State of Israel, to the International Court of Justice 
30th January 2004.
87 Sharoni, above note 67.
88 Ibid.
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belonged to a high risk population since she lived in the line of fire of an Israeli man 
who had learned to use his gun to deal with crises and difficult situations.89
For Sharoni, women in Israel remain unable to reach full individual self-determination while 
violence defines their lives. The same must be said of Israeli men. For Lentin, the 
consequence of living as the militarised oppressor must be examined by Israeli men and 
women.90 That is, the consequences for their own community, particularly in the 
construction of Israeli gender relations, which have become infused with narratives of force 
and difference.91
El-Sarraj describes a similar linkage between public and private violence in the lives of 
Palestinian women, concluding, ‘Palestinian women . . .  are faced with two burdens: the 
violent environment and a seemingly eternal victimization by their own authoritarian and 
patriarchal society. They are victims of all kinds of violence: political, social, domestic’ 92 
El-Sarraj draws on the case study of a twenty-year-old Palestinian, Samiha, who had married 
at the age of sixteen:
It was an arranged marriage like most marriages. I moved to join his family in their 
home. One week later I was in despair. He used to beat me with plastic pipes. . . My 
husband was imprisoned before we got married. Everything he experienced in prison 
he used against me.93
The self-evidence of the chain of violence from public to private in the lives of these 
women, fails to reverberate in international legal narratives.
The image of private space in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is further complicated by 
the direct attacks the Israel state has made against the homes of Palestinian citizens, either 
through Israeli settlements or through the direct destruction of Palestinian homes and towns. 
For example, the building of the Wall required the removal of Palestinian homes in the path 
of the barrier. The encirclement of the Palestinian territory by the Wall has, moreover, 
created an economic, health and education prison, isolating Palestinian communities from 
basic services. El-Sarraj contrasts Palestinian refugees’ memories of home: ‘my father keeps 
this key with other documents of family properties, still dreaming of the day he will return’ 
with the reality of those who have been able to remain in Palestinian homes:
89 Ibid. at 121-22.
90 Lentin, above note 84, at 314.
91 Sharoni, above note 66.
92 El-Sarraj, ‘Screaming in Silence’, in Waller and Rycenga, above note 67, at 19-20.
93 Ibid at 22.
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The stagnant political process and the aggressive Israeli response have both 
contributed to the re-emergence of feelings of frustration and of calls for radical 
violent tactics. This is particularly the case in the Gaza Strip, which in many ways fits 
the model of a prison . . .  In this environment, everyone is affected by the 
overwhelming stress, which is bound to reactivate various forms of violence. 
According to a study of adult Palestinians, 64 per cent of the participants had been 
subjected to humiliation, harassment and beating. The resulting anxiety is transmitted 
to children ..  ,94
In contrast, Espanioly writes from the perspective of a Palestinian woman living in Israel. 
Espanioly identifies a different narrative for women in her community from those of Israeli- 
Jewish women and from Palestinian women living in the Occupied Territories.95 Yet, the 
narrative continues to be constructed around the nexus between public and private violence. 
Espanioly explores the lives of Palestinian women caught between the modem, Western 
lifestyle embraced by the Israeli state and the traditional role women are expected to 
maintain to emphasise their Palestinian identity under Israeli rule.96 The positive impact of 
this has been the emergence of political consciousness and political activism in Palestinian 
women living in Israel. This has impacted on the provision of health and education services 
to the Palestinian community in Israel, as Palestinian women in Israel have, through political 
activism, organised around these rights 97 Yet, at the same time, Palestinian women living in 
Israel must negotiate the continual threat of being targeted by the repressive and violent 
policies of the state of Israel, which is also their home. Like Sharoni’s understanding of the 
close relationship between public and private violence, Espanioly’s work leads towards the 
conclusion that the provision of military ‘security’ in the state of Israel has important 
consequences for the capacity of individuals to pursue personal security. The complex 
interaction of nationalism, militarism and security are underscored by daily, intimate threats 
to women’s livelihoods.98
An additional group of narratives emerges from Palestinian women living in the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, and addresses the role of liberation struggles in providing a positive 
conduit for women’s social and political determination.99 Mayer suggests that the major 
conflict for these women is between social determination and national determination.100 
Likewise, Dajani writes,
94 Ibid. at 19.
95 Espanioly, ‘Palestinian Women in Israel’, in Mayer, above note 66, at 106.
96 Ibid at 116-117.
97 Ibid at 112,118.
98 Mayer (ed.), Gender Ironies o f Nationalism, (Routledge, 2000).
99 Mayer, ‘From Zero to Hero’, in Ibid , at 283.
100 Ibid.
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Palestinian women are becoming acutely aware of their vulnerability. They realise 
that national liberation is not necessarily synonymous with social liberation. They 
want their political activism . . .  to be translated into real social gains and 
democratization throughout the whole of Palestinian society, so that they do not find 
themselves, as women, relegated to a permanently subordinate position after national 
liberation.101
The Western failure to understanding the limited success of social movements, in their own 
histories, to produce sex equality alongside other social goals provides clear parallels.102
To draw this discussion back to the use of force to promote self-determination, it may be 
concluded that the self-determination of women in Israel and the Occupied Palestine 
Territories is a complex issue with multiple narrative sites and extended and differing 
narratives within each site. Providing a legal answer, which offers an opportunity for the 
individual self-determination of women in the Occupied Territories as well as within Israel 
itself, would be dependent on providing political agency to women and men equally.103 It 
would also be grounded in programmes for the eradication of private violence, particularly 
violence enacted by men against women. To hear women’s voices from Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories is to identify the nexus between individual and collective 
self-determination as each articulates the role military security strategies play in limiting 
their personal safety and visibility.
In a final narrative from Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Emmet 
demonstrates the continuum of public and private violence in relation to the chorus of Israeli 
and Palestinian women who form the Women in Black movement, who,
. . .  lift the veil of democratic rhetoric that proclaims citizens’ equality in the state and 
reveal the ongoing and heated Israeli debate on the nature of citizenship. In forging 
gendered peace vigils, the Women in Black address several issues. They question 
whether all citizens (Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians, women and men) are equal. 
The vigils also test the right of citizens to dissent from a national consensus in a 
society that places high value on the collective.104
101 Dajani, ‘Between National and Social Liberation’, in Mayer, above note 98, at 34; see also 
Chinkin, (1992) above note 3.
102 Morgan, Sisterhood is Powerful, (Vintage, 1970), introduction.
103 While a delegation of Israeli and Palestinian women with leadership roles met at the UN in New 
York in September 2006, that this was a gender segregated event suggests women are not accepted as 
mainstream ‘statesmen’, see: http://www.unifem.org/news events/story detail.php?StorvID=512 (last 
accessed May 2009).
104 Emmett, Our Sisters' Promised Land: Women, Politics and Israel-Palestinian Co-existence, 
(Michigan, 1996) at 22.
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Reforming Palestinian self-determination struggles in terms of the individual self- 
determination of women in the region has multiple answers to the counter-position that 
advocates the use of force either to achieve or defeat self-determination. This elevates the 
worth of individuals before nations and it ties the violence Israeli women suffer at the hands 
of militarisation within the Israel state to the self-determination of Palestinian women and, 
additionally, makes individuals responsible for their actions rather than subsuming them in 
the politics of the state. The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the building of the Wall by the Israeli 
state consistently affirms the right of self-determination for the Palestinians while denying 
the violence of the Israel social, political and military choices through a focus on an external, 
limited understanding of self-determination.105 This is reinforced in other ICJ opinions and 
judgements, Security Council Resolutions and the practice of states, and it may be said, in 
international legal structures generally.106 This status quo is further maintained and 
demonstrated through Israel’s reservations to the CEDAW that demonstrate a lack of 
commitment to the protection of women’s rights in Israel.107
By choosing to see the solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict in the dialogues and 
conversations of women in the conflict, I have grounded the self-determination of those 
women in their future actions. International law cannot tell Palestinian women or Israeli 
women what to say or to do to achieve their freedom, nor can the international legal system 
promise such a process through the provision of force. The role of the international legal 
structures in securing self-determination needs to be grounded in the eradication of violence 
against women, built on programmes towards women’s literacy and education and fulfilled 
through women’s health services. These rights are only gendered in the sense that they are 
identifying a gender imbalance that can be redressed with the purpose of developing the self- 
determination of women and men. No collective voice in Israel or the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories will make sense until individuals are granted the opportunities to work together to 
create a meaningful collective for all citizens. To emerge as a collective under the 
international, individual self-determination must be acknowledged as a pre-requisite and a 
right.
105 Above note 6, paras. 122,155 and 159.
106 GA Res 1541; see also Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, {Burkina Faso v Mali), ICJ Reports 
(22nd December, 1986) 554 at paras. 25/6; also, above note 31.
107 Reservations to CEDAW by Israel affect the application of Article 7(b) (on the appointment of 
women as judges to religious courts), Article 16 (the reservation exempts religious laws on personal 
status in Israel from CEDAW) and Article 29(2) (on the possibility of non-observance being referred 
to the International Court of Justice).
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2.3 Timor-Leste
In contrast to the struggles of the Saharawi and the Palestinians, the legal narrative regarding 
Timor-Leste’s external identity suggests self-determination has been secured by the use of 
Security Council authorised force.108 In 1999, after the Indonesian militia embarked on a 
programme of violent repression against the East Timorese people, the UN Security Council 
authorised the use of force by the UN International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). 
INTERFET’s mandate was to use all means necessaiy to halt the pro-Indonesia violence, to 
provide security in the region and to facilitate the implementation of popular consultation for 
the East Timorese, in accordance with the expressed desire of the population in the 1999 
popular consultation.109 INTERFET was later joined by the UN Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET).110 In 2002, the UN-administrated territory known as East Timor 
formally gained its independence and is now the independent state of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste.111
From the international legal narrative a process of external self-determination culminating in 
statehood and control of territory is evident. As a legal narrative this appears to be the last 
act in a process begun during the UN era of decolonisation.112 Timor-Leste was a Portuguese 
colony for three hundred years until withdrawal by the Portuguese and invasion by Indonesia 
in 1975. Viewed from this angle, the legal narrative begins in colonisation and concludes 
with full citizenship in the international community. However, the legal narrative omits 
many important aspects of the process of self-determination. This includes more than twenty 
years of repressive Indonesia practices in the territoiy and the complicity of third states in 
Indonesian’s aggressive determination of the lives of the Timor-Leste (at the time named 
East Timor) people during 1975 to 1999.113 For example, the ICJ in the Case Concerning 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) explicitly refrained from commenting on the Indonesian 
occupation, implicitly reinforcing the status quo of Indonesian control and the benefits 
derived by third party states.114 For Nevins, the international legal narratives, ‘barely 
mention the pre-ballot period’ offering only silence ‘on the matter of external support for 
Indonesia’s crimes in Timor-Leste, especially that of the world’s most powerful
108 Nevins, ‘(Misrepresenting East Timor’s Past’, 4 (1), Journal o f Human Rights, (2002), 523, at 
525-526.
109 SC Res 1264,15th September 1999, acting under UN Chapter VII.
110 SC Res 1272,25th October 1999.
111 SC Res 1414,23rd May 2002.
112 See Chinkin, ‘East Timor: A Failure of Decolonisation’, 20, Australian Yearbook o f International 
Low, (2000) 1.
113 Nevins, above note 108, at 525.
114 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Reports 90.
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countries*.115 The level of violence against the Timorese from the Indonesian military during 
the popular consultation and the ineptitude evidenced by the UN decision that permitted 
Indonesia to provide security during the popular consultation is also sidelined in the formal 
legal narrative.116
Chinkin presents the sequence of events in Timor-Leste as ‘A Play in Five Acts’, while 
Drew describes the ‘stoiy’ of Timor-Leste, which hides under the ‘Hollywood ending’ of 
‘the triumph of right (self-determination) over might (the Indonesian Army)’.117 Orford uses 
a personal narrative of the period from August 1999 until the arrival of UNTAET to explore 
her own feelings of ambiguity over the use of force to justify the 1999 intervention.118 
Nevins refers to the misrepresentation of Timor-Leste’s past.119 As such, each of these 
authors highlights the narrative element of law either explicitly, as Orford does, or implicitly 
through the reference to the ‘stoiy’, the theatre or misrepresentation of Timor-Leste’s 
history. The general dissatisfactions critical accounts project on to the international legal 
narrative of the self-determination of Timor-Leste are echoed in the words of the former 
President of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmao, who, in his 2001 New Year’s address, criticised 
the role of international narratives in the shaping of the future of Timor-Leste.120
In researching the shift in Timor-Leste after independence in 2002, a plethora of narratives 
can be placed alongside the legal narrative recorded above. My personal priority in this work 
was the recording of women’s narratives, be they from international feminist scholars or 
women in Timor-Leste. My intention was to evidence the links between individual, social 
and international self-determination, in line with the rest of this chapter. Unfortunately, 
although I found multiple narratives that I might insert here there is an absence of
115 Nevins, above note 108, at 527; also see: Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order, 
(Routledge, 2004).
116 Above note 51, at 137.
117 Chinkin, above note 112; Drew, above note 19; for an alternative narrative see: Philpott, ‘East 
Timor’s Double Life: Smells Like Westaphalia Spirit’ 27(1), Third World Quarterly, (2006) which 
praises ‘the resilience and political maturity of the people of East Timor’ at 159. Note both authors 
refer to ‘East Timor’ rather than ‘Timor-Leste’ as this was correct at the time the articles were 
produced, I have used the name ‘Timor-Leste’ unless referring to specific UN documents that use the 
name ‘East Timor’.
118 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge, 2003) 1-37.
119 Above note 108.
120 Quoted in Charlesworth and Wood, ‘Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor’, 
71, Nordic Journal o f International Law, (2002) 325, at 335.
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representation of the voices of Timor-Leste women,121 the authors tend to be Western 
feminists or international humanitarian or NGO workers.122 For example, Charlesworth and 
Wood’s analysis of the impact of the Gender Affairs Unit in Dili is built on consultation 
with women’s groups in the region and they conclude, ‘it was unclear whether gender 
mainstreaming was aimed at UNTAET international workers, or East Timorese women, or 
Timor-Leste people in general. This led to misunderstandings about the practical and ethical 
basis of sex equality rhetoric in the UNTAET mission’.123 Charlesworth and Wood move on 
to discuss the difficulties of merging institutional and Western feminist approaches, as is 
found in the UN under the gender mainstreaming mantra, into a community with its own 
feminist structures and women’s organisations. While their approach utilises the narratives 
of the women of Timor-Leste it is directed at international legal audiences and ultimately 
represents a Western feminist understanding of events in Timor-Leste. The resonance of 
their findings illustrates the limitations of international law rather than the self-determination 
of the people of Timor-Leste.124 In contrast to Charlesworth’s and Wood’s study, Cristalis 
and Scott’s book, Independent Women: the Story o f Women's Activism in East Timor, 
endeavours to ‘dispel the myth that women working for women's advancement in East 
Timor are agents of a foreign or Western agenda*.125 The authors trace the role of women in 
the resistance and independence movement in Timor-Leste. Although they build on their 
experiences of living in Timor-Leste and their consequential intimacy with events and 
people in Timor-Leste, the authors are not themselves from Timor-Leste.
So in an attempt to add the narrative of the women of Timor-Leste, I looked to courtroom 
narratives, which through the East Timor Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP) 
are available online.126 Courtroom narratives add insight into the relationship of the women 
of Timor-Leste to legal structures implemented after self-determination. The JSMP has 
compiled two key reports on gender justice in Timor-Leste. The first Report, Statistics on 
Cases o f Violence Against Women in Timor-Leste, released in February 2005, records how, 
of the 361 reports collected by police, less than three per cent of cases involving violence 
against women were resolved in court.127 In the second Report, the eight cases where
121 Niner, ‘Martyrs, Heroes and Warrors’, in Kingsbury and Leach (eds), East Timor: Beyond 
Independence, (Monash, 2007).
122 See, for example, Cristalis, and Wood, Bitter Dawn: East Timor A People’s Story, (Zed, 2002).
123 Above note 120, at 344.
124 Also see, Charlesworth, ‘Not Waving, Drowning’, 18, Harvard Human Rights Journal, (2005) 1.
123 Above note 122.
126 See: http://www.ismp.minihub.org/ (last accessed May 2009).
127 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Statistics on Cases o f Violence Against Women in Timor- 
Leste, Dili, Timor-Leste, (February 2005).
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violence against women was prosecuted were analysed by the JSMP.128 The Report 
commends the prosecutions that occurred, suggesting that previously, ‘there had never been 
any decisions handed down in cases of violence against women’.129 However, the leniency 
of sentences and the insensitivity of judicial personnel to gender issues were of high concern 
to the authors of the Report, as was the lack of application of ‘international standards*.130 
These internal legal narratives may allow us to make certain inferences about the 
development of Timor-Leste, post-independence. Yet I would suggest that they have greater 
relevance in illustrating the limitations of international, and Western narratives, around 
gender-based violence.131
With respect to Timor-Leste, the Reports demonstrate a commitment to change grounded in 
bringing women’s experience into the realm of the criminal justice system. This 
commitment is also prevalent in the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
Report,132 and the recent Criminal Process and Criminal Law Codes.133 Yet, the interrogation 
of Timor-Leste’s judicial processes demonstrates the role the enforcement and practice of 
law, now built on a liberal model of formal equality, play in impairing women’s capacity to 
secure justice for violent crime directed towards them. To suggest, as the Reports do, that 
the lack of prosecutions for violence against women is a feature of the Timor-Leste social 
structure is to misunderstand the role of liberalism in gender-based injustices. Thus, rather 
than offering a narrative on the internal social fabric of Timor-Leste, the Reports should 
direct us towards the international narrative of which the experience in Dili is indicative. 
That is, under Western models of liberalism law is a key barrier to the recognition of gender- 
based crimes and the prosecution of domestic or sexual violence.134
By suggesting the ‘root causes of domestic violence* lie in the ‘culture, tradition and 
religion’ of Timor-Leste, the Reports deny the role law, either that imposed by the 
Indonesian occupation or transplanted after the UN transitional administration, plays in
128 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Analysis o f Decisions in Cases Involving Women and 
Children Victims: June 2006 -  March 2005, Dili, Timor-Leste, (April 2005).
129 Ibid, at 250.
130 Above note 128.
131 Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perceptions, World Travelling and Multicultural Feminism’, in Wing (ed), 
Critical Race Feminism, (NYU Press, 1997), at 352.
132 For the text of the Report (titled Chega!) see: www.cavr-timorleste.org (last accessed May 2009).
133 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Overview o f Timor-Leste Justice Sector, Dili, Timor- 
Leste, (January 2006).
134 Vlachova and Bison (eds), Women in an Insecure World, Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Force, 2005, Part I; although note too Niner describes gender-based violence as 
‘possibly the greatest issue facing the justice system in East Timor’ above note 121, at 125.
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scripting the possibilities for tackling gender-based crime.135 As a result, my response to the 
narratives of women’s rights and gender justice in Timor-Leste is apprehensive. While there 
is a tendency in the Reports of the JSMP to blame the local culture and traditions for the 
prevalence of gender-based violence,136 there is an implicit denial of the role played by 
international law, in both the use of force to resolve the 1999 ‘crisis’ and through the 
implementation of Western liberalism, in the global non-prosecution of gender-based 
violence.137 For example, to be living in the United Kingdom and to be shocked by a rate of 
under three per cent judicial resolution of gender based crimes in Timor Leste is to ignore 
the comparable statistics for the judicial resolution of sexual offences in the UK, which, at 
the time of writing, are at six per cent of reported cases.138 Similarly the UK government 
domestic violence portal records that two women die from domestic violence eveiy week.139 
Studies of sex trafficking, sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by UN staff also present 
an alarming adjunct to the national strategies to prosecute sexual violence in Timor-Leste.140
With respect to the internal, or substantive, self-determination of the people of Timor-Leste 
my own narrative remains equally apprehensive. My conclusions lead me to question the 
absences apparent in the international narratives rather than proffering an ‘authentic* account 
of the Timor-Leste journey to self-determination. The ongoing violence within the newly 
created state adds further discomfort to my acceptance of the international legal narrative 
that suggests that the use of force in Timor-Leste was successfully justified on the grounds 
of self-determination. The absence in international law begins in the denial of international 
and powerful state complicity in the violence perpetrated by the Indonesian government over 
the period of occupation and is traced through the post-1999 endeavours to nurture a social 
structure compliant with international legal norms, even when those norms, especially 
criminal law structures available to prosecute domestic and gender based violence, remain 
ineffectual in the West. I am troubled by the quickness to find the source of weak gender 
prosecution in ‘culture, tradition and religion’ rather than in an international legal structure
135 Above note 127, at 23; above note 128, at 4 and 9.
136 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The Law o f Gender-Based Violence in Timor-Leste, Dili, 
Timor-Leste, (April-November 2005), at 14 and 26.
137 I place crisis in inverted commas as this understanding of events denies the lengthy and violent 
occupation of East Timor by Indonesia; Nevins, above note 108; Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A 
Discipline of Crisis’, 65 (3), Modern Law Review, (2002), 377.
138 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Without Consent, Central Office of Information (UK), 
(January 2007).
139 http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/dv/dvO 1 .htm; also see http://www.justiceforwomen.org.uk (last 
accessed May 2009).
140 Spurling, ‘Peacekeepers; Timor; and the Need to Address the Warrior Ethic’, Conference Paper, 
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation o f Women in Violent Conflict, Netherlands Defense Academy, 
Amsterdam, 19th June 2007.
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dependent on a division between public and private that frustrates the termination of 
domestic violence and is dependent on understandings of rape and sexual violence premised 
on masculine definitions of consent Furthermore, the persistent violence in Timor-Leste 
raises questions around the impact of the use of force as an international lever to resolve a 
‘crisis’.
My conclusion with respect to the narratives of internal self-determination of Timor-Leste is 
to emphasise the depth that Pahuja’s focus on the ‘postcoloniality of international law’ 
grants to our perspective.141 The internal narratives defining international understandings of 
Timor-Leste play off ‘culture, tradition and religion’ against the legitimacy and rationality of 
the liberal democracy, defining our self understanding and projecting the Western 
state/subject as definitive of the universal. Feminist theory suggests international law will 
remain stymied by this self-ignorance unless the voices and choices of the most marginalised 
are perceived as equal. The women of the new state of Timor-Leste may, therefore, teach 
Western scholars much about the limitations of the right to self-determination and provide a 
site for challenging the dominance of patriarchal, imperialist devised versions of the 
international. Or, they may not. What is certain is that without their participation we will 
never know.
Consequently, while Knop is correct in asserting self-determination rights as a place where 
international law must confront diversity and the Other,142 a general neglect of the process of 
‘internal’ self-determination leads to the perpetuation of sexed forms of the state and all its 
gendered repercussions. I have focused on the Western Saharan conflict, although currently 
endorsed under international legal narratives as under a ceasefire, as a territory where the use 
of force by Morocco has not heralded adequate international condemnation. The building of 
the Berm and the placing of landmines along it can be described as acts of aggression.143 By 
contrasting Timor-Leste with the Western Saharan struggle — the post-referendum 
aggression by Indonesian military forces with the continued stalling by Morocco to facilitate 
self-determination in the Western Sahara — different understandings of violence and 
aggression are evidenced. Additionally, the building of the Wall by Israel and its violent 
impact on both the daily lives of Palestinians as well as their public rights, especially that of
141 Above note 3.
142 Knop, above note 3.
143 See GA Res 3314, the Definition of Aggression, Article 2 (a); see discussion in Clark, ‘Western 
Sahara and the United Nations Norms on Self-determination and Aggression’, in Arts and Leite (eds), 
above note 30, at 55.
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self-determination, should be addressed in light of the Moroccan built wall in the Western 
Sahara that has equally stalled implementation of the right of self-determination. However, 
international legal narratives continue to hide behind externally driven understandings of 
self-determination and a consequential neglect of social and individual self-determination.
Self-determination dialogues also indicate the role women’s rights, and feminist articulation 
of those rights, can play in articulating new narratives for international law. Self- 
determination rights show how women’s rights activism and feminist insight engage both 
the practical aspect of international norms, for example, the demand for participation of all 
members of a community in self-determination processes and substance, and engage the 
normative aspect of international norms, demonstrating the weakness of norms that are 
committed to a form of formal equality and recognition (external self-determination) without 
understanding substantive equality (internal and individual self-determination). Through 
challenging gender-based discrimination, particularly violence against women, but also 
ensuring women’s free political participation and female sexual autonomy, lasting and 
effective social norms that will lead societies away from conflict and towards social or 
internal self-determination are the result.
3. THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY
In this, the final part of the chapter, I argue that legal regulation of women’s self- 
determination and autonomy parallels international understandings of autonomy and the 
self-as-state. I argue that improving women’s participation, freedom and autonomy 
strengthens communities and consequently builds states that are able to shift away from 
narratives that justify violence. At a conceptual level, I contend that the regulation of states 
under international law provides parallels with the regulation of individuals within the 
liberal state. There are factual, political, social and structural differences between states and 
individuals yet the legal regulation of each is markedly similar. I explore these similarities 
and the consequences for women and non-states in this section of the chapter. While in other 
chapters I have suggested that there may be some merit in dissolving the analogy, this 
chapter reflects on how the solutions offered by feminist theories to the self-determination of 
women as individuals may offer strategies that may be of relevance to peoples seeking self- 
determination under international law. The additional claim I make is that this has
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descriptive and conceptual purchase for international laws on self-determination, as not only 
is there an analogy in regulation but the facilitation of women’s individual self- 
determination increases the internal coherence of a community.
3.1 Victims and Agents
Berman’s identification of the paradox of self-determination, that ‘a right accru[es] to an 
entity which, by its own admittance, lack international existence’ provides a crucial lever for 
understanding the conceptual relevance of feminist scholarship to the right to self- 
determination.144 Feminist jurisprudence builds its projects on the empirically recognised 
oppressions and violence that women encounter in their lifetimes.145 Yet to speak, and to 
challenge these oppressions, women must first take for themselves a measure of power or 
control and present themselves as full legal subjects. This creates, for feminist theoiy, the 
same paradox that Berman sees in self-determination, the paradox between agency and 
victimhood. However, unlike scholarship on the right to self-determination, feminist 
jurisprudence seeks both to live with and move beyond the internal paradox presented by the 
dual victim-agent status.146 What I suggest is that the complex international legal issues 
raised by the paradox of victim/ agency in the expression of a right to self-determination 
might listen to and speak with feminist scholarship to gain increased understanding of this 
paradox.147
In both stages of legal regulation, the severance of the layers of self-determination has 
curtailed the achievement of self-determination for those who find their experience is not 
perceived to replicate the ‘normal’ citizen.148 As such, feminist discourse on the curbing of 
individual autonomy for women through the benchmark of formal neutrality under 
liberalism has relevance for international understandings of self-determination. As attention 
to the narratives of women in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories demonstrates, 
without individual guarantees of freedom from violence, communities will be 
unrepresentative of all members’ experiences. To challenge the preference for a formal 
equality model under liberalism, feminist reform strategies directed at creating substantive 
equality for women could be utilised to build strategies for the substantive equality of
144 Above note 1.
145 Above note 2.
146 See, for example, MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (Harvard, 2006).
147 Talukdar, above note 82, at 73.
148 Naffine, ‘The Body Bag’, in Naffine and Owens, Sexing the Subject o f Laws, (LBC, 1997).
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peoples.149 Such feminist strategies include the re-imagining of the public and private 
spheres,150 discursive challenges to liberal constructions of binaries that distance certain 
narratives from legal understandings, and the interrogation of both sexed and gendered 
categories within legal discourse. Feminist revisions also include philosophical projects that 
aim to re-imagine the liberal subject without the sexed and gendered limitations that 
circumscribe an individual’s freedom from hunger, violence and illiteracy.151 States or 
peoples, like individuals, need freedom from hunger, violence and illiteracy to allow their 
communities the space to create a meaningful identity.152
The right to self-determination under international law rests on unspoken assumptions about 
the definition of a state under international law as a neutral and acceptable aspect of 
international legal personality. Feminist legal theories challenge both the construction of the 
state and the primacy of the state itself under international law.153 Understanding self- 
determination as challenging legal subjectivity — of states, of individuals and of peoples — 
is thus a crucial aspect of feminist reconstructions.
Wright considers the role of state agency in international political relations as further limited 
by the manifest inequalities between states that are suppressed by the Westphalian system. 
As a consequence, according to Wright, inequalities in power between states lead to a lack 
of belief in their agency as international legal subjects.154 Likewise, Reisman and Armstrong 
have recorded the ‘mimetic’ role of US allies in parroting US foreign policy for combating 
global terrorism during the Bush administration,155 and Otto has written that the failure of 
international law in securing democracy within states must be connected to the failure of the 
United Nations to build democracy between states within the organisation’s participation 
procedures for states.156 These reflections on the gap between the promise of sovereign 
equality and the reality of state power replicate, in international law, a status quo and 
liberalism that feminist theories identify as silencing women and deflecting female energies
149 For example, Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, Oxford, (1999) or Jackson, Regulating 
Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy, (Hart, 2001) at 3-8.
150 Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, (Hart, 1998), chapter three; Thornton (ed), Public and Private: 
Feminist Legal Debates, (Oxford, 1995).
151 See: Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, 20, Yale 
Journal o f Law and Feminism, (2008), 8.
152 Chinkin and Wright, above note 3.
153 Knop, above note 3; Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 17, chapter five.
154 Wright, ‘The Horizon of Becoming’, 71, Nordic Journal o f International Law, (2002) 215.
155 Reisman and Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense', 100 (3), 
AJIL, (2006) 525.
156 Otto, above note 24.
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away from a belief in their own agency in the public sphere. Self-determination rights, from 
this perspective, extend well beyond the shift to self-government for previous colonial 
territories. The recent General Assembly Declaration on Indigenous Rights,157 which 
considers self-determination a right of indigenous communities, as well as regional 
instruments such as the Banjul Charter,158 may indicate self-determination in the 
decolonisation process has been a first but not last stage of an emergent norm. To move 
effectively and productively on from the confined model bom in the decolonisation era, 
there needs to be a shift away from force at the outer boundaries of the enforcement of the 
right. In this sense, self-determination may represent an important site for feminist re- 
imagining of states and communities, ‘post-identity’.159
3.2 Participation
If the status of the State in international law rests on its respect for the right to 
participation in democratic governance, then it is open to women to insist, drawing on 
arguments developed in feminist critiques of domestic law, that the right be 
interpreted in ways that truly afford women equal representation in government.160
Self-determination struggles, the site where the subaltern seeks expression and thus 
inclusion in the international, on the one hand may be argued to be a site where women are 
doubly excluded.161 At the same time, using self-determination as a site to re-imagine the 
self — within international and national legal structures — it is a valid and relevant place for 
feminist conversations. By definition, those conversations are inclusive of women from 
within communities seeking self-determination and inclusive of women within communities 
seemingly ‘determined’.162
The participation of women in international processes is recognised across feminist literature 
and increasingly in UN documentation.163 Security Council Resolution 1325 falls short of 
identifying women’s participation as necessaiy for increased gender equality in international 
responses to conflict and peace building. The Resolution requires ‘the particular needs of 
women and girls’ to be taken into account at the various stages of peace building and
157 GA Res 61/295, 2nd October 2007, Article 3 states ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to self- 
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’.
158 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981,2ILM 58, (1982).
159 Above note 151.
160 Knop, above note 3, at 298.
161 McDonald, above note 3, at 7.
162 Kandiyoti, ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil’, 28, Third World Quarterly, (2007) 503.
163 Charlesworth and Chinkin, above note 17.
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conflict resolution but does not demand women's participation as necessaiy to achieve an 
understanding of the needs of women and girls. Similarly the production of gender 
disaggregated statistics under gender mainstreaming also falls short of demanding the 
participation of women in the UN and its activities.164 For example, the equal participation 
of women and, in some cases, positive discrimination to ensure more than fifty per cent 
female representation requires more than the insertion of women alongside men at decision­
making tables. This is a demand for attention to social and economic rights for women that 
gives them the opportunity to (self-)determine futures, which will prepare them to participate 
in the international sphere and with full capacity to articulate their experiences and needs. 
Anything short of this will lead to a continuation of elite Western women as the key female 
participants in the international arena.
In this sense, Wright’s work as the Northern Director of the Akitsiraq Law School in 
Nunavut, Alaska stands as a groundbreaking initiative. Wright’s action and choices 
reconstruct dialogues of power and otherness to work towards the empowerment of a local 
community and its individual members through the provision of education equal to the 
educational demands many in the developed world see as an inviolable right and choice.165 
Consequently,
Training indigenous lawyers, especially women, means that international law is no 
longer impermeable to the power of those traditionally seen as on the margins (and in 
the Arctic, literally on the margins!) of world events. Canada’s presence in the Artie 
depends on Inuit cooperation . . . Nunavut itself is a creation of Inuit, Canadian and 
international law structuring sovereignty and self-determination in the Artie. The 
creation of the Akitsiraq Law School shows that the structure of sovereignty and 
rights must be about Inuit agendas, and that these agendas must be responsive to the 
demands of women and their needs.166
This process of securing slow, long term internal self-determination for the Inuit community 
can be contrasted with the use of force to secure autonomy for the Kurdish people in 
Northern Iraq in the 1990s.
164 Spurling, ‘Peacekeepers; Timor, and the Need to Address the Warrior Ethic' Confrence Paper, 
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation o f Women in Violent Conflict, Netherlands Defense Academy, 
Amsterdam, 19* June 2007 suggests equal representation of women in military and peacekeeping 
organisations is an important aspect of increasing women’s participation.
165 Chinkin, Charelsworth and Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to international Law: Reflections from 
Another Century’, in Buss and Manji, International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005), 
at 36.
166 Ibid. at 43; the authors note the Akitsiraq Law School has a predominance of women students 
which has lead to the incorporation of strategies to ‘support the needs of female students with 
childcare and other ‘women’s’ responsibilities’ (at 42).
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McDonald documents the failure of this process to be inclusive of women’s social and 
economic rights or women’s civil and political rights, particularly in terms of political 
representation and participation. McDonald, writing in 2001, suggests the consequence was, 
that,
The male leaders of the PKK, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan, and other parties, claim to speak on behalf of the Kurdish people. Men 
have defined the goals and have negotiated with the states . . .  This perpetuation of the 
patriarchal power base has serious implications for the well-being of the Kurdish 
population, a great proportion being the women and children who suffer the 
consequences of these struggles.167
The post-2003 situation in Iraq where further Western force has contributed to ongoing 
violence and isolation of all Iraqi communities, has led the claims of the Kurdish population 
in Northern Iraq to move down the international political and legal agenda. While national 
trials in Iraq prosecute previous Iraqi government officials for earlier crimes against the 
Kurdish population, the shifting of international attention to the rights and actions of 
Western militaiy forces in Iraq has left little space for considering the discrimination 
encountered by Kurdish women or Kurdish communities more generally.168 In fact, the PKK 
appears to have been ‘re-classified’ as terrorists following attacks along the Turkish 
border.169 The line between ‘liberation fighters’ and ‘terrorists’ that non-state actors must 
navigate under international law in a post-September 11 political environment adds a further 
dimension to the victim-agent paradox.170 After the 2003 invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq, the lack of agency experienced by Kurdish women in the autonomous 
Kurdish region in the 1990s has been replicated across Iraqi institutional and government 
structures that have not pursued women’s rights as a priority in the re-building of Iraq.171
The participation of women in international forums and decision-making processes must 
begin with greater attention to women’s social and economic participation in the community 
and access to education and employment. A corresponding element of this may be the 
development of social programmes that regard child rearing and the management of 
domestic space as positive choices for men or women and as sites of economic relevance to 
the state. Of course, this level of social reform can only be achieved through ongoing and 
slow social programs, which have long term goals of handing over power and knowledge 
rather than the imposition of foreign or Western social structures. To return to the example
167 McDonald, above note 3, at 148.
168 Ibid,
169 Dymond, US and Turkey to Hit PKK, BBC News, (2nd October 2007).
170 Chinkin, above note 30, at 339.
171 Al-Ali, and Pratt, What Kind o f Liberation? Women and the Occupation in Iraq, (Berkeley, 2009).
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of the Kurdish autonomous region secured in Northern Iraq through force in the 1990s, it is 
clear that the use of force and preoccupation with external forms of self-determination is 
also a slow process without guarantees of success.
I place women’s participation at the centre of legal reforms to enhance the self- 
determination of peoples because of the flow on intergenerational affect this has for a 
community, as evidenced by the social infrastructure of the Saharawi camps in Algeria. The 
experience of Afghan women under Taliban rule, where the education of girls was forced 
into private dwellings and performed in secret, is a similar example of women investing in 
‘social capital’ despite the lack of external state/ international support.172 To conclude, it 
must be acknowledged that this is not a project that is perceived as applicable to ‘others’ or 
that hoists Western communities as a pinnacle of achievement for women’s rights and 
participation but one which prioritises women’s rights and the elimination of violence 
against women in all states for self-determination to be a meaningful term.
3.3 Conclusions
In providing a framework for re-scripting the international legal narrative on self- 
determination, I have argued for the importance of the following three ideas. First, the layers 
of self-determination, identified at the beginning of the chapter, need to be regarded as 
concurrent, overlapping and equally important categories to the facilitation of self- 
determination. Second, the positioning of force as a possible enforcement measure suggests 
the processes attached to the international right to self-determination need to be challenged 
and re-considered. Third, the narratives of those most marginalised in current self- 
determination narratives must be elevated so that participation is democratic. These projects 
involve a shift from seeing self-determination as ‘closed,’ or close to closure as 
decolonisation narratives become redundant, towards reframing self-determination as 
entering the international with ongoing significance to all states.173 There is a need to see the 
securing of individual self-determination — freedom from hunger, freedom from violence, 
and freedom from illiteracy — as the cornerstone of future global, legal narratives that move 
beyond the promises of formal liberalism.
172 Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women, (Zed Books, 2007).
173 Higgins goes some way towards this formulation, above note 7, but ultimately ties self- 
determination rights to decolonisation so as to maintain the efficiency of territory in defining the 
international legal subject.
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To conclude, there is a sentiment that runs through this chapter and all those proceeding, 
which focuses on the agency of those under whose name force is justified. I recently found a 
similar sentiment in a children’s picture book, written by Nobel Prize winner Toni Morrison. 
The picture book tells the story of three children who are forced to live in a large box; each 
child speaks in turn to the adults around them who seem not to listen. The children say:
I  know you are smart and I  know that you think 
You are doing what is best for me 
But if  freedom is handled just your way 
Then it's not my freedom or free.174
Feminist legal methods and the vast feminist scholarship on the different meanings of 
freedom and autonomy highlight the gendered constructions of the self that is permitted to 
self-determine under international law.175 Not surprisingly, the recipients of the use of force 
deployed on self-determination grounds find their communities stuck in a perpetuation of 
violence rather than a shift away from violence. The three self-determination conflicts given 
increased attention over the millennium, Timor-Leste, Palestine and the Western Sahara, 
remain trapped in modes of violence and law that offer little space for self-definition as 
communities or for individuals within those communities. Each community demonstrates a 
troubling lack of agency and voice while they remain in the ‘grey space’ between ‘peoples’ 
and ‘states’. Notably, the Saharawi have attempted to avoid the perpetuation of violence and 
shifted towards the creative process of building internal self-determination. This is despite 
the failure of the international legal process to adequately support these internal self- 
determination gains.
It has been shown in this chapter that force by third parties justified on the grounds of 
assisting the self-determination of peoples is a gendered narrative dependent on Western 
legal structures. By moving outside the debates on the illegality or legitimacy of force, 
justified on self-determination grounds, and interrogating these legal debates through the 
lens of feminist theory, the potential for reframing self-determination is envisaged. Rather 
than dictating an answer or solution, this approach opens dialogues to those outside
174 Toni Morrison (with Slade Morrison), The Big Box (Children’s Picture Book), (Hyperion Books, 
1999).
175 Also see: Third World Approaches, for example, Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty 
and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law’, 40, Harvard International Law Journal, 
(1999), 1.
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traditional power structures in the UN and the international structure. In addition to the 
practical evidence of the relationship between individual, internal and external self- 
determination, the regulative analogy between women’s autonomy in liberal legal systems, 
which has been consistently undermined by the lack of legal structures guaranteeing 
women’s self expression and definition, can be mirrored with the way international law has 
demanded non-states emulate (Western) states to gain recognition under international law. A 
feminist project centres on those most marginalised by liberal legal structures as a means of 
challenging the abuse of communities, or individuals, perceived to lack power. This has the 
potential to avoid the imposition of ill-fitting international legal norms so as to offer the 
people who seek self-determination the skills to define their own freedom.
This chapter hopes to make clear that these conclusions are of importance to Western 
feminism and Western legal scholars. It is necessary to consider the limitations on the self- 
determination of many within our own communities before universals can be offered to non- 
Westem communities. Non-Western communities might offer some leads to understanding 
the limitations within liberal conceptions of the legal subject.176 Even in an era where 
‘decolonisation’ struggles seem historical; these debates are of importance to feminist 
scholarship: important as a site where feminist analysis would suggest that some form of 
international enforcement and protection of the right to self-determination may be necessary. 
Yet feminist scholarship demands we ask how to secure these rights without force. I have 
argued that women’s narratives require inclusion and have demonstrated the shortcomings of 
self-determination without women’s full citizenship and participation. I have also argued 
that mainstream international scholarship could utilise the extensive feminist critique of 
liberalism and liberal legal personhood to challenge the victim-agent paradox at the centre of 
the international legal narrative of self-determination. Without increased feminist 
engagements with self-determination and without mainstream engagements with feminist 
findings, debating justification for the use of force on self-determination grounds will remain 
irresolvable, as will the violence in those communities struggling to achieve external, 
internal or individual self-determination for their people.
176 Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, 42, Harvard 
International Law Journal, (2001) 201.
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CHAPTER FIVE
JUSTIFYING FORCE: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
‘His words took precedence over her sirffering A
1. INTRODUCTION
In analysing justifications for the use of force, this thesis has argued that state claims for the 
legality of the use of force rely significantly upon a domestic analogy with the legal 
construction of interpersonal justifications for violence, particularly as they exist in Western 
legal structures. This chapter argues that the use of humanitarian arguments to justify the use 
of force on the territory of another state, as was debated extensively after the NATO use of 
force in Serbia in 1999, also benefits from the use of a domestic analogy geared towards 
exposing the sexed and gendered contours of international law. I contend that the regulation 
of the domestic space of states under international law parallels the regulation of domestic 
space (or the private sphere) associated within the home under Western domestic legal 
structures. I particularly focus the analogy on the legal regulation (and non-regulation) of 
intimate partner violence,2 including the contemporary turn to mandatory interventions into 
domestic partner violence.
Humanitarian intervention can be defined as:
The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights of
1 Kennedy, The Dark Side o f Virtue, (Princeton, 2004) at 39.
2 The World Health Organisation defines domestic violence, or intimate partner violence, as ‘any 
behaviour within an intimate relationship that causes physical, psychological or sexual harm to those 
in the relationship’, Krug et al, World Report on Violence and Health, (WHO, 2002); also see the 
World Health Organisation typology of violence (available in Krug’s Report, ibid.), which situates 
violence between intimates in the wider context of family violence and highlights the similarities with 
collective violence, including political violence. In this chapter, I use the terms ‘domestic violence’, 
‘domestic family violence’ and ‘intimate partner violence’ interchangeably but recognise, outside the 
context of this study, there is value in providing definitional distinctions.
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individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied.3
Unlike self-defence, humanitarian interventions respond to violence internal to a foreign 
state. There is no armed attack requirement or identification of a threat to the nationals of the 
state using force.4 Neither will there have been an invitation from the government of the 
state where the violence is manifest.5 Therefore, states wishing to use force justified as 
humanitarian interventions must look outside the Charter law on the use of force to articulate 
the justification. Customaiy international law on the use of force, international human rights 
laws and the need to protect individuals from wide scale human rights abuses are used to 
explain the use of force justified as humanitarian interventions.
In 2000, the Canadian government commissioned a group of independent experts to address 
the issue of humanitarian intervention, resulting in the Responsibility to Protect Report that 
left open the possibility of unilateral interventions while acknowledging Security-Council 
authorised interventions as an accepted component of international law. In the 2005 Summit 
Outcome Resolution, the General Assembly found humanitarian interventions fell within the 
range of Chapter VII authorised force yet remained silent on the issue of unilateral state 
interventions.6 These institutional developments cohere with state and institutional practice 
during the 1990s. The Security Council endorsed the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 
(albeit retrospectively)7 and the US-led intervention in Somalia in 1992,8 while unilateral 
state interventions were not accepted without qualification or criticism from the international 
community (for example, the use of force by NATO against Serbia in 1999).9 After the 1999 
NATO force ceased its bombing of Serbia, the Security Council identified the situation as 
constituting a threat to international peace and security and authorised a 50,000 strong
3 Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, (CUP, 
2003) at p.l; there is currently no accepted legal definition of humanitarian intervention.
4 See chapter three on self-defence for further discussion.
5 On the invitation by a government to use force, see: Gray, International Law and the Use o f Force, 
(OUP, 2004,2nd Edition), chapter 3.
6 UN Doc A/Res/ 60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome, (24th October 2005) para. 139; Evans, Sahnoun, 
et al, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, (International Development Research Centre, 2001)
7 Mgbeoji, Collective Insecurity, (UBC Press, 2003).
8 Gray, above note 5, at pp. 222-224; also see Hipold, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for 
a Legal Reappraisal?’, 12(3), EJIL, 437, at 446 identifying interventions in Rwanda (SC Res 929, 
1994) and Haiti (SC Res 940 1994) as additional examples of Security Council authorized 
humanitarian interventions.
9 See, for example, Jokic (ed), Lessons o f Kosovo: The Dangers o f Humanitarian Intervention, 
(Broadview, 2002); also see the discussion in Gray, above note 5, at 260-262, 267-270; O’Connell, 
‘The UN, NATO, and International Law after Kosovo’, 22, Human Rights Quarterly, (2000), 57.
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military force, KFOR, to supervise the withdrawal of Serbian military, police and 
paramilitary forces from the Kosovo Province using ‘all means necessary’.10
In this chapter, these debates and developments provide the backdrop for considering the 
limitations of humanitarian intervention as a justification for the use of force. I acknowledge 
mainstream approaches, especially the jurisprudence that emerged after the use of force to 
protect the Kosovo people by NATO in 1999, but primarily argue for an alternative account 
of humanitarian interventions.11 The chapter is directed at unilateral state interventions 
justified on humanitarian grounds rather than authorised interventions; however, the wider 
implications of the chapter apply to state and Security Council interventions justified on 
humanitarian grounds. Although the Security Council is not required to justify the 
authorisation of force it can be assumed that the rationale for authorising a humanitarian 
intervention would follow many of the contours presented here regarding unauthorised 
interventions.12
To develop the domestic analogy apparent in humanitarian intervention narratives I focus, 
therefore, on constructions of public and private violence and how these are replicated across 
national and international legal discourse. Feminist theory makes the link between private 
(individual) acts of violence and public (state) violence.13 This chapter argues not only are 
the consequences of each connected, but further legal regulation of each reinforces and 
constructs a gendered image of the two sites of violence.14
10 SC Res 1244,10th June 1999.
11 For mainstream accounts, see: 49(4), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2000) 
[various authors]; Cassese, lEx iniuria ius oritur. Are We Moving Towards a International 
Legitimation of Forcible Countermeasures in the International Community?’, 10, EJIL, (1999), 23; 
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, (OUP, 2001); Franck, Recourse to Force, (CUP, 2003); Gray, 
above note 5; Holzgrefe and Keohane above, note 3; Kritsiotis ‘Appraising the Policy Objections to 
Humanitarian Intervention’, 19, Michigan Journal o f International Law, (1993), 1010; Lillich, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, (University Press of Virginia, 1973); O’Connell, 
above note 9; Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 10, EJIL, (1999), 1.
12 For a thorough discussion, see Mgbeoji, above note 7, chapter three.
13 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, 85, AJIL, (1991), 
613; Moser, ‘The Gendered Continuum of Violence and Conflict’ in Moser and Clark (eds), Victims, 
Perpetrators, Actors?, (Zed, 2001), at 30; Kelly,‘Wars Against Women’ in Jacobs, Jacobson and 
Marchbank, States o f Conflict, (Zed, 2000), at 45.
14 See Buss ‘Austrelitz and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries’, in Buss and 
Manji, International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005), at 94-100, on critiques of 
public and private space in international law.
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I also analyse two further binaries apparent in the discourse on humanitarian intervention. 
The first is the implicit distinction made, by law, between protectors and protected subjects 
in the process of granting legal subjects agency. Under humanitarian intervention narratives, 
although developed in the name of a community or group with only limited representation 
under international law, agency remains fixated on the acts of states. Within international 
law it is states that must articulate humanitarian interventions norms, or reject them, in a 
manner that distances the act of force from the group the force is proposed to protect. I argue 
that this genders the international narrative on humanitarian intervention, similar to the way 
Mills has described mandatoiy interventions into domestic partner violence as robbing 
women of legal agency. Those that ‘save’ and ‘protect’ are cast as legal actors (who have 
access to the public sphere) while those who are saved and protected are given limited legal 
agency (and are associated with the private or domestic sphere).
The additional binary, prevalent in humanitarian intervention narratives, and relevant to the 
discussion in this chapter is the tension between legal positivism and natural law accounts.15 
Arguments that focus on legal positivism are pitched against natural law approaches in a 
manner that again refracts attention away from the survivors of humanitarian crises to the 
reiteration of a central tension in Western political philosophies. I argue that feminist legal 
theories represent a useful means to step beyond the natural law-legal positivism dilemma 
and toward building strategies for preventing and challenging domestic state violence.16 I 
argue that the debate on whether states can or should act forcefully in response to 
humanitarian crises in other states is cast as a dialogue between morality and legality that 
significantly distances dominant international legal accounts from the needs articulated by 
the survivors of intrastate violence. This bolsters the international legal subjectivity of states 
wishing to intervene and perpetuates the denial of public space for non-state actors on the 
international plane, as those enduring violence as well as survivors of violence must wait 
until a recognised legal subject articulates the justification for an intervention.
Therefore, by exposing the persistent debates between public and private spheres, 
construction of protecting and protected subjects and the legal positivism / natural law 
binaiy, I critique the way in which a perpetuation of the status quo of force continues under
15 For an account of the tension between natural law and legal positivism in international 
humanitarian interventions, see: Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’, 65, Modern Law 
Review (2002), 159.
16 See Frazer and Lacey, The Politics o f Community, (Harvester, 1993).
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the humanitarian intervention justification. To move away from the seemingly perpetual 
exchange between morality-legality, public and private, protector and protected, I propose 
the use of the domestic analogy as a tool for re-conceptualisation of approaches to 
humanitarian intervention.
To build this argument, the chapter considers how a domestic analogy can be made between 
the regulation of domestic state violence (that is, the ‘humanitarian’ crisis that leads to an 
intervention) and the regulation of domestic violence within the home.17 I explore the 
potential, and the limits, of such an approach in this chapter. Drawing on the work of Mills, 
which describes interventions into domestic family violence as ‘doing harm to women’; I 
consider how humanitarian interventions into domestic state violence embed similar 
gendered narratives of public and private space and of sexed agency.18 The purpose of the 
chapter is not to provide a comprehensive solution to the complicated dilemmas 
humanitarian crises pose for international law, instead I use Mills’ model of survivor-centred 
agency to re-imagine the terrain of intervention justifications. As such, the chapter expands 
feminist dialogue on humanitarian interventions through recognition of the analysis feminist 
legal theories have already developed to understand legal narratives of protector/ protected, 
public/ private and morality/ legality.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Part Two, I give a brief history of the role force 
has played in the regulation of domestic state violence by international legal organs and 
evidenced through state practice. I argue this mirrors the regulation of domestic violence in 
the home under Western national legal structures. I then contrast my use of a domestic 
analogy to the work of Franck, which compares humanitarian interventions with the 
common law defence of necessity. This is contextualised through a discussion of other 
mainstream explanations of unilateral state humanitarian interventions.19 In the third part of 
the chapter, I argue that the analogy with domestic violence in the home provides a focus on 
emergent strategies for halting domestic family violence. As such, I consider the possibility 
of transposing feminist solutions to interpersonal violence onto intra-state violence. I
17 For a definition of domestic violence, see above note 2; also chapter one.
18 Mills, ‘Killing Her Softly’, 113(2), Harvard Law Review, (1999) 550; also see Mills, Insult to 
Injury: Rethinking our Responses to Intimate Abuse, (Princeton, 2003). Mills argues that mandatory 
intervention strategies ultimately harm women through replicating the patriarchal power relations that 
make women vulnerable to domestic violence in the first place.
19 See Franck, Recourse to Force, (Cambridge, 2002); Tesdn, Humanitarian Intervention: an Inquiry 
into Law and Morality, (1997); Greenwood, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: the Case of Kosovo’, 
Finnish Yearbook o f International Law, (2000) 141; also see above note 11.
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compare possible feminist solutions with the narrowness of current Western accounts of the 
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions and argue that despite the difficulties of 
transposition, feminist investigations of humanitarian interventions through a domestic 
analogy with domestic violence in the home offer real avenues for change in international 
law. This leads me to conclude that feminist dialogue on the role of identity and diversity 
within critical projects is mandatory to develop understanding of the meaning of 
international legal narratives on humanitarian interventions. The chapter argues against the 
use of force justified as humanitarian interventions but acknowledges that without structural 
changes to the international legal system that refocus on private violence as relevant to the 
international and that see the survivors of violence as the key to challenging future violence 
the interventionist model will continue to appear humane.20
2. REGULATING INTRA-STATE VIOLENCE
The histoiy of the United Nations has seen a rejection of the right of states to intervene in 
the domestic affairs of another state to halt human rights abuses or widespread humanitarian 
crises, unless an invitation has been issued by the state requiring assistance or the Security 
Council has authorised the intervention.21 When states have intervened to (ostensibly) halt 
humanitarian crises the action has often been justified by the states in question as a form of 
self-defence. For example, India’s intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 has been described as 
an instance of humanitarian intervention.22 India claimed, however, that the use of force was 
justified as the influx of refugees into Indian territory constituted a form of ‘civil 
aggression’.23 When Tanzania intervened in Uganda in 1978, and Vietnam intervened in 
Kampuchea (now Cambodia) in 1978, both states used Article 51 and the right to self- 
defence as the platform for their justification. This was despite the force arising in response 
to widespread internal violence and gross human rights abuses in Uganda and Kampuchea 
rather than an armed attack on the territory of Tanzania or Vietnam.24 The failure of these
20 While tremendous inroads have been made with respect to prosecuting internal state violence 
through the development of international criminal law, this is distinct from enforcement and 
preventative strategies.
11 See UK Foreign Policy Document No. 148 57 BYIL, (1986) 614.
22 Chesterman notes, however, that the intervention did have political and economic payoffs for India, 
see Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, (2001), at 75; see also Hipold, above note 8, at 444.
23 GAOR (XXVI) 2003rd Plenary Meeting, 7th December 1971, at 15, para. 165; the term ‘civil 
aggression’ is used by Franck, above note 19, at 141.
^H5n Bangladesh, see 1971 UNYB 144; on Uganda see 1979 UNYB 262; on Cambodia see 1979 
UNYB 271. In the case of the Tanzanian intervention into Uganda, prior acts of aggression had been 
instigated by the Amin government in Uganda against Tanzanian territory see S/13141, Letter dated
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states to consider humanitarian goals as adequate to justify their actions before the 
international community suggests the collective rejection of humanitarian interventions as a 
justification for the use of force during this period.25
In addition to state practice, the UN Charter and the Definition of Aggression indicate an 
absence of institutional support for the use of force justified in the absence of an armed 
attack or Security Council authorisation.26 This is further endorsed by the International Court 
of Justice that considered the use of force to protect the human rights of the citizens of a 
foreign state in the Nicaragua Case and found: ‘[wjhile the USA might form its own 
appraisal of the situation as to the respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force 
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure respect’.27 The Court’s approach 
reiterates its earlier conclusions in the Corfu Channel Case, when it found humanitarian 
justifications for the use of force ‘would be reserved for most powerful states’ and create the 
potential for serious abuses of international law.28
In the 2005 Summit Outcome Resolution humanitarian interventions authorised by the 
Security Council were acknowledged as an appropriate use of the collective security 
structure.29 Member states resolved on the words:
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through 
the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case by case basis and in cooperation with the relevant regional organisations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.30
5* March 1979 from the Representative of Angola to the Secretary-General. These attacks, however, 
were not of such consequence to justify the scale of intervention embarked upon by the Tanzanian 
government. In the case of the Vietnamese intervention, despite the gross violence conducted by the 
Khmer Rouge regime, the use of force failed to gain even the semblance of acceptance offered to 
Tanzania and India, with states keen to reiterate the centrality of Article 2(4) in the Charter era in 
response to Vietnam’s actions. For further discussion, see Franck, above note 19, chapter 9.
25 However, that states obviously saw humanitarian crises in neighbouring states as requiring force 
suggests to other commentators that the right to use force on humanitarian grounds has some 
precedent in the life of the UN, see Franck, ibid. at 172.
The Charter only justifies the use of force in self-defence (article 51); the Definition of Aggression 
fails to explicitly endorse humanitarian interventions as exceptions to the prohibition on force, GA 
Res 3314 (14th December 1974); also see GA Res 2625 (24th October 1970).
27 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports 
(1986) para. 202 and 268 [hereafter Nicaragua Case],
28 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports 4 (1949), at 34.
29 GA Resolution A/Res/60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome.
30 Ibid at para. 139.
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This document does not, however, endorse the unilateral use of force on humanitarian 
grounds or develop a framework to guide states considering the use of force on humanitarian 
grounds.31 Moreover, this reiterates the documented and customary approach to 
humanitarian interventions in the UN era.32 Additionally, the General Assembly 
endorsement of authorised humanitarian interventions by the Security Council invokes a 
high threshold. That is, the Security Council should only authorise interventions in instances 
of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.
In the next section of the chapter, I consider how this legal narrative of humanitarian 
intervention — especially the lack of legal weight for unilateral state force — mirrors the 
regulation of domestic family violence. Tensions exist, under international and national 
laws, with respect to the regulation of what is termed ‘domestic’ violence. Rather than 
seeing this as an argument justifying future interventions, I use the analogy to argue that a 
conceptual flaw exists in discussions of humanitarian interventions into, either, domestic 
state violence or domestic partner violence. Before attending to the consequences of this 
contention, I introduce the range of claims mainstream commentators make to argue in 
favour of humanitarian intervention as a justified use of force.
2.1. The Domestic Analogy
During the early twentieth centiuy in Western states, particularly in common law states, such 
as the US, the UK, Australia and Canada, domestic family violence was considered beyond 
the remit of legal enforcement.33 Thus, the regulation o f domestic state violence and
31 See, in contrast, the Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, (2nd December 2004), UN Doc A/59/565 
(henceforth A More Secure World), which pre-dates this document and which proposes (in paragraph 
207) five basic criteria of legitimacy for the Security Council to address when considering whether to 
authorise or endorse the use of military force and adds, in paragraph 209: ‘we would also believe it 
would be valuable if individual member states, whether or not they are members of the Security 
Council subscribe to them’. This appears to envisage the possibility of justified humanitarian 
interventions without Security Council authorisation. The removal of the criteria for legitimacy and 
the reference to unilateral state action in response to humanitarian crises suggests the NATO 
intervention has not led to a change in the law. For discussion, see: Bellamy, ‘Whither the 
Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’, 20 (2), Ethics and 
International Affairs, (2006), 143.
32 Gray, above note 5, at 49; Koskenniemi, above note 15, at 163; also see Schachter, ‘The Right of 
States to Use Armed Force’, 82, Michigan Law Review, (1984), 1620 at 1629; for extended discussion 
see Lillich, above note 11; for an alternative approach see Franck, above note 19, at 138-139.
33 The failure to include an analysis of domestic family violence beyond these states represents a 
limitation of the thesis drawn from time and space considerations. However, the selection of these 
states also reflects the methodological concern with the impact of Western liberalism on Western 
accounts of international law and the development of international law more generally.
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domestic family violence are both sites where the early twentieth century legal structure 
denies responsibility andfails to offer the victims o f either site o f violence any real source o f 
redress or protection against perpetrators.34 Under national liberal legal structures the 
domestic space of the home was generally regarded as outside of legal regulation. Violence 
enacted by a family member against other family members in the home, in addition to being 
(and remaining) largely gendered as male violence against female family members, was seen 
as a legitimate exercise of patriarchal power.35 In the same period, the domestic interior of 
the state was regarded as outside of the purview of international law. Violence enacted by 
the state, or its agents, against its citizens was not regarded as within the domain of 
international law.36 The categorisation of violence, at both sites, by the relevant legal 
structures, as domestic and private constructs the analogy between domestic family violence 
and domestic state violence.
By tracing the shift across the twentieth century in the regulation of domestic violence — in 
the home and within the state — the analogy develops and culminates in a shift to 
interventions at the close of the twentieth century. At an international level the shift is slow 
but apparent from as early as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although the 
concept of minority rights emerged prior to the creation of the UN.37 In national legal 
structures the shift, at least for Western states, towards recognition of the impact and 
illegality of domestic violence in the home, was triggered by the women’s movement that 
emerged as a visible political voice in the West during the late 1960s, although some 
activism pre-dates this period.38
The idea that the home is private and outside of legal regulation has kept family violence 
outside of law’s gaze in Western liberal states until relatively recently. International law 
extended the separation of public and private into its construction of legal relationships, 
casting the state in the guise of the male citizen who emerges in public separate to his/ its
34 However, note, when the legal category of the ‘state was not satisfied intervention seemed possible, 
just as when the legal category of ‘family’ was not satisfied interventions could occur without issue, 
i.e. through colonial histories (under international law) and through social service interventions such 
as those that created the ‘stolen generation’ in Australia (under national laws).
35 Power Cobbes, ‘Wife Torture in England’, 32, Contemporary Review, (1878), 55; Mahoney, ‘Legal 
Images of Battered Women’, 90, Michigan Law Review, (1991) 1; Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the 
Neighbours Will Hear You, (Penguin, 1974).
36 For example, Oppenheim, International Law [Vol 1 Peace], (IDC: 1981) at 171-172.
37 See Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights in Context, (OUP, 2004,2nd Edition) Part A.
38 Morgan, Sisterhood is Powerful, (Random House, 1970); Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 
(Cambridge, 1988).
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private relationships. This is sexed because a seemingly ‘natural’ aspect of legal regulation 
under liberalism, the separation of the public and private spheres, reflects Western men’s 
constructions of law and political relationships. This dichotomy has extensive pedigree in 
international law. This is a point made by early international legal thinkers, such as Grotius 
who: ‘defined the power of the head of households as essentially similar to the power of the 
state.’39 This characterisation of the state as a public international entity, with a separate 
domestic legal system outside of the main interests of international law, has largely persisted 
in the UN era, underscored by Article 2(7) of the Charter.40 Moreover, Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter expressly controls the public acts of states while ignoring the ‘domestic’, 
internal or private violence within a state. The image of the state as a benevolent provider to 
citizens draws upon a stereotype of the paternalistic, male state that mimics the family as a 
site of gendered oppression. While the creation of the distinction is sexed, the application 
and interpretation of this knowledge in the development of international law can be 
described as gendered. The transposition of the state as the legal subject, akin to the citizen 
in Western states, is not, on this reading, a benign re-appropriation of a legal device but a 
reflection of the sexed and gendered history of liberalism.
The analogy between the regulation of domestic state and domestic family violence 
continues in the legal developments across the twentieth century. The human rights 
movement in international law grew after the Nuremberg trials and further with the creation 
of the international Bill of Rights, as well as in response to the shifts in civil society that 
recognised the franchise rights held in international relations and the move to influence state 
action through lobbying41 Throughout the UN era, NGOs have led the human rights 
movement in terms of practice, strategy and identification of need, as well as often 
instigating responses to humanitarian emergencies.42 While the work of NGOs in the field 
may not be without criticism, the shift towards the greater protection of human rights under 
international law can be described as emerging from grassroots movements and with origins 
in civil society rather than at the impetus of states. This input has increasingly led to state
39 Kinsella, ‘Gendering Grotius’, 34 (2), Political Theory, (2006), 161, citing Grotius, Book II 
Chapter V, para XII, 240.
40 Article 2(7) states: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll’; see Steiner and Alston, 
above note 37, at 188 for a discussion of the changing emphasis states have placed on Article 2(7).
41 Higgins, Problems and Processes, (Oxford, 1995), chapter 6.
42 Chandler, ‘The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New 
Humanitarian Agenda’, 23 (3), Human Rights Quarterly, (2001) 678; Leyton, ‘Touched by Fire: 
Doctors without Borders in a Third World Crisis’, in Lawrence and Karim (eds), On Violence: A 
Reader, (Duke, 2007).
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awareness of the impact domestic unrest in foreign states has on regional and global 
stability.43 Similarly, the advent of greater recognition of the harm domestic family violence 
holds for the larger community has been led by non-government organisations, particularly 
women’s groups and feminist advocates.44 Both, international legal regulation of domestic 
state violence and Western national legal regulation of domestic family violence, can then be 
said to follow the best practices and lead of civil society rather than be driven by 
government policy45 By the end of the twentieth century, international law and national 
laws (in Western states) have witnessed the evolution of legal processes for dealing with 
‘domestic’ violence as a consequence of the emergent social narratives on humanitarianism 
and on domestic family violence. In national legal structures this is yet to lead to any 
Western state developing a comprehensive legal strategy that eradicates, or even effectively 
prosecutes, domestic family violence.46 At an international level a similar story of regulation 
has occurred: mechanisms exist to challenge and to halt domestic state violence but 
enforcement issues remain unresolved.47
The real value of identifying an analogy in the legal regulation of domestic violence 
emerges, however, when intervention narratives are appraised. The shift towards 
interventionism into domestic state violence in the 1990s (by the Security Council and by 
states or groups of states acting without authorisation) is paralleled in Western domestic 
legal systems where there has been a significant shift towards mandatory interventions into 
domestic family violence.48 In both cases, this shift is, in part, in response to past criticisms 
of state omissions to act voiced by non-government actors: human rights lobbyists (in the
43 For example, in relation to the apartheid government in South Africa, see SC Res 392 (1976), 577 
(1985).
44 Gordon, Heroes in their Own Lives, (Illinois, 2002) from page 289.
45 The 2003 CEDAW Thematic Shadow Report on Violence Against Women in the UK states, 
‘Government attention to the significant issue of domestic violence has been comparatively slow to 
develop . . .  In spite of new policy initiatives, the shift to a more integrated approach within criminal 
justice remains weak, with few domestic violence courts, low conviction rates, vulnerable witness 
status by application only and few advocacy and support schemes . .  there are good examples of local 
initiatives [yet] it is difficult for these good practice initiatives to continue without guaranteed 
funding. It also means the lessons learned from these projects cannot be more widely delivered’ 
Humphreys, Kelly and Sen, Violence Against Women; A CEDAW Thematic Shadow Report, 
(Womankind, March 2004) at 10; in the international arena see: Chandler, above note 42; also see: 
Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem’, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, (2001) 101.
46 Valchovd and Biason (eds), Women in an Insecure World, (DCAF, 2005), chapter four; Krug, 
above note 2.
47 Brilmeyer, ‘What’s the Matter with Selective Intervention?’, 37, Arizona Law Review 955, 1995; 
the Human Rights Council being the most recent international body created to ensure human rights 
compliance from states, created by GA Res 60/251,3rd April 2006.
48 Known as ‘zero tolerance’ in Canada, ‘pro-arrest’ policies in the UK and also referred to as ‘no­
drop’ policies.
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case of domestic state violence) or feminist advocates (in the case of domestic family 
violence).49 This is where, I argue, the analogy merits further interrogation by international 
scholars and from states advocating the use of force to secure humanitarian objectives. 
Humanitarian interventions continue to be supported by a range of human rights actors;50 in 
contrast, interventions into domestic family violence have received fragmented support from 
feminist theorists. Feminist scholarship that challenges intervention strategies for domestic 
family violence is of particular relevance and offers insight into interventions on the 
international plane.
While some feminist advocates promote the use of mandatory interventions to halt domestic 
family violence there is now additional, and increasingly persuasive, feminist analysis that 
argues interventions into domestic family violence leads to increased violence and threats to 
women who are the victims of domestic violence.51 It is this range of scholarship that 
explains why humanitarian interventions fail to offer an adequate justification for the use of 
force. This is because there is an analogy that can be made in the continued feminising of the 
victims of the violence. Intervention dialogues justifying the use of forceful measures, to halt 
either domestic state or domestic family violence, revolve around rescue narratives that 
ignore the autonomy of the victim. Hence, under intervention narratives the victim of the 
violence needs to be perceived as powerless and without agency. I pick up this theme in Part 
Three of the chapter. Before reaching this discussion, I will contrast my approach, first, with 
the use of an (alternative) analogy with the Western legal defence of necessity and, second, 
other theoretical justifications for humanitarian interventions.
2.2 The Necessity Analogy
My use of an analogy between the regulation of domestic family and domestic state violence 
is in contrast to the approaches of other writers.52 For example, Franck suggests there is an
49 Choudhry and Herring, ‘Righting Domestic Violence’, 20 (1), International Journal o f Law, Policy 
and the Family, (2006), 95; Ellison, ‘Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim Participation*, 
65, Modern Law Review, (2002) 834.
50 However, see Kennedy above note 1; Cain, Postlewait and Thomson, Emergency Sex, (Ebuiy, 
2006). Note, however, critical responses to humanitarian interventions tend to use descriptive rather 
than conceptual evidence to substantiate their claims. This chapter considers conceptual limitations of 
intervention models.
51 Smith, ‘It’s My Decision, Isn’t It? A Research Note on Battered Women’s Perception of Mandatory 
Intervention Laws’, 6 (12), Violence Against Women, (2000), 1384.
52 None of the key commentators makes a link between the regulation of domestic family violence 
and domestic state violence, however, see Chinkin, ‘The State that Acts Alone: Bully, Good 
Samaritan or Iconoclast?’, 11, EJIL, 2000. Chinkin uses a narrative of interpersonal violence taken
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analogy between the criminal defence of necessity and the framing of justifications for 
international humanitarian intervention:
Legal systems worldwide accept the need for some such way out of the legal 
conundrum in which good law, strictly enforced, conduces to a result which opens an 
excessive chasm between law and common moral sense. There maybe differences 
between national systems as to whether necessity excuses a crime or merely mitigates 
its consequences, but all recognize the obligation of law to make available one or the 
other way to resolve — or at least manage — the conundrum.53
To explain the relevance of the necessity defence to understanding humanitarian 
interventions, Franck draws on two separate nineteenth century common law cases.54 
Furthermore, Franck suggests moral norms play a distinctive and important role in shaping 
the contours of legal norms. While this thesis challenges the failure of legal norms to 
adequately account for other normative structures, a law and morality dualism fails to shift 
law from its hierarchical self-appointment over social and cultural accounts, and fails to 
recognise the entwined relationship, influence and overlap of legal, moral, social, cultural, 
political and economic norms.55
For Franck, the relationship between law and morality is conclusive of law’s source and 
authority in a manner that appears to be derivative of the work of prominent US liberal 
theorist Dworkin.56 Consequently, Franck’s approach leads him to assert, ‘[t]he law’s self- 
interest, therefore, demands that a way be found to bridge any gap between its own 
institutional commitment to consistent application of formal rules and the public sense that 
order should not be achieved at too high a cost in widely shared values’.57 By suggesting that 
law must uphold a series of moral norms, in addition to, and perhaps occasionally at the 
expense of formal application of the rules, Franck allows for an analogy between 
international and domestic law and between the international justification of humanitarian 
intervention and the criminal defence of necessity, writing, ‘ [international law, like 
domestic law, also has begun gingerly to develop ways to bridge the gap between what is
from Western Christian ideologies (the Good Samaritan) and compares this with justifications for the 
use of violence to halt human rights abuses in Kosovo in 1999; also see Charlesworth and Chinkin’s 
analysis in The Boundaries o f International Law, (Manchester, 2000), at 268.
53 Franck, ‘Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention’ in Holzgrefe and 
Keohane (eds), above note 3, at 214.
54 Regina v. Dudley 14 QBD 273 (1884) and US v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas, 1 Wall Jr. 1 (1842); Franck 
develops a similar argument, above note 19.
55 Davies, ‘Flat Law Theory’, Keynote Address at the Law, Gender Sexuality Conference, Up Against 
the Nation States o f Feminist Legal Theories, (University of Kent, June/July 2006).
56 See Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’, 88, Harvard Law Review, (1975) 1057.
57 Franck, above note 19, at 178.
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requisite in strict legality and what is generally regarded as just and moral’.58 The analogy 
pivots on the recognition that necessity defences neither fully exculpate the actors nor render 
the law ‘nugatory’.59 Necessity, and by extension humanitarian interventions, are 
consequently constructed as defences that allow illegal acts to occur should extenuating or 
mitigating factors exist to reduce liability for the use of force.60
Franck further extends the analogy with domestic legal structures to the use of trial by jury 
to assess culpability in common law states, suggesting, ‘[t]he UN system, too, facilitates a 
sort of trial by jury and pleas in mitigation. This ensures due attention to the appropriate 
situational variables and brings into play the contextual, textual — not absolute or simple — 
standards.’61 While this may sound reasonable at a theoretical level, the legal norm that 
Franck is advocating as ‘contextual and textual’ is Article 2(4), the prohibition on the use of 
force. While some international legal standards may invite this type of analysis it is unlikely 
that many states will agree that Article 2(4) permits such subjective readings and 
application. As discussed in chapter one, Article 2(4) plays a role as a sign of the legitimacy 
of the international legal order. Franck himself has lamented the disastrous consequence of 
the shift away from a position that projects Article 2(4) as absolute.62
Leaving aside the loose reliance on reasonably old accounts of the concept of necessity and 
the convenient avoidance of the ILC articles on state responsibility and necessity as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness,63 Franck’s analogy fails to offer an adequate legal 
justification for humanitarian interventions as it is dependent on a broader moral justification 
drawn from human rights laws. As the multitude of responses from states and from scholars 
to the NATO intervention in Serbia in 1999 suggest, a shared global ethic is far from 
realised in contemporary human rights laws64 and even further from realisation, is an
58 Ibid. at 180.
59 Ibid at 179.
60 Note, too, the different approach of the ILC on necessity in the Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, discussed in Crawford, The International Law 
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries, (Cambridge,
2002), at 178.
61 In Holzgrefe and Keohane, above note 3, at 227.
62 Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)?’ 64 (4), AJIL (1970, 809.
63 See Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, (Cambridge, 2007), from 713; 
under one of the key cases referred to by Franck, above note 19, {Dudley and Stephens (1884), 14 
QBD 273) the rule stated is that the necessity defence is not available as a defence to murder; 
however also see the judgement of Lord Justice Brook in the recent UK case: Re A (children) [2000], 
4 All ER 961.
64 See for example: Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, (Pennsylvania, 2002).
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understanding of what global ethics or an international morality might equate to in terms of 
enforcement practices.
Furthermore, a feminist reading of Franck's analogy would challenge his reliance on 
Western jurisprudence and debates. Franck’s insistence on seeing humanitarian interventions 
as a straddling of natural law (morality) and positive law (legality) approaches is drawn from 
a Western jurisprudential history that is steeped in imperialistic and sexist accounts.65 My 
use of an analogy, while also dependent on Western legal structures, differs because it uses 
these structures to understand the limitations of the international legal model rather than re­
asserting irresolvable debates on the role of morality in the construction of legal norms.66 
Franck’s account is simplistic in its assumption that a distinction between, ‘what is lawful 
and what is right’ can be evidenced through the examination of state claims and actions. The 
use of force, with the serious consequences it entails for states — those using force and those 
attacked — demands a stronger critical engagement than the suggestion that after the event 
international institutions will condone or mitigate behaviour akin to a common law defence 
of necessity.67
The focus on these jurisprudential questions by Franck revolves around a Western history of 
positive and natural law debates allowing liberal arguments drawn from common law 
jurisprudence to seep into debates over the nature and expression of international law. 
Consequently, liberal perceptions of the legal subject and the domain of law’s narrative, 
particularly the excision of legal from social norms, are able to neatly sever expressions of 
justifications for humanitarian interventions from the consequence of the use of force. The 
preoccupation with possible moral criteria that underpin humanitarian justifications for the
65 See: Barnett, Sourcebook o f Feminist Jurisprudence, (Cavendish, 1997), Part HI.
66 Green, ‘Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals’, Hart-Fuller Conference, (New York 
University School of Law, February 2008).
67 However, Franck does state, ‘For state’s seeking to invoke the law’s margin of flexibility, there are 
hard tests, requiring sophisticated pleading backed by relevant and highly probative evidence, for 
example, the US could not adduce before the General Assembly to support its claim to be rescuing its 
citizens from lethal danger in Grenada’. My criticism rests on the retrospective aspect of Franck’s 
account which suggests it is reasonable for the international system to supply a judgment on 
justifiability of the use of force after its use. I would suggest, in line with feminist legal 
methodologies, rather than developing humanitarian interventions as a potential exception to the 
prohibition on force, strengthening the ICC capacity to prosecute the crime of aggression would act as 
a greater deterrent to the use of force, and consequently build the future of Article 2(4) rather than 
detract from its impact.
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use of force neatly re-directs concern from the social, cultural, environmental and health 
implications associated with the use of force.68
2 3  Other Justifications for Humanitarian Interventions
Beyond Franck’s account, three approaches for arguing for justified humanitarian 
interventions in the international legal order seemed to emerge after the 1999 NATO 
intervention. All engage foremost with Western jurisprudence. Despite the range of 
approaches each ultimately invokes a model of law that accommodates exceptions, excuses 
and mitigated behaviour for forceful behaviour akin to the common law concept of 
necessity. A fourth approach would be to consider no right of humanitarian intervention to 
exist under the UN Charter and/ or customaiy international law. This approach is not 
considered in this section of the chapter as I am interested in the range of arguments 
developed to justify humanitarian intervention rather than those that oppose this type of 
intervention.69 I have labelled the three dominant approaches to justifying humanitarian 
interventions: the exceptional-legitimacy approach, the human rights trump and the textual 
flexibility approach.70 I provide an introduction to each approach, and identify works that 
utilise each approach in this part of the chapter to support my argument that justifications for 
humanitarian intervention are unable to shift outside of a liberalist paradigm, at either a 
jurisprudential level (that is, through debates over the tensions between natural law and legal 
positivism) or at an enforcement level (through hinging on narratives of protection over 
agency).
2.3.1 Exceptional -  Legitimacy Approach
The first approach emphasises the illegality of interventions, reiterating the role of the 
principle of non-intervention and the centrality of sovereignty rights in the international
68 Chinkin, ‘The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Yugoslavia (FRY) under International 
Law’, 49(4), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2000) from 910.
69 See ibid.', O’Connell, above note 11, p 88-89; Chinkin, ‘Kosovo: Good or Bad War?’, 93 (4), AJIL 
(1999); also see Gray, above note 5, at 31-49.
70 My description of die three approaches is similar to that of Stromseth, ‘Rethinking Humanitarian 
Intervention’ in Holzgefe and Keohane, above note 3; commentators and states often draw on a 
combination of the three approaches in application to particular events. For example, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (henceforth ICISS), uses a mixture of approaches 
one and three; using textual flexibility to avoid the need to condemn NATO in Kosovo while 
affirming sovereignty rights of states and the doctrine of non-intervention when developing criteria 
for future ‘exceptional’ cases.
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legal system.71 Moral and ethical arguments are then drawn on to establish humanitarian 
intervention as legitimate under exceptional circumstances. The UK government presented 
this type of reasoning during NATO’s intervention to assist the Kosovo people in 1999 and 
developed criteria to assess the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention claims.72
To establish the legitimacy of force that is otherwise illegal, a normative claim about the 
justness of exceptional interventions is invoked. The interventions against Serbia and Iraq 
(enforcing the no-fly zones in the 1990s) then become evidence of state practice.73 
Advocates of this approach argue legal standards cannot account for all possible 
eventualities and in extreme and unusual circumstances states must resort to making 
decisions on ethical or moral grounds. In this sense, this first approach is similar to Franck’s 
appropriation of the law of necessity.
This first approach leaves intact the distinction between public and private violence and the 
public/ private division in international law. Without challenging any of the current law on 
the use of force, construing humanitarian intervention under claims of exceptional 
legitimacy protects the construction of Article 2(4) as a prohibition on international violence 
without jurisdiction in the realm of intra-state violence. Consequently, this approach to 
humanitarian intervention protects a status quo that feminist scholarship contends stems 
from a gendered understanding of violence and gendered strategies for halting violence. That 
is, the exceptional-legitimacy approach perpetuates the supposed distance between private 
and public harms. The act of using force to halt humanitarian crises is given quasi-legal 
status, while the initial violence retains a domestic and private label under international law. 
The exceptional-legitimacy approach is immediately too narrow and too broad. The 
approach is too narrow in terms of the assessment of the forms of internal state violence that 
attract the coercive practices of the international community. For example, all forms of 
violence against women are left unregulated by this approach, despite uniform global 
statistics.74 Yet, an exceptional-legitimacy approach is too broad as it places the task of
71 Cassese, International Law, (Oxford, 2001) at 98 (on non-intervention) and 86 (cn die sovereign 
equality of states).
72 ‘United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention’ Speech by Mr. Robin Cook, Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 19th July 2000, reproduced in 71, Iritish Yearbook 
o f International Law (2000) 646.
7 Franck, above note 19, at 152-155; this argument ignores the parallel clam that implied 
authorisation existed for both of these interventions, see Greenwood, above note 19.
74 Mackinnon, Are Women Human? (Harvard, 2006), at 262.
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assessing the legitimacy of the use of force with individual states in the first instance rather 
than in the collective security structure.
This approach also adds to the legal semantics on the use of force, a further stratum of less 
confrontational wording for military endeavours. The use of humanitarian intervention as a 
metaphor for militaiy interventions is itself a cloak on the use of force. For scholars 
advocating this approach, to suggest interventions can be described as legitimate rather than 
legal, adds to the existing binaries of international law the hierarchy of illegitimate and 
legitimate acts of states. The convenience of this parlance for powerful states mimics the 
traditional development of justifications in Western criminal codes that have provided 
sliding scales of legality for violence and force from the perspective of men. The reality is 
interventions, such as the NATO intervention against Serbia, use strategic militaiy 
technology, for example, aerial bombing, that has long term consequences for the 
communities and environment targeted.75 This is military violence that is no more or less 
exceptional than wars fought in self-defence. The idea of ‘legitimately* deployed force to 
protect at-risk communities imagines a dichotomy of protector and protected to construct the 
justificatory narrative. Not only is the use of force seemingly justified because its goal is to 
protect others, the force has the appearance of fairness because it involves technology geared 
to protect the interveners. This extends the narratives evidenced in the discussion of Article 
51 self-defence rather than disrupting them.76
2.3.2 The Human Rights Trump
The second approach seeks to establish the legality (as opposed to the exceptional legitimacy 
in the first approach) of interventions. This approach draws on human rights standards, 
suggesting human rights ‘trump’ sovereignty rights through rinding ‘[n]on-interventionism 
is a doctrine of the past . . . Rescuing others will always be onerous, but if we deny our 
moral duty and legal right to do so, we deny not only the centrality of justice in political
75 Mclnnes, ‘Fatal Attraction? Air Power and the West’, in Mclnnes and Wheeler, Dimensions o f 
Western Military Intervention, (Cass, 2002).
76 Apart from the UK, this was not the type of argument most NATO states relied on to justify their 
actions in Kosovo. Other NATO states, such as France and the US drew on more than just these 
‘excusable breach type arguments’ and incorporated arguments of implied authority through Security 
Council resolutions and the evolution of human rights law to justify the use of force in Kosovo; see 
Stromseth, above note 70.
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affairs, but also the common humanity that binds us all’.77 This approach is developed in the 
work of Tes6n and invokes human rights as peremptory norms in the international system.
The human rights approach circumvents the sovereignty rights of states by emphasising 
human rights as jus cogens under international law, that is, no derogation is permitted.78 
From the point of view of feminist theory some aspects of Tes<5n’s argument sound like the 
expression of feminist concerns, for example, the challenge to sovereignty and the challenge 
to the primacy of the state as the international legal subject.79 However, using the rhetoric of 
feminists, and other critical thinkers, in this manner disregards the particular concerns that 
lead to the formation of human rights law in the first place. The ‘human rights trump 
sovereignty’ approach disregards much of the discourse that would ultimately see 
humanitarian intervention, and the forceful military endeavours it co-opts in the pursuit of 
securing human rights, as detrimental to the long term protection and promotion of human 
rights agendas.80
The ICISS Responsibility to Protect Report suggests human rights will always ‘trump’ 
sovereignty rights, as ‘it loads the dice in favour of intervention before the argument has 
even begun’.81 For the ICISS, the preferred legal course is to change the focus from 
intervention talk, which Thakur suggests focuses on the rights, claims and prerogatives of 
the states intervening and re-hamess concern on the ‘intended, putative beneficiaries of a 
given action’.82 Whether the ICISS formulation of a Responsibility to Protect achieves this 
goal of refocusing concern on the communities suffering, rather than the states offering to
77 Tes6n, ‘The Liberal Case for Intervention’, in Holzgrefe and Keohane, above note 3, at 128-129.
78 For an approach similar to Tesdn’s, see: Nardin, ‘The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention’, 
16(1), Ethics and International Affairs,(Spring 2002).
79 Tes6n does acknowledge the impact of feminist theory on rights discourse in, The Philosophy o f 
International Law: Human Rights Approach, (1998), at 163 and 177. His approach builds on a 
Kantian conception of rights which draws on natural law perspectives and does not challenge the 
limited definition of individuals in Kantian theory which is ultimately in conflict with much feminist 
theory; see Fraser and Lacey, The Politics o f Community, (Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993); contrast 
Tesdn’s approach to sovereignty to the approach of Knop, ‘Re/statements: Feminism and Sovereignty 
in International Law’, 3, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, (1993) 239.
80 On human rights as trumps: see Thakur, ‘Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to 
Protect’, 33 (3), Security Dialogue 2002; on human rights as ‘part of the problem’ see: Kennedy, 
above note 45; Chandler above note 42; Orford, ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives 
of the New Interventionism’, 10 (4), EJIL, (1999) 679; Petersen, ‘Whose Rights? A Critique of the 
‘Givens’ in Human Rights Discourse’, 15, Alternatives, (1999), 303.
81 Thakur, ibid at 328; Evans, Sahnoun, et al, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (International Development 
Research Centre, 2001) para2.28; Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging 
Legal Norm?’, 101, AJIL, (2007) 99.
82 Thakur, Ibid.
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rescue, is challenged by Chandler as a thinly veiled return to imperialist discourse.83 This 
echoes the ICJ’s reluctance to see interventions as little more than permission for strong 
states to use force.84 The language of the Responsibility to Protect Report seems to add to 
the semantic ‘game’ distancing the action (responsibility) from the military consequences. 
Despite this, the language of the Responsibility to Protect Report continues to gain support.85 
However, regional adaptations of the Responsibility to Protect model suggest one of its 
strengths as a potential legal approach is the malleability to regional conditions the model 
implicitly contains. Recognition of the variety of conflict and the temporal and regional 
differentiations tends to be overlooked in ‘human rights trumps’ arguments.86
Finally, the human rights approach, and the ICISS Responsibility to Protect Report, invokes 
the troubling dichotomy between protectors and the protected to enhance the justification for 
humanitarian interventions. Feminist analysis of the role of this binary in the sexing of 
international humanitarian law may be applied to the jus ad bellum arguments to evidence 
this as a retrograde step.87 This second approach, while superficially appealing, especially to 
those that have peacefully fought for the improved enforcement and compliance with human 
rights standards in the state-centred international system, under scrutiny demonstrates how 
posing an equation between sovereignty and human rights ultimately denies the complexity 
and contingency of human rights.88
2.3.3 Implied A uthorisation
The third approach argues that past interventions were not contraventions of international 
law as there was implied Security Council authorisation in each instance. This approach 
draws on the resolutions of the Security Council before and after NATO’s 1999 use of force 
against Serbia, to find implied authorisation by the Security Council. This approach mimics 
the statements of France and the USA justifying NATO’s 1999 action and is also similar to 
the manner in which the UK, US and France justified the patrolling of the no-fly zone in Iraq
83 Chandler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’ ?’ 11, International 
Peacekeeping, (2004) 59.
84 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports 4 (1949), at 34; Nicaragua Case, above note 27, para. 202 and 
268.
85 For example, see the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, 
(December 2006), Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region.
86 See further discussion of Mgbeoji, above note 7, at 31.
87 Kinsella, above note 39, at 164.
88 On the contingency of human rights see: Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge, 
2003) chapter 6.
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during the 1990s.89 This framing of the right to humanitarian intervention leaves the 
international legal system unchallenged. It suggests nothing extraordinary needs to be read 
into these particular instances of humanitarian intervention as they comply with Security 
Council resolutions and the Charter. The interventions of India, Tanzania and Vietnam 
during the Cold War are presented as evidence under this approach that states have practiced 
interventions even when they have not argued for them, while the interventions in Serbia and 
Iraq are offered as evidence of the growing acceptance by the global community that when 
necessary a humanitarian intervention is excused.90 The interventions in Liberia and 
Somalia, retrospectively authorised by the Security Council, are added to the list of past 
interventions that evidence the shifting acceptance by the international community of 
humanitarian goals as a justification for force, even when state have not always been 
forthright about their underlying humanitarian justification.91
Exponents of this approach, including the majority of NATO states, re-affirm the Charter 
system and the centrality of states’ interests in the international order. Consequently, the 
inherent inequalities of the system, which includes those between states and those between 
citizens, are also affirmed, echoing the warning of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case.92 This 
approach to humanitarian intervention asserts the applicability of international laws while 
creating a space for the neglect of international law by those with the power to use force and 
legal argument in their best interest. As with the first approach, key concerns of feminist 
jurisprudence, such as the use of a gendered hierarchy of binary relationships under law, and 
the specifically gendered division of public and private spheres, remain unchallenged and 
out of view. As with the second approach, an encroaching return to natural law themes 
emerges in this final approach as it relies on calls to ‘ethics’ ‘morality’ and ‘fairness’ that 
avoid complex reflection on the implications of interventions for citizens in both the 
intervened and intervening state. The notion of states acting as the juiy on the legitimacy of 
an intervention’s necessity closes off feminist concerns about the nature of public space in 
international law and the role of the state in perpetuating gender violence.
89 This is the position of France with respect to the Kosovo intervention, see Stromseth above note 70, 
at 235; Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force’, 10(1), European Journal o f International 
Law, (1999) 12; Stromseth suggests the US stressed the extraordinary situation, the resolutions and 
the threat to international peace and security (including through the refugee crisis) at 236; on the no 
fly zone in Iraq to protect the Kurdish population, see Gray, above 5, at 3-38 and *UK Materials on 
International Law’, 63, BYIL, (1992) 824.
90 See Franck, above note 19.
91 On Liberia, see Mgbeoji, above note 7. On Somalia, see the discussion in Gray, above note 5, at 
222.
92 Above note 28.
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In conclusion, all three approaches invoke extra-legal notions of ‘legitimacy’, ‘morality’ or 
‘fairness’ that remain open-ended and unsatisfactoiy guides for formulating a right to 
humanitarian intervention. Koskenniemi describes this as a shift from ‘formalism to ethics’ 
that is apparent after NATO used force in Serbia in 1999, because it ‘enlists political 
energies to support causes dictated by the hegemonic powers and is unresponsive to the 
violence and injustice that sustains the global everyday’.93 Consequently, the criteria for 
testing the legality, or legitimacy, of interventions is distanced from engagements with 
global deficiencies with respect to gender equality, distanced from reflection on the role of 
gender stereotypes in the formation of rights and distanced from the impact of gender in the 
construction and consequences of force. The focus of all three approaches is heavily 
weighted toward identifying the rights of intervening states rather than identifying the rights 
and needs of the people within the states that will experience the consequences of the 
intervention and, as discussed above, even the Responsibility to Protect Report fails to 
fundamentally shift the imbalance between states and communities. All three approaches 
and the Responsibility to Protect Report maintain a dialogue that divides the public from the 
private in international law, segregating the social and cultural effects of interventions from 
the legal repercussions for states wishing to use force. The term ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
further clouds debates by denying the military implications — for both states using force and 
the states targeted by the use of force — of interventions, a process that is continued in the 
ICISS recommendation that humanitarian interventions be discussed as a ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ — terminology that carries further gendered and imperialist connotations rather than 
one that escapes them.94 In response to these criticisms, in the remaining section of this 
chapter, I offer an alternative construction of debates on humanitarian intervention via the 
domestic analogy between the regulation of domestic state violence and domestic family 
violence.
3. THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY AS A STRATEGY FOR REFORM
Mills constructs a survivor-centred model for challenging domestic family violence that I 
argue is also useful as a critical tool to re-evaluate and challenge the limitations of military 
interventions into humanitarian crises within a state.95 The consequence of using Mills’
93 Koskenniemi, above note 15, at 160.
94 See further: Bond and Sherret, A Sight for Sore Eyes: Bringing Gender Vision to the Responsibility 
to Protect Framework (Instraw, 2005); Bellamy, above note 31.
95 Mills, (1999) above note 18.
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approach would be a shift away from the justification for the use of force on humanitarian 
grounds towards empowerment of the survivors of violence. This is important to create a 
shift away from legal dichotomies that invoke a gendered distinction between the protectors 
and the protected within a state.
I utilise non-legal narratives from Kosovo during the 1990s to suggest the path toward 
intervention by NATO in 1999 was neither inevitable nor desirable for the Serbian and 
Albanian populations of the Former Yugoslavian Province of Kosovo. In the decade prior to 
the NATO intervention, narratives from the non-violent opposition to Serbian repression and 
on the role of international economic institutional interventions in the region challenge the 
image of a ‘crisis’ moment as represented by NATO states in 1999,96 Through juxtaposition 
of the alternative narratives from Kosovan peace movements with the legal narrative — that 
pivots around force and urgency — the limitations of contemporary Western approaches are 
demonstrated. International humanitarian discourse fails communities because important 
knowledge — social, cultural, historical and power relations — is excised from the 
discourse.97 The dichotomous thinking that informs Western legal approaches is imperialist 
and gendered and ‘tends to lead to unduly polarised debates in which middle positions are 
marginalised as merely compromises and as unprincipled. A dichotomised distinction 
implies not only that the two concepts in question are used to mark out phenomena which 
are analytically distinct, but also that they refer to opposites’.98 The key dichotomies 
apparent in humanitarian intervention narratives (public-private, legality-^norality and 
protector-protected) limit international legal debates in precisely this manner. Furthermore, 
the analogy between interventions into domestic state violence and mandatory interventions 
into domestic family violence is able to expose the role the gendered dichotomies play in 
legal narratives of intervention. By engaging this analogy, I argue that the types of dialogues 
required to move beyond the straitjacket of a natural law-positivist dichotomy or the 
protector-protected binary, as well as engaging the public and private, requires focus on the 
binaries occurring on a continuum rather than as mutually exclusive.
96 Oxford, ‘Locating the International’, 38, Harvard International Law Journal, (1999); Charlesworth, 
‘A Discipline of Crisis’, 65 (3), Modern Law Review, (2002)377.
97 Koskenniemi, above note 15.
98 Frazer and Lacey, The Politics o f Community, (Harvester, 1983), at 168.
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3.1 Transposing National Models onto the International
In 2004 the UK government, under the Domestic Violence, Crimes and Victims Act, made 
common assault an arrestable offence. This provision was developed to ensure police 
compliance with the policy of mandatory criminal justice interventions into domestic family 
violence." Similar laws have emerged in other Western states since the late 1990s, 
particularly those with common law genealogies.100 The broad impact of these policies is 
compulsory intervention and prosecution once domestic family violence is brought to the 
attention of the police. The advent of this development has been in response to feminist 
research that had previously criticised the poor enforcement and policing of domestic family 
violence.101 After the introduction of mandatory interventions into spousal violence a further 
strand of empirical and analytical feminist research has emerged that describes mandatory 
interventions as a negative consequence for many women who experience domestic family 
violence. Feminist criticisms of mandatory interventions into domestic family violence are 
not uniform;102 however, I find feminist accounts that are critical of criminal justice 
interventions provide a useful conceptual analogy that can be applied to the regulation of 
domestic state violence.
Mills presents a compelling analysis of the limitations of interventions into domestic family 
violence. In her article ‘Killing Her Softly’, Mills gives an empirical account of the effects 
of mandatory interventions into domestic family violence and concludes the interventions 
ultimately ‘do violence to battered women’.103 Mills begins by acknowledging the role of 
feminist scholarship and activism in the emergence of mandatoiy intervention policies. Mills 
also acknowledges feminist arguments in favour of interventions, including enforcement 
failures and racial bias in the prior application of domestic violence laws. This parallels the 
international debate where the failure of the international community to respond to the
99 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 UK; Hester and Westmarland, Domestic 
Violence: Effective Interventions and Approaches, Home Office Research Study 290, (Development 
and Statistics Directorate, Feb 2005).
100 In Canada there have been ‘mandatory charging directives’ in some Provinces since the early 
1980s and zero tolerance policies for police forces were introduced in the early 1990s, for discussion 
see: Ursel, ‘The Possibilities of Criminal Justice Intervention in Domestic Violence: A Canadian Case 
Study’, 8 (3), Current Issues Criminal Justice, (1997) 263; in the US more than 20 states have 
mandatory intervention laws, as well as ‘no-drop’ policies, see: Mills, above note 18.
101 Choudhry and Herring, about note 49.
102 For example, Durham, ‘The Domestic Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied 
Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem’, 71, California Law Revie, (1998); Davis, 
Domestic Violence: Facts and Fallacies, (Greenwood, 1998); Currie, ‘Battered Women and the State: 
From the Failure of Theory a Theory of Failure’, 1 (2), Journal o f Human Justice, (1993); Snider, 
‘The Potential of the Criminal Justice System to Promote Feminist Concerns’, 10, Studies in Law, 
Politics and Society, (1990).
103 Mills, above note 18, at 550.
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internal violence in Rwanda drew criticisms over the selectivity of interventions reflecting 
the imperial history and racial bias of the structures of international law.104 However, Mills 
goes on to identify mandatoiy interventions as perpetuating rather than halting violence 
against women. Mills contends that intervention policies rob women of control over the 
consequences of the reporting of domestic family violence and consequently dislocates 
women from the arrest and enforcement process.105 The process of mandatory interventions, 
therefore, replicates die patriarchal power relations that can be said to have been a key factor 
in the prevalence of domestic family violence in the first place. Mills work is supported by 
analysis of data from Manitoba, in Canada, where intervention policies appear to have been 
successfully developed by the provincial criminal justice system in an environment 
conducive to radical structural reform of criminal justice practice.106
My analogy identifies the continued feminisation of the victims of domestic violence under 
international laws as akin to these (Western) national legal processes. International law casts 
domestic state violence as primarily outside of its gaze and, when international laws do 
recognise domestic state violence, the identification of the violence as private/ internal/ 
domestic is as important, perhaps more important, than the recognition of the violence 
itself.107 This allows intervention strategies to revolve around rescue narratives that ignore 
the autonomy of the victims. Shifting what was previously private into the public domain, 
through legal regulation, fails to challenge the sexed version of law ground in the liberal 
insistence on a gendered division between public and private. Otto describes a similar 
process in the institutional responses to women’s human rights activism.108 Legal 
developments utilise a distinction between the protected (feminised, female) object and the 
legal subject/ actor who gains the capacity to protect (and thus act) within the scope of the 
law. Consequently, the application of any new legal practice is at the mercy of the gendered 
and sexed structure that legal practices are imagined to function within. Public violence 
(what has been characterised in the UN era as the use of force) remains the benchmark for 
understanding the aggression and violence of states. Conversely, private violence is 
reinforced as outside of international law under humanitarian interventions when the 
interventions are grounded in recognition of their exceptionality and unusualness.
104 Mgbeoji, above note 7.
105 Ibid
106 Ursel, above note 100.
107 This is because internal state practices continue to be considered as outside of the ‘everyday’ 
concerns of international law.
108 Otto, ‘Disconcerting “Masculinities”: Reinventing the Gendered Subjects) of International Human 
Rights Law’, in Buss and Manji, International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005), at 
124.
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Furthermore, intervention justifications illustrate the persistent division between public and 
private through their preoccupation with the legality/legitimacy of the intervening force 
rather than the prevention of the domestic state violence.
Kinsella suggests ‘sex is a prior materiality upon which gender acts’.109 The shift to 
justifications for humanitarian interventions in the late twentieth century and at the advent of 
the new millennium that preserve a distinction between public and private violence is an 
excellent example of this process. Humanitarian interventions reify the sexed binary rather 
than offering a positive re-interpretation of the relationship between public and private 
spheres under law. The dependence on the public/ private distinction in humanitarian 
intervention justifications makes narratives around the necessity to protect, and the 
consequential dichotomy between the protectors and the protected seem natural, rather than 
constructed through law and gendered. This replicates, on the international level, what Mills 
describes as occurring when mandatory interventions are conducted into domestic family 
violence. Mills also argues that: ‘policies that support victims of battering must respect their 
emotional, cultural and financial challenges and must not reinforce the emotional 
oppression, initiated by violent actors, that the state currently perpetuates’.110
3.2 Survivor Centred Models
While Mills’ work is not alone in documenting the disconnection between feminist strategies 
and the consequences of mandatory interventions, her strategies for challenging domestic 
family violence without mandatory interventions form a conceptual model that can be re­
developed to challenge humanitarian interventions under international law. Mills strategies 
focus on ‘survivor centred’ responses and are premised on a respectful, sometimes slow, but 
gentle, attitude towards empowering the survivors of domestic family violence. Crucially, 
Mills’ approach acknowledges there is a relationship of importance between the abuser and 
the survivor of domestic family violence. Mills acknowledges that her approach may 
prolong the oppression and violence initially, but suggests her approach will ultimately lead 
towards both survivor and abuser as willing participants in the process of halting domestic 
family violence. Mills concludes,
109 Kinsella, above note 39, at 165.
110 Above note 18, at 557.
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Engaging survivors in the political struggle against domestic violence must begin with 
facilitating personal empowerment in the intimate sphere. Coercive tactics serve only 
to disengage these women and alienate them from the larger feminist power base that 
has become so strongly identified with these approaches.111
Transposing this idea onto domestic state violence would be difficult yet not impossible. The 
three key features of Mills’ model, the use of law to empower individuals (rather than 
protect), the recognition of the relationship between the survivor and the abuser and the 
reliance on survivor articulated goals for change, can be applied and analysed in terms of 
international justifications for humanitarian interventions.
3.2.1 Using Law to Develop Agency
Feminist legal theories have developed sophisticated dialogues on the role of individual 
agency and autonomy under law and the capacity of liberal legal structures to guarantee 
these aspects of legal personhood to women.112 Mills draws on this range of feminist theoiy 
to demonstrate how intervention strategies rob survivors of domestic family violence of 
agency, by deeming them ineffective or unreliable agents in the process of securing a 
conviction. By recognising the agency of survivors of violence, Mills changes the legal 
response from one concerned with negative freedom to one concerned with an approach 
centred on securing positive rights and freedom for survivors. That is, rather than a 
regulative (legal) response that functions to justify enforcement action, Mills advocates laws 
that function to empower the potential and actual victims of violence. A key element of 
empowering the victims of violence is the focus on measures to eradicate women’s poverty 
and the provision of comprehensive health services and rights.113 A comprehensive 
Australian analysis of approaches to domestic violence concluded current criminal justice 
approaches are flawed through their preoccupation with violence after it occurs rather than 
seeking to challenge future violence prior to its manifestation.114 Mills’ study, similarly, 
shows that mandatory interventions can lead to the perpetuation of violence as the survivor 
is disempowered when her capacity to challenge the violence is re-appropriated by the state 
in the guise of police enforcement. Not only does this invoke the protector-protected myth, 
the approach permits the revocation of female legal subjectivity, deeming women unreliable 
agents in the criminal justice process.
111 Ibid. at 569.
112 See further chapter four on self-determination.
113 Krug, above note 2.
114 Carrinton and Phillips, Domestic Violence in Australia — an Overview o f the Issues, (7th August
2003), Parliamentary Library of Australia, available online at: 
www.aph.hov.au/librarv/intguide/SP/Dom violence.htm (last accessed May 2009).
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Research demonstrates that female financial dependence as well as broader social relations 
(including legal norms) that perpetuate images of male aggression as acceptable forms of 
interpersonal interaction are causal factors in the continued existence of domestic 
violence.115 A particularly poignant research project in the United States found that the 
provision of housing to the survivors of domestic family violence was die single most 
effective mechanism for halting future abuse.116 Mills’ work on challenging domestic family 
violence through survivor centred strategies with specific attention to the agency and full 
legal subjectivity of survivors has resonance with contemporary feminist approaches to 
international law. For example, Otto in her analysis of the conundrum of women’s human 
rights advocacy is critical of feminist strategy that ‘repeats the gendered subjectivities of the 
hierarchies that are responsible for producing the gendered violations in the first place’.117
Otto places the gendered hierarchy between protector and protected classes of persons as 
both a product of and an assumption of human rights discourse. While this analysis is 
directed at the sex/ gender of the specific rights bearers in human rights laws, my argument 
is that the same sex/ gender binary emerges, generally, in international law on the use of 
force and, specifically, in the discourse on humanitarian interventions. Feminist legal 
theories work to shift beyond the mere recognition of sex/gender confines to develop 
strategies ‘that are disruptive of gender hierarchies*.118 For Otto, the strategy with respect to 
human rights laws is to ‘consciously reject constructions of gender as hierarchy and fully 
embrace the insight that knowledges about sex/ gender are socially constructed and therefore 
open to infinite possibilities beyond the relentless dualisms that have been naturalised by so 
many laws and practices’.119
Mills’ approach asks that the turn to law be centred on empowering the survivor of violence 
rather than offering ‘protection’, ‘rescue’ or ‘saving’. In the international arena, a similar 
approach to combating violence against women is emergent. So the recent WHO Report on 
the gender responsiveness of the Millennium Summit Outcomes finds combating violence
115 Ibid.
116 Hunter, ‘Law’s (Masculine) Violence’, 17(1), Law and Critique (2006), 27; also see: Sokoloff 
(ed), Domestic Violence at the Margins: Readings on Race, Class, Gender and Culture, (Rutgers, 
2005); with respect to the role of economic interventions and international humanitarian crises, see: 
Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War’, 38, 
Harvard International Law Journal, (1997), 443.
117 Otto, above note 108.
m Ibid.
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against women through policy integral to all of the Outcomes, rather than pertaining to 
specific ‘women’s’ provisions, and through policy centred on the re-imagining of legal 
provisions as tools for the creation of positive rights rather than negative rights.120 Rees, 
similarly, argues for the development of special provisions for the promotion and 
development of women’s social and economic rights in post-conflict communities. Rees 
indicates that this is necessary to facilitate communities that can develop strong human 
rights mechanisms rather than submitting communities to the paternalism latent in the 
mantra of the protection of rights imposed externally.121
A similar range of criticisms have been made by some international scholars in response to 
humanitarian interventions.122 For example, Orford directly links the flaws of ‘saving’ others 
to the gendered narratives of international law and concludes,
The subject of the intervention narrative, the muscular hero, is portrayed as the 
character able to act in the world, and to imagine, create and bring about new worlds 
in his own image . . . Missing is any sense of the agency of the peoples of the states 
where the intervention is to be conducted.123
Feminist theory as a process of listening to personal expressions of political conundrums 
centres on practices of empowerment developed through real engagement with those 
suffering under the status quo. Therefore, not only does Mills work on mandatory 
interventions into domestic family violence offer a conceptual understanding of the 
limitations of interventions, feminist legal theory offers theoretical and practical reflections 
on how to make empowerment, agency and autonomy exist for all people.
Important studies and voices from Kosovo highlight the failure of the provision of such 
positive rights in 1999 prior to the Western intervention.124 While NATO states argued for 
the legality or legitimacy of a Western intervention there was little discussion around 
offering the people of the Kosovo Province agency or a platform for exercising choices. 
Instead it was deemed appropriate by foreign states that foreign states and international
120 Above note 2.
121 Rees, ‘A Comprehensive Presentation on Consequences of SEA in Violent Conflict’, Conference 
Presentation, NLDA Symposia, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse o f Women in Violent Conflict, 17th-  
19th June 2007.
122 Chandler, above note 42; Kennedy, above note 1; Mgbeoji, above note 7; Chinkin, above note 52.
123 Orford, above note 88, at 170.
124 For example, the failure of the international community to see the 1990 Declaration of 
Independence by Kosovo leaders as a response to Serbian violations in the Province.
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organisations find the best way to ‘achieve the liberal peace’ in Kosovo.125 The strong non­
violent movement in Kosovo, which had involved a decade-long struggle against repressive 
Serbian forces, was effectively silenced by international debates that emerged in Western 
states. Furthermore, harmful cultural constructions of gender within the Kosovan community 
were hidden by a process that was not interested in securing the plethora of narratives that 
emerged from the community. Rodgers writes of the ‘extremely patriarchal construction of 
gender relations amongst Kosovo Albanians*.126 Likewise, further repressive practices 
against minority groups in the Province, particularly against the Roma people who live in the 
Kosovo Province, were not acknowledged in the process of challenging Serbian repression. 
One of the consequences of this has been continued violence against Roma communities in 
Kosovo after the NATO intervention.127 While the NATO intervention and the subsequent 
UN Transitional Administration have ultimately led to the creation of a new Kosovan state, 
this has not lead to the cessation of group violence.128
Like the discussion in the previous chapter, it becomes apparent that the use of force as a 
mechanism of international regulation is inadequate to create lasting solutions for all citizens 
within a community. The participation of women and minorities is crucial in the articulation 
of the demands a community makes of the international network of states.129 In discussions 
of humanitarian interventions, however, it becomes apparent that this articulation of the role 
of law in emphasising the rights and participation of some subjects over others, applies not 
just at an individual level but also between communities of peoples. To speak, or write, of 
using law to develop agency is to reconfigure expectations of the appropriate agents. This 
knowledge, taken from understandings of individual/ intimate violence and its regulation, 
when projected onto the international law on the use of force develop across the continuum 
of legal subjects (from individual to state) and across the continuum of acts (private/ 
community/ state violence). One of the resounding findings of this thesis is that international
125 Chandler, above note 83.
126 Rodgers, ‘Gender Dimensions of International Interventions’ in Mclnnes and Wheeler, 
Dimensions o f Western military Interventions, (Cass, 2002), at 184.
127 ‘Justice for Kosovo’ Special Edition No.s 3 and 4, Roma Rights, (2005), published by the 
European Roma Rights Centre.
128 Also see: Amnesty International, Document - Serbia (Kosovo): The Challenge to Fix a failed UN 
Justice Mission, (January 2008) available at: www.amnestv.org/en/librarv/info/EURQ70/001 /2008 
(last accessed May 2009); on the current and potential future status of the Republic of Kosovo, see: 
‘Agora: Kosovo’, 8, Chinese Journal o f International Law, (2009), 2 [Various Authors].
129 Chinkin, ‘The International Law Framework with Respect to International Peace and Security’ in 
Glasius and Kaldor, Advances in International Relations and Global Politics, (Routledge, 2006); 
Charlesworth and Chinkin, ‘Building Women into Peace: The International Legal Framework*, 27, 
Third World Quarterly, (2006) 937; Zeigler and Gunderson, The Gendered Dimensions to Conflict’s 
Aftermath’, 20 (2), Ethics and International Affairs, (2006) 171.
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laws on the use of force do merit from exposure of the conceptual contingencies between the 
regulation of private violence from the individual to the international. The strategies 
elaborated for re-imagining the regulation of international violence manifests in the private 
— the empowerment of individuals — and in the public realm — the re-imagining of state 
structures/ participation and subjectivity. Feminist legal theories open up understandings of 
the laws on the use of force and anticipate increased dialogues that challenge the terrain and 
its participants.
3.2.2 Understanding the Relationship between Perpetrators and Survivors
Returning to Mills9 work on challenging domestic family violence, the second feature 
focuses on acknowledging that the relationship between survivor and abuser is of central 
importance in formulating strategies to halt domestic/ family violence. This is magnified in 
the domestic state violence scenario where, by definition, both perpetrators and survivors of 
violence will continue to share territory and resources.
Ursel’s data on the impact of intervention strategies in Manitoba, Canada is illustrative of 
this point. Ursel is largely in favour of interventions into domestic family violence; however, 
her work differs from that of other pro-intervention feminists as she acknowledges, ‘we must 
change our definition of success within the justice system from short term outcome 
(conviction) to a longer term process (redressing an imbalance of power)’.130 Ursel 
demonstrates how the ‘successes’ of the Manitoba mandatoiy intervention model 
incorporates a multi-agency shift away from the ‘rigid hierarchical ‘justice’ system’ toward 
a flexible model able to ‘respond to social as well as legal imperatives’.131 The Manitoba 
approach to domestic violence interventions included strategies to change prosecutor, crown 
and judicial expectations of an intervention in order to ‘abandon the all or nothing 
expectation. . .  survival and recovery are rarely a one-off proposition’.132
The law on the use of force, and specifically humanitarian intervention narratives, invoke an 
image of force as a short term, useful solution to halt violence. Recognition of the ongoing 
relationship between survivors and perpetrators — and the further recognition that some 
actors will fall into both categories — changes the expectation of force and the possibility of
130 Ursel, above note 100, at 273.
131 Ibid. at 273.
132 Ibid. at 273.
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its usefulness in assisting communities. Returning to Gunning’s model of world travelling 
we can invoke her three methods, seeing oneself in context, seeing oneself as the other sees 
and seeing the other in her context, as a guide.133
By combining Mills’ and Gunning’s methods, a different picture of the Kosovo community 
in the 1990s can be narrated. Firstly, seeing oneself in context would require Western 
recognition of the involvement of international economic institutions in the Balkans during 
the decades preceding the break up of the Former Yugoslavian Republic. This approach 
would acknowledge the complicity of Western states in the decision-making structures of 
international economic institutions and the role this plays in the capacity of developing states 
to determine their internal practices.134 Seeing oneself as the other sees you, Gunning’s 
second challenge, would involve engaging the people of Kosovo, as well as engaging Serbia 
as the ‘Other’ of international dialogues on the intervention in 1999. In this sense, Serbian 
associations with the Kosovan territory and the presence of Serbian communities within the 
Province need to be regarded as having relevance, at least to Serbian people. Engaging with 
this knowledge would require acknowledgement that ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are not one­
dimensional categories. Finally, seeing the other in her context would ask us to understand 
Kosovan and Serbian communities as similar to us and as different to us, in the sense that 
this is a condition of humanness.135 This approach — which draws on a range of feminist 
methods as a means to listen to the plethora of narratives appropriate to any legal ‘crisis’ — 
challenges us to reconstruct our relationship with law, especially understandings of legal 
subjectivity. At the base of this project is an acceptance of the historical and ongoing 
relationship between survivors and perpetrators of violence. In the context of the Kosovo 
intervention, both the non-violent resistance movement prior to the NATO intervention and 
the inter-community violence after the intervention become elements of the law and violence 
relationship that require international attention as a consequence.
133 Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perceptions, World-travelling and Multicultural Feminism’, 23, Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, (1991), see discussion in chapter one.
134 Orford, above note, 96.
133 See the discussion of natality in chapter six.
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3.2.3 Setting Internal Driven Goals
The debates reveal that ‘Kosovo’ is not only about what happened ‘out there’ . . .  but 
also, and importantly, about what took place ‘in here’, the audience . . . Kosovo has 
come to be a debate about ourselves, about what we hold as normal and what 
exceptional, and through that fact, about what sort of law we practise.136
Mills advocates, for domestic family violence, the need for internally rather than externally 
set goals to change abusive relationships. To suggest otherwise, that the police or any other 
external agency might set an agenda that challenges the domestic violence relationship, 
replicates the destructive gendered paradigm the woman experiencing abuse is trapped in. 
Police and other external agencies perpetuate the notion that women require a masculine 
protector to escape violence, rather than promoting a version of events where the survivor’s 
agency is paramount. We can see how the same narrative is played out in the case of 
domestic state violence, where the community under threat is denied the opportunity to 
respond or articulate what they need in order to challenge the continued threat of violence. 
Koskenniemi’s description, above, of the NATO action in Serbia presents a telling narrative 
of the incapacity of the Western legal mind to let foreign communities formulate and express 
their desires for autonomy, or even freedom from violence, in their own voice. A look at the 
Security Council resolutions in response to the Serbian violence in the Kosovo Province 
demonstrates a similar shift away from the expressed desires of the Kosovar Albanians. In 
Resolution 1160, one of the Council’s earliest comments on Serbian violence in the Province 
of Kosovo, the Council acknowledges the ‘clear commitment of senior representatives of the 
Kosovar Albanian community to non-violence’.137 This recognition is left out of subsequent 
resolutions and state justifications for the use of force.138
To deny the applicability of Mills’ survivor centred model to gross humanitarian crises 
within states is a denial of human agency, equality and identity for the survivors of human 
rights abuses. It should be noted that precisely this manner of change often occurs away 
from the centre of international law’s gaze, as non-violent social movements demand 
tremendous resources and commitment over an extended period of time. The slow resolution 
of the territorial dispute and aggression in the Cameroon with Nigeria is an example of this 
type of progress.139 This is intertwined with the requirement that the processes to stem state 
violence are premised on respect for and listening to the survivors, rather than to intervene
136 Koskenniemi, above note 15, at 162.
137 SC Res 1160,31st March 1998.
138 See, for example, SC Res 1199,23rd Sept 1998; SC Res 1203,24 Oct 1998; SC Res 1239,14 May, 
1999; SC Res 1244,10* June, 1999.
139 Gray, above note 5, chapter one.
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and make decisions on the survivor’s behalf. To connect Mills’ survivor centred model to a 
practical example, where a supposed justified humanitarian intervention might have taken a 
different (less violent) form, we need only to return to Kosovo in the decade prior to 
NATO’s intervention.
3 3  Challenging Humanitarian Interventions/ Identity and Diversity in Feminist 
Theories
They worry about what kind of fashion statement they make as they dress for a 
demonstration calling for the re-opening to ethnic Albanians of the schools and 
universities. Shots of handkerchiefs being dipped in vinegar (‘Tear Gas’ explains a 
bopping computer graphic), alternate with shots of shoes and slacks being tried on, 
reflected in full length mirrors. The video mischievously mirrors ‘us’ as it presents 
‘them’. The West’s projections of the exotic and the unknown onto these hip 
Europeans becomes a joke that we all share.140
NATO states’ use of force in 1999 presented a dialogue, assisted by Western media 
representations, of a desperate situation where Kosovar Albanians risked immediate danger 
from the discriminatoiy, violent practices of die Serbian government. Both Western media 
and Western legal accounts leave out of this narrative the role of Kosovar Albanians in 
shaping a resistance to Serbian repression for ten years prior to the NATO intervention.141 
This was a largely non-violent resistance movement that focused on the establishment of a 
parallel government, health system and education system to counter Serbian discrimination 
against ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo Province. Waller writes:
The elected president of the ethnic Albanian population, Ibrahim Rogova, successfully 
orchestrated a non-violent response to Milosevic’s repression. Fearing that any or all 
versions of militarization would indeed make Kosova another Bosnia (a position that 
proved utterly accurate), Rogova and others evolved the strategy of creating a parallel 
government, parallel schools and parallel clinics, though all these institutions had to 
operate essentially without funding.
Unfortunately the nation-states of the militarized and militaristic West foiled to 
support Rogova, either symbolically or materially, an omission that opened the way 
for the formation of the armed KLA.. ,142
140 Waller, ‘Not Your Usual Agit-Prop’, 3(1), International Feminist Journal o f Politics, (2001), 119, 
at 121.
141 Ibid.
142 Waller, above note 138, at 120; Waller uses the spelling ‘Kosova’ which matches the ethnic 
Albanian spelling; Rugova was elected President of the Kosovo Assembly in March 2002. Rogova 
passed away on January 21st 2006.
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The lack of Western (non-violent) intervention to support the non-violent challenge to the 
Serbian repression and discrimination in Kosovo, in the ten years of oppression against the 
ethnic Albanians, reads uncomfortably with the legal narratives regarding the necessity of 
the intervention in 1999. While the Western world looked elsewhere during the 1990s 
Rogova’s non-violent challenge to Serbian repression was doomed to failure. The 
commitment of the Kosovo people to their own form of ‘internal self-determination’ in 
response to the overtly racist practices of the Serbian government was a narrative that had 
limited articulation in Western communities. The multiple answers to why such a failure to 
listen occurred must offer little solace to the Kosovo community now. These answers 
resonate with our limited Western understanding of law’s capacity to accommodate 
diversity. This is a theme that emerges consistently in feminist jurisprudence. For example, 
Orford writes of the failure of elite Western men to recognise either their own particularity 
or the capacity of the particularity of the ‘Other’ to inform their practices.143
Imposed democracy homogenises communities and obscures the complex diversity across 
all groups of humans and within any group identification. This is not to say Western states 
and Western jurisprudence have nothing to offer the non-Westem state. It is to add that as 
Westerners we must meet and engage with the Other — inside and outside of our 
communities — to better understand our own limitations and to gain insight into alternative 
methods of achieving democracy. Recognition of the diversity within, and around us, grants 
us the capacity to learn and to listen outside of the predetermined narratives of statehood and 
militarism under international law. This includes recognition by Western feminist theories of 
the potential for third world feminist methodologies and scholarship to add to and to 
challenge the production of Western feminist texts.
To conclude, the main argument of this chapter lies in the evidencing of an analytical claim. 
That is, there is a correlative legal form across international and Western legal systems in the 
regulation of domestic violence. This has a continued negative impact on women’s lives and 
the victims of state violence within in the territory of the state. I have not focused on the 
further negative, disproportionate and harmful reality of military and state force on women’s 
lives. This is well documented elsewhere, including in earlier chapters of this thesis. Instead 
I have focused on current theoretical engagements with domestic family violence. This has 
paralleled developments in international law around the containment of domestic state
143 Orford, ‘The Politics of Collective Security’, 17, Michigan Journal o f International Law, (1996), 
376.
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violence. By exposing this analogy in regulation, the base of international law, particularly 
the distinction between public and private acts of states, is exposed as incorporating a sexed 
model.
The evidence of the chapter further serves to illustrate why past feminist reforms on the 
nature and content of international law have been inhibited in application, often remain 
unenforceable and offer little challenge to pervasive and dominant gender norms, which 
continue to function to place women, globally, in danger of violence justified as private. 
Feminist engagements with law must not just explore the outward reach of legal norms in 
the construction of wider gendered and social dialogues. This chapter demonstrates the 
internal reach that is required by feminist legal theories to expose the veiy central, seemingly 
impenetrable, sexed construction of the foundations of law. Feminist legal theory suggests, 
in evidencing the sexed nature of the distinction between public and private that there is a 
need to disrupt this sexed coupling, rather than increased regulation of the private sphere or 
the shifting of acts and their meaning from the private into the public domain.144
I have used Mills survivor centred approach to halting domestic family violence, as a 
potential guide to reconsidering the regulation of the domestic sphere of the state under 
international law. Mills centres on the survivor as the legal subject rather than the public 
actor (of the state or the foreign state seeking to intervene) and she perceives the relationship 
between the abuser and the survivor as crucial, instead of focusing on the relationship 
between the abuser and the larger legal structure. Finally, Mills suggests private knowledge 
can lead public action, rather than vice versa, when she suggests internally driven responses 
must be prioritised over external assessments of needs. To re-develop such a framework 
under the guise of international law would not be simple nor would it be expedient or 
without cost. The current continued military presence in Kosovo heads towards the 
completion of a decade while the destruction of public infrastructure and killing of civilians 
during the bombing of Belgrade in 1999, although no longer occurring, has lasting 
repercussions for the people of Serbia.145 Similarly, the consequences of NATO’s 
intervention continue to impact on the lives of citizens in NATO states. Military 
interventions are complex, lengthy and expensive. What I have sought to suggest, in this
144 Kinsella suggests a similar project with respect to the nature of the protector/ protected binary in 
international humanitarian law, above note 39.
145 See Amnesty International, ‘Collateral Damage' o f Unlawful Killings? Violations o f the Laws o f 
War by NATO during the Operation Allied Force (2000); Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in 
the NATO Air Campaign (2000).
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chapter, is they are not the only type of response the international community has at its 
disposal.
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CHAPTER SIX
FEMINIST DIALOGUES ON FORCE IN THE ERA 
OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’
1. INTRODUCTION
For citizens in Western communities, and undoubtedly many others, the date September 11* 
2001 is latent with meaning, history and, most likely, memories of where and how we heard, 
saw and reeled at the images of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington and 
Pennsylvania. We now speak of ‘9/11* in knowing tones as if some sense and understanding 
has been wrought from this violence. My own personal narrative of ‘September 11th’ is filled 
with knowledge of births and deaths in an unfortunate collision of personal and public 
events.1
Having been bom on September 11th thirty years earlier, meant that I began September 11th 
2001 with anticipation and excitement at the prospect of personal celebrations at a family 
gathering that evening. My sister had travelled across the world to London to mark the 
occasion with me, which was generous of her and greatly welcomed by me. At my 29th 
birthday we had decided, across telephone exchanges, to celebrate my thirtieth birthday in 
New York. However, the birth of my second son stalled our more adventurous departure and 
we settled on a rendezvous in London. So, still reeling from the effects of new motherhood, I 
missed New York and planned to celebrate with my family in London. My son’s birth and 
my birthday were foremost in my mind as September 11* 2001 dawned. A crying baby and 
a sleepless night were not about to inhibit an evening in a child-free restaurant, enjoying the 
luxury of a babysitter and someone else’s cooking. Instead the dinner became, for me, 
symbolic of the decadence of our culture as each of us wondered whether ‘total war*2 would 
be thrust upon us by morning. The streets of London were eerily deserted on the evening of
1 Bunch, reflecting on Western introspection, acknowledges ‘that 9/11 is not seen as a defining 
moment for the rest of the world -  at least not in terms of what happened that day’ emphasizing, 
instead ‘it has become a defining moment because of how it has been used. But the issues highlighted 
by 9/11 are not new and have been raised by many events both before and after it’, see Bunch, 
‘Whose Security?’, in The Nation, (23rd September 2002).
2 Mclnnes, Spectator Sport War: the West and Contemporary Conflict, (Rienner, 2002), chapter 4,
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September 11* 2001, adding to the sense offin de siecle. The day closed with the knowledge 
that my birthday now stood as ‘an exemplary day of male violence’.3
When I reflect on that day, as equally as I remember the unspeakable scenes watched on a 
TV screen in London, my memories are fused with the also unspeakable but vastly different 
trials I encountered as a mother fighting for the preservation of a public self. The world 
seemed to collude in definitions thrust upon me that I did not want or could not live out. I 
was tired, I was lonely, 1 was busy, 1 was sore, I was exhausted and I was, am, a mother. 
Like violence, childbirth and post-natal experiences often remain unspeakable aspects of our 
collective experience.4 Just as we do not launch into our understandings of the slow deaths 
inflicted upon Iraqi civilians through the destruction of civic infrastructure nor do we discuss 
the painful, bloody, heroic labour of birthing. The connection between the two -  violence 
and birth -  are explored by Cohn as she describes the language used by scientists involved in 
the testing and development of the atomic bomb:
There is one set of domestic images that demands separate attention -  images that 
suggest men’s desire to appropriate from women the power of giving life and that 
conflate creation and destruction. The bomb project is rife with images of the male 
birth. . .
The entire history of the bomb project, in fact, seems permeated with imagery that 
confounds man’s overwhelming technological power to destroy nature with the power 
to create -  imagery that inverts men’s destruction and asserts in its place the power to 
create new life and a new world. It converts men’s destruction into their rebirth.5
Violence has something that birthing inherently lacks. While all humans have the capacity 
for violence, men are bom but they cannot give birth.6 Male experiences of birth are, 
therefore, forgotten or second hand or downplayed. It is this that Cohn seems to suggest the 
building of weapons, at some level, may compensate for.7 This is what Scarry refers to as the 
unmaking of the world.8 Yet even this is a culturally constructed narrative, as men do 
experience birth, as children, partners, fathers, medical professionals, as brothers, uncles and
3 MacKinnon, ‘Women’s September 11*’, in Are Women Human and Other International Dialogues, 
(Harvard, 2005), at 260; also see Amis, The Second Plane, (Cape: 2008) connecting the masculine 
violence of the 9/11 terrorists with negation of female citizenship common to religious 
fundamentalism, at 19,49.
4 Morgan, The Demon Lover: the Roots o f Terrorism, (Piatkus, 2001,2nd edition), at 68.
5 Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, 12 (4), Signs, (1987), 687.
6 Apologies for stating the obvious.
7 Also see: Theweleit, ‘The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War’, in Woolacott, and Cooke, (eds), 
Gendering War Talk, (Princeton, 1993), 283.
8 Scarry, The Body in Pain, (Oxford, 1987), at 22.
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as significant others. Even more so than female experiences of birth, men’s experiences of 
birth are hidden in Western communities.
What does birth, creation, have to do with the international law on the use of force? It is 
through an unhappy coincidence that my birthday is now shared with the most visually 
confronting act of terrorism known to humankind. The very public preoccupation of 
humankind with violence over birthing is not an unhappy coincidence. It is instead 
something we all play a role in developing and maintaining across our lifetimes. This thesis 
is about violence, force and justifying violence but it is also about creativity and birth -  the 
creation of alternative narratives, alternative strategies and an alternative international law 
than the one we see as predominant from our positions in Western communities. Arendt 
defines the creation of new narratives, philosophies and political action as natality, arguing 
that it is the capacity for natality that makes us human, so that in:
[njatality; the beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only 
because die newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of 
acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action and therefore natality, is 
inherent in all human actions. Moreover, since action is the political activity par 
excellence, natality, and not morality, may be the central category of political 
[thought].9
Arendt’s use of the natal experience as a means of understanding the world of political 
action is instrumental as a means to developing an alternative conception of justice.10 If each 
of us is fortunate enough to hold a new bom baby in our arms then we are given the 
possibility of understanding that all of us are bom with full rights and no rights. Full rights 
because the newborn human exemplifies our equal origins as crying, thirsty children. No 
rights because no child survives simply through an allocation of rights, rather through the 
input of, and dependence on, the will of other humans for the provision of basic rights, food, 
shelter, communication and warmth. To have the capacity for individuality and to be 
dependent is thus to be bom. For international law to move forward it must see the 
dependency and the isolation of individuals rather than continue to construct the state in an 
image of separateness and autonomy.
9 Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago, 1998,2nd Edition), at 9.
10 It strikes me, further, that elevation of the role of natality, to more than the giving birth to new 
humans to encompass the giving birth to ideas and action in the political realm, has the potential to 
challenge cultural norms regarding motherhood and birthing as a definitive female experience. By 
shifting natality away from mothering, action and agency are offered to individuals in a radical and 
challenging manner because Arendt’s conception of natality is not an inherently gendered sphere.
207
How can this knowledge change our understandings of the laws on the use of force? To 
write of autonomy and dependency as connected is to argue that key concepts need to be 
constructed under law as continuums rather than as binaries. Persistent binaries present in 
legal discourse, such as, the distinction between public and private violence, would need to 
be re-constructed as relative rather than oppositional. Returning to the domestic analogy, the 
regulation of violence from the personal to the public, if considered as a continuum of 
regulation, assists recognition of persistent flaws within the continuum. This approach 
allows the domestic analogy to be better theorised as potentially useful and as potentially 
limiting. By embracing the domestic analogy between the state and the citizen as legal 
subjects on a continuum it would be necessary to acknowledge the state as a legal person in 
analogy with humankind rather than the modernist perception of mankind. Attention to the 
state as a personification of a human (rather than male) subject would demand attention to 
essentialist and pluralist critiques so as to sustain and imagine the spectrum of multifaceted 
legal subjects. The alternative to this is to de-person the international legal subject, re- 
conceiving international law as a consequence. I have considered both these strategies at 
different points in this project and leave open their possibilities. I have argued throughout 
the thesis that a re-formulation of the legal subject -  either through a reconceived domestic 
analogy or through a conscious shift away from the personification of the state -  demands, 
in either form, a re-imagining of the law on the use of force.
Braidotti writes, ‘internationalism starts at home’.11 By writing about international laws on 
the use of force as the only possible ‘solar plexus’ of the international system we give those 
laws their continued importance and fail to imagine alternative approaches to challenge, 
regulate, prohibit or justify violence. In this thesis I have placed the laws on the use of force 
centre stage, not to reiterate their worth or to facilitate their status as the ‘solar plexus’ of 
international law, but instead I have endeavoured to disrupt the narratives on the use of force 
and justified violence. I have used feminist legal approaches to expand the range of 
questions asked of international law on the use of force and to provide strategies and 
methods for the development of future norms. Ultimately, the purpose of the project is not to 
re-script the law on the use of force, rather to argue that re-scripting is a possibility and that 
an urgent and drastic re-think on the role of women’s participation in international law is 
necessaiy.
11 Braidotti, ‘The Exile, The Nomad and die Migrant — Reflections on International Feminism’, 15 
(1), Women’s Studies International Forum, (1992) 7, at 9.
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If internationalism begins at home, then Western feminist legal theories need to expose the 
relationship between law, gender and violence to build a foundational theory that challenges 
the contemporary expansion of justifications for die use of force. This conclusion is in 
contrast to contemporary Western debates on the use of force that have centred on narrow 
constructions of the relevant issues under the conditions of a ‘War on Terror’, at least since 
2001. This chapter argues for the poverty of the ‘War on Terror’ justification and promotes 
feminist approaches that explore the foundations of the law and violence relationship 
through the use of sex and gender as analytical tools.
Therefore, this chapter concludes the thesis with analysis of the ‘War on Terror’ as a social 
narrative in Western communities. I argue that an analogy exists between preemptive force 
as a justification for violence and domestic provocation defences. The analogy is illustrative 
of contemporary discourse on the use of force functioning to reinforce the sexed and 
gendered model of force discussed throughout the thesis. In Part Three of the chapter, I 
summarise chapter and thematic findings from across the thesis.
2. THE WAR ON TERROR
Throughout the thesis I have argued that the ‘War on Terror’ provides a justification for the 
use of force that is conceptually analogous with criminal law provocation justifications. In 
chapter three, I argued that the flaw of arguments for preemptive self-defence lies in the 
severance of the proportionality and necessity requirements from the use of force that is 
demonstrated by the provocation analogy. In this chapter, I return to this discussion as a 
means to reflect on the limitations of contemporary discourse on force. Underlying this is the 
assumption that the ‘War on Terror’ distracts attention from the bulk of claims exposed in 
the thesis. I also use the discussion of this final, emergent justification to explore the limits 
of the methods utilised in the project, the domestic analogy and perception of law as a 
narrative, as well as considering larger questions that must be analysed for feminist 
approaches to international law to move forward.
In chapter one I acknowledged three specific limitations of the project. Firstly, the 
overriding simplicity of feminist ethics when presented as a uniform theoretical account, 
secondly, the risk of reproducing Western cultural narratives through the domestic analogy, 
and thirdly, the myriad potential narratives available for consideration and analysis under a
209
law as narrative method. In this chapter I discuss the strategies used throughout the thesis in 
response to these limitations and suggest the contours future methodologies might take as a 
consequence. I place particular emphasis on the requirement of feminist analysis and action 
both inside and outside the mainstream of international law.
I begin this section with a brief discussion of what the ‘War on Terror’ is and how it 
articulates a range of excuses for the use of force by a state. This is primarily evidenced 
through the US National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006,12 as well as analysis offered 
by key (Western) scholars.13 The ‘War on Terror’ emerges in numerous non-legal 
discourses, including as a political term used to describe/justify US acts of foreign policy,14 
as a socio-legal discourse in Western communities justifying the curtailment of civil 
liberties,15 as media shorthand for a range of international events initiated after the terrorist 
attacks against the US in 2001 and as a justification for the use of force in specific conflicts, 
including Afghanistan,16 Iraq17 and Somalia.18 The ‘War on Terror* is not a form of legal 
terminology and specific legal narratives -  preemptive force, implied authorisation and the
12 National Security Strategy of the United States 6 (September 2002), available at: 
www.whitehouse.gov.nsc.nss/2002/index.html (last accessed May 2009); National Security Strategy 
of the United States 23 (March 2006), available at www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss/2006/nss2066.pdf 
(last accessed May 2009).
13 See: Ackerman,, International Law and the Preemptive Use o f Force Against Iraq, (CRS Report 
for Congress, 11th April, 2003), available online at:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21314.pdf (last accessed May 2009); Byers, ‘Terrorism, 
the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September,’ 14, EJIL, (2003), 227; Glennon, ‘The Fog 
of Law: Self-defence, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51 of the UN Charter’, 25, Harvard 
Journal o f Law and Public Policy, (2002), 539; Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive 
Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq’, 4, San Diego International Law Journal, (2003), 7; 
O’Connell, The Myth o f Preemptive Self defence, (paper prepared for the American International Law 
Task Force on Terrorism, 2002); Reisman and Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense’, 100 (3), AJIL, (2006), 525; Taft and Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and 
International Law’, 97, AJIL (2003), 557; Wedgewood, ‘The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security 
Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-defense’, 97, AJIL, (2003), 576.
14 Bush, George, W., ‘State of the Union’ Address, January 28* 2003, available online at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003Q128-19.html and claiming ‘We have the 
terrorists on the run. We’re keeping them on the run. One by one the terrorists are learning the 
meaning of American justice'. The 2009 Obama administration has preferred to use the term 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ rather than the term the ‘War on Terror’.
15 Goold and Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights, (Hart, 2007); Golder and Williams, 
‘Balancing National Security and Human Rights: assessing the Legal Response of Common Law 
Nations to the Threat of Terrorism’, 8, Journal o f Comparative Public Policy Analysis, (2006), 43.
16 Greenwood, above note 13.
17 Ibid
18 International Crisis Group, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds, (Africa 
Report Number 95, 11* July 2005); Schmitt, Eric, ‘Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia’, The 
New York Times, (May 2nd 2008); Rice, “‘Many Dead” in U.S. Airstrikes on Somalia’, The Guardian, 
(January 9* 2007).
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responsibility to protect - are invoked to justify the use of force under the ‘War on Terror’.19 
In this sense, the ‘War on Terror’ offers an excellent example of how legal norms rely on 
and engage with other normative structures, particularly cultural, political and social 
discourse. Through looking at the legal implications of the ‘War on Terror’, and arguments 
made that persistent and low level threats may justify the use of force by states, I argue that 
an analogy with the rationale of domestic provocation defences is apparent
2.1 Justifying Violence under the ‘War on Terror’
The ‘War on Terror’ develops three types of narratives to project legality on to the political 
rhetoric.20 The first type of narrative centres on prior debates over the possibility of 
anticipatory force and attempts to expand self-defence under the conditions of the ‘War on 
Terror’ to encompass preemptive self-defence. That is, the use of force may be justified in 
response to low level and persistent terrorist threats. The second type of narrative focuses on 
past Security Council resolutions and contends that states may use force if force can be 
justified through implied authorisations found in prior Security Council resolutions. The 
third range of narratives argues that the use of force is justified in failed states as well in 
response to potential threats from rogue states with the perceived capacity to build weapons 
of mass destruction.
Under the first narrative, what was controversial, the customary international law category 
of anticipatory self-defence, has come to include a narrative on the possibility of the use of 
preemptive force to track down, kill or capture ‘hard core terrorists’.21 Reisman and 
Armstrong suggest this is more likely to involve ‘strategic preemptive strikes against 
weapons of mass destruction or terrorist training camps’ than ‘large scale attacks on 
states’.22 This description conjures terrorist camps and WMD production facilities as 
(strangely) outside of the territory of states, implicitly suggesting these are something
19 On connecting the arguments of a responsibility to protect with arguments made in response to the 
war on terror, see: Slaughter and Feinstein, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/ Feb, (2004) 
136; Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules o f State Responsibility, (Hart, 2006).
20 See chapter three, for further analysis.
21 National Security Strategy of the United States, (March 2006), above note 12, at 12.; this can be 
compared to the earlier National Security Strategy of the United States, (2002), that suggested the 
right of states to track down and prevent terrorists from acting was even larger in scope.
22 Reisman and Armstrong, above note 13, at 532.
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‘Other* to the political independence and territorial integrity encompassed by the prohibition 
on the use of force articulated in the Charter under Article 2(4).23
An analogy can be made with legal discourse that traditionally places women’s bodies 
outside of the remit of laws on assault and battery. Provocation laws are complicit in this 
legal ‘Othering’ through the location of female bodies as potentially provocative of male 
violence and therefore sites where violence may be excused or justified.24 Feminist legal 
scholarship argues that the bounded bodies of men represent the normal body of the legal 
subject so that, not only are women’s bodies defined as penetrable through heterosexual 
images of the sexualised female body, but law has tolerated physical assaults on women’s 
bodies in private space that would be unthinkable with respect to the bounded male body in 
motion in public space.25
The construction of terrorist acts in a space outside of the territorial integrity defended by the 
global community of states uses a similar regulative model to the provocation defence. Once 
cast as outside of the “normal” construction of (male) legal actors, that is as acting outside 
the control of any state, it appears that terrorist actors can be justifiably attacked for less than 
an armed attack. At the same time the notion of an armed attack under Article 51 has been 
re-articulated to include attacks from non-state actors, whereas prior to the September 11th 
there was an assumption that Article 51 armed attacks required a link to a state to fall within 
Article 51. For example, Gardam found, in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, that 
international law was such that,
It is not clear that the terrorist activities against the US can be attributed to any 
particular state, in which case there is no state-based responsibility . . . (and) there is 
no right thereby conferred on the injured state to use force in self-defence.26
23 Discourse has also emerged around ‘failed states’ as a site of terrorist activities that potentially 
permit the suspension of Article 2(4) protections and the use of force by foreign states to target 
terrorist actors. The Security Council, in its response to terrorism, has also shown a willingness to 
override accepted international norms on non-intervention into the domestic jurisdiction of states, see 
the discussion in: Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, 72, Nordic Journal o f International Law, (2003), 159.
24 See Leader-Elliott, ‘Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation’, in Naffine and 
Owens, Sexing the Subject o f Law, (LBC, 1997).
25 Naffine, ‘The Body Bag’, in Naffine and Owens, ibid.
26 Gardam, ‘International Law and the Terrorist Attacks on the USA’ in Hawthorne and Winter (eds), 
September 11, 2001: Feminist Perspectives, (Spinifex, 2002). Also see: Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), ICJ Reports, (27* June 
1986) 14, at para. 195; however, see the discussion of Greenwood, above note 13, at 16-17.
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As was discussed in chapter one, Article 2(4) defines the parameters of the international 
legal subject through the requirement that force must not compromise a state’s territorial 
integrity and political independence. The use of the imagery of terrorist actors outside of the 
regular (accepted) boundaries of the state thus facilitates the production of a justification for 
violence directed at terrorists despite the use of force also compromising the territorial 
integrity of the state the terrorist actors are situated within.
Furthermore, the threshold for violence directed at the ‘Other’ is lower than the threshold 
triggering justified violence against other legal subjects. That is, the preemptive force 
argument projects low-level persistent threats as sufficient to justify state force in contrast to 
the armed attack requirement required to initiate the use of force in self-defence against a 
state. While this is in some ways different to national provocation laws, there remains a 
conceptual analogy where the tests that measure the acceptable violence perpetrated by legal 
subjects are constructed by perceptions of the actors that the violence is directed against. In 
national legal structures, provocation defences have consistently been developed to justify 
fatal violence against women who pose no immediate threat of violence but represent a low 
level threat to the honor (and often sexual integrity) of the defendant. Under international 
law, the ‘War on Terror’, scripted as preemptive force, utilises an analogous model of 
violence justified against actors within the private domain of a state as a means of 
responding to low-level threats, including challenges to the honor and legitimacy of Western 
hegemony.27
If the ‘War on Terror’ can be narrated as similar to common law conceptions of provocation, 
this allows questions to be raised about the recent shift in many jurisdictions to eradicate and 
limit provocation defences.28 The changing nature of provocation laws in national systems, 
in addition to the diversify of provocation defences across systems, illustrates a clear 
limitation of the domestic analogy that takes a snapshot of either domestic or international 
laws. In viewing the snapshot, temporal and geographical variations are difficult to 
accommodate. For example, while provocation laws have been abolished in some Western 
states, some states have continued to perceive provocation as a mitigating defence to 
homicide, while other states construct honor crimes in a similar form to provocation
27 See: Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers o f Mourning and Violence, (Verso, 2006); bin Laden, 
‘Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Places’ in Lawrence and 
Karim (eds), On Violence, (Duke, 2008), at 540.
28 See Law Commission (UK), Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, (Law Commission Report No. 
340,28* November 2006), at 11.
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narratives.29 However, this criticism overlooks the purpose of the domestic analogy, which is 
to consider the limitations of the international legal system, specifically as they emerge in 
analogy with national legal structures. In this sense, the approach is not constructed to 
demonstrate the necessity of maintaining an analogy between national and international legal 
structures. Furthermore, the use of the domestic analogy as a conceptual tool does not 
preclude other domestic legal structures also being utilised as tools of measurement of the 
strengths or limitations of international narratives.
With respect to domestic laws on the provocation defence, feminist criticisms have centred 
on the leniency with which the excuse is applied to mitigate domestic partner homicides 
perpetrated by men against women. For this reason Western feminist scholarship has 
advocated abolishing the provocation defence in national legal systems.30 Yet, even when 
feminist challenges to provocation laws have impacted on the structure of law, underlying 
structural biases within Western legal systems have often led to results that have been 
harmful to women and/ or non-heterosexual men. For example, Volpp highlights how the 
development of a ‘cultural defence’ in the United States to permit a wider variation of 
actions within provocation defences has reinforced male cultural power while negating 
women’s experience of gender as a cultural condition.31 In the Australian state of Victoria 
the use of a subjective test within the provocation defence led to an increase in the use of the 
provocation defence to protect heterosexual male actors from prosecution for violent and 
fatal attacks on gay men and to justify the killing of women by men overcome with 
jealousy.32 The Victorian parliament abolished the defence of provocation as a consequence
29 Compare the responses of the UK and the Australian state of Victoria, discussed footnotes 28 and 
32; Hossain and Welchman, (eds), Honor: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence against Women,(Zed, 
2005).
30 Quick and Wells, ‘Getting Tough with Defences’, Criminal Law Review, (June, 2006), 514, at 523.
31 Volpp, ‘ “(Mis)identifying Culture”: Asian Women and the ‘Cultural Defence’, 17, Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal, (1994) 57. In this article, Volpp describes the US case of a man who had 
killed his wife and, at trial, relied on the evidence of a cultural anthropologist of Chinese cultural 
expectations with regard to honour because the defendant’s wife had a sexual relationship with 
another man. This resulted in the mitigation of the defendant’s sentence (to a period of probation 
rather than incarceration) and the reduction of the charge from homicide to manslaughter. Volpp 
compares this to a second case involving a Chinese woman who had killed her son and unsuccessfully 
attempted to argue a cultural defence because the woman’s ‘independent’ lifestyle ultimately meant 
Western and Chinese cultural expectations about mothering led to the cultural defence being 
unavailable to her. Volpp argues that the intersection of gender and cultural are screened out of this 
type of approach and male violence gains increased opportunity for mitigation or justification.
‘Victoria Scraps Provocation Murder defence’ The Age, 4th October, 2005; de Pasquale, 
‘Provocation and the Homosexual Advance Defence: the deployment of Culture as a Defence 
Strategy’, 26, Melbourne University Law Review, (2002) 110; Golder, ‘The Homosexual Advance 
Defence and the Law/Body Nexus’, 11, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of law, (2004) 
available at: http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/indices/issue/vllnl.html (last accessed May 2009).
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and the Victorian Attorney-General at the time stated, ‘the defence of provocation promotes 
a culture of blaming the victim and has no place in a modem society’.33
In the context of this project, the analogy between preemptive force and provocation 
defences is useful to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of the preemptive force argument. 
The failure of the justification to adequately set restrictions on force, in terms of 
proportionality or necessity, is akin to the gendered subjectivity that has marred application 
of the provocation defence.34 Furthermore, the preemptive force argument justifies the use of 
force through an assumption, made by the state using force, about the future motives of the 
individuals killed in any preemptive attacks. This is a form of ‘blaming the victim’ in the 
sense that terrorists are held responsible for the use of force used to destroy them or, in the 
words of the 2009 US administration, ‘we have a clear and focussed goal: to disrupt, 
dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to 
either country in the future.’35 This unusual euphemism for killing terrorists (prevent their 
return) is formulated in parallel to domestic provocation justifications, blaming the terrorist 
for low level persistent provocation to justify the extreme use of force and to justify a 
circumvention of international, and local, criminal justice standards to halt the violence of 
individual (non-state) actors.
The second justification for the use of force articulated by the United States within the 
narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ encompasses the possibility of implied authority from the 
Security Council. After the failure of the United States and its allies to discover weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq and, perhaps due to the continued internal conflict in the Iraq, this is 
a common justification given for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.36 Security Council 
Resolution 1511 endorsed the presence of a Multi-National Force in Iraq from October 
2003. Prior to this excuses and justifications articulated by states and scholars focused on 
(the much older) Security Council Resolution 678 to gain legal credibility for the use of 
force in Iraq.37 This narrative, again, invokes a sense of provocative behaviour by the rogue 
state that, although not immediately threatening to the hegemon, provokes the use of 
violence through the continual defiance of the hegemon’s demands (although such demands
33 Ibid
34 Above note 30, at 522.
35 ‘Obama Announces New Strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan’, (27* March 2009), available at
www.america.gov.
36 See Gray, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?’, 56, ICLQ, (2007), 157.
37 SC Res 1511, 16th Oct 2003; also see SC Res 1483, 22nd May 2003; SC Res 678, 29^ November 
1990.
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were originally articulated through the institutions of the United Nations). This example 
illustrates the limitations of a provocation-type justification for the use of force. Unilateral 
state assessment of the magnitude of threats posed by Iraq proved to be vastly overestimated. 
This diminished the claim that the use of force in 2003 against Iraq had been necessary and 
places the implied authorisation argument/ justification as analogous to the provocation 
defence in domestic legal structures. The choice not to act through the collective security 
structure is, in the implied authorisation argument, bolstered by the self-belief (of the 
UK/US) that the collective security structure condones the action and thus legitimates the 
violence. Provocation defences imply a self-belief by the aggressor in the acceptability of 
individual acts of violence that gain legitimacy through the collective legal structure 
retrospectively. Responsibility for the violence is then directed toward those that die 
violence is directed against. For the husband or partner whose honour is challenged by the 
sexual activity of his wife/ girlfriend/ ex-lover it is her behaviour that justifies and provokes 
his violence, to be later sanctioned by the community through the legal defence of 
provocation. In the implied authorisation example, the rogue state’s assumed and continual 
violation of an international norm/expectation/regulation justifies and provokes the powerful 
state’s violence that will be, because of the legitimate belief of the actors in the validity of 
their acts, eventually sanctioned by the international community through legal means or at 
least not condemned.
The hindsight offered by the failure of the US and its allies to find weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq emphasises the accuracy of Brownlie’s assessment of preemptive force 
justifications as ‘extremely vague’ such that ‘any act or omission by the authorities of a State 
could be regarded as provocation if it displeased a powerful opponent.’38
The consequent social, cultural, legal and economic consequences for women after the use 
of force in Iraq in 2003 supports the overarching claim of the thesis that military force, 
whether authorised, justified or illegal, contributes to rather than eliminates threats to 
women’s security. Furthermore, the current status of women in Iraq exposes the insecurity 
resultant from the use of force justified as implied authorisation, in line with other forms of 
force analysed across the thesis. Al-Ali and Pratt have found in their research on the 
condition of women in Iraq after the US-led force:
38 Brownlie, ‘The Use of Force in Self-defence’, 37, BYIL, (1961), 183 at 199.
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Iraqi women are not suffering because of anything specific to Islam. They are 
suffering because there is a staggering amount of violence on all levels and no 
functioning state to provide security, services and adequate humanitarian assistance. 
No-one is willing or able to guarantee and implement women’s legal rights. The legal 
rights enshrined in the contested constitution are flawed to start with and do not 
promote equal citizenship. Iraqi women are also deprived because of widespread and 
crippling poverty, large scale unemployment and lack of access to adequate resources
39
As the US and its allies prepare, in 2009, to leave Iraq the focus of US foreign military 
action is centred on Afghanistan and the destruction of the Tabilan and Al-Qaeda actors 
along the northern Afghan and Pakistan border. The Obama administration have utilised the 
rhetoric of women’s rights to underscore the nature of threat in Afghanistan and Northern 
Pakistan.40 The rhetoric of women suffering and at threat from Islamic power is used to 
supplement the image of terrorist provocation justifying US force in Afghanistan and 
Northern Pakistan. This occurs without reflection on the role that the US and its allies have 
played in contributing to the insecurity in women’s lives and the refraction of women’s 
rights in Iraq. The failure to see the impact of the use of force in Iraq on women’s rights, and 
women’s lives, returns us again to the unsatisfactoiy nature of the implied authorisation 
argument that cannot engage a notion of proportionality as, like the authority, die threat is 
implied.
Through contrasting the narratives on women in Iraq and women in Afghanistan the 
underlying gendered performance of international law is again revealed. The prevalent 
international narrative on women’s rights in Iraq is one of formal equality as international 
representations focus on the stability of the state formed after the US-led invasion to 
maintain justification for the use of coalition troops to monitor the re-structuring of the Iraqi 
state. A formal equality narrative ignores the daily insecurity Iraqi women navigate and the 
role a return to religious legal structures in the area of family law will play in the future 
(in)security of Iraq women. In Afghanistan, where illustrating the instability of the state is an 
important aspect of the narrative justifying the continued use of (Western) force, women’s 
vulnerability is brought to the fore, not as an issue in and of its self, rather to anchor the 
justification for the use of force. Feminist approaches to international law must look beyond 
(or behind) the rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’ to articulate strategies that challenge 
women’s insecurity from the domestic to the international. The insecurity of women in Iraq
39 Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind o f Liberation? Women and the Occupation o f Iraq, (Berkeley: 2009)
40 ‘Obama announces New Strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan1, 27 March 2009, available at
www. america. g o v .
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is linked to the insecurity of women in Afghanistan and is also linked to the gendered 
narratives that confine and restrict women’s capacity to be agents for change in Western 
states. I return to the role of women’s participation in challenging the international law on 
the use of force, below. While I looked at the conceptual analogy relevant to preemptive 
force and the provocation defence under the first range of narratives on the ‘War on Terror’, 
the second range of narratives, on implied authorisation developed primarily in response to 
the use of force in Iraq in 2003,41 links once more the sexed conceptual analogy with the 
gendered insecurities women face in conflict regions.
The third type of legal argument enlarged in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ engages the 
narrative of failed states that is apparent in international legal discourse since the end of the 
Cold War but specifically connected to the use of force in the era of the ‘War on Terror’. 
Under this type of narrative terrorist actors on a foreign territory become factors assisting 
identification of the status of a state as failed and as symbols justifying the use of force.42 In 
1993 the Security Council identified the failure of the Libyan government to renounce 
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. This led to the imposition of 
sanctions by the Security Council, which were not lifted until 2003 43 However, after the 
instigation of the ‘War on Terror’ this narrative shifts considerably as the US articulates the 
targeting of terrorists on failed states as justifying unilateral militaiy action. For example, the 
US has used force intermittently since 2007 in the ‘failed’ state of Somalia, suggesting the 
identification of failed states may permit a softening of international regulations with respect 
to the principle of non-interference in other states.44 The use of unmanned drones by the US 
to attack terrorist actors in the northern regions of Pakistan and its 2008 attack on Syrian 
territory have also been justified through the representation of the territory subject to force 
as outside of the control of the sovereign state.45
41 Also see justifications for the use of force against Serbia in 1999: Greenwood, ‘International Law 
and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo’, 49 (4), International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
(2000) 926.
42 See Wilde, ‘The Skewed Responsibility of the Failed State Concept’, 9, ILSA Journal o f 
International and Comparative Law, (2002), 425; Helman and Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, 
Foreign Policy, 89, (1992-3) 3, Langford, ‘Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of 
Intervention’, 1, International Studies Review, (1999) 59.
43 See SC Res 883, 11* November 1993; SC Resolution 1502, 12* September 2002; although the 
type of action begins significantly before with the retaliatory attacks by the US in response to the 
terrorist attacks on US embassies in 1998. At this point the justification was constructed in terms of 
self-defence.
44 Above note 18.
45 Shah and MacAskill, ‘Anger in Pakistan at US Plan to Expand Drone Attacks’, The Guardian, 19* 
March, 2009; Cockbum, ‘US Admits Raiding Syria to Killing Terrorist’, The Independent, 28* 
October, 2008.
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A similar narrative is presented with respect to rogue states that are perceived to be 
developing weapons of mass destruction. For example, Feinstein and Slaughter argue in 
favour of a ‘duty to prevent’ that is articulated through a comparison with the Responsibility 
to Protect narrative, claiming that:
Humanitarian protection is emerging as a guiding principle for the international 
community. In the same vein we propose a duty to prevent as a principle that would 
guide not only the Security Council in its decision-making but also national 
governments in shaping foreign policy priorities. . . Ours is not a radical proposal. It 
simply extrapolates from recent developments in the law of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes . . . [t]he corollary duty to prevent governments without 
internal checks from developing WMD.46
The proposed duty to prevent includes the possibility of the use of unilateral force by states 
to prevent threats from developing. Although yet to be articulated by a state in the language 
of a duty to prevent, the clear shift away from the Charter system, particularly, the 
prohibition on the use of force, demonstrates earlier arguments I have made regarding the 
potential for legal discourse to utilise ‘signs’ accepted in older narratives to shift debates. 
Furthermore, the articulation of what is described as ‘the law of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes’ illustrates how the argument, on the one hand, utilises a past 
narrative (on humanitarian interventions) while consciously changing that narrative 
(describing this as law). While the Responsibility to Protect and subsequent institutional 
documents embracing the Responsibility to Protect model affirmed the Charter, as well as 
human rights laws, to articulate the new narrative both the failed state discourse and the duty 
to prevent narrative shift away from the Charter significantly.47 This cannot be produced by 
a solely legal narrative; rather the legal narrative is bolstered by social, cultural, political, 
even economic narratives that reproduce the fear of the Muslim terrorist or of the rogue state 
developing weapons of mass destruction to ultimately justify preventive, forceful responses 
to future potential provocations.
In chapter five I discussed the way that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, articulated by 
the ICISS, maintains a focus on states while giving the appearance of addressing private/ 
domestic violence within a state. The failed state narrative furthers this insufficient 
understanding of addressing non-state actors on the international plane. The Responsibility
46 Feinstein and Slaughter, above note 19, at 149.
47 Evans, Sahnoun, et al, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, (International Development Research Centre, 2001).
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to Protect doctrine originates in concerns for non-state actors at risk from violations either 
tolerated or enacted by the state itself. In contrast, the failed state narrative targets non-state 
actors themselves, circumventing the complicity or responsibility of the state the non-state 
actors are operating from and consequently circumventing the potential of other areas of 
international law to challenge, prevent or combat terrorism. The turn to the use of force 
through narratives of failed states replicates the provocation defence in national legal 
structures that permits the legal subject’s subjective assessment of a situation define an event 
regardless of whether that assessment coheres with the agreed norms of the legal 
community.
Behind each of these ‘War on Terror’ justifications for the use of force there is a repetition 
of narratives demanding a response to low-level but persistent threats, such as that posed by 
transnational terrorist. However, the US government reports that 72 000 individuals were 
targeted by terrorists, globally, during 2007. Of this figure, 16 individuals were private US 
citizens all of whom were in conflict zones at the time of the recorded attack. The Report 
further records that approximately half of die individuals targeted by terrorist acts were of 
Muslim faith and nearly 1200 mosques were attacked during 2007.48 This data quite clearly 
illustrates the low level threat of terrorism, at least to Western states, despite its persistent 
nature.
As a common law defence to homicide, mitigating murder to manslaughter, the provocation 
excuse exists in England for defendants ‘who, without acting out of a considered desire for 
revenge: (1) killed only in response to gross provocation; and/ or (2) killed only in response 
to a fear of serious violence in circumstances’.49 The second aspect of the English common 
law provocation defence, excusing (or mitigating) the use of violence when an individual 
‘fears serious violence,’ informs the analogy I have drawn attention to in the thesis. The 
constitution of provocation as an excuse rather than a justification for homicide is relevant in 
terms of the analogy with international preemptive force. As an excuse, the provocation 
defence mitigates rather than absolves criminal responsibility. In this sense, the act remains
48 See: Office for the Co-ordination for Counterterrorism, National Counterterrrorism Centre: Annex 
of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30* 2008, available ^ online at: 
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103716.htm (last accessed May 2009).
49 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? 
(2005), 171- 176; also see: Law Commission Report No 290, Partial Defences to Murder, (2004), 30- 
72; Provocation in the UK has also been described as a partial excuse as it mitigates homicide to 
manslaughter rather than offering a full justification; see Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley 
(Jersey) [2005] UKPC 23, (15 June 2005).
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illegal but the perpetrator is treated with leniency due to the mitigating factor of the 
provocation. Under international law, arguments for the right to use preemptive force 
function in a similar manner, as the United States, at least since 2006, has not argued for a 
right of preemptive force as a widespread justification for the use of force available to all 
states akin to the right of states to use force in self-defence under Article 51. Instead, the US 
has argued for a right to use preemptive force in the special circumstances of a ‘War on 
Terror’ that is directed at the specific provocation/ threat of future terrorist attacks by Islamic 
terrorists against Western territories.50 This is articulated as a justification rather than an 
excuse, as the latter concept has not been an aspect of the international system. However, 
preemptive force, and it might be added humanitarian interventions, demonstrate a move 
away from justifications towards the less satisfactory category of excuses if viewed through 
a domestic analogy. The discursive consequences of this shift have not yet received 
thorough attention in international legal discourse.
Furthermore, the consequential social narrative that focuses on a fear of future 
provocative/violent behaviour to justify increased infringements of civil liberties by the state 
can be highlighted as analogous to internalised social discourse many women experience in 
response to male violence. Feminist writing that emerged in the weeks after the 11th 
September attacks in the United States, emphasised this connection between the 
internalisation of the fear of male violence by women and the internalisation of fears of the 
‘Other’ in the guise of the Muslim terrorist within Western communities. For example, 
Morgan records, on September 19th 2001, the necessity to
talk about the need to understand that we must expose the mystique of violence, 
separate it from how we conceive of excitement, eroticism, and “manhood”; the need 
to comprehend that violence differs in degree but is related in kind, that it thrives 
along a spectrum, as do its effects -  from the battered child and raped women who 
live in fear to a entire population living in fear.. .51
An important aspect of the analogy between the ‘War on Terror’ and provocation defences, 
then, lies in the strong social narratives of fear and the consequential curbing of liberties and 
agency. For women, provocation narratives are co-opted into women’s self blame for men’s 
violence. This results in the refusal by many women to walk at night, or to move in public 
spaces unaccompanied, through the fear of rape or attack from an unknown male assailant.
50 National Security Strategy of the United States, (March, 2006), above note 12, at 12.
51 Morgan, ‘Reactions: Whose Terrorism?’ in Hawthorne and Winter, September 11, 2001: Feminist 
Perspectives, (Spinifex, 2002), at 25; also see, MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other 
International Dialogues, (Harvard, 2006), chapter 25.
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This is despite intimate relationships forming the key global threat to women.52 In the West, 
after the instigation of the ‘War on Terror’ a similar fear was enacted culturally against the 
unpredictable Muslim terrorist. This narrative, similar to discourse on the threats to women’s 
safety, misallocates the source of the fear as external, the ‘Other’, the irrational Muslim 
terrorist denying the role Western imperialist strategies contribute to poverty and violence in 
foreign states and downplays the threat of terrorism to Muslim communities outside of the 
West.53 This discourse also collapses complex religious and nationalist identities with racial 
and ethnic identities. It should be noted that this is more than a social or cultural narrative as 
laws have been implemented to detain individuals who fit the profile of die Western 
conceived image of the terrorist, although these infringements of civil liberties potentially 
apply to all citizens. For some writers, this is a necessary sacrifice of liberal freedoms for the 
goal of greater security.54
The impact of the ‘War on Terror’ for Western citizens becomes the narrative warning of the 
threat of future violence rather than any actual violence. This justifies those of us in Western 
communities averting our attention from ‘Other’ violences and justifies governments in 
Western communities curtailing civil liberties. As New Yorker, Morgan wrote in the weeks 
after the September 11th attacks: ‘the world’s sympathy moves me deeply. Yet I hear echoes 
dying into the silence: the world averting its attention from Rwanda’s screams’.55 That the 
use of force impacts on those inflicting the force is not a new narrative; Weil writes of the 
recognition of this in the Iliad:
Force is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its 
victims; the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The truth is, nobody really 
possesses it. The human race is not divided up, in the Iliad, into conquered persons, 
slaves, suppliants, on the one hand, and conquerors and chiefs on the other. In this 
poem there is not a single man who does not at one time or another have to bow his 
neck to force.56
Weil’s analysis of the Iliad illustrates that which is hidden in the law on the use of force: not 
only does endless articulation of justifications and excuses ignore the consequent harm, 
violence, death and suffering that force inflicts but those using force are equally harmed
52 See Kelly, ‘Wars Against Women: Sexual Violence, Sexual Politics and the Militarised State,’ in 
Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank (eds), States o f Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance, (Zed, 
2000).
53Above note 51, at 24, stating ‘Need I say that there were not nationwide attacks on white Christian 
males after Timothy McVeigh was apprehended after the Oklahoma City bombing’.
54 Above note 15.
55 Above note 51, at 25
56 Weil, ‘The Iliad, or the Poem of Force’, in Weil, et al, War and the Iliad, (New York Review 
Books, 2005, first published 1945), at 11.
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because ‘at all times, the human spirit is shown as modified by its relations with force’.57 
Through the ‘War on Terror’, which traverses social and cultural discourses in an attempt to 
produce a coherent legal discourse, the two way impact of force continues to resound in 
Western communities. This reinforces gendered identities and a gendered division of labour 
that militaries function within. Women’s roles, in relation to military actors, are 
encapsulated by female stereotypes of women requiring protection, women as wives and 
mothers and women as providers of sexual and domestic services.
The domestic analogy between provocation defences and the Western cultural discourse on 
the ‘War on Terror’ further serves to demonstrate some key methodological aspects of the 
thesis. It is in this chapter that the domestic analogy between interpersonal justifications for 
violence and the usefulness of demoting law from a position of objectivity to the status of 
narrative become increasingly entwined. The sex and gender of laws, exposed by the 
domestic analogy, connects with the understanding of law’s function as a social and cultural 
narrative. The US discourse on the ‘War on Terror’, in an effort to build a legal narrative, 
utilises social and cultural narratives linking international and national legal structures. This 
chapter also demonstrates some of the limitations of the two methods embraced by the 
thesis, specifically the level of generality required by the law as narrative technique and the 
failure of either the alternative or the mainstream narrative to permit subversive accounts. 
Although the law as narrative technique has been a crucial aspect of the project it is a limited 
technique in that in admitting the subjectivity of law and legal discourse the fluidity of any 
text is exposed rather than disguised. Therefore, although an increasingly accepted legal 
narrative regarding preemptive force, implied authorization and a responsibility to prevent is 
apparent in mainstream international discourse, an exclusive focus on these narratives 
ignores the feminist and critical voices that have challenged the narrative of an international 
law defined by hegemonic states since, before and after 9/11. It is these alternative narratives 
that I now turn to.
57 Ibid., at 3; for an alternative reading of the Iliad in the context of contemporary conflicts, see 
Bobbit, The Shield o f Achilles: War, Peace and the Coarse o f History, (Allen Lane, 2002) describing 
war as ‘a creative act of civilised man’.
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2.2 Feminist Responses to the ‘War on Terror’
Scheherazade breaks the cycle of violence by choosing to embrace different terms 
of engagement. She fashions her universe not through physical force, as does the 
king, but through imagination and reflection.58
After the acts of September 11th 2001, and the instigation of the United States* ‘War on 
Terror*, feminist scholarship emerged (occasionally) in support,59 in opposition and in 
analysis of this Western narrative.60 In this section I concentrate on feminist legal responses 
to the ‘War on Terror’ and post-September 11th narratives. In examining feminist responses 
to the ‘War on Terror’ I indicate the wider possibilities -  and limitations -  of adapting 
feminist approaches to international law and to understand the international law on the use 
of force. My purpose is to reflect on how contemporary ‘War on Terror’ narratives have 
significantly disrupted any larger feminist study of the law on the use of force. I argue that 
international legal developments that acknowledged the relevance of feminist approaches 
and women’s participation during the 1990s, appears to have been either sidelined by the 
‘War on Terror’ narrative or developed around the production of restrictive categories of 
female victim-status.
I have three arguments that I wish to bring to the fore under a feminist narrative on the ‘War 
on Terror’. Firstly, alongside the limited narrative of terrorist actors as rogue male actors 
functioning outside the boundaries of the state are images of women’s sexual vulnerability 
and need for protection that miscasts the threat to women’s sexual autonomy as also outside 
the state. This has, recently, emerged in specific international legal acts, notably from the 
Security Council. I argue that the production of a restrictive female sexuality, vulnerable to 
attack from rogue male actors is a reiteration of sexed and gendered discourse prevalent in 
security discourse prior to the ‘War on Terror*. Consequently, initiatives, such as Security 
Council resolution 1820 on women, peace and security do little to challenge the underlying 
legal structure that is inimical to women’s security. Underlying this restraint is the feminist 
methodological limitation related to the construction of a feminist ethics. While feminist 
analysis of sex and gender is sophisticated and multifaceted, bringing this knowledge to law 
often collapses categories and may reinstate binaries feminist legal theorists have worked 
towards dismantling. Secondly, subversive feminist accounts in response to the ‘War on 
Terror’, alongside other critical and/or subversive approaches, become difficult to articulate
58 Nafizi, Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books, (Fourth Estate, 2003), at 19.
59 Elshtain, Just War Against Terror, (Basic Books, 2003).
60 Hawkesworth and Alexander, War on Terror: Feminist Perspectives, (University of Chicago Press,
2008); Hawthorne and Winter, September 11: Feminist Perspectives, (Spinifex, 2002).
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when the dominant Western narrative appears to function to reject international legal norms. 
Underlying this is the acknowledged limitation of approaching law as a narrative. Not only 
are there multiple alternative narratives, but law, as a discipline, effectively screens out 
radical alternative narratives precisely because of their status as narratives. The third 
argument contends that Western feminist approaches in the era of the ‘War on Terror* have 
been unable to significantly contribute to the debate because of the fundamental lack of 
debate within feminist approaches to international law to the question of when, if ever, force 
would/could be justified. This is consistent with the overall conclusion of the thesis that 
posits that feminist approaches enlarge our understanding of the law on the use of force and 
the consequences of this knowledge are relevant for the development of feminist legal 
theories and for international legal approaches generally. In this chapter I have extended this 
contention to recognise the possibilities of a feminist re-imagining of the base of 
international law through a politics of natality and, with respect to international law 
generally, highlighted the importance of seeing force as having effects on the communities 
where force is directed and where force is directed from.
Under the first argument, what is notable about institutional responses to women’s issues 
after September 11th, 2001, is the entrenched association of women with peace alongside 
elaboration of women as a category of protected (usually sexualised) subjects.61 The anti- 
terrorism narrative, which revolves around the dynamic of the rogue terrorist versus the just 
male warrior, also functions as a gendered discourse. To complete the narrative of the 
violent male actor represented in Western states as the Muslim terrorist, die emergence of 
increased images of the female mother/child/victim requiring protection is to be expected. 
Post-9/11 institutional developments use gendered representations of women’s sexual 
vulnerability and consistently suppress the agency of women, in a retrograde manner.62 
Placed alongside the gendered image of the Muslim terrorist, it is not surprising that the 
narrative of male violence expounded under the ‘War on Terror’ is contemporaneous to 
projects that centre on women’s sexual vulnerability rather than female empowerment or 
agency.63 Facilitating the increased sexualised representation of women under international 
law, is a general neglect of women’s participation and agency. In chapter three I argued that 
fundamental questions regarding the development of Article 51 become difficult to ask
61 Charlesworth, ‘Are Women Peaceful?’ Annual Lecture, (Centre LGS, 15* May 2008); Otto, 
‘Dissonance Between Survival and Consent’, Second Annual Shimizu Lecture in International Law, 
(London School of Economics, 7th March 2007); Otto, ‘Disconcerting ‘Masculinities” in Buss and 
Manji, International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005).
62 Otto, ibid.
63 Ibid
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because preemptive force shifts self-defence jurisprudence away from the Charter model. A 
further consequence of the discourse on the ‘War on Terror’ is the averting of attention from 
women’s rights and women’s participation at the international level.
The Secretary-General reported in September 2008 that two percent of UN military 
personnel were women.64 At one level this demonstrates the inadequacy of Security Council 
initiatives, such as resolution 1325 constructed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter as a soft, 
or non-binding, resolution, and is therefore without compulsory norms for the active 
participation of women. As a consequence there is little incentive for states to make changes 
to the profile of military communities. Feminist approaches to international law, however, 
demand a more sophisticated analysis than this. The reliance by the UN on statistical 
articulation of gender parity indicates a fundamental failure to see feminist awareness 
requiring more than adding women to existing security strategies. Furthermore, the 
dependence on militaries as the key strategy to challenge insecurity indicates a larger failure 
to see the structure of militaries as complicit in the production of women’s insecurity.
The consolidation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security65 in 
Resolution 1820 in 2008 refines the approach of the Security Council from one focussed on 
addressing a wide range of issues to a strategy centred on sexual violence in conflict zones.66 
The narrowing of the Security Council focus links women’s peace and security with sexual 
vulnerability. Resolution 1820 also transfigures the possibility of future force to challenge 
sexual violence.67 The reduction of the Security Council attention to a linkage of women’s 
sexual vulnerability with potential military actions miscasts the causal element between 
military action and sexual violence presenting the possibility that militaiy action might halt 
rather than function as a cause of sexual violence, exploitation and abuse.
The alternative image of women, present in international security literature and institutional 
acts, assumes the success of feminist and women’s movements proscribing women’s formal 
equality as a marker of democracy. In this sense the juxtaposed images of the Western 
woman, the free citizen/ actor in a liberal democratic state, beside the non-Western woman,
64 Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security, 25* September 2008,
S/2008/622 para. 51.
65 SC Res 1325,31st October 2000.
66 SC Res 1820,18th June 2008.
67 Ibid., see operative paragraph 1.
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vulnerable to sexual violence, exploitation and abuse that is prevalent in conflict zones, 
ignores the agency of the latter and the sexed and gendered notion of freedom available to 
the former. In this sense current institutional moves, such as Security Council resolution 
1820, parallel the ‘War on Terror’ articulation of the non-Western rogue male actor with the 
vulnerable non-Westem female victim. The only acceptable Western feminist narrative, in 
this context, is the narrative of Western women ‘saving’ non-Westem women through the 
institutions of international law.
Secondly, alternative feminist responses to the legal narratives embedded in the ‘War on 
Terror’ narrative become increasingly difficult to articulate in a cultural environment that 
rests on the refrain, ‘you are either with us or against us’.68 The occasional legal 
engagements from feminist legal theorists appear to head in two directions as a consequence: 
either consisting of a re-iteration of a legal status quo or the production of non-legal 
materials to make critical sense of the legal narrative on terrorism. For example, Gardam 
provides a response that applies a formal legal reading to diminish the viability of the 
rhetoric that emerged from the US, and its allies, after the September 11* attacks.69 In 
contrast, Charlesworth and Chinkin use social and cultural knowledge to challenge the 
narrative of the ‘War on Terror’, as do Buchanan and Johnson who offer a subversive non- 
legal account that engages narrativity, law, film theory and gender theory to engage the 
West(em) preoccupation with violence and law’s foundation.70 Buss also uses a narrative 
approach to engage the multiple narratives that emerge in international legal scholarship 
otherwise limited to a dichotomy between US unilateralism and the cosmopolitan ethic of 
the international legal order.71 Similar then to George W. Bush’s decree, ‘you’re either with 
us or you are with the terrorists’, international jurisprudence produces a split of, you are 
either with the formalists, reinforcing the ‘good’ and ‘moral’ basis of the existing 
international order, or you are with ‘them*, a term encompassing US defenders of the ‘War 
on Terror’ at the expense of international law. For feminist and critical theorists in Western 
liberal democracies, this creates a dilemma in that die mainstream is posited as the only 
alternative to a pro-Bush/ ‘War on Terror’ stance. The consequence is a reduction of debates 
and answers to the legal questions produced in the era of the ‘War on Terror,’ as a
68 Bush, Address to the Joint Session o f Congress and the American People, (20th September 2001), 
available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last accessed 
May 2009); also see discussion in Butler, Precarious Life, (Verso, 2006), at 2.
69 Gardam, above note 26.
70 Buchanan and Johnson, ‘The ‘Unforgiven’ Sources of International Law’ in Buss and Manji, 
International Law: Modem Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005); Charlesworth and Chinkin, ‘Sex, 
Gender and September 11*’, 96(3), AML, (2002).
71 Buss, ‘Keeping Its Promise: Use of Force and the New Man of International Law’, in Bartholomew, 
Empire’s Law, (Pluto, 2006).
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dichotomy between texts re-imaging international law (constructed by those developing the 
‘War on Terror* narrative) and texts asserting the relevance of the status quo of international 
law are represented as the only ‘other’ space for discourse.72 The assertion of a mainstream 
(or formalist) return to the key values of die Charter, or international law, leaves little space 
for feminist approaches to international law that are premised on the possibility of re- 
imagining international law’s core.
For Orford, drawing on the work of Charlesworth, the fake crisis of a dilemma posed 
between the ‘War on Terror’ and the perceived canons of international law acts as a 
‘founding’ moment that ultimately reasserts the legitimacy and potential of international 
law.73 Described in this way, the ‘War on Terror’ is demonstrated as a crucial initiatory 
moment or foundational discourse, a re-affirming of the discipline of international law. We 
should not be surprised, in this sense, to find feminists, women, critical theorists, writers 
from tbe global south, postcolonial theorists and third world approaches excluded from the 
dialogue.74 The Western discourse that responds to the 9/11 attacks, and mobilises a forceful 
solution, becomes, then, not THE founding moment but one founding moment amongst 
many in a discipline that asserts its legitimacy and authority through crisis.75 In a text written 
prior to the ‘War on Terror,’ but with increased relevance since, Rajagopal writes,
This is nothing but a retelling of that old problem in international law: how to 
establish order in a world of sovereign states. But at a deeper level, this is a problem 
faced by law in general: on the one hand, law needs to constitute itself as the ‘other’ 
of violence to be legitimate, on the other hand, the law needs to use violence 
instrumentally to preserve power. The contradictions created by this paradox become 
part of the constant crisis of international law.76
For feminist theory this reading, on the need for crisis and the role of the crisis moment as a 
foundational narrative, illustrates a methodological abyss in feminist approaches to 
international law. That is, as a theory that posits an alternative vision, indeed the possibility 
of a re-structured international legal order responsive to feminist knowledge, feminist theory 
has been able to partake in the unearthing and exposure of the discursive violence associated 
with foundational narratives in law. What feminist legal theories have failed to do is indicate 
whether a re-imagined feminist international order must also assert a foundational narrative
72 [Various Authors], ‘Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict’, 97, AJ1L (2003), 553-642.
73 Orford, ‘The Destiny of International Law’, 17, Leiden Journal o f International Law, (2003) 441.
74 For a TWAIL analysis of the ‘War on Terror’, see: 43, Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2005).
75 Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’, 65 (3), Modem Law Review (2002), 377.
76 Rajagopal, ‘International Law and the Development Encounter’, ASIL Proceedings, (1999) 16, at 
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and whether that narrative is implicitly violent.77 Law and violence jurisprudence, for 
example the work of Cover, argues that founding law is to enact violence. If feminist politics 
is a quest for a new founding moment, can the violence be in the act of severance from past 
narratives or must feminist theory take the further step and use force? To articulate the range 
of feminist positions on when, if ever, force may be justified, I have argued, the relationship 
between law, violence and gender requires increased engagement.
Specific feminist responses to the ‘War on Terror’ circle these questions. For example, 
Mackinnon suggested, as early as 1992, that an international feminist approaches would 
justify the use of force in the Former Yugoslavia to halt the horrendous sexual violence and 
rapes.78 After the September 11 attacks, Mackinnon finds,
It is the ‘war on terror’ that is the metaphor -  legally a mixed one at that -  although its 
pursuit has been anything but, and violence against women that qualifies as a casus 
belli and a form of terrorism every bit as much as the events of September 11th do.79
MacKinnon’s work comes close to suggesting a feminist response to violence against 
women may be the controlled violence of legal coercion. At this point, the ‘War on Terror’ 
highlights a crucial methodological limitation that is yet to be theorised or discursively 
engaged with by feminist approaches to international law. That is, if alternative narratives, 
or alternative institutional structures, are an implicit aspect of the feminist legal project then 
the relationship between law and violence needs to be embraced or rejected or, at the very 
least, cease to be avoided in feminist scholarship. If we sever the assumptions of a feminism 
ground on peace work, feminism must confront her own violence as an aspect of the human 
proclivity for violence.80 This, by definition, also interrogates the association of masculinity 
with war and the warrior. In terms of this study on the law on the use of force, this approach 
would take us full circle and the original question would be how, or when, would feminist 
legal theories justify the use of force, if ever. Even if feminist legal theory rarely condones 
or justifies the use of force between states, unanswered questions remain about the larger 
complicity of law in gendered violence. Feminist legal theories must acknowledge that a re- 
imagined international legal structure needs to address the relationship between law and 
violence to understand the further association of law, violence and gender. Although the 
thesis is unable to answer this question, the placing of the question at the forefront of future 
feminist approaches to international law is a conclusion of the thesis.
77 See, however, Orford, Reading Humanitarian Interventions, (Cambridge, 2003), chapter six.
78 MacKinnon, above note 3, at 260; see also, MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Genocide’, in 
Stiglmayer, Mass Rape, (University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
79 MacKinnon, above note 3, at 266.
80 Above note 61.
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I have indicated Arendt’s political model of natality as a potential feminist framework to 
build new narratives on force. However, as a non-legal narrative the radical potential of 
Arendt’s insightful work is difficult to shape into a legal narrative that can be accommodated 
in the contemporaiy international legal structure. This then demonstrates the limitation of the 
law as narrative technique that is at once ‘inside’ (as it engages with the existing mainstream 
of international law) and ‘outside’ (as it posits solutions that engage discourses and 
narratives outside of law’s disciplinary boundaries).
Feminist approaches to international law must, therefore, engage directly, firstly, with the 
question of why muster a critique and challenge to the international legal edifice only to find 
a deep rooted structural bias that potentially negates any future project. And secondly, 
feminist approaches must respond to the claim that perhaps it is law itself that is the ‘gentle 
civiliser’. The use of the law as narrative technique throughout the thesis has been, in part, a 
choice made to illustrate the view that current international legal arrangements need not be 
the only international legal arrangement. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Otto, I have 
argued that feminist approaches must function as projects ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the 
mainstream of international law to provide long term, productive engagement and 
solutions.81 In response to the second claim, on the potential of law to restrain war and 
armed conflict, I have argued throughout the thesis that this claim can only be made by 
blinding ourselves to the realities of armed conflict for women living in conflict regions and 
the impact of force on those of us living in communities justifying the use of force on the 
territory of another state. Furthermore, law that seeks to restrain armed conflict through 
controlled force, I have argued, rests on a fundamental error about the possibility of military 
violence to be controlled, rational or useful for the creation of women’s security.
3. BEYOND THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’
Throughout the thesis I have endeavoured to show that, beyond the ‘War on Terror’, the 
Charter based norms on the law on the use of force, as well as the customary international 
law perceptions of justified force, require sustained feminist engagement. This chapter has 
examined the arguments that construct justifications for the use of force under the US-led 
‘War on Terror’, as well as feminist discourse in response to the ‘War on Terror’. This final
81 Otto, ‘A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325’, 13, Michigan Journal o f Gender and Law, (2006), 113.
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part enlarges the argument that feminist legal theories must look at laws beyond the ‘War on 
Terror’ discourse to re-examine the law on the use of force generally.
The first two claims discussed here, the demand for an increase in women’s participation in 
security mechanisms and the need for an elaboration and development of the prohibition on 
the use of force, are directed at feminist strategies that function ‘within’ the mainstream of 
international law. Both of these recommendations, however, must be read within the context 
of the arguments for a politics of natality discussed above. In this sense I acknowledge that 
any reform strategies are of limited value in a system that is structurally sexed and gendered. 
By drawing conclusions that pertain to the development of laws as they currently exist 
alongside conclusions that challenge the edifice of international law generally I utilise 
Lacey’s critique/utopia/reform model and Otto’s recognition of the inside/ outside status of 
feminist legal theories.82
The thesis as a whole makes an argument for the increased participation of women in 
international security mechanisms. This has not been articulated as a quota-type strategy. 
While the empirical, or substantive, aspect of the participation claim lies in the recognition 
of the relative absence of women in international and national decision making structures, 
my own strategy for addressing this absence has been the incorporation of women’s 
narratives from outside of the mainstream of international law to explain, analyse and 
challenge the international law on the use of force. The methodological aspect of 
participation claims is to replace demands for gender equality, in terms of women’s 
representation, with a more sophisticated approach to women’s participation in international 
and state structures. This would involve seeking out women’s understanding of their own 
and society’s needs, as well as understanding the role of women on the ‘peripheries’ in 
challenging social, cultural and legal norms.83 To seek women’s full participation in legal 
processes is, therefore, to embark on a (slow) reworking of legal structures and normative 
categories.
Therefore, pursuit of women’s participation shifts beyond quotas towards recognition of the 
failure of current legal arrangements to be inclusive of women at the foundation. Underlying
82 Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women’, in Knop (ed), Gender and Human 
Rights, (Oxford, 2004); Otto, ibid.
83 Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics o f Postcolonialism, (Routlegde, 2005), chapter 4.
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this conclusion then, is recognition that the ‘foundations’ of international law are neither 
settled or permanent but gendered and socially constructed. Furthermore, my claim is, not 
that women’s experiences and knowledge are innately different to men’s, but rather that 
women’s experiences and knowledge are informed, globally, by social and cultural norms 
that result in women having different priorities and needs from those of men. Reflecting the 
cultural diversity of women’s experiences and knowledge, as well as the socially constructed 
spheres of reference understood as female, demands a re-working of fundamental legal 
categories and processes built on women’s participation that goes well beyond proportionate 
representation. I have reflected on the possibilities and limitations of the feminist utopia of 
active inclusion of women in the making of the world throughout the thesis. This is a 
foundational claim, not merely instrumental, so, for example in chapter four on self- 
determination, the foundations of a right to self-determination under international law were 
challenged through attention to women’s narratives drawn from communities seeking self- 
determination.
Beyond the move to incorporate a conceptual shift in understanding how and when women 
could and should participate in international decision-making, my second claim is that the 
preoccupation of states and scholars with the articulation of justifications, rather than the 
prohibition on the use of force, is instrumental to the perpetuation of the use of force by 
states. The placement of Article 2(4) as the epitome of state agreement on the nature of 
prohibited force reflects the legal positivist origins of the international legal structure. As 
the reflection of a specific theoretical perspective on law, the prohibition provides a marker 
of the legitimacy of the international legal structure. The knowledge produced in the thesis 
argues that, rather than perceiving Article 2(4) as the pinnacle of human creativity in the 
outlawing of violence, time would be well spent on elaboration and development of what it 
means to have a prohibition on the use of force, its limits, its regulation and its co-option 
into a gendered understanding of law and violence. This coheres with a politics of natality 
that acknowledges the capacity for new ideas (birth) as the essential characteristic of the 
human condition.
Other attempts to expand the contours of the Article 2(4) prohibition, such as die Definition 
of Aggression and the Declaration of Friendly Relations are marked as historical attempts 
that add little in the contemporary setting and, at the time of their articulation, were 
circumscribed by political realities. The current attempts by the ICC Special Working Group 
on the Crime of Aggression are not inclusive enough to offer a genuine or workable
232
elaboration of the prohibition. Although contemporary institutional reports, such as the More 
Secure World Report and In Larger Freedom, have addressed the laws on the use of force, 
this has been to enlarge and develop justifications rather than to strengthen the prohibition. 
In contrast, the Non-Aggression and Mutual Security Protocol annexed to the Great Lakes 
Peace and Security Pact,84 while not without fault, utilises three separate articles to articulate 
what it means to prohibit the use of force on the African continent post-millennium. In the 
Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual defence states agree to the following:
1. The Member States undertake to maintain peace and security in accordance with 
the Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region, 
and in particular:
a) To renounce the threat or the use of force as policies means or instrument aimed 
at settling disagreements or disputes or to achieve national objectives in the Great 
Lakes Region;
b) To abstain from sending or supporting armed opposition forces or armed groups 
or insurgents onto the territory of other Member States, or from tolerating the 
presence on their territories of armed groups or insurgents engaged in armed 
conflicts or involved in acts of violence or subversion against the Government of 
another State;
c) To cooperate at all levels with a view to disarming and dismantling existing 
armed rebel groups and to promote the joint and participatory management of 
state and human security on their common borders.
d) If any Member State fails to comply with the provisions of this Article, an 
extraordinary Summit shall be convened to consider appropriate action.85
While the Pact does face implementation difficulties, it stems from the co-operation and 
consultation of heads of states, governments and communities in the region and is 
supplemented by a further Protocol extending meanings and expectations for states. As a 
regional document, the Great Lakes Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence may 
be inappropriate for direct transplantation into the international collective security structure 
and it does not explicitly address women’s security but it does illustrate the potential and 
capabilities of states choosing to work to eradicate rather than justify conflict.
84 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, (December 2006), Protocol 
on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region.
85 Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region, Chapter II, Article 5.
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My recommendation, to develop the legal finesse of Article 2(4), is in contrast to the 
increasing emphasis placed on justifications and is voiced in the context of further 
recommendations regarding women’s participation and agency. To develop the legal finesse 
of Article 2(4) would require recognition of the inadequacy of the prohibition because it has 
been consistently read as accommodating justifications for violence that utilise Western 
patriarchal justifications to underpin their normativity. Development of the prohibition 
would therefore require strategies that seek to disassociate constructions of the nation state 
under international law from understandings of the Western sexed legal subject. 
Consequently, what begins as a strategy ‘within’ the contemporary contours of international 
law also requires a larger feminist project of re-imagining the basic premises that shape 
international normativity. Underlying this claim is an expectation that a renewed focus on 
the prohibition encourages peacebuilding initiatives and preventative strategies.
Moreover, a review of the most recent report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression demonstrates the limitations of contemporary institutional endeavours with 
respect to women’s participation.86 The low representation of women in the drafting and the 
forthcoming negotiating stages is fundamentally circumscribed through the absence of 
recognition of the impact gender on security and of the relationship between law, gender and 
violence. Moreover, the definition of aggression recommended by the Special Group uses 
the words ‘the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state’.87 This proposed definition focuses on interstate 
violence that is retrograde in terms of contemporary understandings of violence and 
aggression and, fails to recognise critical and institutional knowledge of the limitations of 
security mechanisms that neglect to respond to the relationship between women’s insecurity 
and state insecurity.88
In addition to these specific recommendations, the thesis makes the following general 
observations and conclusions. Primarily, justified violence within legal discourse has been 
constructed through gendered understandings of legal subjectivity. Underlying this 
knowledge is embedded assumptions, at least in Western legal liberalism, regarding the 
nature and capabilities of the (sexed) legal subject. Consequently, feminist legal theories that
86 Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Report o f the Sixth Session, 20* February, 
2009, ICC-ASP/7/S WGCA/2; for an example of the text of proposals, see further chapter two.
87 Ibid., see Annex 1 of the Report
88 For example, Secretary-General In-depth Study o f All Forms o f Violence against Women, 9* 
October, 2006, A/61/122/Add.l
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challenge the sexed and gendered representations of justified violence within national legal 
structures provide a useful starting place for a domestic analogy. This is an analogy in terms 
of the regulation of violence and helps expose how persistent dilemmas will remain 
unresolved without attention to the gender of justified violence under law. This conclusion is 
of relevance to feminist approaches to international law and to mainstream scholars. 
Furthermore, mainstream international legal actors can learn from feminist debates on 
essentialism, especially techniques I have used throughout the thesis, such as, engaging 
peripheral subjects,89 embracing the potential for multicultural conversations/ world 
travelling,90 and law as narrative.91 This knowledge addresses the limitations of Western 
discourse (including within this project) and the necessity of perceiving law as a narrative 
with multiple interpretations and meanings. This allows for attention to the necessary 
generality of any narrative and the attendant problems of traversing the particular and the 
universal in legal accounts. My approach to these limitations has been to reiterate the need 
for the Western subject/ author/ perspective to be analysed in terms of her own subjectivity. 
Throughout the thesis, I have begun a feminist dialogue on how, as Westerners, our culture 
impacts on constructions of the international law on the use of force and how sex/gender 
play a central role in Western cultural and legal accounts.
Feminist strategies for change also acknowledge the unpredictability and thus the limitations 
of solely legal reform. In this sense the search for articulations of political theories that re- 
imagine the relationship between the state and its subjects or, under international law, the 
state as the legal subject are necessary. I have suggested Arendt’s natality model as one 
potential site for this type of work. Other post-liberal articulations of legal subjectivity, such 
as contemporary work on the vulnerable subject, might also offer relevant contours to re- 
imagining international legal subjectivity.92 However, these remain extensions and 
refinements of the project discussed across this thesis, so with respect to the law on the use 
of force the claim is that a return to the prohibition, rather than increased articulations of 
justifications, would signal a return to the reduction and limiting of force that coalesces with 
feminist expectations of international security.
89 Kapur, above note 83.
90 Bradiotti, above note 11; Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perceptions, World-travelling and Multicultural 
Feminism’, 23, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, (1991) 189.
91 See Davies, Feminism and the Flat Law Theory’ Conference Paper at the Centre LGS Conference, 
Up Against the Nation States o f Feminist Legal Theory, (June/ July 2006) available online at:
http://www.kent.ac.uk/clgs/documents/nsfltPlenarv MDavies Flat%20Law 5iulv06.doc 
(last accessed May 2009).
92 For example, Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, 20, 
Yale Journal o f Law and Feminism, (2008) 8.
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To conclude, the thesis provides a feminist analysis of the international laws on the use of 
force across six chapters. Chapter one provided an introduction to feminist approaches to 
international law and how they were developed as a methodology in the thesis, as well as an 
introduction to the international law on the use of force. In chapter two I considered the 
power of the Security Council to authorise the use of force under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter. An important aspect of the chapter was the role recent institutional reports 
play in re-iterating a form of security played out in the Council’s history, rather than the 
articulation of a new understanding of the role of the Security Council in the new 
millennium. Through analysis of the Security Council’s use of Article 39 and 41, as well as 
consideration of the impact of the use of authorised force under Article 42 on the sexual 
agency of women, I argued that the move to enlarge the concept of security in documents, 
such as, In Larger Freedom and the More Secure World Report, in reality encapsulates a 
gendered vision of security expounded throughout the history of the United Nations. 
Furthermore, the expanded rationale for Security Council action -  especially with respect to 
humanitarian motives -  functions to enlarge unilateral state justifications for the use of force 
through the implicit suggestion that force is a rational and useful response to complex 
emergencies and situations. The thesis argues that a feminist analysis of the international 
security regime would seek to limit militaiy activity under the collective security banner 
because of the detrimental impact of authorised force on women’s long term security.
In chapter three I focused on the role of Article 51. I argued that the regulation of the 
international self-defence justification is analogous with the regulation of the inter-personal 
self-defence justification, especially as it has been articulated in common law states. The 
troubling use of the analogy to explain the existence of the international right of states to use 
force in self-defence was contrasted with philosophical explanations for the existence of 
legal conceptions of self-defence. Philosophical engagement tended to focus on the 
limitations on the right as the key to explaining the very existence of a right to self-defence. 
Consequently, the site where domestic feminisms have interrogated interpersonal self- 
defence, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, was discussed as transposing a 
sexed subject that contributed to the gendered consequences of self-defence. I also 
considered the role of the preemptive self-defence justification as shifting attention away 
from the formulation of Article 51, yet contributing to the assertion of Article 51 as an 
unsexed and unproblematic aspect of international law.
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Chapter four presented a study of self-determination as a justification for the use of force. 
This chapter considered three key post-millennium narratives on self-determination, and 
their relationship with the use of justified force, through the discourse of feminist activists 
and feminist academics associated with self-determining communities. Each case study built 
on my contention that self-determination must be explored at three levels -  as individual, 
internal and external self-determination. By incorporating women’s narratives on self- 
determination the role of force to secure international identity for a community is 
problematised as a process that fails to develop or guarantee individual and/ or internal self- 
determination. In this sense, the chapter demonstrates how feminist legal theories provide 
useful understandings of conceptualisations of agency that have analogous relevance to 
conceptions of agency for non-state entities.
Chapter five considered humanitarian intervention as a form of justified force. I developed 
an analogy between the regulation of domestic partner violence and the regulation of 
domestic state violence across the twentieth centuiy. Both sites of regulation culminated in a 
shift toward intervention narratives at the close of the twentieth century. Through the 
engagement with feminist critiques on the perpetuation of victim status, constructed through 
mandatoiy intervention narratives into domestic violence, I argued that international 
humanitarian intervention narratives risk a similar construction of protected/protector or 
victims/actors in international law. This helps to demonstrate the futility of the use of force 
justified through humanitarian goals. Furthermore, I suggested feminist strategies to 
challenge domestic partner violence have conceptual relevance to international approaches 
to domestic state violence.
Finally, this chapter has considered the ‘War on Terror* as a narrative akin to Western 
cultural narratives on provocation that have been used to curtail women’s movement in 
public space. The analysis of provocation narratives fuses the domestic analogy thesis and 
the law as narrative technique to highlight the continued sex and gender of post-9/11 
developments in the laws on the use of force. I have also used this discussion to indicate the 
limitations of the feminist tools used across the thesis. Of particular concern, with regard to 
the use of a narrative approach to explain law, is the consequential level of generality and 
die invocation of stereotypes to expose the weaknesses of legal narratives. This may play a 
role in disguising discrepancies in narratives and the capacity for subversive narratives to be 
articulated alongside, and sometimes within, dominant narratives. A further limitation of the 
law as narrative approach is the risk of contributing to stereotypes of masculinity and
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femininity rather than challenging essentialism. I have sought to disrupt this consequence of 
gender narratives, but I acknowledge that the veiy articulation of the words, gender, sex, 
woman, man, women, men, female, male, femininity and masculinity plays a role in 
enshrining sexed difference in discourse. However, this is also a representation of the 
gendered reality that we live within and that laws must be enacted amongst I have also 
considered the next step for feminist approaches to international law with respect to the 
international law on the use of force, recognising the necessity of further dialogue on what it 
means to re-imagine international laws and law’s foundation.
With respect to the domestic analogy a key limitation of the approach is that the whole diesis 
becomes tied to Western constructions of law, ignoring analogies between international legal 
forms and non-Westem legal structures, as well as those outside of the common law model. 
This has implications for feminist approaches to international law and for international legal 
discourse. For feminist legal theories, Murphy’s question about the methodological choices 
feminist theoiy makes and the prolonged association of feminist approaches to international 
law with the tools of feminist legal theories more generally are indicated as requiring greater 
attention.93 While it may be that feminist approaches to international law will need to 
develop their own range of tools to engage a sustained discussion with international law 
there are some problems with this approach because international law itself is so heavily co­
opted into a projection of Western legal methods and regulatoiy practices on to conceptions 
of the international. For mainstream scholars, the questions Murphy asks of feminist legal 
scholars working within the discipline of international law, about choices in the construction 
of methodologies, need to be spotlighted on the construction of the international legal 
subject, so that the personification of the state as the international legal subject, and the 
composite sexing of that subject, gains increased interrogation and critical engagement. The 
purpose of the domestic analogy in this project has not been to endorse the analogy but to 
open the topic for critical engagement and to argue that feminist legal theories offer useful 
tools for developing hypotheses. It may be that answers, however, extend beyond the remit 
of feminist legal theories as other vectors of difference beyond sex and gender (certainly 
race, culture, ethnicity and sexuality) are developed as necessary narratives within 
international jurisprudence.
93 Murphy, ‘Feminism Here and Feminism There’, in Buss and Manji, International Law: Modem 
Feminist Approaches, (Hart, 2005).
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This thesis has enlarged upon the idea that the law on the use of force is constructed within 
the larger international legal project that is sexed and gendered. The thesis begins a dialogue, 
a conversation, a narrative and a jurisprudence that co-opts the international law on the use 
of force into the construction of sex and gender. The thesis also begins a dialogue, a 
conversation, a narrative and a jurisprudence that co-opts Western constructions of sex and 
gender into the international law on the use of force. Unravelling answers to the questions 
raised by such a thesis, it is argued, will involve looking behind the ‘War on Terror’, 
preemptive force, implied authorisation, humanitarian intervention or even self- 
determination, to the law on the use of force under the Charter provisions and the 
perpetuation of justifications for the use of force under customary international law. 
Unravelling, of course, threatens our sense of stability gained by these ‘signs’ of the 
international legal structure. Unravelling also suggests we might re-construct the 
international to better entwine the narratives of humanity, rather than that of man.
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